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Introduction
William T. Alpert
University of Connecticut
and
The William H. Donner Foundation
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute

Some of the most important personal consumption items that indi
viduals receive are closely tied to work and are provided or financed by
employers, either voluntarily or by government mandate. In the United
States and Canada, as in most industrialized countries, these benefits
include retirement income, health care, income during times of unem
ployment (in the form of unemployment insurance), income and medi
cal care in the event of workplace injury (workers' compensation), and
life insurance. Employers' expenditures on these employee benefits
have grown dramatically in the last 50 years and now are on the order
of one-third of total labor costs in most industrialized countries (Hart et
al. 1988).
This volume brings together 14 original research chapters on vari
ous aspects of the employee benefits systems of Canada and the United
States. Preliminary versions of some of the papers in the volume were
presented at a conference held in the mid 1990s sponsored and sup
ported by the William H. Donner Foundation and the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. In planning the volume, our inten
tion has been to use a Canadian-U.S. comparison to highlight the basic
economic features of employee benefits and the policy issues that are
connected with them.
There are substantial differences between the employee benefit
systems of Canada and the United States; the most striking are in the
two countries' health care systems. In Canada, health care is provided
through a system of provincial and territorial plans funded by the fed
eral government out of general revenues, whereas in the United States
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health care is provided through a mixed private/public system financed
largely by employer contributions and payroll taxes. Because the
Canadian provincial and territorial plans are funded out of general rev
enues, they are not perceived as an employer cost, as they are in the
United States.
The differences between Canada and the United States in other
social insurance programs are less stark, although the differences are
nonetheless substantial. For example, government involvement in the
provision of retirement income takes the form of three major programs
in Canada, as opposed to just one in the United States. Public pensions
are more generous and private pension plans are correspondingly less
important in Canada than in the United States (see the chapters by
Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando (p. 381) and by Dorsey (p. 413) in this
volume).
The existence and magnitude of employee benefits pose numerous
economic questions that are important to public policy. In organizing
the volume, we have grouped these questions under four headings:
labor supply and worker availability, labor demand, labor-market
adjustment and equity, and pensions. We place issues such as whether
the availability of benefits (or lack thereof) create incentives or disin
centives to work under the heading of labor supply, treated in Part I.
(To some extent, these issues are also treated in chapters on labor-mar
ket adjustment. For example, the chapters by Olson (p. 295) and by
Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor (p. 325) address the labor-supply
implications of the U.S. health care system, which essentially requires
an individual to work in order to be covered by health insurance.)
Issues stemming from the status of employee benefits as a cost of labor
(do employee benefits create incentives that alter the level or mix of
employment?) are labor-demand issues, treated in Part II. The poten
tial for employee benefits to affect worker turnover, tenure, and wages
are adjustment issues, treated in Part III. Finally, Part IV centers on
issues related to retirement income programs, both public and private.
Differences between Canada and the United States in employee
benefits and labor costs offer a natural laboratory in which to examine
the impacts of differing policies on labor market outcomes in the two
countries. In both the United States and Canada, however, there is a
dearth of research that is both rigorous and policy-relevant on the link
ages between labor markets and the provision of these benefits by
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employers or the government. We hope that the research presented in
this volume helps fill the gap.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

In his overview chapter ("Does the Composition of Pay Matter?"),
Sherwin Rosen addresses an essential question and places the issues
posed by employee benefits in their proper economic context. Rosen
views employment-related benefits as consumption decisions that have
been centralized so as to become collective or group decisions, dele
gated partly to firms and partly to governments. He offers three eco
nomic reasons for the centralization of certain consumption decisions.
First, there may be economies of scale in the provision of some goods;
that is, joint provision of a common good may reduce transaction and
other costs that would be incurred if decisions were made individually.
Rosen notes that such economies take on special importance as a
motive for employer-provided benefits when certain benefits escape
taxation. Second, some goods may be viewed as inputs that enhance
productivity—hence, firms paternalistically provide some goods to
improve their workers' welfare and productivity. Similarly, enduring
employment relationships and employment security may be viewed
and analyzed in light of their effects on workers' productivity. Third,
an insurance rationale—or an intertemporal consistency problem, as
Rosen calls it—motivates many employee benefit programs. Rosen
emphasizes the moral hazard that social provision of health, retire
ment, and other benefits may produce and discusses the principle that
public provision of such benefits may merely offset or substitute for
their private provision. Rosen applies these three analytical insights in
discussions of military compensation and of compensation in the
former Soviet Union. Overall, Rosen's sweeping and comprehensive
essay offers a framework for future economic research on employee
benefits.
Part I of the volume comprises three chapters that treat the rela
tionship between employee benefits and the supply of labor.
In Chapter 1 ("Child Care and the Supply of Labor in Canada and
the United States"), Charles Michalopoulos and Philip Robins address
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differences between Canada and the United States in child-care
arrangements and the working patterns of women. The growth of the
labor-force participation rate of married women has been accompanied
by the growing use of day-care centers and caregivers who are not fam
ily relatives and the declining use of parental care and family relatives.
Significant controversy has surrounded the extent to which the childcare choices and labor-force decisions of women are affected by gov
ernment policies that subsidize child care. Michalopoulos and Robins
analyze pooled Canadian and U.S. data with the goal of obtaining
improved estimates of the effect of subsidies on child-care choices and
labor supply of mothers. They describe the broad similarities and spe
cific differences between the two countries' child-care policies (both
countries provide general and targeted child-care subsidies through
their personal income tax systems) and present data describing the
methods of child care in each country. They then estimate the impact
of child-care prices and subsidies on both the primary form of child
care used by families and the labor-force behavior of mothers. The
authors' empirical results suggest that the form of child care chosen
and employment of the mother are influenced mainly by the husband's
earnings, ethnicity, and location. There is little evidence that child-care
prices and subsidies influence the form of child care in the two coun
tries. Neither do child-care prices and subsidies appear to be major
determinants of whether mothers work full time, part time, or not at all.
In Chapter 2 ("An Economic Model of Employee Benefits and
Labor Supply: An Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System"),
Paul Fronstin turns to an essential question that has rarely been
addressed in empirical research: Does the mix of compensation influ
ence labor supply and, if so, how? He addresses this question by esti
mating a system of demand equations for leisure and employee
benefits using data from the 1993 Current Population Survey. His esti
mation proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, he estimates a bivariate probit model of labor supply (the probability of working) and
employee benefits (the probability of participating in a salary-reduc
tion pension plan). In the second stage, he estimates selectivity-cor
rected share equations for leisure and pension contributions. The
central (and novel) result in Fronstin's chapter is his estimate of the
cross-price elasticity between leisure and pension contributions, which
he finds is essentially zero; that is, pensions, unlike wages, have mini-
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mal effect on the supply of labor. Fronstin's other results of estimation
are in keeping with existing empirical findings; for example, he finds
that pensions and wages are highly substitutable. Although limited by
the unavailability of data on other aspects of compensation, Fronstin's
innovative study points the way to further exploration of the relation
ship between labor supply and employee benefits when improved data
do become available.
As the labor-force participation of women has grown, so has the
importance of family and medical leave benefits. In Chapter 3 ("The
Economics of Family and Medical Leave in Canada and the United
States"), Eileen Trzcinski and William T. Alpert provide a description
of the family and medical leave policies of both Canada and the United
States, noting that family and medical leave provisions have (poten
tially) two components—the provision of wage replacement benefits
during the leave and the guarantee of the same or similar job upon
return from the leave. In Canada, each province mandates family and
medical leave that includes both wage replacement and a job guaran
tee, whereas in the United States, the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) of 1993 provides only a job guarantee, and this only in firms
with 50 or more workers. Trzcinski and Alpert use data on more than
2,700 firms from the 1988 Small Business Administration's Employee
Leave Survey to describe the incidence of family leave policies in the
United States before enactment of the FMLA. They use the same data
to model the determinants of each of the main components of family
and medical leave—paid leave and a job guarantee. Their modeling
efforts are more successful in tracing the factors that are correlated
with paid leave provision than the factors that are correlated with a job
guarantee upon return from a leave. They interpret their results to sug
gest that different theoretical approaches are needed to understand the
incidence of paid leave and a job guarantee and to predict the impacts
of further legislative mandates.
Part II of the volume turns to an examination of the relationship
between employee benefits and the demand for labor. Payroll taxes are
used to finance all three of the major social insurance programs in the
United States: Social Security, workers' compensation, and unemploy
ment insurance. The most persistent criticism facing social insurance
programs financed by employer contributions has been that they raise
labor costs and thereby reduce both employment and the competitive-
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ness of U.S. business. In Chapter 4 ("Payroll Taxation, Employer
Mandates, and the Labor Market: Theory, Evidence, and Unanswered
Questions"), Jonathan Gruber appraises this and other criticisms of
mandated employer contributions in the United States. Gruber reviews
programs that are financed by payroll taxes and discusses the theory
and evidence on the labor-market effects of payroll taxes and employer
mandates (including various complications such as minimum wages
and group-specific mandates). He also presents some new evidence on
the influence of employer mandates on wages at both the individual
and firm levels. He then considers the implications for efficiency and
equity of changing the method of financing social insurance programs
from the payroll tax to the income tax. This highly useful chapter
highlights what is known about the labor-market effects of payroll tax
ation and employer mandates, develops and presents new evidence,
and points the way to fruitful avenues for further research.
In Chapter 5, Masanori Hashimoto continues this line of inquiry
with a theoretical treatment of the relationship between employee ben
efits and labor demand ("Fringe Benefits and Employment"). Hashimoto's model differs from previous models of employee benefits by
considering the entire market for benefits rather than focusing solely
on the decisions of firms. In this setting, changes in employee benefits
can occur because workers' tastes for benefits change, because the cost
of providing benefits changes, or because of changes in government
mandates. Whether increases in employee benefits reduce employ
ment, then, depends on the cause of the increase in benefits. Increases
in benefits that follow from reduced benefit costs or from increased
demand for benefits by workers (resulting from favorable tax treat
ment, for example) will increase employment. Increases in benefits
that follow from increased government mandates, on the other hand,
are likely to lead to employment losses. Hashimoto also reports the
results of some sensitivity tests of his model's results.
Part III of the volume includes four chapters that consider the
implications of employee benefits for worker turnover, wages, and
equity. The first three chapters in Part III focus mainly on a peculiar
feature of health insurance provision in the United States—that most
individuals who are covered by private health insurance are covered
through an employer-provided plan and that employer-provided health
insurance often covers all members of a worker's family. It stands to
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reason that this link between the job and the availability of health
insurance could affect the behavior of workers in a variety of ways.
In Chapter 6 ("Family Health Benefits and Worker Turnover"),
Dan Black examines a previously unexplored aspect of the link
between health benefits and turnover. Although much attention has
focused on so-called preexisting conditions clauses as a source of "job
lock," Black notes that the family coverage provisions of many
employer-provided health insurance plans are an even more likely ave
nue by which employer-provided health insurance could affect worker
turnover. Black's theoretical treatment shows that the existence of
employer-provided family health coverage can alter the value that a
worker places on alternative job offers, increasing or decreasing the
likelihood of turnover depending on specific circumstances. Black
then uses April 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) data to docu
ment the extent of double coverage by employer-provided health insur
ance. As a test of his theory, he uses the same data to estimate models
(for men and women) of job change in which the probability of recent
job change depends on coverage by a spouse's health insurance plan
(among other variables). Black finds that workers (both men and
women) who are covered by the employer-provided health insurance
of their spouses are about 50 percent more likely than others to have
changed jobs in the last year, suggesting in turn that the existence of
employer-provided spousal benefits substantially distorts incentives to
change jobs and reduces the efficiency of labor markets.
In Chapter 7 ("Part-Time Work, Health Insurance Coverage, and
the Wages of Married Women"), Craig Olson examines whether
employer-provided health insurance influences the labor-supply deci
sions and wages of married women. Using CPS data from 1983 and
1993, he first shows that women who are married to men without
health-insurance coverage are more likely to have jobs that provide
health insurance than are women married to men who do have health
insurance coverage. In other words, wives whose husbands do not pro
vide health insurance have a higher demand for health insurance than
wives whose husbands do provide health insurance. In turn, married
women who are not covered by their husbands' health insurance may
increase their work hours in order to obtain health insurance coverage
at work (part-time jobs are less likely than full-time jobs to offer health
insurance). Olson's empirical results using 1993 data support this
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notion; in contrast, his results for 1983 show no impact of husbands'
health insurance coverage on wives' work hours. Olson argues that
this change was caused by the decline in health insurance coverage
among men during the 1980s; that is, as health insurance coverage
among men fell, more women increased their work hours to gain eligi
bility for employer-provided health benefits.
In Chapter 8 ("Employer-Provided versus Publicly Provided
Health Insurance: Effects on Hours Worked and Compensation"), Janet
Hunt-McCool, Thomas McCool, and Avi Dor further examine the
impact of employment-based health insurance on labor-market behav
ior and outcomes. In particular, they examine differences in the behav
ior of married women who are and are not covered by the
employer-provided health insurance of their husbands. They view
women who are covered by their husbands' health insurance as "virtual
Canadians," in that their decisions about labor-force participation and
labor supply are independent of employers' health insurance offers (as
is the case under a system of public health care like Canada's). On the
other hand, women who are not covered by their husbands' health
insurance are likely to consider employers' health insurance offers in
making labor-supply decisions. Using data from the 1987 National
Medical Expenditure Survey, they estimate two-stage models of
wages, earnings, compensation, and health insurance premiums (the
first stage of their models creates controls for possible selection in the
matching of women to men who do or do not have jobs that provide
family health benefits). Their results are consistent with two hypothe
ses: 1) women who are not covered by their husbands' health insurance
select jobs that provide health insurance and 2) these women are will
ing to sacrifice wage income for health insurance. Hunt-McCool,
McCool, and Dor, like Black, suggest that efficiency and social welfare
are reduced by the U.S. system of providing health care provision.
As employee benefits have grown as a share of total compensation,
their potential to have important implications for the distribution of
income has also grown. Few studies of income distribution, however,
have considered employee benefits. In Chapter 9 ("Employee Benefits
and the Distribution of Income and Wealth"), Daniel Slottje, Stephen
Woodbury, and Rod Anderson examine household data that include
information on health insurance expenditures (the National Medical
Care Expenditure Survey and the National Medical Expenditure Sur-
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vey) or pension wealth (the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer
Finances) in an effort to better understand how employee benefits
influence income distribution. They find that employer contributions
to health insurance, although more unequally distributed than personal
income, are distributed in such a way that they slightly reduce the over
all distribution of income. They find that the distribution of private
pension wealth is about as unequal as the distribution of private nonretirement wealth overall, although private pensions smooth the high end
of the wealth distribution. These findings suggest that neither health
insurance nor private pensions can be seen as a major force behind
increasing inequality in the distribution of income or wealth.
Part IV of the volume comprises four chapters that focus on pen
sions and public policy toward retirement income in Canada and the
United States. In Chapter 10 ("Public Pension Plans in the United
States and Canada"), Morley Gunderson, Douglas Hyatt, and James
Pesando offer a highly useful analytical description and comparison of
the government programs that provide retirement income in Canada
and the United States. They compare the contributions to and benefits
from both public and private pensions, discuss the extent to which pub
lic pensions replace earnings, and examine how public pensions trans
fer income both within and between generations. The authors also
treat the potential effects of the Canadian and U.S. public pension
plans on work incentives, retirement, and the demand for labor. The
authors' emphasis on comparing the Canadian and U.S. systems brings
into relief the essential features of any public retirement system and
highlights the problems facing any government program that provides
retirement income.
Whereas Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando focus on public pensions,
Stuart Dorsey describes and reviews the literature on private pensions
in Canada and the United States in Chapter 11 ("Current Policy Issues
Toward Private Pensions in Canada and the United States"). He begins
with a brief review of the history of private pensions in Canada and the
United States, then describes and compares the main features of gov
ernment intervention into private pensions—tax policy and regula
tion—which are remarkably similar in the two countries. The bulk of
Dorsey's chapter is devoted to discussing four specific policy issues
that confront both Canada and the United States in considering the
future of private pensions: the extent of private pension coverage, the
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portability of private pensions, tax policy toward private pensions, and
the problem of indexing pension benefits for inflation. In all of these
discussions, Dorsey highlights the results of research and the relevance
of research to policy toward private pensions.
In Chapter 12 ("Labor-Market Effects of Canadian and U.S. Pen
sion Tax Policy"), James Pesando and John Turner examine a special
feature of pension policy in both Canada and the United States: the
tax-favored treatment of employer contributions to pension plans. Nei
ther in Canada nor in the United States are employer contributions to
private pensions subject to the personal income tax, creating an incen
tive for workers to receive compensation in the form of contributions to
a private pension plan. Pesando and Turner's main goal is to trace the
influence of this favorable tax treatment on the extent of pension cover
age. In addition, they examine how the tax treatment of pensions
affects three other outcomes: the generosity of pension plans, whether
private pension plans are funded through employer or worker contribu
tions, and whether pensions take the form of defined-benefit or
defined-contribution plans. The authors pay special attention to two
important differences between Canada and the United States. First,
worker contributions to private pension plans in Canada are tax deduct
ible regardless of whether the worker participates in a defined-benefit
or a defined-contribution plan, whereas a worker in the United States
must participate in a 401k (or similar) plan for his or her contributions
to be tax deductible. Second, in Canada, workers face a lower limit on
the amount they can save through the pension system.
The volume closes with an empirical analysis of a worrisome
trend—the decline in private pension coverage that occurred among
young men during the 1980s. In Chapter 13 ("Did the Decline in Mar
ginal Tax Rates during the 1980s Reduce Pension Coverage?"), Patri
cia Reagan and John Turner use Current Population Survey data from
1979, 1988, and 1993 to examine the reasons for this decline. Their
analysis stems from the reasoning that, because employer contributions
to private pensions are not subject to the personal income tax, the
incentive for workers to be covered by pensions (and to receive com
pensation in the form of contributions to a private pension plan) rises
as the marginal personal income tax rate rises. Reagan and Turner's
careful modeling efforts suggest that a 1-percentage-point increase in
the marginal income tax rate leads to a 0.4-percentage-point increase in
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pension coverage rates. It follows that the drop in marginal tax rates
that occurred during the 1980s was an important factor in the reduced
pension coverage of young men.
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Does the Composition
of Pay Matter?
Sherwin Rosen
University of Chicago

THE ISSUES
Why are people paid in so many different ways? Most pay is in
cash, but some is in kind. These days, a part usually is deferred until
retirement, occasionally another part is paid "up front," and some goes
to purchase certain things, such as social security and unemployment
insurance, that are legally tied to job holding and payroll taxes. How
different allocations of pay among these and many other components
affect the allocation of resources and economic performance is the
main problem for the economic analysis of employee benefits.
Consumption per person is the ultimate measure of economic per
formance. After all, the economic role of productive capacity and
other inputs in the economy derives from their contributions to sustain
ing consumption and improving the living standards of citizens over
the long term. In primitive times, when transportation costs were so
large that gains from exchange and the development of markets were
extremely limited, specific acts of production and work hardly could be
separated from specific acts of consumption. Robinson Crusoe had to
carefully coordinate the consumption of particular goods with their
production because exchange with others was not possible. Work and
consumption essentially were joint decisions. Virtually all compensa
tion was in kind.
The modern economy, with its extensive market structures and
extraordinary division of labor, achieves much of its high standard of
living by exploiting specialization and gains from trade. As always,
personal command over consumption still is determined by the produc
tivity of one's labor and other resources, but consumption decisions are
not nearly so tied to specific, personal acts of production. If all pay
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were in cash, virtually all personal consumption decisions would be
independent of personal income sources. None whatsoever would be
tied to particular acts of work, and each person would purchase pre
cisely the most desired consumption bundle, independent of what oth
ers chose. Needless to say, this is not the way things are always done.
We have moved a long way from Robinson Crusoe, but many per
sonal consumption items and other forms of spending are closely tied
to work. Compensation is a complicated package of payments, prom
ises, and obligations in most modern labor markets. Important aspects
of compensation are provided in kind, often in the form of bundles of
goods that are purchased in common by all workers in an organization.
Fringe benefits, such as health and retirement plans, typically have
many uniform features among all workers in a firm. The effort and
attention paid to these items suggest that much is at stake in the precise
form in which compensation is paid today.

THE EFFICIENCY OF MONETARY PAY: GENERALIZED
PURCHASING POWER
Economies of information make decentralization through some
form of market system the standard "default" paradigm for economics.
In theory, it is the utility-maximizing allocation of work, output, con
sumption, and investment that determines potential economic welfare,
given tastes and technology. How is this allocation achieved? If pref
erences were fully known and transactions were costless, people could
equally well hire agents to purchase goods on their behalf to choose
among particular items themselves. The same utility-maximizing out
come would be achieved in either case.
However, if tastes are private information and not easily known or
conveyed to others, vast resources are saved by decentralization. Deci
sions are made more efficiently. Individual consumers are in the best
position to make the most informed choices on their own behalf. Dele
gating or contracting it to others is bound to lead to misallocations in
most cases. There are considerable savings from not having to com
municate all possible preferences to others, not only to avoid misun
derstandings, but also for hired agents to make the right choices should
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unusual circumstances and unexpected opportunities arise. In addi
tion, individual choice avoids potential conflicts of interest and control
problems of delegating decisions to people who have independent
interests and agendas of their own. Who will spend a person's money
in that person's best interests? The person or someone else? This, of
course, is the fundamental argument for the desirability—indeed, the
necessity—of decentralized individual decision making to efficiently
allocate resources. Why then, should compensation be paid in any
other form?
The most important reason arises from Alfred Marshall's observa
tion that workers must deliver their own work themselves. Insofar as
there is utility or disutility in specific acts of work, work locations,
work associates, etc., these must be appropriately accounted in final
consumption and considered as payments in kind. 1 Even in the
absence of these technological tie-ins and consumption (or possibly
investment) aspects of work, however, there are other economic rea
sons for consumption decisions to be "centralized" in collective or
group decisions, sometimes tied to work decisions and at least partially
delegated through firms, and other times delegated to government or
other agencies.
One reason is potential economies of scale in the provision of
some types of goods. Another is a form of externality, where the con
sumption of one person affects the welfare of others in ways that can
not be fully priced nor fully internalized socially by purely private
choices. A third is intertemporal externality or consistency problems,
where adverse individual outcomes are shared by the community at
large.
Economies of Scale
Economies of scale is the most familiar, indeed, the stock argu
ment for the provision of public goods through collective or public
choice. Joint provision of a common good to many consumers saves
transaction costs that otherwise would be incurred if individuals make
the decisions for themselves, completely independent of each other.
Saving transactions costs in these cases typically requires that the
administrative agency purchase a standardized good or a very limited
range of goods; otherwise, the economy of scale tends to be lost. Col-
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lective choices, therefore, necessarily involve some loss of freedom
relative to making independent individual choices. Individuals in the
group do not always get exactly what they desire most under these
restrictions, and this represents the private and social costs of buying
goods collectively through group consensus rather than individually.
Such costs are not voluntarily incurred unless there are corre
sponding benefits. It is rational to subvert one's specific preferences to
common, group-chosen consumption standards if the good can be
obtained cheaply enough. Goods provided in this way tend to cater to
median preferences in the group, but if the system is stable, the goods
must be close enough to the preferences of any member to make con
tinued participation worthwhile. Otherwise, members would defect,
and the group would either change its character or disappear altogether.
In advanced market economies, perhaps the most important cause
for components of pay to take this form is tax avoidance. To a first
approximation (but see below), the firm cares about the total cost of an
employee, not how the cost is allocated among various components of
compensation. Furthermore, all costs are equally counted as expenses
in calculating income, corporate or otherwise, for assessing tax liabili
ties of the firm. To the extent that the tax system finds it difficult to tax
in-kind income of workers, there are obvious incentives for firms and
workers to agree to convert income into tax-free, in-kind forms. Some
ways of doing so are easier than others (Woodbury and Huang 1991).
Tax authorities everywhere are loathe to impute income to "intan
gibles" for tax purposes because of the difficulties of doing so without
costly disputes and substantial differences of opinion. An obvious
example is the failure to impute rent on owner-occupied housing in cal
culating the personal income tax. A less obvious example is imputing
taxable income for jobs with desirable amenities, such as good work
ing conditions, location, office quality, air-conditioning, and other.
Income taxes encourage on-the-job consumption of such items because
it is too costly to calculate their monetary equivalents in each individ
ual case. Obviously, these forms of pay are of greater value the greater
the marginal tax rate. Progressive income taxation implies that these
forms of pay are of greater value to higher-wage workers than they are
to lower-wage workers.
The monetary value of many other things, such as company-pro
vided meals, housing, club memberships, and work clothing are easier
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to assess, and they are often included in income for individual incometax purposes. Other important benefits, such as the employer's share of
contributions to retirement or to health insurance, however, have easily
imputed value but still are exempted from taxable income by law. It is
interesting to note that many in-kind pay provisions in the United
States and Canada originated in periods such as wartime, when nomi
nal wage controls were used to suppress inflation. There is a natural
tendency toward "wage drift" in those circumstances: using wage and
price controls to suppress inflation gives strong incentives for workers
and employers to look for ways to increase worker incomes exempt
from regulation. Provision of company-owned housing to employees
often was used for this purpose in Europe in the post World War II era.
World War II money wage controls are said to be the origins of firmprovided health insurance to workers in the United States.
Externalities and Productivity
Next, consider goods that have "productive consumption"
attributes, that is, goods having important linkages between personal
consumption and personal productivity. The consumption of many
goods affects productivity directly, some for the good, others for the
bad. In a fully decentralized and complete market economy, private
consumption decisions would take these productivity by-products fully
into account because individuals would confront the full costs and ben
efits of their decisions. For instance, if an act of consumption, such as
drinking, causes one's productivity to fall, the person rationally antici
pates an extra charge in the form of reduced wages while under the
influence and properly takes that into account in deciding where, when,
and how much to drink.
In practice, many markets are incomplete and too costly to operate.
In such cases, these by-product effects on others are not fully priced
and not always fully internalized by private decisions. A worker who
gets drunk and has to skip work might get docked a day's pay, but typ
ically doesn't have to compensate co-workers for the bother and extra
effort they must exert to make up for the absence. Usually these imper
fections arise because transactions costs make it too expensive for
firms and workers to contract directly on worker output.

18 Rosen

Rather, transactions costs are economized by contracting more
imperfectly on inputs, such as own time, whose day-to-day quality is
hard to monitor and can be partially affected by conscious worker (and
firm) behavior. In these cases, firms have interests in their workers'
consumption habits because it directly affects labor costs and firm pro
ductivity. Paternalistic interests by firms in their workers' welfare can
arise solely on considerations of self-interest, without any altruism
whatsoever. Many U.S. firms provide athletic facilities, meals, and
health services partly for these reasons.
This idea has many potential applications. Consider, for instance,
the provision to workers of complementary inputs into the production
process. One could imagine a system in which professors were
required to purchase their own chalk for classroom lectures, instead of
the system we have, where educational institutions typically provide it
"free of charge." If professors were paid directly by their students and
their fees varied directly with the demand for participation in specific
classes, teachers would carefully calculate the costs and benefits of
using chalk for enhancing their net revenues and would choose to use
the socially efficient amount.
However, in the system we have, professors aren't paid directly by
students. Most teachers are paid on an annual salary basis, and pay is
only imperfectly geared to specific classroom performance, so having
the professor buy the chalk probably would lead to inefficient decisions
that would imperfectly serve the interests of students and schools. A
teacher could decide to use no chalk whatsoever, saving these personal
expenses while receiving, at least in the short run, more or less the
same pay from the school. Under these conditions, it's just easier for
the school to freely distribute chalk on each chalkboard each day and
let the professor use all that is desired. Using chalk excessively at the
margin may be better than not using enough.
There is no need to belabor the triviality of this example. It was
chosen for its possible (mild) amusement value and familiarity to some
readers, but there are many more important examples. A production
worker in a large manufacturing establishment today is paid to work
with capital and machines that are almost always owned by third-party
shareholders in the firm and looked after by managers hired for that
purpose. Yet, in the early days of the factory system, it was common
for workers to rent machinery directly from the factory owner and mar-
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ket their own output themselves. "Compensation" would look much
different under these two circumstances.
Corporate executives could be given no complementary resources,
such as offices, secretaries or assistants, to work with. Instead, they
might rent their own office (if indeed they wanted one) or hire addi
tional help at their own expense. Such expenses would be worthwhile
and incurred voluntarily if they improved the person's productivity
enough. Yet, for most executives, decentralized arrangement such as
these hardly ever arise because it is so difficult to pay executives on the
basis of their specific "outputs." It is more economical for the firm to
provide productivity-enhancing complementary resources as part of
the work environment and pay managers mostly on the basis of their
own time inputs.2
Worker-Firm Commitment
A particular form of these kinds of interactions has been exten
sively analyzed in economics over the years. When it is expensive to
use and to closely control implicit markets for internal transactions
within the firm, it can be efficient to substitute cooperative, sharing
solutions between workers and management instead. The concept of
firm-specific human capital has been an important development in
labor economics and essentially this is what lies behind it. If many
internal transactions are not explicitly priced or are priced incorrectly,
there is potential for unproductive conflict among various agents in an
organization. In making their individual production and investment
decisions, some conflict is avoided by providing incentives to encour
age workers to weigh the interests of the organization as a whole in
addition to their self-interests. It's as if workers were brought into the
enterprise as implicit partners. All parties bear some of the costs and
some of the returns in mutual investments in worker-worker and
worker-management knowledge and relationships. Issues of paternal
ism arise within the organization from the joint interests of all parties
to protect their shared investments and stakes in the firm. This is not
entirely unrelated to the ways in which interpersonal relationships
develop in families.
Probably the most important benefit that results from these shared
investments is employment security and enduring employment rela-
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tionships. In reality, employment contracts always are of random dura
tion, with future (implicit) promises guaranteed only up to the external
fortunes of the firm, the state of demand for its products, the economic
conditions of its suppliers, and the quality of its managers. Neverthe
less, the fact is that there is an enormous amount of job continuity over
the working lives of most people. The typical pattern is for job turn
over to be largest at younger ages, a time when learning and informa
tion gathering about both the talents of young workers and their
prospects in firms is most important. Job turnover falls sharply with
work experience in the firm. Within 6 or 7 years of entry into the labor
force, the typical worker has found a permanent job that will last for 20
years or more.
It is a bit unusual to think of employment security as a fringe bene
fit, perhaps because, with few exceptions in some trade union con
tracts, these terms are not explicitly written down anywhere. None
theless, the ties that are built up through mutual specific human capital
investments serve as the equivalent of financial bonds and act to dis
courage costly quits and layoffs under many circumstances. They
affect employment variability and the incidence and duration of unem
ployment in the economy (Rosen 1985).
A great deal of empirical work has established that the payment of
normal fringe benefits and other fixed costs of employment in the firm,
such as hiring and training costs that are not closely related to work
intensity, insulate workers from short-term product market fluctuations
(Hamermesh 1993; Hart 1984). For instance, if demand falls but the
decline is expected to be temporary, the firm has something to lose by
laying off workers. It has incentives to retain them because some val
ued employees will never return if they are laid off, and the fixed costs
associated with their initial employment must be incurred again on
subsequent replacements. Similar considerations apply to workers and
serve to deter them from quitting in response to attractive short-term
outside opportunities. All of this acts as a kind of self-insurance that
supplements explicit unemployment insurance programs mandated by
the government.
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Intertemporal Consistency
Finally, there is a related concept of externalities that cuts across a
different spectrum of consumption activities and personal behavior.
For the problem at hand, the most important of these are "social insur
ance" types of activities involving transfers of resources among indi
viduals and over time. Perhaps the main growth of the State in
otherwise decentralized market economies throughout the world is
attributable to mandatory, tax-financed provision of activities such as
health care, unemployment insurance, retirement plans, and the like.
The subject is too vast to be discussed in any detail here, except to
point out the tendency for centralized government decisions to increas
ingly substitute for private planning and individual decisions through
out this century. The fact is that governments have increasingly
undertaken these paternalistic functions, often administrated through
employment records and financed by payroll and income taxes. Few, if
any, compelling explanations for this most important social and eco
nomic trend have been offered, and no attempt will be made to do so
here.
With the possible exception of unemployment compensation, most
of these activities are best thought of as essentially private acts of con
sumption or investment, that is, the government supplying or regulat
ing private goods. How much a person wishes to set aside for future
retirement or to spend on a personal medical condition is inherently a
private decision, so the classical economic case for the possibility of
public policy does not immediately apply. However, a case can be
made that external social interests arise if the financing of these private
decisions turns out to concern others. Choices may then not be timeconsistent in the following sense. Some individuals may make earnest
but erroneous decisions, and others may not be willing to let them suf
fer the poor ex post consequences of unfortunate choices. If this out
come comes to be anticipated, however, and individuals think they can
be bailed out by throwing themselves at the mercy of the community, it
encourages reckless, inefficient behavior that can be avoided by forc
ing people to set aside resources to take care of themselves.
A person who hasn't bought health insurance on the expectation of
not getting sick often is cared for at public expense should the unlikely
and costly illness occur. Some people who gamble away their retire-
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ment wealth or invest retirement funds unwisely find themselves in a
similar situation. The community finds it difficult to completely turn
its back on such people ex post, and it is hard to credibly commit to not
doing so ex ante. Knowing that the community will step in, however,
creates incentives for inefficient private decision making in the first
instance. Many firms make participation in retirement and health
insurance plans mandatory for these reasons. It protects them against
paying excessively for old loyalties and "family" ties to employees.
The community at large has a similar interest in mandatory participa
tion. In practice, it often finances these programs through payroll taxes
on employment. 3

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION
The basic approach to analyzing the structure of compensation was
put forth by Adam Smith in his extraordinary discussion of the tenden
cies for labor market equilibrium to equalize the net advantages among
alternative employments. If some kinds of jobs offer attractive ameni
ties and substantial in-kind pay compared with others, their observed
monetary compensation must be lower to ration eager job applicants
and encourage some workers to apply to less attractive employments.
This idea implies an index number approach to assessing "total advan
tages," imputing value for all in-kind and other components and adding
them to nominal wages to assess the total. In equilibrium, all compo
nents additively substitute for each other at the margin. Otherwise net
advantages would not be equalized.
The compelling simplicity of the logic of equalizing differences is
not always matched by simplicity of application, especially in the
realm of public policy. As has been stressed throughout this essay, the
many alternative ways of providing consumption to people makes it
important to keep substitution possibilities and private incentives in
mind when analyzing public programs. In many cases there are impor
tant offsets. Direct effects of policies are not always as large as they
might appear on the surface. The important consequences of many
programs are as likely to arise from hidden subsidies built into many of
them, as to the programs themselves.
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Examples are easy to find. Indeed, analysis of these programs has
provided plenty of work for analysts over the years, something like a
works-project-administration relief bill for applied economists in the
past few decades.
1) When the payroll tax was increased to finance Medicare
for elderly persons in the United States in the mid 1960s, there
was a significant decline in private health insurance purchases
by the aged. To be sure, Medicare increased health insurance
coverage among the elderly population, but the subsequent
run-up in expenditures was caused as much by the enormous
subsidy in Medicare prices as by increased coverage.
2) Private pension plans in the U.S. labor market invariably
coordinate their benefits and provisions with a worker's
expected claims on Social Security pensions. From a firm's
point of view, it is a matter of indifference whether a dollar is
paid into a funded private pension plan or into Social Secu
rity's unfunded pay-as-you-go system through payroll taxes.
Many have argued that the decline in private saving in the
United States is partly attributable to the substitution of
unfunded government pensions for funded private pensions.
3) The financing of public unemployment benefits increases
the propensity for many firms to increase layoffs in adverse
business conditions and increase the unemployment rate
(Topel 1983). These kinds of incentives are even more adverse
in the Canadian system than in the U.S. system because highrisk firms do not pay actuarial fees reflecting the risk they
impose on the system to the insurance fund. Furthermore, the
enormous subsidies for seasonal unemployment in the mari
time provinces causes inefficient tax distortions in employ
ment decisions elsewhere in Canada and encourages many
workers to remain employed in seasonal industries even
though their productivity is much lower in them than in other
locations or in nonseasonal jobs.
4) The tendency for European governments to closely regu
late employment commitments of firms affects their propensity
to hire young workers, thus increasing the joblessness of youth
and worsening their long-term prospects (Lazear 1990).
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There is compelling empirical evidence of substitution between
wages and private fringe benefits and direct on-the-job consumption
amenities in the form of equalizing differences (Woodbury 1983;
Rosen 1986). Nonetheless, what often appears in the data seems not to
be equalizing in this sense at all because it is generally the good jobs—
the ones with high wages, good working conditions, and low turn
over—that offer the most fringe benefits. Low wage jobs are more
often associated with poor working conditions, high turnover and
exposure to unemployment, as well as low fringe benefits. This, how
ever, does not affect the logic of substitution and the necessity for
analysis to proceed on such terms in contemplating new regulations
and programs because these observations also are readily explained by
a few simple extensions of the argument.
Focusing on the consumption aspects of pay composition reveals
why higher paying jobs tend to offer more benefits and perquisites.
Many consumption items tied to work are normal goods. They have
positive income elasticities, so higher skilled and higher wage workers
would be expected to purchase more of them, on average, than would
lower skilled, lower wage workers. Were it not for greater consump
tion and participation in these kinds of arrangements, highly skilled
workers would have even higher wage rates than are actually observed.
Favorable tax treatment of some forms of fringe benefits reinforces the
incentives for high wage workers to convert their pay to these forms.
Estimates of total resources spent in these forms are surprisingly
hard to find, but they must be a fairly large component of total compen
sation. Health and retirement benefits, certainly the most easily mea
sured components, account for about 10 percent of total monetary
compensation (Smeeding 1983; Slottje et al. 2000). Assessing implicit
values for such things as job security, work and location amenities,
flexible work schedules, and a wide variety of other aspects of work
has proven more difficult, not least because of the reasons mentioned
in the paragraph above. Surely numbers on the order of another 10
percent of total pay would seem to be a reasonable minimum. If so,
fringe benefits broadly defined must account for 20 percent or more of
total compensation in the U.S. labor force. Adding the payroll taxes
used to finance a number of other related social programs contributes a
substantial amount more. These are large numbers. They are impor-
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tant components of the economy and can be expected to grow over
time.

SOME EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS
Some extreme cases illustrate many issues arising in the econom
ics of fringe benefits in a dramatic way. Perhaps the most unusual case
is military compensation. A substantial amount of military compensa
tion is in-kind. In the ancient world, plunder was a principle compo
nent of military pay—today compensation is provided by govern
ments. Conscription in modern armies relieved the state of most direct
cash payment obligations, so a very large fraction of conscript army
pay was direct provision of consumption and future retirement bene
fits. Nonetheless, even in voluntary armies the proportion of direct
monetary pay in total compensation is much smaller as compared with
that of other employments.
Almost all the factors mentioned above apply in one way or
another to military compensation (Rosen 1992). The nature of military
production requires massing personnel in far off locations largely
removed from the rest of the population, so separation of consumption
from production is difficult, if not impossible. The remote areas in
which military outposts are placed makes it costly for private markets
to supply many consumption needs directly to soldiers. The army
itself must be a major provider of many of these things. To a large
extent, these expenditures are taken "off the top" and make military
monetary compensation appear smaller than is truly the case.
The army has direct interests in the consumption and behavioral
patterns of personnel to maintain its readiness and force-quality status.
Partly, this is controlled directly in the consumption goods that are
made available, a point that is reinforced by the economies of scale in
providing standardized consumption and other expenditures for
recruits. In addition, the army has special reasons for insisting on com
mon consumption standards and a fair bit of equality of treatment
among recruits, to maintain and invest in the esprit de corps needed to
maintain an effective force. Loyalties to the organization are extremely
important because of the obvious conflicts between self-interest and
organizational interest in dangerous situations.
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Of course, many military-specific skills also have little value in
other employments. To protect its training investments in personnel
from excessive depreciation through turnover, military organizations
tend to back load pay to a significant extent, with vesting rights set up
in ways that encourage career personnel to stay for lengthy periods.
Back-loaded retirement pay also helps resolve agency and obedience
problems that encourage proper teamwork. There are sound economic
reasons why military organizations are so paternalistic.
Some private employments have military-like features. Work
required in far flung outposts, such as the Hudson Bay Company in the
19th Century, or the Alaskan pipeline in the 20th, largely followed the
military model because the market for consumption goods was too thin
to make complete decentralization practical. Furthermore, in many of
these circumstances, the employing firms had a direct interest in the
consumption patterns of their employees because it might affect their
productivity. Institutions such as the truck system and the company
store arose to meet these needs (Hilton 1957).
The former Soviet Union and other countries in the Eastern Bloc
provide interesting contemporary examples of how fringe benefits
affect resource allocation. The examples also have implications for
current economic reforms there because the change in control of enter
prises and production needed now may be impeded by past obligations
the State enterprises made to their employees (Lazear and Rosen
1995).
In many ways those economies followed a military-style economic
organization, something that is practically inevitable in a central com
mand and control system. In addition to their overwhelming role in
total production, the state-owned enterprise typically served as the nat
ural administrative unit through which many aspects of consumption
were organized. Housing was often provided to employees at subsi
dized rates, as were public utilities, child care, and many direct con
sumption items such as food and clothing. Income in-kind and other
"fringe benefits" were a much larger proportion of total pay in these
economies than in most market economies, partly for ideological rea
sons, but also because centrally commanded systems need substitutes
for market mechanisms.
The socialist structure was inherently paternalistic. It encouraged
equality and common consumption standards to promote solidarity and
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commitment to the system. Housing, education, food, and health ser
vices were viewed as more socially productive kinds of consumption
than were other goods. Conspicuous consumption was stigmatized.
The practicalities of central control were important as well. The com
mand system does not allow prices to fully allocate resources across
most goods. Draconian penalties for participating in illegal markets
discouraged their use. When the state determines production and con
sumption allocations, surpluses and shortages of both goods and jobs
become a chronic condition of life. Other, far more costly, social insti
tutions arise to fill in the gap.
Queues are a familiar manifestation of nonprice rationing alloca
tion problems, but there are other mechanisms that serve this purpose,
including clout, political connections, and barter. For example, the
provision of a substantial hot meal in company lunchrooms was very
common in State enterprises because alternative markets either for pre
pared meals or for raw ingredients were so limited. Furthermore, the
central authority had to limit labor mobility in order to carry out is pro
duction plans. More goods were made available in large cities such as
Moscow than in other places, and an elaborate system of passport con
trol was needed to insure that workers remained where the central plan
allocated them. State control of housing was required for these pur
poses, and since wage rates were not allowed to clear specific labor
market shortages and surpluses, firms often supplied their own housing
to get the labor they needed. Company-provided housing was itself
partially allocated by internal queues within the firm rather than by
prices.
The tax system that supported the state bureaucratic apparatus in
these economies was hidden in total government ownership of physical
capital. However, there were substantial implicit payroll taxes because
state income and old-age security, and some health services, though
formally administered by the central and local governments, were
financed through taxes on the utilization of labor by enterprises. The
absence of well-functioning private financial institutions also required
extensive involvement of the state and enterprises in intertemporal
allocations of consumption (saving and dissaving) of workers over
their lifetimes. For example, retired workers often remained in their
company-provided housing paying little for rent and utilities.
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In short, Soviet workers were important stakeholders in their enter
prises. These intensive ties and social commitments undoubtedly were
a major force in the operation of soft-budget constraints and unattain
able consumption desires that eventually brought the system down.
However, they have also presented serious obstacles for reform and
movement toward a market system in these countries. In the command
system, the firm and the state were so intertwined that it was almost
impossible to distinguish between the obligations of the two. Now that
the enterprise and the state have to be so clearly separated, it is not
obvious to whom these commitments to workers will be transferred
and how they will honored when control of enterprises redounds to pri
vate hands. The state may sell off claims to machinery, equipment, and
structures, but who will gain "title" to the security and consumption
obligations these firms have built up with their workers?
No doubt, many of these obligations will merely be forgotten, and
workers, left with broken promises, will have to fare on their own
devices. Presently it is obvious that a system of consumer and worker
"sovereignty," where workers' economic fortunes and connections
were not so closely tied to specific enterprises, would make the transi
tion to a market economy much easier. Uncertainty about previous
commitments is proving to be an enormous obstacle in moving toward
a rational ownership and market structure in these countries. In China,
the remarkably productive rural and agricultural reforms hardly have
been attempted in the large urban State enterprises. These difficulties
are not confined to poor economies. In such rich countries as the new,
unified Germany, the willingness of West Germans to pick up the
social obligations of their Eastern relatives has been a great economic
and social drag on that economy. Other formerly socialist or commu
nist countries have no such rich relatives to lean upon. These problems
are not only confined to countries attempting to reform their economic
structures. In the United States, tie-ins of some fringe benefits to job
holding, such as health insurance, apparently have inefficiently limited
labor mobility between firms in recent years (Madrian 1994).
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CONCLUSIONS
Fringe benefits are of importance to such fundamental labor mar
ket problems as the social organization of work and production, as well
as to social and moral obligations between workers and firms and of
governments to citizens. These issues cut deeply into core issues in
labor economics and, indeed, of economic systems more generally.
They deserve more attention than they have generally received from
the economic research community.

Notes
1. Some jobs embody negative attributes and disutility In principle, these should be
subtracted from total income to arrive at final consumption
2. No doubt the individual income tax is a factor here as well. However, it is not
decisive because offices, secretaries, and other complementary inputs usually
were provided to managers free of charge before the income tax was important.
The income tax encourages excessive use of these things—plusher offices on
higher floors and more secretaries and assistants.
3 This logic helps one to understand why there is a community interest in "social"
programs, but it cannot explain either the form it takes or the magnitude of the
interest. It cannot explain why governments have often gone into these businesses
directly rather than regulating participation in private programs; nor can it account
for the great growth of these programs in this century

References
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1993. Labor Demand. Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press.
Hart, Robert A. 1984. The Economics of Non-Wage Labour Costs. London:
George Alien and Unwin.
Hilton, George W. 1957. "The British Truck System in the Nineteenth Cen
tury." Journal of Political Economy 65(June): 237-256.
Lazear, Edward. 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment." Quar
terly Journal of Economics 105(June): 699-726.
Lazear, Edward, and Sherwin Rosen. 1995. "Publicly Provided Goods and
Services in a Transition Economy." In Economic Transition in Eastern
Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform, E. Lazear ed. Palo Alto, Califor
nia: Hoover Press.

30 Rosen

Madrian, Brigitte. 1994. "Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job
Mobility: Is their Evidence of Job Lock?" Quarterly Journal of Economics
109(February): 27-54.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey." Journal of Economic
Literature 23(3): 1144-1175.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1986. "The Theory of Equalizing Differences." In Hand
book of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard eds.
Amsterdam: North Holland.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1992. "The Military as an Internal Labor Market: Some
Allocation, Productivity, and Incentive Problems." Social Science Quar
terly 73(June): 227-237.
Slottje, Daniel J., Stephen Woodbury and Rod W. Anderson. 2000. "Em
ployee Benefits and the Distribution of Income and Wealth." Chapter 9 of
this volume.
Smeeding, Timothy. 1983. "The Size Distribution of Wage and Nonwage
Compensation." In The Measurement of Labor Cost, J. Triplet! ed. Chi
cago: University of Chicago Press.
Topel, Robert. 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance." American
Economic Review 73(September): 541-559.
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Wei-Jang Huang. 1991. The Tax Treatment of
Fringe Benefits. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ
ment Research.
Woodbury, Stephen A. 1983. "Substitution between Wage and Nonwage
Benefits." American Economic Review 73(March): 166-182.

Parti
Worker Availability and
Labor Supply

31
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Increases in the employment of married women over the past few
decades have been accompanied by changes in child-care choices.
Today, more than one-half of all preschool children receive care during
part of the day by someone other than their parents. Among children
of employed parents, there has been an increasing trend toward the use
of formal types of child-care arrangements, such as day-care centers
and group day-care homes. Because the child-care market has become
so important, economists have intensified their efforts to understand
the market. Economists in both the United States and Canada have
studied the effects of child-care prices on women's employment (Blau
and Robins 1988; Connelly 1992; Kimmel 1995a; Cleveland, Gunderson, and Hyatt 1994), the effects of child-care prices on receipt of wel
fare (Connelly 1990; Kimmel 1995b), the effects of child-care costs on
fertility (Blau and Robins, 1989), and the effects of child-care subsi
dies on employment and child-care costs (Heckman 1974; Hofferth
and Wissoker 1992; Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992; Ribar
1992, 1995; Cleveland and Hyatt 1994). All of these studies examine
choices using data from a single country, either the United States or
Canada. In contrast, this paper examines child-care choices in both
countries, using a pooled data set based on national surveys in each
country. Our objective is to exploit variation between the two coun
tries to obtain better estimates of the factors that affect child-care and
employment decisions.
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Several recent papers have examined the effects of child-care sub
sidies in the United States on child-care choices and employment of
mothers of young children. Hofferth and Wissoker (1992) predicted
that subsidies would have a substantial effect on the mode of care cho
sen. According to their estimates, if states were to increase subsidies to
nonparental care by 10 percent, there would be an 11 to 30 percent
increase in the use of center-based care, a 6 to 10 percent increase in
care by relatives, and a 12 to 18 percent reduction in parental care.
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992) find that increases in
child-care subsidies would increase child-care expenditures, but such
subsidies might have little impact on either the quality of care or the
employment of mothers of young children. According to their esti
mates, making the U.S. child-care tax credit considerably more pro
gressive would more than triple child-care expenditures and increase
child-care subsidies by a factor of eight. Even with such massive
changes, however, they predict that the quality of child care would
increase by only 30 percent and that hours worked by mothers of
young children would increase by only 6 percent. 1
A potential problem with estimating the effects of child-care subsi
dies using data from only one country is that parents are eligible for
many of the same subsidies. For example, both countries have subsi
dies through the federal income tax, which depend on a family's tax
able income and child-care expenses. In principle, all families within a
country have the same incentives because all are subject to the same
income tax system. Previous studies have examined the effects of sub
sidies within a particular country using instruments to predict potential
subsidies. Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel, for example, used
nonlabor income and predicted wage rates to determine potential sub
sidies.
Previous research has also found that higher child-care prices
reduce the use of market care and lower the likelihood of employment
of mothers of young children. However, the magnitude of this effect is
still being debated in the literature (See Blau [1995], for example).
Ribar (1992) found relatively large effects of prices, while Micha
lopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992) found very small effects.
Chaplin et al. (1996) found that the effect of price is quite sensitive to
the definition of price. As with subsidies, child-care prices are not
given solely by providers but depend on a family's choices. Due to

Child Care and Labor Supply

35

economies of scale, parents who work full time can expect to pay less
per hour of care than those who work part time, if the care is of the
same type and quality (Folk and Beller 1993). Parents can also choose
from a variety of types of care, each with a different quality and price.
In this chapter, we follow previous studies in examining the effects
of economic factors on child-care and employment choices. However,
we add to previous studies by using pooled data from Canada and the
United States in examining choices. Because there is a natural separa
tion of markets between the two countries, and because the citizens of
the two countries are subject to different systems of subsidies and reg
ulations, we should be able to exploit exogenous differences in prices,
wages, and subsidies to obtain more precise estimates of the effects of
economic factors on child-care and employment choices.
According to two national surveys of child care, about half of
Canadian and U.S. mothers of preschool children work in a given
week, and Canadian families are slightly less likely to use parental care
and center care as the primary source of care for children under age 13.
Among mothers who work full time, however, Canadian mothers are
only about two-thirds as likely to use center care and correspondingly
are more likely to use other non-relative care. Among mothers who do
not work, Canadian mothers are much more likely than U.S. mothers to
use center care and correspondingly are less likely to use parental care.
After controlling for various economic and demographic factors, we
find that if Canadians were to face the same economic circumstances
as U.S. mothers, they would be somewhat less likely to work full time.
When they do work full time, Canadian mothers are less likely to use
center care; when they do not work, however, Canadian mothers are
less likely to use parental care. However, we find little role for differ
ences in prices and subsidies in affecting these child-care choices.
This chapter has two objectives. The first is to describe child-care
programs and choices in the two countries. The second is to assess the
importance of economic differences between the two countries in
child-care and employment choices. In the following sections, we
summarize the major child-care subsidy programs in the two countries
and discuss their respective regulations; we use national survey data
from each country to examine differences in child-care choices and
child-care prices; and we provide an assessment of the role of differ-
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ences in tax credits, prices, and regulations, as well as other economic
and demographic factors.

CHILD-CARE POLICIES IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES
Federal and local child-care policies are similar in Canada and the
United States, but there are some differences. Both countries provide
subsidies directly to parents though their federal income tax systems,
as well as through subsidies targeted toward low-income families. In
both countries, state and provincial governments regulate child-care
providers. In addition, the Canadian provinces and most of the United
States provide additional tax relief to users of child care. One key dif
ference between the two countries has to do with state and provincial
subsidies. While state spending in the United States is dwarfed by fed
eral spending, provincial subsidies to providers who care for children
in needy families are larger than federal expenditures in Canada.
While state subsidies in the United States are largely targeted toward
families receiving welfare, many more families in Canada are eligible
for subsidies.
Federal Subsidies
In the United States, the federal government spent nearly $10 bil
lion in 1992 on a complicated array of at least 41 federal programs that
spend money directly on child care plus five additional programs that
give tax breaks for families with child-care expenditures. The largest
federal government expenditures were $2.8 billion for the child-care
tax credit (which works through the federal income tax code) and $2.2
billion for the Head Start program. 2 In addition, the federal govern
ment provided about $3 billion in grants to the states, including $1.1
billion on the Child Care Food Program, $300-$400 million each on
child care for families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Chil
dren (AFDC), at-risk children, and the Child Care and Development
Block Grant (Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of
Representatives 1993), and approximately $800 million on the Title
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XX Social Services Block Grant. 3 Another $3 billion in tax revenue
was lost through tax exclusions for employer-provided child care.
The Canadian child-care subsidy system appears to be somewhat
simpler than the U.S. system. As in the United States, the Canadian
federal government subsidizes child care through the income tax code.4
In 1989, about 600,000 families claimed the tax credit, for a tax sav
ings of $288.5 million (Hess 1992). (Note that throughout this paper,
Canadian expenditures are converted to U.S. dollars using a conversion
rate of 0.75 U.S. dollars per Canadian dollar.) The Canadian govern
ment also provides grants to the provinces, which are used to subsidize
child care for needy families. In contrast to the array of federal pro
grams in the United States, the Canadian government provides funds to
the provinces primarily through one program, the Canadian Assistance
Plan (CAP) (Child Resource and Research Unit 1993).
The federal tax-based subsidies in the two countries are quite simi
lar. Each limits the subsidy based on parents' taxable income, so that
poor families with low tax bills have limited access to the subsidy. In
the United States, the credit is nonrefundable, so that a family's maxi
mum credit is its tax bill. In Canada, the maximum deduction is twothirds of the income of the parent with lower earnings. Each credit has
a maximum exemption per child. The U.S. credit allows a family to
claim expenses of up to $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two or
more children. The maximum exemption for the Canadian deduction
is more generous: in 1989, it allowed up to $3,000 for each child under
age 7 and $1,500 for each child between 7 and 14.5 In both countries,
the subsidy is generally available to parents regardless of the type of
child care used, with some minor restrictions. In Canada, the childcare provider cannot be a member of the immediate family or a relative
under age 21, and the caregiver must provide a receipt. In addition, the
taxpayer must be employed, operating her own business, or working on
a research grant to receive the credit. In the United States, the credit is
available only to parents who work or are looking for work and taxpay
ers who claim the credit must provide the name, address, and an identi
fication number of the caregiver.
The primary difference in the two plans is the relationship between
allowable expenditures and the amount of the credit. In Canada, childcare expenses up to the maximum allowable amount are deducted from
a parent's taxable income, so that a taxpayer essentially receives a
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rebate at her marginal tax rate. 6 In the United States, the credit also
depends on family income but is not directly related to the tax rate. For
families with income below $10,000, the credit is 30 percent of allow
able expenditures. The credit rate declines gradually to 20 percent for
families earning more than $28,000. As a result, the maximum credit
declines as income increases in the United States, but increases (with a
parent's earnings) in Canada, along with the marginal tax rate.
To compare the tax-based subsidies in the two countries, we calcu
lated the amount that a family would receive under a variety of circum
stances: if they paid $1 for child care for each hour the mother worked,
if the husband earned $50,000 per year, if the family had one child
under age 7, and if they took standard deductions and filed jointly in
the United States. Figure 1 summarizes these calculations. The taxbased subsidy is shown for each country for up to 2,500 hours worked
per year by the mother at two wage rates—$5 per hour and $20 per
hour. For the lower wage earner, the U.S. credit is more generous. A
woman has to work only about 250 hours (earning $1,250) in order to
be eligible for some credit and would receive more than $500 per year
if she worked full time. In contrast, because a Canadian mother can
claim a larger amount of nontaxable earnings, she would have to work
1,000 hours before having to pay taxes and hence be eligible for a tax
subsidy and would receive about $300 per year if she worked full time.
For the higher wage earner, the Canadian system appears to be more
generous, providing about $700 per year for a full-time worker, while
the U.S. credit provides about $400 for a full-time worker. Similar cal
culations for larger families and for families with higher spousal
income reveal the same pattern: the Canadian system is more generous
for higher-earning families, but less generous for lower-earning parents
because the marginal subsidy rate in the United States is lower for fam
ilies with higher income, while the marginal subsidy rate in Canada is
tied directly to the marginal tax rate.
Provincial and State Subsidies
Every Canadian province has an income-tested subsidy provided
directly to a family's licensed child-care provider. Table 1 summarizes
key features of the provincial subsidies in 1991. As is obvious from the
table, the subsidies vary in generosity and eligibility from province to

Figure 1 Federal Child-Care Tax Subsidies in Canada and the United States
Assumptions: Husband's Annual Income = $50,000,1 Child under Age 7
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Table 1 Features of the Canadian Provincial Child-Care Subsidies, 1991 ($)a

Province

Turning
pointb

Break-even
point

Maximum
subsidy0

Expenditure
per child

Federal
contribution
per child

Newfoundland &
Labrador

8,280

14,490

NA

10

7

Prince Edward Island

11,160

29,376

16.50/day

54

26

Nova Scotia

13,590

25,200

15.75/day

36

23

New Brunswick

10,098

19,629

10.50/day

14

6

Quebec

11,250

37,500

NA

41

28

Ontario

12,715

19,509

NA

107

25

Manitoba

14,171

30,055

3,164/year

90

52

Saskatchewan

15,651

32,571

90% of fee

36

20

Alberta

17,085

28,478

276/month

43

15

British Columbia

17,079

23,317

430/month

74

30

SOURCE: The Childcare Resource and Research Unit 1993.
a All Canadian expenditure numbers were converted to U.S. dollars using an exchange rate of 0.75 U.S.$ per Can$.
b The turning point is the income level at which a family is no longer eligible for the full subsidy. The break-even point is the income
level at which the family is no longer eligible for any subsidy. For Ontario, the break-even point and turning point are not uniform
across the providence. The numbers provided are the median in Toronto.
c Maximum subsidy is for an infant, generally less than 2 years old, in a center. For some provinces, the maximum subsidy depends on
the provider's fee. These are marked "NA."
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province. A family is potentially eligible for the full subsidy as long as
its income is below the turning point (the income level at which the
family is no longer eligible for the full subsidy).7 As a result, in British
Columbia and Alberta, a two-parent family with two children can earn
more than $17,000 per year and still be potentially eligible for the full
subsidy. In contrast, Newfoundland and Labrador will pay the full sub
sidy only to families with less than $8,250 in annual earnings. A fam
ily is potentially eligible for some subsidy until its income reaches the
break-even point. As a result, a family can potentially earn more than
$30,000 per year in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Quebec before it
loses eligibility for provincial subsidies. In contrast, a family in New
foundland is ineligible for the subsidy if it earns $14,250 or more per
year.
In the United States, individual states also subsidize child care.
Each of the states subsidizes child-care expenses for welfare recipients
and provides funds to match federal Title XX Social Services Block
Grants. In addition, many of the states provide subsidies directly to
parents through state income tax child-care credits. In 1989, 28 states
had such credits (Robins 1991). Like the federal income tax credit,
most states' credits are nonrefundable. Only two states, New Mexico
and Minnesota, had refundable credits. As a result, poor families with
working parents were eligible for meager subsidies, as is the case for
the federal tax credit. The maximum credit also varies considerably,
from a high of $1,440 in Minnesota and $1,200 in New Mexico to a
low of $39 per year in Arizona.
In general, the provinces appear to provide more generous subsi
dies per capita than do the states. In 1992, the provinces spent $353
million for subsidies to providers of needy children, the federal gov
ernment contributed another $225 million for this subsidy through the
CAP program, and the provinces spent another $226 million in other
subsidies for providers (Child Resource and Research Unit 1993).
Among the larger provinces, Ontario spent more than $100 per child
under 12, British Columbia about $74, and Quebec about $40. In con
trast, in 1985, the states spent a comparatively small $1.5 billion on
child-care services (in 1992 dollars), including federal contributions,
and another $350 million on income tax credits for child care (Robins
1991). California was the most generous state, spending nearly $80
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per child under 12. Other large states spent much less, ranging from
$16 per child under 12 in Texas to $65 in New York. 8

Provincial and State Child-Care Regulations
While the federal governments provide funds for subsidizing child
care, the states and provinces have individual regulations on both fam
ily providers and center care. These regulations take a number of
forms, including background checks on providers, training require
ments, and minimum education requirements. In this section, we
focus on three of the regulations that are most common: the maximum
number of children that a family provider can care for before being
subject to regulation, the child-to-staff ratios for family providers and
centers, and the maximum number of children for which a regulated
family provider or center can provide care.
Figures 2 through 6 summarize and compare the percentage of
children subject to several types of regulations. For example, Figure 2
shows the maximum number of children allowed in family day care.
The lines in Figure 2 show the proportion of children under age 13 who
live in states or provinces with a given regulation. About 25 percent of
all Canadian children live in provinces which prohibit more than five
children in family day care, while only about 5 percent of U.S. children
live in states with such a stringent regulation.
According to all five figures, Canada appears to have more strin
gent child-care regulations. 9 Consider Figure 2 again. Among the
states that regulate family providers, only the District of Columbia,
Florida, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Massachusetts limit family providers
to six or fewer children. In contrast, provinces representing about 65
percent of children (including Ontario and Quebec) have such stringent
regulations. Most of the large states allow 12 or more children, includ
ing California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Michigan, and North Caro
lina.
All the provinces and most of the states limit the child-to-staff
ratio. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the maximum number of children
that the states and provinces allow in day-care centers for 18-monthold children and 4-year-old children, respectively. Again, Canada
appears to have much more stringent regulations. Nearly half of all
Canadian 18-month-old children live in provinces which allow no
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Figure 2 Maximum Number of Children Allowed in Family Day Care
(Percentage of Children Covered)
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Figure 3 Child-to-Staff Ratio for 18-Month-Old Children in Center Care
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Figure 4 Child-to-Staff Ratio for 4-Year-Old Children in Center Care
(Percentage of Children Covered)
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Figure 5 Maximum Group Size for 18-Month-Old Children
in Center Care
(Percentage of Children Covered)
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Figure 6 Maximum Group Size for 4-Year-Old Children
in Center Care
(Percentage of Children Covered)
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more than three children per group. In contrast, among the United
States, only Maryland has such a stringent regulation. While no Cana
dian province allows, more than six 18-month-old children per staff
member, nearly 40 percent of U.S. children live in states which allow
more than six children. The pattern is the same for 4-year-old children
(Figure 4). While more than 90 percent of Canadian children live in
provinces which prohibit more than eight children per staff member,
fewer than 5 percent of U.S. children live in such states.
Most states and provinces also limit group size in center care. Fig
ures 5 and 6 summarize these regulations for 18-month-old children
and 4-year-old children, respectively. Once again, Canadian regula
tions appear more restrictive. Except for Prince Edward Island, New
Brunswick, and Saskatchewan, which do not regulate group size, all
provinces prohibit groups of 18-month-old children with more than 14
children. In contrast, nearly half of U.S. children live in states with no
group-size regulations or regulations that allow more than 14 children.
For 4-year-old children (Figure 6), more than 50 percent of children—
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including those living in Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta—live in prov
inces that cap the group size at 16. In contrast, no state prohibits
groups smaller than 19, and more than half of children live in states
with no group-size regulation.

CHILD-CARE CHOICES AND PRICES—
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Data
This section describes the child-care choices made by U.S. and
Canadian families and the child-care prices faced by those families. If
Canadians are making different choices, then further investigation
might be warranted to determine how those choices are affected by
price, public policies, and other economic factors. However, even if
choices are the same, differences in economic circumstances might be
contributing to this similarity.
To examine these issues, we use data from two national surveys of
families with children under age 13. For the United States, we use the
National Child Care Survey of 1990 (USNCCS). The USNCCS con
tains information on a nationally representative sample of U.S. families
with children under age 13. Families were chosen from phone lists in
100 counties and county groups, and interviews were conducted if the
family had a child under the age of 13. To make the sample nationally
representative of families with young children, the 100 counties were
randomly selected, with a probability of selection proportional to the
number of children under 5 in the county. Information was obtained on
child-care choices and expenditures, as well as labor-market behavior,
income, and demographics. 10
For Canada, we use the National Child Care Survey of 1988
(CNCCS). The CNCCS was a supplement to the Canadian Labour
Force Survey, a nationally drawn survey of labor-market activity. As
with the USNCCS, the CNCCS uses a multistage stratified sampling
technique to obtain information for families with children under the
age of 13. Because the survey is a supplement to the Canadian Labour
Force Survey, its sample is designed to be representative of the labor
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force, not families with young children. In addition, in order to obtain
accurate information on sparsely populated areas, families from small
provinces are oversampled. As with the USNCCS, information was
collected on child-care choices and expenditures, labor-market behav
ior, income, and demographic characteristics."
A drawback to the CNCCS is that it contains limited information
on earnings and wages. Annual household income, as well as income
for parents, is reported in ranges of $7,500, with a top range of $45,000
and higher. Hourly wages are not reported, and calculation of hourly
wages based on categorical income would result in sizable measure
ment error. Because hourly wages are a key component in analyzing
employment and child-care choices, and because annual earnings are
important for determining eligibility for child-care tax subsidies, an
auxiliary part of our econometric analysis uses a second Canadian
sample from the Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS). 12 The
LMAS provides information on hourly wages and hours of work for a
subsample of parents in the CNCCS. Powell (1997) linked the
CNCCS and the LMAS.
Primary Child-Care Choices
In both child-care surveys, parents were asked for the primary, sec
ondary, and tertiary choices of child care for each child. In this paper,
we focus on the primary child-care choice. Table 2 presents the distri
bution of primary child-care choices in the USNCCS and the full sam
ple of the CNCCS for children less than 13 years of age. Although
U.S. families who were surveyed were given different options than
Canadian families, we place choices into seven groups: care by a par
ent at home or at work, care by a relative in the child's home, care by a
relative outside the child's home, care by someone other than a relative
in the child's home, care by someone other than a relative outside the
child's home, center-based care, and other. 13
As Table 2 indicates, child-care choices are remarkably similar in
the two countries. 14 Canadian parents are slightly less likely to take
care of the children themselves or to use center care; they are slightly
more likely to use other types of care. Although the magnitude of the
differences is generally small, the sample sizes are large enough so that
all but one of the differences are statistically significant.
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Table 2 Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choices in Canada and the
United States, Children 0-12 Years Old
United States (%)
(7,578 children)

Canada (%)
(41,331 children)

Center

13.3

11.8

^-statistic3
3.6*

Parents

56.6

51.7

7.9*

Relative, in the
child's home

7.5

9.2

9.9*

Relative, outside the
child's home

7.5

7.8

0.9

Non-relative, inside
the child's home

3.1

5.8

11.7*

Non-relative, outside
the child's home

7.2

105

9.9*

Self-care and other

4.7

3.2

5.8*

Type of care

SOURCE: Statistics Canada's National Child Care Survey of 1988 and The Urban
Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a Mest that the probability is the same between countries. The chi-squared statistic for
the test of the hypothesis that the distributions are the same: 261.3*
* Difference between Canada and the United States is significant at the 5% level.

Although the primary choices are similar between the two coun
tries, there are some important underlying differences. Tables 3 and 4
show the choices of care by the age of the child and the mother's
employment status. From previous research, we know that mothers
who work full time are more likely to use center care, which tends to
be a more stable source of care. Mothers who do not work are gener
ally more likely to rely on their own care. We also expect child-care
arrangements to differ with the age of the child. Infants are more likely
to be cared for by their parents or by relatives or non-relatives in the
child's home. Older children are much more likely to be cared for in
centers.
According to Table 3, the most striking differences between Cana
dian and U.S. children are in center care and care provided by the par-
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Table 3 Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice by Child's Age in
Canada and the United States (%)
Type of care

<1 year old

1-2 years
old

3-4 years
old

5 years
old

Center
31.9
7.4
14.6
United States
21.6
31.8
48.6
2.2
9.2
Canada
4.9*
3.7*
f-statistic
0.0
14.6*
Parents
United States
41.1
49.4
60.6
50.1
24.7
54.8
43.6
Canada
32.2
2.8*
2.1*
^-statistic
1.4
11.7*
Relative, inside the child's home
4.3
8.0
6.6
United States
6.7
Canada
6.6
5.5
9.6
8.1
5.8*
2.5*
r-statistic
1.4
1.4
Relative, outside the child's home
8.1
United States
77
8.2
10.3
Canada
9.4
14.2
12.6
5.3
5.1*
2.1*
2.5*
^-statistic
1.7
Non-relative, in the child's home
United States
3.6
2.4
3.8
3.8
•
Canada
6.7
8.9
6.8
4.7
3.6*
5.6*
4.2*
^-statistic
1.0
Non-relative, outside the child's home
United States
10.0
12.6
10.4
8.6
Canada
12.5
17.6
13.2
11.2
3.4*
2.6*
2.1*
1.8
f-statistic
X2 statistic for null hypothesis
of same distributions
113.9*
61.7*
42.8*
215.7*
SOURCE: Statistics Canada's National Child Care Survey of 1988 and The Urban
Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
*Difference between the U.S. and Canadian percentages is significant at the 5% level.
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Table 4 Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choices by Mother's
Employment Status in Canada and the United States (%)
Type of care

Mothers
employed
full time

Mothers
employed
part time

Mothers not
employed

Center
United States
30.7
19.5
13.4
Canada
20.1
18.4
24.1
8.4*
/-statistic
10.5*
0.6
Parents
United States
23.3
46.3
69.2
Canada
21.0
48.3
35.5
6.9*
/-statistic
1.3
15.1*
Relative, inside the child's home
United States
6.6
5.4
6.2
Canada
8.8
6.2
8.9
3.7*
2.6*
/-statistic
1.2
Relative, outside the child's home
United States
12.1
10.3
5.5
Canada
11.9
10.3
10.2
6.5*
/-statistic
0.5
0.9
Non-relative, in the child's home
United States
3.2
2.7
3.6
Canada
9.4
8.6
5.4
9.5*
5.2*
9.0*
/-statistic
Non-relative, outside the child's home
United States
22.2
12.3
2.5
Canada
28.8
19.1
5.6
4.9*
5.8*
6.1*
/-statistic
X2 statistic for null hypothesis that
distributions are the same
218.8*
199.4*
294.7*
SOURCE: Statistics Canada's National Child Care Survey of 1988 and The Urban
Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990. Employment status was determined
by hours worked by the mother during the survey reference week, with full time
denned as 35 hours or more.
*Difference between the U.S. and Canadian percentages is significantly different at the
5% level.
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ents. Canadian preschool children of all ages are less likely than
corresponding U.S. children to receive parent care as their primary
care. Similarly, Canadian children who are less than 3 years old are
less likely to be cared for in centers than are their U.S. counterparts.
However, Canadian 5-year-olds receive quite different care than U.S.
5-year-olds. About twice as many 5-year-old children in Canada are in
center care as in parent care, while the proportions are reversed in the
United States. For infants, the difference in parental care is made up
for in Canada by use of relatives outside the child's home and non-rela
tives inside the child's home.
Table 4 compares the child-care choices for children who live with
their mothers and the hours worked by the mother in the week prior to
the interview. The differences are even more striking in this table.
While Table 2 indicates that Canadian families overall are slightly less
likely to use center care, Canadian mothers who work full time (30
hours or more per week) are much less likely to use center care than
U.S. mothers. Only about 20 percent of Canadian mothers who work
full time use center care, but more than 30 percent of U.S. mothers who
work full time use center care. Equally striking is that Canadian moth
ers who did not work are the most likely to use center care, and they
are almost twice as likely as nonworking U.S. mothers to use center
care. While Canadians overall use less parental care, this masks under
lying differences across employment status. Both Canadian and U.S.
mothers who work full time use parental care about 22 to 23 percent of
the time. 15 In contrast, U.S. mothers who are not employed are much
more likely to rely on their own care (69.2 vs. 48.3 percent).
Differences in use of center care partly reflect a difference in the
surveys. In the USNCCS, school was not considered a source of care
while, in the CNCCS, kindergarten was considered a source of care
and grouped with center care. Therefore, 5-year-old Canadian children
in kindergarten are considered to be in center care while 5-year-old
U.S. children in kindergarten are assigned their secondary source of
care. Likewise, Canadian children who are in kindergarten and who
have unemployed mothers are considered to be in center care, while
U.S. children who are in kindergarten and who have unemployed U.S.
mothers are probably listed as being cared for by their parents.
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Price of Child Care
Differences in regulations should affect the price of care in the two
countries. In addition, the very generous provincial subsidies to pro
viders of children in needy families should decrease the price of care
paid by parents in Canada. While the subsidies are paid only to
licensed providers, they might also lower prices for relative care and
unregulated day-care services because parents might be unwilling to
pay much for unlicensed care if licensed care is available and inexpen
sive.
Table 5 presents the results of tobit regressions of the price per
hour of care paid for nonparental care for the youngest child under 6 in
two-parent families. 16 The sample includes all families indicating that
a particular type of care was used as the primary care. However, the
sample is limited to the youngest child in each family since the most
accurate information is collected for these children. 17
According to these results, U.S. families paying for care paid 95
cents more per hour for center care, 72 cents more per hour for relative
care, and 38 cents more per hour for non-relative care. 18 Because we
use a tobit regression, these differences are most easily interpreted as
the difference in hourly payments among parents who pay for care. In
contrast, a simple comparison of mean hourly payments among parents
paying for care (not reported) indicates that the United States pays 75
cents more per hour for center care, 63 cents more for relative care, and
6 cents less for non-relative care.
According to the estimated coefficients, more stringent regulations
substantially affect the price of relative and non-relative care. Increas
ing the maximum children in regulated family care lowers the price of
relative and non-relative care by 20 and 6 cents per hour. In addition,
relative and non-relative care in states in which this maximum is not
specified are substantially cheaper. For center care, the child-to-staff
ratio has little effect, while allowing the group size to increase by one
child leads to a 1.8 cent increase in the hourly price.
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Table 5 Determinants of the Hourly Price of Child Care in Canada and
the United States, Youngest Child Under 6 in Two-Parent
Families (tobit estimates, standard errors in parentheses)
Variable
Intercept
U.S. family

Child-care regulations
Maximum children in regulated
family care
Maximum children in regulated
family care not specified
Maximum child-to-staff ratio
Maximum group size in center care
Maximum group size not regulated
Other variables
Age of child is under 1 year
Age of child is 1-2 years
Number of children under age 6 years
Number of children age 6-18 years
Lives in metropolitan area
Standard error of distribution

Relative care
0.3943
(0.6234)
0.7239
(0.4418)

Non-relative
care
1.6427*
(0.1193)
0.3848*
(0.0802)

-0.2067*
(0.0457)
-2.4423*
(0.7025)

-0.0601*
(0.0088)
-0.4168*
(0.1519)

-

-

_

_

_

_

_
0.0090
(0.0127)
0.0179*
(0.0039)
0.2020
(0.5049)

-1.4989*
(0.3552)
-0.4631
(0.2775)
-0.7705*
(0.2394)
-1.0957*
(0.1419)
-0.1755
(0.2490)
4.5356*
(0.1375)
3,163
1.74

0.1697*
(0.0687)
0.2044*
(0.0553)
-0.3034*
(0.0478)
-0.1300*
(0.0315)
0.3883*
(0.0515)
1.3246*
(0.0188)
3,511
1.56

0.1484
(0.1858)
0.4068*
(0.1269)
-0.5055*
(0.0995)
-0.0320
(0.0530)
0.1530
(0.0851)
1.9690*
(0.0342)
2,744
1.72

Number of observations
Average price of care (families
paying for care) ($)
Percentage of families paying for care
82.7
24.3
Log of likelihood function
-2,681
-5,100
* Significantly different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.

Center care
0.1354
(0.2660)
0.9451*
(0.1662)
_

71.7
-4,485
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THE EFFECTS OF TAX CREDITS AND PRICES ON
EMPLOYMENT AND CHILD-CARE CHOICES
As discussed previously, child-care tax subsidies are different in
the two countries, regulations are set by provinces and states, and prov
inces provide generous subsidies for children in needy families. These
differences in policy have some testable implications. Greater subsi
dies for child care should encourage mothers of young children to
work by expanding their choices of affordable child care. 19 Likewise,
those subsidies should increase the likelihood of using nonparental
care, which is often paid for. Stringent regulations should have the
opposite effect. If licensed providers must comply with stringent regu
lations, they will be forced to charge more for their services. Increased
prices for market child care would presumably lower the likelihood
that a mother with young children would work and that she would
choose market forms of care. This section attempts to test some of
these hypotheses more directly.
A Model of Employment and Child-Care Choices
A common approach to estimating child-care choices is to use a
multinomial logit model (see Duncan and Hill [1975] and Hofferth and
Wissoker [1992], for example). We use a similar approach. Specifi
cally, we assume that a mother chooses how much to work and which
child-care type to use to maximize her utility. 20 According to this
notion, the mother's decisions will be influenced by prices of various
child-care opportunities, her potential earnings and other income, her
preferences, and her ability to produce child care in the home. Assume
that the utility of the Mi individual, if she chooses employment state j
and child-care mode k, is given by

Vtjk = StJk <* + PA P, + w, Sw + N, §2jk + X&jk + ey*
where
plk is the price per hour of child care mode k for mother /,
wt is the mother's hourly wage rate,
N, is her nonlabor income, which we limit to spouse's income,21
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Sljk is the potential child-care tax credit she would receive if she
works at level j and chooses mode k 22
X, are other characteristics of the mother, and
£ljk is random component that is i.i.d. across mothers, modes of
care, and employment choices.
In this model, the explanatory variables can be classified into three
types. Tax-based child-care subsidies, which depend on both income
and the amount spent on care, vary by work state and child-care mode.
To identify the effects of subsidies, we force the effect of subsidies to
be the same across employment states and child-care modes. In other
words, an extra dollar of subsidy has the same effect on utility whether
the parent is considering using center care or relative care and whether
the parent is considering working full time or part time. It is the
amount of the potential subsidy that varies across these choices. The
price of child care is assumed to vary only by child-care mode, so its
effect is assumed to be constant within an employment state. That is, if
the cost of all forms of care increased by $1 per hour, it would not
affect the relative probabilities of choosing a particular type of care,
but it would affect the choice of how much the mother works because
working would entail higher expenses. No other variables differ by
child-care mode or employment state. These variables include eco
nomic factors, such as the hourly wage rate and other sources of
income, as well as demographic factors, such as the ages of the chil
dren. The contribution of these factors is assumed to vary from choice
to choice. For example, the effects on utility of having a 1-year-old
child will be different if the parent stays home and cares for the child
than if the parent works full time and puts the child in a center.
The mother chooses employment state j and child-care mode k if
Vljk>Vllm for all / and m. If the eyjk have an extreme value distribution,
the probability of working is given by the logistic distribution function.
To implement this model, we let j take on three values: 0 if the mother
did not work in the week prior to being interviewed, 1 if she worked
part time (fewer than 35 hours) in the week prior to being interviewed,
and 2 if she worked full time (35 or more hours in the week prior to
being interviewed).23 We let k take on four values: 0 for parent care, 1
for relative care, 2 for non-relative care, and 3 for center care.24
To identify the effects of prices, wages, and tax credits in this
model, we also assume:

56 Michalopoulos and Robins

Ptjk = bok + bi^ + b2kRegu + ul}k
w, = c0 + clXl + c^Age, + c ^Education l + v,

where
pljk is the price paid by family i, living in state/province j, choos
ing child care mode k,
ReglJ are child care regulations in i's state/province, and
Age and Education are used to represent the human capital of
mother i.
Under this specification, we identify the effects of prices by allow
ing local regulations to affect prices but not to directly affect employ
ment or child-care choices. We identify the effects of wages by
allowing age and education of the mother to affect only wages but not
employment or child-care choices directly.25
A number of calculations are necessary in order to estimate these
relationships. The price a family pays for child care is endogenous: the
family may choose to pay a high price in order to receive high quality
care. In addition, we do not know what a family would have had to pay
for types of care that it did not use. Therefore, we use the results of
Table 5 to predict the price of three types of child care: relative care,
non-relative care, and center care. First, we use the regression results
to predict an hourly price for each type of care. For all predictions, we
simulate the full distribution of prices by adding a random component
to each predicted price, drawn from a normal distribution. The addi
tion of these random components was originally suggested by Manski
and Lerman (1977) as a possible means of avoiding the inconsistency
of parameter estimates that results from using predicted values in a
nonlinear regression. Because we use tobit analysis, there is a natural
method of predicting whether a family would pay for care: if the pre
dicted price for a family is negative, we assume the family would
receive free care of that type.
We also predict wages for all women.26 We do this for several rea
sons. As for child-care prices, potential wage rates are not known for
mothers who do not work. In addition, we calculate wage rates in Can
ada from earnings and hours worked. Since this calculation introduces
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measurement error, an instrumental variable approach is indicated.
Finally, wage rates might be endogenous to employment decisions.
Women who choose to work full time are likely to receive higher
wages than those who work part time simply because employers will
offer higher wages to anyone who is willing to work full time. Women
who are receiving higher wages are likely to be those who are more
committed to the labor market, who have accumulated human capital
over time, and therefore are more likely to continue working regardless
of the wage they could receive.
The third calculation is of the potential tax-based subsidy for
which a family would be eligible. 27 As with prices and wages, this
measure is endogenous because it depends on child-care expenditures
and either total family income (in the United States) or earnings of one
of the parents (in Canada). Also, as with some prices and wages, the
tax-based subsidy for an individual is unobserved. To calculate the
tax-based subsidy, we assume that a mother will work either 0, 20, or
40 hours per week, depending on whether she does not work, works
part time, or works full time; we assume that she works each week of
the year; and we assume that she uses a particular child-care type for
all children under 6 for each hour that she works.28
This model focuses on the decisions of the mother, taking the deci
sions of other family members as given. In particular, only the earn
ings of the father are considered, and it is assumed to be exogenous.
This implies that the utility of other household members does not enter
directly into the decision-making process, an assumption that is valid if
family labor supply decisions are made sequentially, with the family
first determining the work status of the father, and then determining
hours supplied by the mother. In theory, the labor supply of a husband
and wife are likely to be made simultaneously. Mroz (1988), however,
provides some evidence that other income—primarily from the hus
band—is exogenous to the wife's labor supply.
Differences in Choices and Explanatory Variables by Country
Before turning to the econometric results, we present the distribu
tion of child-care and employment choices as well as the means of
explanatory factors used in the econometric analysis in Table 6. The
sample used in Table 6, as well as the econometric analysis, consists of
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Table 6 Sample Means of Variables Used in Econometric Analysis of
Child-Care and Employment Choices, Married U.S. and
Canadian Mothers of Children Under 6 Years Old
U.S. families

Canadian
families

33.8

26.9

Using center care

10.8

4.8

Using relative care

Variable
Distribution of employment and child-care choices
Percentage employed full time

6.5

5.9

Using non-relative care

8.5

10.2

Using parent care

8.0

6.0

19.1

22.9

3.6

3.8

Percentage employed part time
Using center care
Using relative care

3.5

4.2

Using non-relative care

2.8

6.7

Using parent care

92

8.2

Percentage not employed

47.1

50.1

Using center care

5.5

8.6

Using relative care

5.2

8.5

Using non-relative care

2.8

5.3

33.6

21.1

Center care

1.74

1.02

Relative

0.82

0.89

Non-relative

1.70

1.76

424

260

Using parent care
Predicted hourly price of care ($)

Predicted annual subsidy ($)
Full-time worker using center care
Full-time worker using non-relative

141

147

Full-time worker using relative

479

482

Part-time worker using center care

312

105

Part-time worker using non-relative

144

67

Part-time worker using relative

327

194
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Variable

U.S. families

Canadian
families

100.0

0.0

Child is less than 1 year old (%)

24.6

23.6

Child is 1-2 years old (%)

37.4

39.4

Number of children under age 6

1.40

1.40

Number of children age 6-12

0.56

0.52

U.S. family (%)

59

Husband's earnings (%)
$15,001-22,500

15.7

18.3

$22,501-30,000

18.0

29.2

$30,001-37,500

17.1

24.0

$37,501-45,000

9.7

11.5

20.9

8.3

$45,001 and higher
Black (U.S.A. only, %)

9.0

0.0

Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)

10.3

0.0

Lives in urban area (%)

41.1

79.5

0.0

21.6

10.37

9.76

Immigrant (Canada only, %)
Predicted wage ($)

two-parent families in which the youngest child is under age 6. Childcare choices are shown for the youngest child in these families, so that
each family enters the calculation only once. Knowing the differences
between countries will be useful in assessing the impact of various fac
tors on differences in employment and child-care choices in the two
countries.
The first part of Table 6 shows the percentage of mothers making
each of the 12 possible choices. This table differs from Table 4 in two
ways. First, the sample is different, consisting of choices for youngest
children under 6, whereas Table 4 shows results for all children under
6. Second, the first part of Table 6 shows the overall distribution of
choices, whereas Table 4 showed child-care choices given the mother's
employment status. According to the first part of Table 6, U.S. mothers
are more likely than Canadian mothers to work full time but less likely
to work part time or to not work. Most of the difference in full-time
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employment is reflected in the greater use of center care by full-time
working U.S. mothers (10.8 vs. 4.8 percent). Although fewer Canadian
mothers work full time, more work full time and use non-relative care
(10.2 vs. 8.5 percent). Likewise, while fewer U.S. mothers do not
work or work part time, more U.S. mothers both do not work and use
parent care (33.6 vs 27.7 percent) and work part time and use parent
care (9.2 vs. 8.2 percent), indicating that Canadian mothers working
less than full time are more likely to use other sources of care.
Table 6 next shows the mean predicted hourly price of care, by
type of care. The means in Table 6 include both families that are pre
dicted to pay nothing for care and those predicted to pay something.
According to Table 6, center care and non-relative care for the entire
sample are equally expensive, at about $1.70 per hour. Since relative
care is so often free, the cost of using relative care is about $1.00 less
per hour. While the means for center and non-relative care are similar
in the United States, Canadians are predicted to pay just over $1.00 for
center care—only about $0.10 more than for relative care—but still
pay $1.76 for non-relative care. Canadians are predicted to pay less,
on average, for center care because fewer Canadians are predicted to
pay anything for center care (49 vs. 69 percent, numbers not shown).
Table 6 then shows the mean of predicted tax-based subsidies for
six possible combinations of work (full-time and part-time) and child
care (center, non-relative, and relative). 29 Differences in subsidies
across countries reflect not only differences in prices but differences in
the tax structures of the two countries. First, full-time working Cana
dian mothers are predicted to receive lower subsidies if they use center
care because the price of center care is predicted to be lower in Canada.
However, full-time working Canadian mothers who use either relative
care or non-relative care are predicted to receive about the same taxbased subsidies as U.S. families. In contrast, Canadian mothers who
work part time are predicted to receive lower average subsidies regard
less of the type of care they use. This stems from the primary differ
ence in the tax code between the two countries: U.S. couples can file
jointly so that the wife's earnings in a two-earner family might be con
sidered fully taxable, whereas Canadian couples file individually, so
that a part-time working mother in Canada pays little tax (and hence
receives a lower child-care tax subsidy) after the nonrefundable per
sonal credit is deducted from her income.
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The remainder of Table 6 presents differences in other explanatory
factors. Several features are worth noting. The age distribution of chil
dren and the number of children is similar between countries. Roughly
one-quarter of the sample have children less than 1 year old and
roughly two-fifths have children between the ages of 1 and 2. Earn
ings of Canadian men are more equally distributed than earnings of
U.S. men. Among U.S. husbands, 18.6 percent earned less than
$15,000 per year, while 20.9 percent earned more than $45,000 per
year. In contrast, only 8.7 percent of Canadian husbands earned less
than $15,000 per year, and only 8.3 percent of Canadian husbands
earned more than $45,000 per year. This finding of greater inequality
in the United States corresponds with that of Blackburn and Bloom
(1993), who found that the variance of male annual earnings in the
United States in the late 1980s was about 10 percent higher than it was
in Canada (0.32 vs. 0.29). Finally, predicted wages are similar, with
U.S. women earning about 60 cents more per hour than Canadian
women.30
Determinants of Whether a Mother Works

Table 7 presents estimates of the effects of prices, income-tax
based subsidies, and demographic characteristics on the probability
that a mother in the sample worked full time, worked part time, and did
not work in the week prior to being interviewed. 31 The numbers in
Table 7 are the product of the derivative of the probability of working
times the mean difference in characteristics between women in the two
countries. The numbers give a sense of the expected impact of differ
ences in the average characteristics of the two samples and policies in
the two countries. Some characteristics might be important in explain
ing different choices by different families (i.e., have an estimated coef
ficient that is significantly different from zero) but still not be
important in explaining different average choices by country if families
in the two countries are similar with regard to these characteristics. On
the other hand, some characteristics might be quite different between
countries, but not important in explaining a family's choices, and again
not contribute to explaining the differences across countries. Only if a
characteristic meets both criteria—significantly explains an individual
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Table 7 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences on
the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice between Canada
and the United States, Married Mothers of Children Under 6
Years Olda
Probability
of working
full time

Probability
of working
part time

Probability
of not
working

6.91

-3.87

-3.04

9.06

-2.21

-6.85

0.11

-0.03

-0.07

Full-time worker using
non-relative

-0.01

0.00

0.01

Full-time worker using relative

-0.01

0.00

0.00

0.15

-0.05

-0.10

Variable
Percentage point difference in
probability between U.S. and
Canadian families
Estimated impact of
U.S. family (%)b
Annual subsidy (000's of dollars)
Full-time worker using center care

Part-time worker using center care
Part-time worker using
non-relative
Part-time worker using relative

-0.002

0.06

-0.04

-0.06

0.19

-0.13

-0.03

-0.01

0.05

Hourly price of care
Center care
Nonrelative

0.01

0.00

-0.01

Relative

0.01

0.00

-0.01

-0.09

-0.06

0.15

Child is 1-2 years old

0.04

0.00

-0.04

Number of children under age 6

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.13

-0.15

0.28
-0.89

Child is less than 1 year old

Husband's income
$15,001-22,500
$22,501-30,000

0.76

0.13

$30,001-37,500

0.35

0.18

-0.53

$37,501^0,000

0.14

0.07

-0.07

$40,001 and higher

-1.72

-1.17

2.89

Black (U.S.A. only, %)

1.23

-1.31

0.07
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Probability
of working
full time

Probability
of working
part time

Probability
of not
working

Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)

-0.49

-0.29

0.78

Lives in urban area (%)

-0.68

0.86

-0.18

Immigrant (Canada only, %)

-0.13

0.25-

0.11

0.12

0.09

-0.20

Variable

Predicted wage ($)

a Except for the first two rows, the data represent the product of the derivative of the
probability of working times the mean difference in characteristics between women
in the two countries. See text for a complete explanation and examples.
b Estimated average difference in behavior between countries from the regression (i.e.,
after controlling for prices, wages, etc.). See text for complete explanation.

family's choices and is substantially different between the two coun
tries—will it help explain different employment choices.
The interpretation of the results in Table 7 can be made clearer
using an example. The first row of Table 7 shows the raw differences
in behavior (as implied by Table 6). Thus, it indicates that the propor
tion of U.S. mothers working full time is nearly 7 percentage points
higher than it is for Canadian mothers, the proportion working part
time is nearly 4 percentage points lower in the United States than in
Canada, and the proportion of women not working in the United States
is about 3 percentage points lower than it is in Canada. The second
row of Table 7 shows the estimated average difference in behavior
between countries from the regression (i.e., after controlling for prices,
wages, and so on). As a result, the difference between the first row and
the second row indicates how much these economic and demographic
factors can explain different average choices in the two countries. The
estimates imply that U.S. mothers are 9 percentage points more likely
than Canadian mothers to work full time, nearly 7 percentage points
less likely to not work, and only about 2 percentage points less likely to
work part time. Thus, our model implies that if conditions and charac
teristics were the same in the two countries, the gap in full-time
employment and not working would be even bigger than it is now.
Subsidies and prices do not help explain different employment
probabilities, despite the fact that U.S. families using center care pay
substantially more than Canadian families and the fact that the tax-
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based subsidy is more generous for part-time working mothers. Since
subsidies are most different for families who use center care (because
prices of center care are most different between the two countries),
they have their largest effect on families who use center care. How
ever, even this effect is small. The greater subsidy available to women
employed full time and using center care would affect the difference in
the proportion working full time by only 0.11 percentage points and
the percentage not working by 0.07 percentage points. The greater sub
sidy available to women employed part time and using center care
would affect the difference in the proportion working full time by 0.15
percentage points and the proportion not working by 0.10 percentage
points. Likewise, differences in prices have virtually no effect, at most
changing the gap in the proportion not working by only 0.05 percent
age points.
Of the economic and demographic characteristics, only two have a
substantial impact on employment choices: having a spouse with earn
ings over $40,000 and being a black U.S. resident. U.S. women are
more likely to be married to men earning more than $40,000 per year.
If Canadian women were just as likely as American women to be mar
ried to such men, the proportion of women working full time would
decrease by 1.72 percentage points, the proportion working part time
would decrease by 1.17 percentage points, and the proportion not
working would increase by 2.89 percentage points. The other charac
teristic that has a substantial relationship to employment is race. If the
U.S. population were completely non-black, then about 1.2 to 1.3 per
cent would shift from full-time work to part-time work.
Determinants of Child-Care Choice

Tables 8 through 10 are analogous to Table 7, but they show which
factors affect the primary child care used for the youngest child in twoparent families with children under 6 years old for the various classes
of workers. The three tables show the predicted effects of various fac
tors on child-care choices of families with mothers who are employed
full time (Table 8), employed part time (Table 9), and not employed
(Table 10). In each table, child-care choices are placed into four cate
gories: care by the parent, care by another relative, non-relative care,
and center care.32
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Table 8 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences on
the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choices between Canada
and the United States, Families with Mothers Working Full Time
and Children under 6a

Variable
Percentage point difference in
probability between U.S. and
Canadian families

Probability
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using
of using non-relative of using
center care relative care
care
parent care
6.01

0.64

-1.74

2.03

7.77

-0.57

0.11

1.75

Full-time worker using
center care

0.14

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

Full-time worker using
non-reltive

0.00

-0.01

0.00

0.00

Full-time worker using
relative

0.00

0.00

-0.01

0.00

Part-time worker using
center care

-001

-0.01

-0.02

0.19

Part-time worker using
non-relative

0.00

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

Part-time worker using
relative

-0.01

-0.02

-0.02

-0.02

Estimated impact of
U.S. family (%)b
Annual subsidy (000's of
dollars)

Hourly price of care
Center care

-0.05

0.01

0.01

0.01

Non-relative

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

Relative

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

-0.03

-0.02

-0.02

-0.02

0.05

0.00

-0.03

0.01

Child is less than 1 year old
Child is 1-2 years old
Number of children under
age 6
Number of children age 6-12

0.00

0.00

000

0.00

-0.12

-0.17

-0.21

0.07
(continued)
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Table 8 (continued)

Variable

Probability
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using
of using non-relative of using
center care relative care
care
parent care

Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500

-0.01

-0.07

-0.04

-0.01

$22,501-30,000

0.03

0.07

0.23

0.44

$30,001-37,500

0.02

0.14

-0.11

0.30

0.02

0.06

$37,501-45,000

0.01

0.05

$45,001 and higher

-0.03

-0.59

-0.54

-0.57

Black (U.S.A. only, %)

0.36

1.07

-0.38

0.18

Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)

-0.18

0.44

-0.60

-0.15

Lives in urban area (%)

0.40

-0.35

-0.27

0.34

Immigrant (Canada only, %)

0.07

-0.37

0.16

0.01

Predicted wage

0.03

-0.05

0.09

0.04

a See Table 7 notes and the text for explanation of values.
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Table 9 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences on
the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice between Canada
and the United States, Families with Mothers Working Part Time
and Children under 6a

Variable
Percentage point difference in
probability between U.S. and
Canadian families

Probability
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using non-relative of using
of using
parent care
care
center care relative care
-022

-0.73

0.84

-2.70

-3.45

3.09

Full-time using center care

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

Full-time using non-relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.03

Estimated impact of
U.S. family
Annual subsidy (000's of
dollars)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Part-time using center care

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.02

Part-time using non-relative

0.07

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

0.24

-0.02

-0.02

Center care

-0.03

0.00

0.00

0.01

Non-relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

-0.01

Full-time using relative

Part-time using relative
Hourly price of care

-0.03

-0.01

Child is 1-2 years old

0.04

0.01

-0.04

-0.01

Number of children under
age 6

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.02

0.00

0.00

0.01

$15,001-22,500

-0.01

0.03

-0.06

-0.10

$22,501-30,000

0.02

0.09

-0.01

0.02

$30,001-37,500

-0.03

0.17

0.00

0.05

$37,501-40,000

-0.02

0.02

-0.05

-0.02

$40,001 and higher

-0.09

-0.57

-0.34

-0.17

Child is less than 1 year old

Number of children age 6-12
Husband's earnings
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Table 9 (continued)

Variable

Probability
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using
of using non-relative of using
center care relative care
care
parent care

Black (U.S.A. only, %)

-0.20

-0.20 .

-0.45

-0.45

Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)

-0.11

0.36

-0.30

-0.26

Lives in urban area (%)

-0.40

1.57

0.30

-0.62

Immigrant (Canada only, %)

0.18

-0.34

0.23

0.18

Predicted wage

0.04

-0.05

0.02

0.08

' See Table 7 notes and the text for explanation and examples.
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Table 10 Estimated Impact of Economic and Demographic Differences
on the Distribution of Primary Child-Care Choice Between
Canada and the United States Families with Mothers Not
Working and Children Under 6a

Variable
Percentage point difference in
probability between U.S. and
Canadian families

Probability
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using
of using non-relative of using
center care relative care
care
parent care
-3.08

-3.32

-2.48

5.92

-443

-6.99

-43.9

8.97

Full-time using center care

-0.02

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

Full-time using non-relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Full-time using relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Part-time using center care

-0.03

-0.02

-0.01

-0.05

Part-time using non-relative

-0.01

-0.01

0.00

-0.02

Part-time using relative

-0.02

-0.03

-0.02

-0.07

Center care

0.02

0.01

0.00

0.02

Non-relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Relative

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.14

0.11

0.04

0.14

Child is 1-2 years old

025

-0.10

-0.11

-0.08

Number of children under
age 6

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.07

0.10

0.06

0.34

$15,001-22,500

0.06

0.05

0.13

005

$22,501-30,000

-0.02

-0.13

-0.25

-0.49

$30,001-37,500

-0.18

-0.26

-0.02

-0.07

$37,501-40,000

-0.12

0.01

0.02

0.01

1.14

0.54

1.11

0.10

Estimated impact of
U.S. family
Annual subsidy (000's of
dollars)

Hourly price of care

Child is less than 1 year old

Number of children age 6-12
Husband's earnings

$40,001 and higher
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Table 10 (continued)

Variable

Probability
Probability Probability of using Probability
of using non-relative of using
of using
parent care
care
center care relative care

Black (U.S.A. only, %)

0.10

0.40

-0.07

-0.67

Hispanic (U.S.A. only, %)

0.01

1.56

-0.42

-0.36

Lives in urban area (%)

-1.04

1.72

0.19

-1.05

Immigrant (Canada only, %)

-0.06

0.21

-0.01

-0.25

-0.11

0.01

-0.14

Predicted wage

0.03

a See Table 7 notes and the text for explanation and examples.

The results in Tables 8 and 9 imply that economic and demo
graphic differences explain little of the differences between Canadian
and U.S. child-care choices. For example, U.S. mothers are about 6
percentage points more likely than Canadian mothers to work full time
and use center care. Economic and demographic differences alter this
gap by about 1.76 percentage points; if economic and demographic
characteristics were the same in the two countries, U.S. mothers would
be 7.77 percentage points more likely to work full time and use center
care. Among women working full time, only one factor explains even
a 1-percentage-point difference in choices: if all U.S. women were
non-black, then 1.07 percentage points fewer would work full time and
use relative care. Likewise, among women working part time, only
one factor explains even a 1-percentage-point difference in choices: the
greater concentration of Canadians in urban areas lowers the difference
in use of relative care by 1.57 percentage points and lowers the differ
ence in use of parent care by 0.62 percentage points
The model does a better job at explaining differences in choices of
care among women not working (Table 10). In particular, use of rela
tive care and parent care by mothers who do not work is quite different
after adjusting for demographics, prices, wages, and subsidies. The
most important demographic and economic characteristics appear to be
spouse's earnings, race, and urban status. If as many Canadian hus
bands had earnings of more than $40,000, the difference in use of cen
ter care and non-relative care would be about 1 percentage point
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greater. If no U.S. mother were black, the difference in use of relative
care and parent care would change by about two-thirds of a percentage
point. Likewise, if no U.S. mothers were Hispanic, the percentage
using relative care would change by about 1.5 percentage points, while
the percentage using non-relative care or parent care would change by
about two-fifths of a percentage point. If Canadians and U.S. popula
tions were equally urbanized, the difference in use of center care would
change by about 1 percentage point, while the use of relative care
would change by nearly 2 percentage points.

CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has used national child-care survey data in Canada
and the United States to compare employment and child-care choices
in the two countries. Government programs are similar in the two
countries. Both countries have nonrefundable subsidies for child care
that operate through the federal income tax system. In both countries,
states and provinces impose regulations on child-care providers with
respect to child-to-staff ratios, maximum center size, and screening
procedures.
Overall, the employment and child-care choices of Canadian fami
lies are quite similar to those of U.S. families. In both countries, about
40 percent of mothers do not work and nearly 20 percent of mothers
work part time. In both countries, more than 50 percent of parents pro
vide primary care for their children, about 10 percent use center care,
and about 15 percent use family care. However, Canadian families pay
substantially less for center care than U.S. families. In addition, the
subsidy through the federal tax system in Canada is somewhat more
generous to full-time workers than the federal tax credit in the United
States. We are unable to find strong evidence that subsidies and prices
are important determinants of employment and child-care choices in
the two countries. The factors that seem to be the most important
causes of differences in employment and child-care choices are the
husband's earnings (particularly in families where the husband earns
more than $40,000 per year), race/ethnicity, and geographic location.
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However, the bulk of the differences between the two countries are not
explained by the variables included in our empirical model.

Notes
We are grateful to a number of people who have assisted us in our effort: Sandra Hofferth and Shen Azer provided information on child-care regulations in the United
States; Susanna Gurr provided information on Canadian regulations and subsidies;
Paul Fronstin provided an extract of the Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey
and information on the federal and state income tax credits in the United States;
Michael Sivyer of Statistics Canada provided us with the Canadian National Child
Care Survey of 1988; and Lisa Powell linked the CNCCS with the LMAS. We also
wish to acknowledge extensive and helpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper by Charles Beach, Gordon Cleveland, and Jean Kimmel.
1

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

To infer the effects of subsidies on quality, Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfmkel
assume that the hourly price of child care is directly proportional to quality. This
is true only if child-care markets are perfectly competitive, if there are no differ
ences in costs from place to place, if parents have full information about the care
their children receive, and if quality is best measured by the parents' preferences
regarding alternative sources of care. In contrast, a child-development expert
might argue that quality can be measured only by looking at inputs which are
known to enhance the child's development. For an excellent overview of quality
and child care, see Blau (1991).
Because of its highly developmental nature, Head Start is not always placed in the
category of child-care programs.
Robins (1991) estimates that the U.S federal government spent about $550 mil
lion on the Title XX Social Serices Block Grant in 1985. The Consumer Price
Index increased 34.5 percent between 1985 and 1992. If expenditures have just
kept pace with inflation, Title XX grants would have totaled about $740 million in
1992.
These subsidies are the result of an income tax deduction, since child-care expen
ditures are deducted from taxable income.
For 1993, this was changed to a maximum deduction of $3,750 for each child
under the age of 7 and for each handicapped child under the age of 15, and up to
$2,250 for each child between the ages of 7 and 14.
The Canadian federal tax code does not allow joint returns. In a two-parent fam
ily, the parent with the lower income claims the child-care deduction. For the
analysis of this paper, we assume the mother is always the parent claiming the
deduction.
Not all families who are income eligible receive the subsidy described in Table 1.
First, the subsidy is not an entitlement; each province has a limited amount of
money allocated to subsidies Second, as the table implies, each province has a
maximum expenditure level that will be subsidized. Finally, each province has

Child Care and Labor Supply 73

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

social criteria for eligibility, such as requiring employment or training. As a
result, there is evidence that 80 percent of child-care subsidies goes to single-par
ent families.
The source for these numbers is Robins (1991), who reports state expenditures per
child under 18. since there are approximately two children under 12 for every
three children under 18, we multiplied the per-child expenditures by 1.5 to make
them comparable to the Canadian expenditures. In addition, the amounts have
been inflated by 34.5 percent to account for the change in the Consumer Price
Index between 1985 and 1992.
Stringent regulations are unlikely to affect the quality of child care if they are not
enforced. We have no information about the relative enforcement of regulations
in the two countries. In the United States, for example, Phillips and Mekos (1993)
compared regulations in Georgia, Virginia, and Massachusetts. While Massachu
setts had the most stringent regulations, its regulations were also most likely to be
ignored. Nevertheless, child-to-staff ratios and group sizes were lower in Massa
chusetts than in either Georgia or Virginia.
See Hofferth et al. (1991) for more details on this survey.
See Special Services Group of Statistics Canada (1992) for more information
regarding sampling techniques and information contained in the survey.
To be specific, we use the subsample from the LMAS only in estimating the rela
tionship between a mother's wages and her age, education, and location. The
results of this exercise are used to predict wages for the entire CNCCS sample,
allowing us to use the entire sample for the primary econometric analysis in the
following section on the effects of tax credits and prices.
Canadian families were asked to classify care as kindergarten, school program,
relative inside and outside the home, non-relative inside and outside the home,
center-based, respondent, respondent's spouse at work, respondent's spouse at
home, older sibling, and self-care. To arrive at our definitions, we defined center
care as care in a center, kindergarten, or school program; we included older sib
lings in relative care; and we defined parent care as care by the respondent or his
or her spouse. U.S families were given a broader range of choices. However,
preprocessing of the data by the Urban Institute resulted in classifications similar
to ours: center care, relatives outside the home, relatives inside the home, in-home
provider, family day care, parents, and others. For comparison with the Canadian
data, we equated in-home providers with non-relatives inside the home and family
day care with non-relative care outside the home. The USNCCS had one type of
care, lesson care, with no equivalent in the CNCCS. For children for which lesson
care was the primary mode of child care, we used the secondary mode of child
care. Since nearly all children in lesson care were school-age and since we focus
on preschool children in this paper, this difference should not substantially affect
our results.
In all statistical results in this paper, sample weights are used to make the results
indicative of national averages.
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15. This percentage might seem high, but two factors should be noted. First, parental
care includes care by the father when the mother is working. Therefore, this cate
gory includes couples who stagger their work hours so that one is always avail
able to provide care. In addition, some families with mothers who work full time
have fathers who work less than full time.
16. In these regressions we make no attempt to correct for selection bias. While Ribar
(1992) and Kimmel (1994) have both found that price equations are sensitive to
assumptions regarding selection bias, we are not confident that the standard cor
rection procedures provide more credible results. Note that the tobit model
accounts for the fact that many users of a particular form of care report a zero
price.
17. In addition, if we included all children, we would have an unbalanced panel. This
would add complexity to the estimation without yielding substantially different
results. In an unreported set of regressions, the sample was not limited to the
youngest child but included all children under 6. Results were nearly identical to
those reported.
18. By grouping Canadian kindergartners into center care but U.S. kindergartners into
parent care, we are probably exaggerating the differences in cost of center care
between the two countries.
19. In addition, greater subsidies might increase the gross cost of care, leaving the
average net cost the same. Thus, it is possible that subsidies would have only a
distributional effect in a general equilibrium setting. The model estimated in this
paper does not address this issue.
20. Either parent could provide parent care. Since most parents who stay out of the
labor force to care for their children are women, we focus on the mothers' deci
sions.
21. We limit nonlabor income to spouse's income for two reasons. First, the two pri
mary alternative sources of income, asset income and welfare, are clearly endoge
nous to the mother's employment choice. Second, spouse's income is the only
nonlabor income included in both surveys.
22. A number of previous studies have assumed that price of child care or the hourly
subsidy affects the decision by lowering the net hourly wage rate. This is equiva
lent to forcing the parameter on price or the subsidy in our specification to be
equal in magnitude, but opposite in sign, to the parameter on the wage rate. In
contrast, our specification is more general and does not impose this restriction.
23. This procedure limits our analysis to the extensive margin, i.e., whether a mother
works and, if she does work, whether she works part time or full time. An inter
esting question is whether child-care prices and subsidies also affect the intensive
margin, i.e., how many hours a working mother works. Powell (1997), for exam
ple, finds that, for Canadian women, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to
child-care prices is greater than the elasticity of participation.
24. Relative care includes relative care inside and outside the child's home. Family
day care is defined as non-relative, noncenter care inside or outside the child's
home.
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25. In addition, our predictions of wages and prices do not correct for selection, i.e.,
the possibility that workers might receive higher wage offers than nonworkers and
that parents using a type of care might face lower prices than other parents. Other
research (Chaplin et al. 1996) has suggested that results are sensitive to variables
used to identify selection equations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to test the
sensitivity of estimates to alternative selection procedures. Nonetheless, our
results should be suggestive of the relative effects of prices, wages, and tax subsi
dies on employment and child-care choices.
26. To predict wages, we use the estimated wage regression presented in Table Al (p.
79). As in the case of prices, we add a random component to each predicted wage
to simulate the full distribution of wages.
27. To measure the effects of subsidies, we focus on the federal child-care tax subsi
dies in both countries. In particular, we ignore the state tax credits in the United
States' and Canada's provincial subsidies to providers of children in needy fami
lies. In addition, we ignore the direct effects of the many subsidies paid directly
to providers. To the extent that these subsidies lower child-care prices paid by
families, differences between subsidies will be reflected in differences in prices
between the two countries. The effect of prices on child-care and employment
choices will, therefore, include the indirect effect of subsidies paid to providers.
28. A common justification for assuming that women work either 0, 20, or 40 hours is
that about three-fourths of all women either do not work or work exactly 40 hours
per week. See, for example, Fraker and Moffitt (1988) or Hoynes (1993) for more
discussion of the reasonableness of this assumption.
29. Predicted subsidies for nonworkers are zero since the tax-based subsidy in both
countries requires recipients to work. In addition, we assume that parent care is
free so that the tax-based subsidy would be zero for any family using parent care.
30. See Table Al (p. 79) for the wage regression used to predict wages. In this regres
sion, the effects of age and education are constrained to be the same for Canadian
and U.S. women. However, an alternative specification was tried in which age
and education were allowed to have different effects on wages in the two coun
tries. This specification produced the same conclusion that U.S. women earn
somewhat more than Canadian women. In addition, a specification test could not
reject the simpler, constrained specification in favor of the more general specifica
tion.
31. Results of the logit regression are presented in Tables A3-A5, pp. 81-86.
32. In these tables, parent care is defined as any care by either parent, either in the
home or at the place of work. Relative care is defined as care provided by a
grandparent, sibling, or other nonparental relative. Informal non-relative care is
care at a family day-care provider or care in the child's home. The excluded
choice is parent care.
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Table Al OLS Regression of the Log of Hourly Wage for Mothers in the
United States and Canada3
Variable
Parameter estimate
Intercept
1.2031*
(0.2278)
U.S.
0.1840*
(0.1856)
Education
High school degree
0.1360*
(0.0537)
Some post-secondary education
0.3357*
(0.0557)
Post-secondary education
0.6719*
(0.0584)
University degree
1.0678*
(0.0646)
Age
20-24 years old
0.1749
(0.1334)
25-34 years old
0.2700*
(0.1267)
35-44 years old
0.3457*
(0.1274)
45 years old and older
0.3704*
(0.1392)
Lives in metropolitan area
0.1824*
(0.0259)
Race/ethnicity
French is native language
-0.0518
(0.3254)
Neither English nor French is native language
-0.0884
(0.4543)
Black
-0.0180
(0.0371)
Hispanic
-0.0215
(0.0480)
R2
0.2091
a Number of observations: 2,963, standard errors in parentheses.
* Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table A2 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary ChildCare and Employment Parameters Related to Child-Care
Prices and Tax-Based Subsidies, Married Mothers of Children
under 6 in the United States and Canada3
____________Variable _________ ______Estimate____
Annual subsidy (000's of dollars)
0.3004*
(0.0737)
Hourly price of care
Non-relative care

0.0012
(0.0096)

Relative care

-0.0126
(0.0146)

Center care

-0.0259

_________________________________(0.0165)_____
SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1998, Labour Market Activity Sur
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a In the United States, if the primary care is listed as lesson, then the secondary care is
used as primary care. The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers.
The intercept includes white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in fami
lies with less than 20,000 Can$ in income. Standard errors in parentheses.
*Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table A3 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary ChildCare and Employment Parameters for Full-Time Employment,
Married Mothers of Children under 6 in the United States and
Canada3
Variable
Intercept
American family

Center
care
-0.5805*
(0.2030)
1.0308*
(0.1129)

Relative
care
-0.3687*
(0.1724)
-0.3582*
(0.1234)

Non-relative
care

-2.3369*
(0.1709)
-0.1661*
(0.1029)

-0.8933*
(0.1142)

-0.8426*
(0.1138)

-0.1805
(0.0928)

-0.7955*
(0.0940)
-0.0464
(0.0752)

-0.5895*
(0.1022)
-0.8269*
(0.0700)

-0.2372*
(0.0761)

0.3096*
(0.0622)

-0.5886
(0.0593)

-0.5409
(0.0495)

-0.0416
(0.0653)
-0.0447
(0.0477)

0.4466*
(0.1337)
-0.2811*
(0.1314)
-0.3914*
(0.1446)
-0.4675*
(0.1885))
-0.1992*
(0.2181)
1.4145*
(0.3054)
0.6315*
(0.2819)

0.2443*
(0.1203)
-0.4234*
(0.1146)

-0.2507
(0.1470)
-0.2615*
(0.0996)

Parent
care
-0.7120*
(0.1473)
0.0194
(0.1093)

Age of child
Less than 1 year
1-2 years

-0.3122
(0.0859)

Number of children
Under age 6
Aged 6-12
Husband's earnings
$15,001-22,500

0.2646
(0.1589)

$22,501-30,000

-0.2756
(0.1491)

$30,001-37,500

-0.1163
(0.1547)

$37,501^5,000

-0.1592
(0.1850)

More than $45,000

-0.1152
(0.1833)
1.2046*
(0.2815)

Black (U.S.A.)
Hispanic (U.S.A.)

-0.7588
(0.4077)

-0.1261
(0.1431)
-0.6815*
(0.1564)

0.1508
(0.1137)
-0.9022*
(0.1130)
-0.9159*
(0.1276)
-0.6818*
(0.1580)
-1.1537*
(0.1846)

-0.2817
(0.4567)
-0.9469*
(0.3531)

0.6334
(0.3371)
-0.1404
(0.3116)

0.1245
(0.1203)
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Variable
Immigrant (Canada)
Lives in urban area

Center
care
0.2664*
(0.0988)

0.0125
(0.0857)

-0.1587
(0.1403)

0.2010
(0.1233)

Relative
care

Non-relative
care
-0.1931*
(0.0685)

Parent
care
0.0830
(0.0767)

-0.1300
-0.0503
(0.1094)
(0.1155)
0.0217*
0.0260*
Predicted wage
-0.0018
0.0286
(0.0050)
(0.0041)
(0.0055)
(0.0050)
SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1988, Labour Market Activity Sur
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. The intercept includes
white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in families with less than
$15,000 in income. All amounts are in U.S. dollars. Standard errors are in parenthe
ses.
* Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table A4 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary ChildCare and Employment Parameters for Part-Time Employment,
Married Mothers of Children under 6 in the United States and
Canada3
Center
care
-0.9142*
(0.2568)

Non-relative
Parent
care
care
-0.4065*
-0.2254*
(0.1862)
(0.1439)
-0.0650*
0.0746
(0.1434)
(0.0985)

-0.0196
(0.1494)

Relative
care
-0.5023*
(0.1871)
-0.9784*
(0.1477)

-2.0560*
(0.2421)
-0.9927*
(0.1299)

-0.6901*
(0.1259)
-0.2326*
(0.1050)

-0.6000*
(0.1124)
-0.0978
(0.0894)

-0.6967*
(0.0959)
-0.1247
(0.0770)

-0.5979*
(0.1325)
-0.2719*
(0.1671)

-0.1547*
(0.0784)
-0.1801*
(0.0617)

0.1485*
(0.0676)
-0.1798*
(0.0536)

-0.0500
(0.0555)
-0.1719*
(0.0408)

$15,001-22,500

0.1891
(0.2124)

0.4262*
(0.1608)

$22,501-30,000

-0.2552
(0.1943)

$30,001-37,500

-0.1779
(0.1995)

0.5396*
(0.1192)
-0.2031*
(0.1163)
-0.1362*
(0.1207)

$37,501-45,000

-0.3939
(0.2180)

More than $45,000

-0.2642
(0.2302)

0.1072*
(0.1486)
-0.3394*
(0.1450)
-0.5552*
(0.1516)
-0.2548*
(0.1893)
-0.5098*
(0.2120)
1.1811*
(0.7552)
0.6510*
(0.3888)

Variable
Intercept
U.S. family
Age of child
Less than 1 year
1-2 years
Number of children
Under age 6
Aged 6-12
Husband's earnings

Black (U.S.A.)

-0.7657
(0.7528)

Hispanic (U.S.A.)

-0.2852
(0.4654)

-0.1669
(0.1541)
0.0366
(0.1576)
-0.3965*
(0.1771)
-0.5806*
(0.1936)

-0.1944
(0.1463)
-0.2548
(0.1516)

-1.223
(12.7576)

-0.7704
(0.5349)

-0.4677
(0.6071)

-0.2971
(0.3026)
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Variable
Immigrant (Canada)
Lives in urban area
Predicted wage

Center
care
0.2852*
(0.1109)

Relative
care
-0.7443*
(0.0920)

Non-relative
care
-0.2205*
(0.0814)

Parent
care
0.1381*
(0.1684)

-0.3232
(0.1742)
0.0301*
(0.0059)

0.2255
(0.1440)

-0.2199
(0.1224)
0.0150*
(0.0051)

-0.1610
(0.1035)
0.0270*
(0.0044)

-0.0065
(0.0059)

SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1988, Labour Market Activity Sur
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. The intercept includes
white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in families with less than
$15,000 in income. All amounts are in U.S dollars. Standard errors are in parenthe
ses.
*Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.
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Table AS Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Choice of Primary
Child-Care and Employment Parameters for Non-Employment,
Married Mothers of Children under 6 in the United States and
Canada3
Center
care
-0.7914*
(0.1743)
-0.8638*
(0.1328)

Relative
care
-0.5535*
(0.1492)
-1.4702*
(0.1286)

-3.1277*
(0.2273)
-0.6654*
(0.1060)

0.4283*
(0.0955)
-0.3516*
(0.0899)

-0.6000*
(0.1124)

-0.3822*
(0.0803)
-0.3015*
(0.0465)

-0.1452*
(0.0558)
-0.0344
(0.0478)

0.1485*
(0.0676)
-0.1798*
(0.0536)

-0.1105
(0.0671)

$15,001-22,500

-0.1649
(0.1485)

-0.1140
(0.1223)

0.4262*
(0.1608)

0.9716*
(0.1699)

$22,501-30,000

-0.1679
(0.1387)

-0.1669
(0.1541)

-0.1633
(0.1549)

$30,001-37,500

0.2190
(0.1424)
-0.6359*
(0.1615)
-0.6979*
(0.1704)

-0.0456
(0.1171)
0.3070*
(0.1224)

0.0366
(0.1576)
-0.3965*
(0.1771)
-0.5806*
(0.1936)

-0.0271
(0.1580)

-1.223
(12.7576)

-0.2223
(0.7468)

-0.4677
(0.6071)

-0.7703
(0.6106)

Variable
Intercept
U.S. family

Non-relative
Parent
care
care
-0.4065*
-1.4899*
(0.1862)
(0.1976)
1.3608*
-0.0650*
(0.1434)
(0.1591)

Age of child
Less than 1 year
1-2 years

-0.0978
(0.0894)

0.1206
(0.1205)
-0.6368*
(0.1039)

Number of children
Under age 6
Aged 6-12

-0.0441
(0.0562)

Husband's earnings

$37,501^5,000
More than $45,000
Black (U.S.A.)

-0.4580
(0.4669)

Hispanic (U.S.A.)

-0.0916
(0.3993)

-0.0633
(0.1572)
-0.3329*
(0.1588)
0.9153*
(0.3800)
1.0764*
(0.2853)

-0.1957
(0.1809)
0.8899*
(0.1799)
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Variable
Immigrant (Canada)
Lives in urban area
Predicted wage

Center
care
0.2447*
(0.0827)

Relative
care
-0.5125*
(0.0699)

-0.0213
(0.1070)
0.0163*
(0.0047)

0.1400
(0.1132)
-0.0094
(0.0050)

Non-relative
Parent
care
care
-0.2205*
-0.1843*
(0.0814)
(0.0896)
-0.2199
-0.0372
(0.1224)
(0.1209)
0.0150*
0.0113*
(0.0051)
(0.0055)

SOURCE: Canadian National Child Care Survey of 1988, Labour Market Activity Sur
vey of 1988, and The Urban Institute's National Child Care Survey of 1990.
a The omitted category is parent care for nonworking mothers. The intercept includes
white non-Hispanic, Canadian children 3-5 years old in families with less than
$15,000 in income. All amounts are in U.S. dollars. Standard errors are in parenthe
ses.
*Different from 0 at the 5% confidence level.

2 An Economic Model of
Employee Benefits
and Labor Supply
An Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System
Paul Fronstin
Employee Benefit Research Institute

Employee benefits that are voluntarily provided by employers have
become a major source of income for workers in the United States. In
1960, employee benefits accounted for 8 percent of total compensa
tion, with pensions and health insurance accounting for 3.4 percent.
By 1993, employee benefits accounted for 18 percent of total compen
sation, or $673.6 billion, with pensions and health insurance account
ing for 10.3 percent (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1995).
Among firms most likely to offer employee benefits, the percentage is
even higher. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1995) found that the
average payment for pension plans and health insurance was 17.6 per
cent of payroll in 1994.
Pension plans are one of the most popular employee benefits pro
vided by employers. According to Table 1, 60 percent of all wage and
salary workers in 1993 were employed by an employer that sponsored a
pension plan. While 79 percent of wage and salary workers participated
in the pension plan when their employer sponsored a plan, only 47 per
cent of all wage and salary workers participated in a pension plan
because some employers did not offer a pension plan, some workers did
not qualify to participate in a pension plan, and some workers voluntar
ily choose not to participate. Of those participating in a pension plan,
54 percent were included in a defined-benefit plan, while 62 percent
were included in a defined-contribution plan. Almost 25 percent partic
ipated in both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans.
Employer sponsorship and employee participation in a pension
plan varies across demographic variables and job characteristics. Table
1 indicates that older workers are more likely to work for an employer

87

Table 1 Employer Sponsorship and Employee Participation in Pension Plans
Of those
participating

Sponsored
Sponsorship
rate

Participation
rate

participation
rate

Defined
benefit

Defined
contribution

Not
determinable

0.60

0.47

0.79

0.54

0.62

0.14

0.43

0.16

0.38

0.37

0.59

0.18

25-34

0.59

0.44

0.73

0.49

065

0.14

35-44

0.64

0.55

0.86

0.57

0.62

0.13

45-54

0.65

0.59

0.90

0.57

061

0.13

55-64

0.59

0.52

0.88

0.59

0.58

0.14

Married

0.62

0.52

0.84

0.55

0.63

0.13

Widowed

0.58

0.49

0.84

0.53

0.57

0.19

Divorced

0.63

0.52

0.83

0.57

059

0.14

Separated

0.56

0.44

0.78

0.50

0.53

0.19

Never married

0.52

032

0.62

0.49

0.61

0.15

White

0.61

0.49

0.80

0.55

0.64

0.13

Black

0.62

0.47

0.75

0.51

0.50

0.20

Variable
Total
Age
18-24

Marital status

Race

Hispanic

0.43

0.31

0.73

0.50

0.51

0.21

Other

0.55

0.41

0.75

0.52

0.63

0.15

Some school

0.36

0.25

0.69

045

0.48

0.21

High school

0.58

0.45

0.77

0.53

0.59

0.15

College

0.71

0.59

0.82

0.55

0.70

0.10

Graduate school

0.79

0.70

0.88

0.63

0.66

0.10

Male

0.59

0.49

0.83

0.55

0.64

0.13

Female

0.62

0.45

0.74

0.54

0.59

0.14

0

0.64

0.52

0.82

0.55

063

0.13

1

0.60

0.48

0.80

0.55

0.61

0.14

2

0.60

0.47

0.79

0.53

0.62

0.14

3 or more

0.52

0.38

0.73

0.53

0.60

0.15

Covered

0.90

0.82

0.91

0.68

0.47

0.13

Not covered

0.54

0.41

0.75

0.49

0.68

0.14

0.68

0.54

0.80

0.55

0.66

0.12

Education

Gender

Number of children

Union contract

Occupation
White collar

Table 1 (continued)
Of those
participating

Sponsored
Sponsorship
rate

Participation
rate

participation
rate

Defined
benefit

Defined
contribution

Not
determinable

Blue collar

0.42

0.28

0.67

0.55

0.45

0.19

Service collar

0.52

0.42

0.81

0.52

0.56

0.15

Firm size
1-24

0.17

0.14

0.82

0.35

0.62

0.15

25^9

0.43

0.32

0.75

0.42

0.60

0.15

50-99

0.59

0.46

0.77

0.44

0.63

0.12

100-249

0.70

0.55

0.79

0.48

0.59

0.13

250 or more

0.87

0.70

0.80

0.59

0.63

0.13

Agriculture, forestry, & fishing

015

0.13

0.84

0.52

0.67

0.15

Mining

0.75

0.69

0.93

0.52

0.75

0.13

Construction

0.35

0.31

0.88

0.56

0.49

0.15

Manufacturing

0.75

0.64

0.85

0.54

0.68

0.13

Transportation, communications,
& utilities

0.73

0.63

0.86

0.59

0.66

0.14

Wholesale trade

0.57

0.48

0.84

043

0.71

0.14

Variable

Industry

0.61

0.37

0.63

0.17

Retail trade

0.41

Finance, insurance, & real estate

0.71

0.57

0.80

0.52

0.75

0.14

Personal services

0.23

0.13

0.57

0.43

0.49

0.21

Business & repair services

0.33

0.25

0.74

0.36

0.82

0.10

Entertainment services

0.38

0.24

0.62

0.55

0.63

0.14

0.25

Professional & related services

0.71

0.54

0.76

0.56

0.54

0.13

Public administration

0.93

0.85

0.91

0.71

0.51

0.13

Part-time

0.41

0.15

0.37

0.48

0.54

0.15

Full-time

0.63

0.53

0.84

0.55

0.62

0.14

Hours of work

SOURCE: Employee Benefits Supplement to the 1993 Current Population Survey.
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that sponsors a pension plan, more likely to participate in that pension
plan, and more likely to have a defined-benefit plan than younger
workers. Not surprisingly, differences in sponsorship and participation
also occur across family type, race, education, gender, unionization,
occupation, firm size, industry, and hours of work.
Health insurance is another employee benefit that many employers
offer to workers. According to Table 2, 74 percent of wage and salary
workers were employed by an employer that sponsored a health insur
ance plan in 1993, and 58 percent of all workers participated in a health
insurance plan. Of the 79 percent that participated in their employer's
health insurance plan, 40 percent have coverage only for themselves,
while 60 percent also have coverage for a family member. 1 Table 2
also shows the probability of participating in a health insurance plan
and the type of plan for various demographic variables and workrelated attributes.
Theoretically, workers demand employee benefits from their
employer for numerous reasons. First, preferential tax treatment of
employee benefits reduces the price of the benefits to both employers
and employees and is thus expected to increase the demand for
employee benefits. However, the evidence regarding the effect of pref
erential tax treatment on employee benefits is mixed. Using cross-sec
tional data, Alpert (1983), Clain and Leppel (1989), and Woodbury and
Bettinger (1991) found positive effects of preferential tax treatment on
the demand for employee benefits. However, Turner (1987) found that
employees do not demand a greater number of tax-preferred employee
benefits when taxes increase. In addition, Vroman and Anderson
(1984) and Alpert (1987) did not find significant positive tax effects on
employee benefit growth when using time-series analysis. Second,
group purchasing results in lower prices for health insurance than an
individual would obtain in the marketplace. Third, the existence of
economies of scale in the provision of employee benefits makes it more
efficient (less costly) to provide savings vehicles for retirement and
health insurance through the workplace (Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
Employers have sound reasons for providing employee benefits.
Many workers have strong preferences for employee benefits. As a
result, competition in the labor market will force firms to provide
employee benefits. Firms that do not offer the wage/benefit packages
that workers desire can experience higher turnover rates as well as dif-

Table 2 Employer Sponsorship and Employee Participation in Health Plans, by Type of Plan
Of those participating

Sponsorship
rate

Participation
rate

Sponsored
participation
rate

0.74

0.58

0.79

0.40

0.60

18-24

0.62

034

0.55

0.75

0.25

25-34

0.76

060

0.79

0.45

0.55

35^4

0.77

0.63

0.82

0.30

0.70

45-54

0.76

0.64

0.85

0.34

0.66

55-64

0.71

0.59

0.84

0.39

0.61

Married

0.75

0.59

0.79

0.20

0.80

Widowed

0.71

0.59

0.84

0.69

0.31
0.38

Variable
Total

Single
coverage

Family
coverage

Age

Marital Status

Divorced

0.77

0.69

0.89

062

Separated

0.73

0.58

0.79

0.46

0.54

Never married

0.69

0.52

0.75

0.89

0.11

White

0.75

0.59

0.79

0.39

0.61

Black

0.76

0.62

0.81

0.44

0.56

Race

Table 2 (continued)
Of those participating

Sponsorship
rate

Participation
rate

Sponsored
participation
rate

Hispanic

0.60

0.47

0.77

0.41

0.59

Other

0.73

0.58

0.79

0.45

0.55

Some school

0.53

0.39

0.73

0.41

0.59

High school

0.73

0.57

0.78

0.39

0.61

College

0.82

0.68

0.82

0.43

0.57

Graduate school

0.87

0.76

0.87

0.35

0.65

Male

0.73

0.63

0.86

0.33

0.67

Female

0.74

0.53

0.72

0.49

0.51

0

0.77

0.64

0.83

0.54

0.46

1

0.75

0.60

0.81

0.39

0.61

2

0.74

0.56

0.77

0.27

0.73

3 or more

0.68

0.50

0.74

0.31

0.69

0.95

0.86

0.90

0.31

0.69

Variable

Single
coverage

Family
coverage

Education

Gender

Number of children

Union contract
Covered

0.70

0.53

0.76

0.42

0.58

White collar

0.81

0.64

0.79

0.41

0.59

Blue collar

0.56

0.37

0.66

0.47

0.53

Service collar

0.67

0.57

0.84

0.34

0.66

Firm size
1-24

0.35

0.27

0.76

0.45

0.55

25^9

0.76

0.55

0.72

0.47

0.53

50-99

0.84

0.64

077

0.44

0.56

100-249

0.87

0.68

0.78

0.44

0.56

250 or more

0.94

0.77

0.82

0.36

0.64

Agriculture, forestry, & fishing

0.30

0.24

0.80

0.36

0.64

Mining

0.91

0.85

0.93

0.16

0.84

Construction

0.50

0.41

083

0.32

0.68

Manufacturing

0.89

0.79

0.89

0.33

0.67

& utilities

0.85

0.75

0.88

0.29

0.71

Wholesale trade

0.79

0.68

0.86

0.38

0.62

Retail trade

0.60

0.38

0.63

0.49

0.51

Not covered
Occupation

Industry

Transportation, communications,

Table 2 (continued)
Participation
rate

Single
coverage

Family
coverage

0.82

0.66

0.80

0.42

0.58

0.36

0.25

0.70

054

0.46

Finance, insurance, & real estate
Personal services

Variable

Of those participating

Sponsored
participation
rate

Sponsorship
rate

Business & repair services

0.55

0.41

0.75

0.49

0.51

Entertainment services

0.56

0.37

0.66

0.54

0.46

Professional & related services

0.82

0.61

0.74

0.45

0.55

Public administration

0.97

0.85

0.88

0.38

0.62

Part-time

0.51

0.16

0.32

0.49

0.51

Full-time

0.78

0.66

0.85

0.39

0.61

Hours of work

SOURCE: Employee Benefits Supplement to the 1993 Current Population Survey.
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ficulties recruiting workers. Virtually all studies on labor mobility con
clude that pension plans significantly reduce turnover rates (B artel and
Borjas 1977; Gustman 1990; Ippolito 1986; McCormick and Hughes
1984; Mitchell 1982; Mitchell 1983). 2 Employers also have an eco
nomic incentive to offer pension plans to reduce their hiring and train
ing costs. If an employer's objective is to increase job tenure among
workers, employers have an added incentive to increase their invest
ment in training, which will increase the overall productivity of their
work force. In addition, health insurance plans may improve the health
and productivity of workers, potentially lowering the firm's rate of
absenteeism. Along the same lines, the provision of child care facili
ties can also reduce the incidence of absenteeism. 3
While previous research has contributed to our understanding of
employee benefits, many studies have not fully utilized theoretical or
econometric techniques in developing a framework for studying
employee benefits and their role in the labor market. In addition, data
problems have led some authors to make conclusions that conflict with
economic theory. For example, Smith and Ehrenberg (1983) attempted
to estimate the trade-off between wages and employee benefits but
failed to find a trade-off because of data problems. In fact, most stud
ies using micro-level data find a positive relationship between wages
and employee benefits, mostly because they do not have adequate data
and can not control for all of the variables that affect employee bene
fits. However, studies using more aggregated data have found a trade
off (Woodbury 1983; Woodbury and Huang 1991).
One reason for the various shortcomings in the employee benefits
literature may be model misspecification. Traditionally, in the simple
static model of labor supply, labor-force participation decisions are
assumed to be a function of hourly wages, nonwage income, and per
sonal characteristics. However, what ultimately matters to workers is
the total compensation they receive per unit of time worked, along with
the quality of basic working conditions. In this paper, the simple static
model of labor supply is extended to include the demand for employee
benefits. Unlike previous work, which has focused on specific aspects
of employee benefits, the model presented in this paper is flexible
enough to take into account all types of employee benefits. A unique
feature of the model is that labor supply is estimated jointly with the
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demand for employee benefits, using Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Equations with a correction for selectivity bias.
The chapter is organized into sections that develop the theoretical
model, present the empirical model, describe the data set and the con
struction of the variables, discuss the empirical results, and provide a
summary.

THEORETICAL MODEL
We assume that an individual receives earned income, Y, for time
worked, and has unearned income, Yn. Earned income and unearned
income are used to purchase market goods and services, G, such that:
Y + Yn =pg G,

(1)

where pg represents the market price of goods and services.
Earned income is equal to the individuals potential hourly wage
rate4 (pw) (net of taxes) multiplied by the number of hours worked (H)
minus the employer's and employee's contribution to employee bene
fits:
Y = pwH-pz B,

(2)

where Y equals wH(l - f), pw is equal to w(l - f) + B/H, t represents the
marginal tax rate, pz represents the shadow price of employee benefits,5
and B represents the quantity of employee benefits consumed by the em
ployee. In Eq. 2, Y represents after-tax, take-home income that the
worker can freely spend to purchase market goods and services and/or
employee benefits. Employee contributions to employee benefits are
subtracted from potential take-home income because these contributions
come out of the workers potential take-home wage in order to take
advantage of lower prices via economies of scale, group purchase, and
the preferential tax treatment.
Firms hire additional workers until the workers marginal revenue
product is equal to the workers total compensation rate, where total
compensation is equal to the sum of wages and the monetary value of
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employee benefits. We assume that employers are indifferent to the
composition of total compensation, but adjustments are not costless.
As a result, workers face a trade-off between wages and employee ben
efits (assuming total compensation is constant across workers with
equal human capital).
Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 gives us:
Pw H-pz B+Yn =pgG.

(3)

Individuals are also subject to a time constraint:
(4)

T = L + H,

where T represents total available time and L represents leisure time.6
Solving Eq. 4 for H, and substituting into Eq. 3 yields the following
full-income budget constraint:
Pw T+Yn = pw L + pz B + pgG.

(5)

From Eq. 5, an individual can consume leisure time (L), employee ben
efits (#), and other market goods and services (G).
Dual to an individual's utility maximization objective is an objec
tive to minimize expenditures on consumption of goods and services.
Formally, the individual's dual problem is to choose L, B, and G so as
to minimize total expenditures (£).
,

(6)

subject to the constraint on utility (f/0) that
UQ = U(L,B,G).

(7)

The optimal amounts of L, B, and G chosen will depend on the respec
tive prices and required utility. Consumer behavior is summarized by
the expenditure function, which shows the minimal expenditures nec
essary to achieve a given level of utility for a particular set of prices.
The consumers equilibrium condition is given by
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E(pg ,pw,pz ;U) = pw T + Yn

(8)

where pwT + Yn represents full income. It is assumed that the expendi
ture function is linearly homogeneous and concave in prices.

ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
Ever since Stone's (1954) system of demand equations, which
were derived explicitly from economic theory, alternative specifica
tions and functional forms of the consumers utility function have been
proposed, the most popular being the linear model (Stone 1954), the
Rotterdam model7 (Theil 1965), and the translog model (Berndt and
Christensen 1972). To avoid placing prior restrictions on the individu
als utility function, a flexible approximation to the consumers' expen
diture function is utilized in this study. The resulting expenditure
function yields an easily estimatable system of consumer demand
equations from which price and income elasticities can be derived.
The consumer expenditure function is represented as follows:

logE(p,u) = a(p) + ub(p),

(9)

where u lies between 0 (subsistence) and 1 (bliss) and p represents a
vector of prices. The expenditure function is linearly homogeneous,
concave in factor prices, and a(p) and b(p) can be regarded as the costs
of subsistence and bliss, respectively. In order to let the consumer
expenditure function be flexible, a(p) and b(p) are set as follows:

(11)
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pointed out that the choice of func
tional form for the above functions is partly due to the need for a flexi
ble functional form; however, their main justification is that the
resulting system of demand equations has desirable properties. In fact,
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substitution of Eqs. 10 and 11 into Eq. 9 yields an expenditure function
that is flexible and easily estimatable. The resulting system of demand
equations is known as the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). The
AIDS system gives an estimate of the direct or indirect utility function
yielding estimates of the structure of the workers' preferences for lei
sure, labor supply, employee benefits, and market goods and services.
Own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities are easily derived from
the AIDS model.
The expenditure function used in this study is shown as follows:
(12)

where the subscript /, j equal g, w, and z.
The expenditure function can be logarithmically differentiated,
yielding the expenditure shares associated with leisure, employee ben
efits, and market goods and services,
Sw =aw + ZjbWJ (\og Pj ) + bw (logm/p*)

(13a)

( 13b>
(13C)
where bl} =Yi(.ci} +C/J' anc* ^e subscript 7 = w, z, and g. The share
of total compensation spent on each good is a function of the natural
log of prices and an income term, log(m//?*), where p* represents a
price index. 8
Economic theory requires the demand system to exhibit three
properties: adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry. Adding-up
implies that the sum of the share equations equal one. We impose this
condition by restricting the parameters in our system of equations as
follows:
I, at = 1,1, blw = 0,L, biz = 0,2, blg = 0,X, bt = 0.

(14)
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In order for the demand system to be homogeneous of degree zero in
prices and income, the following within-equation restrictions are
imposed:
!A,= 0,1,^=0,1,^=0.

(15)

Additionally, symmetry is imposed by setting the cross-substitution
effects equal, such that btj = bjr
After imposing the adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry condi
tions, and appending a vector of demographic variables and normally
distributed error terms, the system of demand equations is written as
follows:
(16a)

(16b)

(16c)

Our data allow us to estimate the system only for workers with
employee benefits and, thus, needs to be adjusted for selectivity bias.
The method to correct for selectivity bias when the subsample is
selected based on two choices can be found in Maddala (1983, p. 368). 9
Suppose labor supply and employee benefits are imperfectly
observed such that:
S =Sl+^,

(Ha)

Sz =S*z+ uz

(17b)
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Suppose, further, that there are latent variables:
(18a)
(18b)

y*2 =X2-c2 +£ 2

such that the individual works if and only if ^ >0 and receives
employee benefits if y2 > 0 . If the MS and es are joint normally distrib
uted,
(19)

y ^22.
y
^21
then the selectivity bias has the form
/

^ —i
(20)

"le'r^Vfe

e2 |e2 >-.

where
£

> —-

(21)

and
f — _.*.,
v Ti, ( ,
i,,

p is the correlation between e { and £2,
({) represents the standard normal density function,
O represents the cumulative distribution function, and
F is the bivariate normal distribution function.
The parameters Tl5 T2, and part of S22 can be estimated up to scale
using a bivariate probit model. The model is estimated with sample
selection because only workers are assumed to receive employee bene-
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fits. The selectivity equations include a comprehensive set of economic
and demographic variables likely to influence the decision to work and
receive employee benefits.
Once the selectivity bias has been taken into account, the expendi
ture share equations can be written as follows:
Sw = aw + bwg (log pg/pw) + bwz (log pzlpw) + bw (log m/p*)
ll |ff =1,5 =!)] + £„

(22a)

Sz = az + bzg (log Pg/pz) + bwz (log pJPl) + bz (log mlp*)
\H =1,B =!)] + &

(22b)

bzg (log pjpg) + bwg (log pjpg) + bg (log m/p*)

(22c)

where H = 1 if the individual participates in the labor force, B = 1 if the
individual receives employee benefits, F, are parameters, and £, repre
sent error terms that have zero means conditional on both the individu
als decision to work and receive employee benefits.
The system of share equations can be estimated using Zellner's
two-step (or iterative) Feasible Generalized Least Squares procedure or
maximum likelihood, which is suitable for constrained, singular sys
tems. One share equation is deleted from the system of equations to
avoid singularity, because the share equations sum to 1 . The choice of
which equation to delete is arbitrary and has no effect on the empirical
results. Data limitations motivate the deletion of the market goods and
services equation; however, we capture the market goods share from
our estimation. Also, the price of market goods and services, pg, is nor
malized to 1 to further simplify the system.
The estimates of the demand system are used to compute the ownprice, cross-price, and income elasticities of demand. Confidence inter
vals are constructed for the elasticities by computing the large- sample
variance of each elasticity (see Kmenta 1986, p. 486).
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DATA
The data for this study come from the April 1993 Current Popula
tion Survey (CPS). This survey included an employee-benefits supple
ment in which detailed questions were asked on employer-provided
pension plans and health insurance plans. With respect to employerprovided pension plans, respondents to the supplemental questions
were asked if their employer or union sponsored a pension plan for
anyone in their company and whether they were included in the plan.
Detailed questions were also asked about the type of plan. From the
survey, we can determine whether the individual was included in a
defined-benefit plan or a defined-contribution plan and the type of
defined-contribution plan (i.e., profit sharing, employee stock owner
ship plan, 401k plan, salary reduction plan, etc.). An additional set of
questions was asked about any salary reduction plans (i.e. 401k, 403b,
etc.), the amount the individual contributed to the plan, and the amount
of the contribution that the employer matched.
Salary reduction pension plan data is highly suitable to our model
because it allows individuals to make choices about their level of con
tributions to the pension plan. Unlike a defined-benefit plan where a
worker's retirement benefit is determined by an equation, usually based
on age, years of service, and final pay—an equation that the worker has
little control over—a defined-contribution plan with a salary reduction
component allows a worker more flexibility at the margin in determin
ing their degree of participation in the plan. Workers are allowed to
determine how much they want to contribute to the plan on a pre-tax
basis, and many plans allow workers to change their level of contribu
tions on a regular basis (i.e., once a month) so that workers are not con
strained to their choice of contribution level for a long period of time.
This flexibility is highly desirable when trying to model workers' pref
erences for pension benefits.
While the CPS also includes data on health insurance plans, the
data are not detailed enough to yield information about the cost of the
plan. Respondents to the survey were asked about employer sponsor
ship of a health insurance plan, their participation, and whether the
plan also covered family members. The survey does not ask whether
the worker has a choice of health insurance options or the relative cost
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of those options. In this survey, a worker with three options would be
treated the same as a worker with only one option. In addition, the cost
of health insurance is not as optimal as pension plan contributions for
the model presented in this chapter because workers can not typically
switch health insurance plans on a regular basis, assuming they even
have a choice of health insurance plans. Open enrollment, where avail
able, is usually limited to once per year.
The sample used in this paper is limited to the noninstitutionalized
civilian population between the ages of 18 and 64. Active duty military
personnel and the self-employed are not included in the sample, result
ing in a sample of 37,975 working and nonworking males and 42,875
working and nonworking females. This sample is used to provide esti
mates of the bivariate probit model, which is used to correct the system
of demand equations for selectivity bias. The system of demand equa
tions is corrected for selectivity bias because it is only estimated with
data on workers participating in a salary reduction pension plan. This
results in a selected sample of 2,129 males and 1,544 females. Sample
means and variable definitions are provided in Table 3.
From the CPS, the following variables are needed to estimate the
system of demand equations:
1) Share of Leisure Time, Sw:
The share of leisure time is measured as the percentage of fullincome spent on the consumption of leisure. This is computed as

Total available time, T, is assumed to be equal to 5,840 hours, which is
the total time available in a given year, given time for sleep. Nonwage
income, Yn, is measured as total personal unearned income.
2) Share of Pension Plan Contributions, Sz:
The share of pension plan contributions is computed as follows:

The shadow price of pension plan contributions is measured using
the workers' marginal tax rate, as discussed in the next section. The
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amount of pension plan contributions, B, is calculated as the annual
employee contribution to the salary reduction pension plan and does
not include any match provided by the employer.
3) Price of Pension Plan Contributions, Pz:
The worker's marginal tax rate is used as a proxy for the shadow
price of the pension plan. As mentioned above, this variable has been
used extensively in previous research. It should be noted, however,
that the use of the marginal tax rate has two potential shortcomings.
First, the marginal tax rate is correlated with income. Higher income
workers are in higher marginal tax rates. While this may present a
problem in this study because real total compensation is used as an
explanatory variable, price and income should have independent
effects on the share equations. Second, the possibility exists that a
worker will lower their marginal tax rate by increasing their contribu
tions to their pension plan. However, a worker's ability to contribute to
a pension plan on a pre-tax basis is limited by constraints set by the
Internal Revenue Service, which minimizes the severity of this prob
lem. In 1993, workers could not contribute more than $9,200 to a 401k
plan and $9,500 to a 403b plan on a pre-tax basis.
Assumptions about an individual's tax-filing status are made from
the various demographic characteristics provided in the CPS. Each
individual's tax-filing status is based on their marital status and the
number of dependent children. It is assumed that all married and sepa
rated individuals file a joint tax return. Widowed, divorced, and never
married individuals are assumed to file as heads of household if they
have dependent children, otherwise they are assumed to file as single
taxpayers. Standard deductions and personal exemptions from taxable
income are based on the number of dependents in the family.
The marginal tax rate is computed from both federal and state
income tax forms. Local taxes, where applicable, and the social secu
rity payroll tax are not included in the marginal tax rate. Given limita
tions on geographic region in the CPS, it is impossible to calculate
local income tax rates. In addition, previous research has shown that
estimates of the demand for employee benefits are commonly unaf
fected by the inclusion of the Social Security payroll tax (Woodbury
and Hamermesh 1992; Woodbury and Bettinger 1991).
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Table 3 Sample Means and Variable Definitions
Variable
Sw

Definition
leisure share

Males

Females

0.59

0.63

Sz

benefit share

0.01

0.01

Sg

goods and services share

0.40

0.37

pw

price of leisure

16.02

11.91

pt

price of benefits

0.21

0.21

m/P*

real total compensation

9827.97

6859.48

AGE

age

40.82

40.59

AGESQ

age squared

1761.98

1748.35

MARRIED =1 if married

0.79

0.63

WIDOWED =1 if widowed

0.01

0.03

DIVORCED =1 if divorced

0.08

0.15

SEPARATE =1 if separated

0.01

0.02

SINGLE

0.12

0.16

=1 if never married

OWNKIDS number of own children under age 18

1.34

1.11

EDUC1

=1 if some school

0.02

0.02

EDUC2

=1 if high school graduate

0.51

0.62

EDUC3

= 1 if college graduate

0.28

0.24

EDUC4

=1 if completed graduate school

0.18

0.12

WHITE

=1 if white, non-Hispanic

0.91

0.88

BLACK

=1 if black, non-Hispanic

0.03

0.06

HISPANIC =1 if Hispanic

0.03

0.03

OTHRACE =1 if other race

0.03

0.04

UNION

0.21

0.19

FULLTIME =1 if full-time worker

0.99

0.94

WHITECOL=1 if white collar

0.67

0.87

BLUECOL =1 if blue collar

0.28

0.09

SERVCOL =1 if service collar

0.05

0.04

FS 1

= 1 if 1-24 employees

0.06

0.08

FS2

= 1 if 25-49 employees

0.03

0.03

FS3

=1 if 50-99 employees

0.06

0.04

=1 if union worker
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Males
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Females

FS4

=1 if 100-249 employees

0.07

0.07

FS5

=1 if 250 or more employees

0.78

0.78

MATCH

=1 if employer matches contribution

0.65

0.59

Fw

Selectivity term in leisure equation

020

0.15

Fz

Selectivity term in benefit equation

0.21

0.16

4) Price of Leisure Time, pw:
The price of leisure time (the after tax hourly wage rate) is mea
sured using observed data from the CPS. The hourly wage rate was
calculated based on usual hours of work per week, weeks worked per
year, and annual earnings. In some cases where weeks worked per
year was missing, the mean (51.5) was substituted.
5) Real After-Tax Total Compensation, m:
The measure of real total compensation is obtained by summing
after-tax annual earnings with annual pension plan contributions and
dividing by the price index, p*.
6) Price Index,/?*:
Using Stone's (1953) price index, some researchers have approxi
mated/?* as:
log p* = Sw (log Pw) + Sz (log /?z) + Sg (log Pg)
and have found this to be a good approximation of the price index
(Anderson and Blundell 1983, 1984; Deaton and Muellbauer 1980;
Kang 1983; and Woodbury and Huang 1991). We follow this approach
to estimate the price index. When pg is normalized to 1, the last term
drops out.
7) Demographic Variables that Affect the Share of Leisure and the
Share of Pension Plan Contributions:
A vector of demographic variables affecting both the share of lei
sure and the share of pension plan contributions includes controls for
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the following: age, marital status, number of children, race, education,
union status, occupation, industry, firm size, and geographic region.
Two variables are included to control for age: age (AGE) and agesquared (AGESQ). We expect age to have a nonlinear effect on the
demand for leisure with the oldest workers having a greater demand for
leisure as they transition out of the labor force. With respect to pension
plan contributions, we expect age to always have a positive effect. As
workers age, they will have less time to take advantage of compound
interest, and they will also realize the need to start saving for retire
ment. Thus, they will make larger contributions to their pension plans.
A set of dummy variables on marital status (WIDOWED,
DIVORCED, SEPARATE, SINGLE) are also included in both the lei
sure demand equation and the employee benefit demand equation
(MARRIED is the base group). We expect to find differences in pen
sion plan contributions between males and females and across marital
status. Unmarried women are expected to be less likely to demand lei
sure time and more likely to contribute to pension plans than married
women. Our expectations are based on previous research, which has
shown that unmarried women are less likely to intend to retire early
than married women because they have access to fewer resources than
married women (Holtmann et al. 1994). The marital status of men,
however, has not been shown to affect their plans to retire early. We
expect similar results in this study. In addition, we expect the number
of children (OWNKIDS) to have an effect on both the share of leisure
and the share of pension plan contributions. Workers with more chil
dren are more likely to demand leisure time than workers without chil
dren in order to spend more time with their children. With respect to
pension plan contributions, workers with children are expected to con
tribute less to their pension plan because of the additional expenses
needed to raise children, all else being equal.
Race has been shown to be correlated with the probability that an
individual works, therefore, we include a set of dummy variables
(BLACK, HISPANIC, OTHRACE) to determine whether race plays a
role in the share of leisure demanded (given that an individual is
already working) and the share of pension plan contributions
demanded (given that a worker participates in a salary reduction pen
sion plan; WHITE is the base group).
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Education variables (EDUC2, EDUC3, and EDUC4) are included
in the model as well (EDUC1 is the base group). We expect more edu
cated workers to demand less leisure time because of the implicit
demands of a job that are correlated with education. In addition, we
expect more educated workers to demand a greater share of their total
income in the form of pension plan contributions. More educated
workers are more likely to be able to evaluate and understand the
advantages of contributing to their pension plan than less educated
workers. More educated workers may also be more comfortable
directing their asset allocation decisions.
With respect to employment characteristics, variables are included
to control for union membership, occupation, industry, and firm size.
We expect union membership (UNION) to increase a worker's demand
for leisure because the union may be better able to negotiate a fixed
work schedule. Our expectations of union membership on pension
plan contributions are less clear. While unions may be better able to
educate their members about the advantages of contributing to a pen
sion plan, union members are typically more likely to have an
employer-funded defined-benefit plan. Therefore, there may be no
need to contribute to a defined-contribution pension plan in addition to
the defined-benefit plan.
The set of dummy variables to control for occupation include a
variable for white collar workers (the base group), a variable to control
for blue collar workers (BLUECOL), and a variable to control for ser
vice collar workers (SERVCOL). 10 With respect to firm size, we
expect workers employed in large firms to have a greater demand for
pension plan contributions because large firms typically have better
educational programs and materials concerning the advantages of con
tributing to a pension plan than a small firm. Dummy variables are
included to control for firms with 1-24 workers (FSl=the base group),
25^9 workers (FS2), 50-99 workers (FS3), 100-249 workers (FS4),
and 250 or more workers (FS5).
8) Demographic Variables which Affect Only Pension Plan
Contributions:
Two additional employment related variables are only included in
the share of pension plan contributions equation. A dummy variable is
include to control for whether the worker was employed part time or
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full time (FULLTIME), and a dummy variable was included to control
for whether the employer offered a match to the workers' contributions
to the pension plan (MATCH). The direction of the effect of the
employer match is unclear because of two potential offsetting effects.
On one hand, we expect the presence of an employer match to have a
positive effect on a worker's contribution to a pension plan. If an
employer offers a dollar-for-dollar match, a worker may contribute
more to the plan because the opportunity cost of not contributing is
higher when the match is forgone. Alternatively, the availability of an
employer match may result in a worker contributing less to the plan if
the match acts as a substitute for the worker's own contributions. 11

RESULTS
Bivariate Probit Model
Table 4 contains the results from the bivariate probit model used to
estimate selectivity corrected estimates of the model on leisure demand
and employee benefits demand. As mentioned previously, the bivariate
probit model is estimated with sample selection because we assume
that only workers will receive employee benefits. The results of the
bivariate probit model are worth briefly mentioning. Separate equa
tions are estimated for males and females. A likelihood-ratio test for
equality of coefficients in the male and female equations rejects the
hypothesis that the two equations are the same.
With respect to the labor supply equation, we find that the proba
bility of working is positively related to age until an individual reaches
age 55, at which point the probability of working decreases as com
pared with the aged 18-24 base group. These results are consistent for
both males and females.
The effects of marital status on the probability of working are not
consistent for males and females. Married males are more likely to be
working than their unmarried counterparts. Divorced, separated, and
never married women, however, are more likely to be working than
married or widowed women, suggesting that unmarried women have
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fewer resources than married women, and thus have a greater incentive
to participate in the labor force.
The effect of education is consistent for males and females: there is
a higher probability of participating in the labor force the more educa
tion an individual attains. Race is also generally consistent for males
and females, with nonwhites less likely to be participating in the labor
force than whites, with the exception of Hispanic males. In addition,
the more children an individual has, the less likely they are to be partic
ipating in the labor force. This is an interesting result because most
individuals with children would be expected to need the resources that
can be derived from working. It is not surprising, however, that the
effect is over three times larger for females than it is for males because
single parent families headed by women are more likely to qualify for
public assistance.
Given that an individual is working, we find the following results
with respect to participation in a salary reduction pension plan. For
both males and females, age effects are strongest for younger workers,
implying that older workers are more likely to have a defined benefit
plan or less likely to have any type of pension plan. Marital status
appears to play an important role in the probability of whether a
worker participates in a salary reduction pension plan, with different
effects for males and females. Unmarried males are less likely than
married and widowed males to be participating in a salary reduction
pension plan. Divorced women, on the other hand, are more likely to
be participating in a salary reduction pension plan than all other
women. This result suggests that divorced women may have lost their
rights to their husbands' pension benefits and must accumulate their
own resources for retirement.
Education has a strong linear effect on the probability that a
worker participates in a salary reduction pension plan. Race has a
strong negative effect, with nonwhites having a lower probability of
participating in a salary reduction pension plan than whites. Number
of children also has a negative effect on the probability of participating
in a salary reduction pension plan.
With respect to characteristics associated with the labor market, we
find statistically significant effects for union membership, hours of
work, occupation, and firm size. Union membership is found to
decrease the probability that a worker participates in a salary reduction
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Table 4 Bivariate Probit Model Estimates for Labor Supply Equation
and Employee Benefit Equation
Male
Female
Employee
Employee
benefit
benefit
Labor supply
Labor supply
equation
equation
equation
equation
-3.646***
—3 457***
-0.491***
-0.878***
Constant
(0.120)
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.095)
0.470***
0.445***
0.116***
0.106***
AGE2
(0.059)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.056)
0.520***
0.516***
0.170***
0.121***
AGES
(0.060)
(0.026)
(0.057)
(0.025)
0.496***
0.532***
0.138***
0.078***
AGE4
(0.062)
(0.028)
(0.026)
(0.059)
0.284***
0.271***
-0.187***
-0.223***
AGES
(0.068)
(0.031)
(0.067)
(0.030)
-0.326***
WIDOWED
-0.128
-0.027
0.061
(0.157)
(0.084)
(0.076)
(0.039)
-0.108***
0.087**
-0.141***
0.182***
DIVORCED
(0.041)
(0.026)
(0.021)
(0.035)
-0.262***
-0.130***
-0.072
SEPARATE
0.067*
(0.091)
(0 047)
(0.076)
(0.038)
-0.273***
0.109***
-0.168***
SINGLE
0.024
(0.035)
(0.019)
(0.034)
(0.019)
0 434***
0.505***
0.364***
0.195***
EDUC2
(0.052)
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.061)
0.681***
0.270***
0.646***
0.477***
EDUC3
(0.060)
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.067)
0.698***
0.316***
0.636***
0511***
EDUC4
(0.062)
(0.030)
(0.072)
(0.033)
-0.408***
-0.140***
-0.346***
-0.085***
BLACK
(0.056)
(0.024)
(0.049)
(0.022)
-0.265***
-0.193***
-0.070***
HISPANIC
0.009
(0.058)
(0.027)
(0.026)
(0.064)
-0.238***
-0.170***
-0.091***
-0.074
OTHRACE
(0.059)
(0.031)
(0.032)
(0.061)
-0.093***
-0.025***
-0.068***
-0.017***
OWNKIDS
(0.009)
(0.005)
(0.010)
(0.005)
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Male

Female
Employee
benefit
Labor supply
equation
equation
-0.145***
-

UNION

Employee
benefit
equation
-0.152***

FULLTIME

(0.028)
0.672***

(0.030)
0.443***

-

(0.041)
-0.431***

-

BLUECOL

(0.088)
-0.299***
(0.049)
_0.12l***

SERVCOL

Labor supply
equation

-

FS2

(0.027)
0.592***

(0.053)
-0.057
(0.040)
0.373***

-

FS3

(0.059)
0.909***

(0.069)
0.626***

-

FS4

(0.051)
0.883***

(0.060)
0.669***

-

FS5

(0.049)
1.109***

(0.053)
0.900***

-

(0.037)
0.963***
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-

(0.035)
0.987
P
(0.202)
(9.563)
n
37,975
42,875
logL
-29,179.1
-29,340.5
NOTE: Age dummies represent the following categones: AGEl =1 if aged 18-24 (base
group), AGE2 =1 if aged 25-34, AGE3 =1 if aged 35-44, AGE4 =1 if aged 45-54,
and AGES =1 if aged 55-64. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard
errors in parentheses.
"**significant at the 1% level.
**significant at the 5% level.
*significant at the 10% level.
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pension plan. Because of collective bargaining agreements, union
members are more likely to have a defined-benefit plan funded by the
employer. Full-time workers are more likely than part-time workers
and white collar workers are more likely than blue collar and service
collar workers to participate in salary reduction plans. In addition,
workers employed in large firms are more likely to participate in salary
reduction pension plans than workers in small firms. These results are
generally consistent for both males and females.
Finally, the correlation coefficient between the labor supply equa
tion and the salary reduction pension plan equation, p, is statistically
significant for males but not for females.

AIDS Model Results
Table 5 contains the estimated coefficients from the AIDS model.
The adjusted R2 for males and females is 0.89 and 0.90, respectively,
for the leisure share equation, and 0.40 for both males and females for
the salary reduction pension plan equation.
The parameters on the price and income variables are significant in
most cases for both males and females. However, the estimated ownprice, cross-price, and income elasticities presented in Table 6, give us
a better understanding of the effects in the model. Therefore, we first
discuss the results of the demographic and labor-market variables and
then discuss the estimated elasticities.
Returning to the results in Table 5, we find consistent nonlinear
effects of age on the share of leisure time for both males and females.
At first, an increase in age reduces the demand for leisure time
(increases time spent at work) and eventually increases the demand for
leisure time. Predictions from the model indicate that males will start
to increase their demand for leisure time at age 52.75, while females
will increase their demand for leisure time at age 47.25. With respect
to pension plan contributions, we find significant positive effects of age
for males, but insignificant effects for females.
As mentioned previously, we expect marital status to have different
effects for males and females on the share of leisure and the share of
pension plan contributions. For males, we find that separated and
never married males demand a greater share of leisure than married,
widowed, and divorced males. For females, we find that all nonmar-
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ried females demand a smaller share of leisure than their married
female counterparts. With respect to pension plan contributions, mari
tal status has no effect for males (with the exception of a small negative
effect for separated males). Divorced females, on the other hand, have
a significantly lower share demand for pension plan contributions than
all other females. This may suggest that given their budget constraints,
divorced females choose to spend less on pension plan contributions
than other females. While we expected unmarried women to be spend
ing a greater share of their income on pension plan contributions, the
effect of marital status appears to be working through the probability of
participating in the pension plan (the bivariate probit model), as
opposed to the amount contributed once participation has been deter
mined.
The number of children exerts consistent positive effects on leisure
demand for both males and females. Both males and females appear to
demand a greater share of leisure the more children they have. With
respect to pension plan contributions, the number of children has a
negative effect on the share of pension plan contributions for males and
an insignificant effect for females.
Our results for race are in large part consistent for both males and
females in both the leisure share equation and the pension plan contri
bution share equation. We find that nonwhites demand a greater share
of their income in the form of leisure than whites. For males, there is
no effect of race on pension plan contributions (any difference appears
in the probability of participating model), while black females demand
a greater share of pension plan contributions than females of other
races.
With respect to education, we find consistent effects for males and
females in the leisure share equation but not in the benefits share equa
tion. We find that increasing levels of education result in a decreased
demand for the share of leisure time, indicating that higher levels of
education are associated with increasing shares of work time. Higher
education levels result in a greater share demand of benefits for males,
while education has no effect on the share demand of benefits for
females.
With respect to the variables associated with the labor market, we
find the following. Hours of work do not exert a significant effect on
pension plan contributions for males, but do exert a negative effect for

118

Fronstin

Table 5 Estimated Coefficients of the Leisure Share and
Benefit Share Equations
"w

Males
2.001***

Females
2.021***

az

(0.021)
-0.011**

as

(0.005)
-0.990***

(0.024)
-0.002
(0.005)
-1.019***

"ww

(0.021)
0.079***

(0.025)
0.080***

bwg

(0.002)
-0.079***

(0.002)
-0.080***

bzz

(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.003***

(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.003***

bzg

(0.001)
0.003***

(0.000)
0.003***

bgg

(0.001)
0.076***

(0.001)
0.077***

bw

(0.002)
-0.175***

(0.002)
-0.176***

bz

(0.001)
0.003***

(0.002)
0.003***

bg

(0.000)
0.171***

(0.000)
0.173***

(0.001)

(0.002)

bwz

AGE
AGESQ

Variables
in leisure
equation
-0.00211***
(0.00069)
0.00002***
(0.00001)

Variables
in benefits
equation
0.00037**
(0.00015)
0.00000**
(0.00000)

Variables
in leisure
equation
-0.00189***
(0.00064)
0.00002**
(0.00001)

Variables
in benefits
equation
-0.00014
(0.00013)
0.00000
(0.00000)

Employee Benefits and Labor Supply

OWNKIDS

Males
Variables
Variables
in benefits
in leisure
equation
equation
-0.00301
-0.00403
(0.00192)
(0.00915)
-0.00084
0.00389
(0.00056)
(0.00262)
-0.00247*
0.01448**
(0.00137)
(0.00649)
0.01155***
-0.00003
(0.00294)
(0.00065)
-0.00034***
0.00282***

BLACK

(0.00057)
0.01321***

HISPANIC

(0.00468)
0.01065***

WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATE
SINGLE

EDUC2

(0.00401)
0.00974**
(0.00442)
-0.01816***

EDUC3

(0.00456)
-0.02373***

EDUC4

(0.00597)
-0.02240***

FULLTIME

(0.00623)
-

OTHRACE

UNION

0.00621***

BLUECOL

(0.00210)
0.00608***

SERVCOL

(0.00205)
-0.00003
(0.00406)

(0.00012)
-0.00025
(0.00103)
-0 00077
(0.00086)
0.00031
(0.00094)
0.00180*
(0.00099)
0.00240*
(0.00133)
0.00327**
(0.00139)
0.00139
(0.00176)
-0.00055
(0.00046)
-0.00055
(0.00044)
-0.00017
(0.00088)
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Females
Variables
Variables
in leisure
in benefits
equation
equation
-0.02579***
-0.00100
(0.00391)
(0.00068)
-0.02310***
-0.00115***
(0.00199)
-0.01130***
(0.00429)
-0.00728***
(0.00190)
0.00400***
(0.00081)
0.01865***
(0.00336)
0.01020***
(0.00412)
0.01106***
(0.00373)
-0.00824*
(0.00462)
-0.01340***
(0.00520)
-0.01785***
(0.00540)
0.00521***
(0.00198)
0.00264
(0.00264)
0.01222***
(0.00407)

(0.00036)
-0.00102
(0.00074)
-0.00027
(0.00033)
0.00009
(0.00016)
0.00145**
(0.00064)
-0.00027
(0.00074)
0.00052
(0.00065)
-0.00089
(0.00083)
-0.00104
(0.00098)
-0.00087
(0.00102)
-0.00286***
(0.00075)
0.00113***
(0.00037)
0.00039
(0.00046)
0.00062
(0.00074)
(continued)
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Table 5 (continued)

FS2

Males
Variables
Variables
in leisure
in benefits
equation
equation
-0.01585***
0.00081

FS3

(0.00537)
-0.01823***

FS4

(0.00608)
-0.02029***

FS5

(0.00590)
-0.02734***

MATCH

(0.00699)
-

Selectivity term

0.18142***

(0.00117)
0.00246*
(0.00138)
0.00274**
(0.00135)
0.00382**
(0.00162)
0.00031
(0.00030)
-0.02078**

Females
Variables
Variables
in leisure
in benefits
equation
equation
0.00162
-0.00021
(0.00461)
(0.00080)
-0.01401***
-0.00070
(0.00439)
(0.00082)
-0.00154**
-0.00541
(0.00413)
-0.02113***
(0.00445)
0.18941***

(0.00079)
-0.00168*
(0.00094)
-0.00019
(0.00024)
0.01588**
(0.00646)
0.40

(0.03589)
(0.00821)
(0.02867)
adjusted R2
0.89
0.40
0.90
n
2,129
1,544
NOTE: Estimation results from applying an iterative unweighted version of Zellner's
seemingly unrelated regression equations. The dependent variables are the shares of
total full income received as leisure consumption and employee benefit share.
Asymptotic standard error shown in parentheses. Each equation includes a set of
two-digit industry dummy variables, and eight region variables, in addition to the
control variables shown.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level.
**sigmficant at the 5% level.
*significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6 Price and Income Elasticities
Males

Females

Uncompensated price elasticities
Mtvw

-0.691

(0.003)

-0.696

(0.003)

T\zz

-1.450

(0.072)

-1.547

(0.074)

-0.984

(0.004)

-0.965

(0.005)

0.002

(0 001)

0.002

(0.001)

\g
1\wz
*W

-0.261

(0.043)

-0.314

(0.050)

T\ wg

0.572

(0.003)

0.555

(0.003)

T|gw

-0.445

(0.004)

-0.512

(0.005)

r\zg

0.266

(0.076)

0334

(0.084)

%

0.005

(0.002)

0.006

(0.002)

Compensated price elasticities
n*
-0.278
'1 ww

(0.003)

-0.246

(0.003)

T\*zz

-1.439

(0.072)

-1.538

(0.074)

T|*gg

-0.409

(0.005)

-0.424

(0.005)

T)*wz

0.008

(0.001)

0.006

(0.001)

n*
M zw

0.590

(0.048)

0.643

(0.054)

0.270

(0.003)

0240

(0.003)

0.393

(0.004)

0.410

(0.005)

0.850

(0.084)

0.895

(0.096)

0016

(0.002)

0.014

(0.002)

Ivvrn

0.703

(0.002)

0.718

(0.003)

T\zm

1.446

(0.043)

1.527

(0.059)

\m

1.424

(0.004)

1.472

(0.005)

n*wg
nV
n*zg
^*gz

Income elasticities

NOTE: Elasticities computed from the parameter estimates displayed in Table 5. Stan
dard error of each elasticity is in parentheses next to each elasticity. Standard errors
are computed by taking a Taylor series approximation at the sample mean.
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females. Union status significantly increases the demand for leisure
for both males and females. It has no effect on pension plan contribu
tions for males but has a positive, significant effect for females. Occu
pation also has no effect on pension plan contributions for both males
and females. On the other hand, firm size plays an important role in
pension plan contributions, but the results for males and females are
mixed. We find that male workers employed in larger firms contribute
a larger share of income to pension plans than workers in small firms,
but the opposite is true for females. In addition, an employer match
does not significantly affect a worker's pension plan contributions.
Finally, we find evidence of selectivity bias for males and females
in both the leisure share equation and the pension plan contribution
share equation. Note, however, that the signs on the selectivity correc
tion term are inconsistent for males and females and may be due to the
fact that the estimated correlation between the error terms in the bivariate probit model was insignificant for females.
Elasticities
The estimated coefficients shown in Table 5 are used to estimate
uncompensated, compensated, and income elasticities. These elastici
ties, computed at the sample mean, along with each standard error
(shown in parentheses next to the elasticity) are shown in Table 6. The
uncompensated own-price elasticities are all statistically significant
and of the correct sign. Our results suggest that a 10 percent increase
in the wage rate would reduce the share of leisure by 6.91 percent for
males and 6.96 percent for females. We find that a 10 percent increase
in the price of a pension plan (that is, a 10 percent decrease in the mar
ginal tax rate) results in a 14.5 percent decrease in the share of income
contributed to a salary reduction pension plan for males and a 15.5 per
cent decrease for females, suggesting that pension plan contributions
are very elastic with respect to a worker's marginal tax rate. We also
find a nearly unitary own-price elasticity for other goods and services.
The uncompensated cross-price elasticities yield interesting
results. We find no effect between the share of leisure time and the
price of pension plans. However, we do find a negative effect between
wages and pension plan contributions, suggesting that pension plan
contributions and wages are gross substitutes. We find that a 10 per-
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cent decrease in the wage rate results in a 2.61 percent increase in pen
sion plan contributions for males and a 3.14 percent decrease for
females. Both males and females behave as we would expect when
facing an employer's wage-benefit trade-off curve. The other uncompensated cross-price elasticities suggest that pension plan contributions
and other goods and services are gross complements, while the results
are mixed for the share of leisure and other goods and services.
The income elasticities are all positive and significant, indicating
that all of the goods are normal goods. The results suggest that the
share of leisure is income inelastic, while the share of pension plan
contributions and market goods and services are income elastic.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the simple static model of labor supply is extended
to incorporate the demand for employee benefits. Traditionally, laborsupply models have ignored employee benefits, even though they have
become a significant component of total compensation during the 20th
century. The model presented in this paper incorporates the demand
for employee benefits by assuming that the demand for employee ben
efits, the demand for leisure time, and the demand for market goods
and services are determined simultaneously. Previous studies assumed
that labor supply decisions were exogenous to the demand for
employee benefits. In addition, previous studies have only modeled
the separate components of employee benefits. The model presented in
this paper is flexible enough to include all employee benefits.
Our results, determined using data from the April 1993 Current
Population Survey, are consistent with economic theory. We find that
the income elasticity of worker contributions to a pension plan is
approximately 1.5, indicating that if worker income increased by 10
percent, contributions to a pension plan would increase by 15 percent.
This result is consistent with previous findings. We also find that pen
sion plan contributions are sensitive to a worker's marginal tax rate.
This result is consistent with Woodbury and Huang (1991), who found
that pension plan contributions would fall between 50 and 64 percent if
their tax-preferred status was removed. We also find evidence of a
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trade-off between wages and employee benefits and the magnitude of
the effect is consistent with adjustments for a worker's marginal tax
rate.
While a joint model of employee benefits and labor supply is pre
sented in this paper, data limitations allowed us to estimate the model
only for pension plan contributions. The model presented in this paper
is flexible enough to incorporate all employee benefits. As more data
on the composition and cost of employee benefits becomes available at
the micro level, future research should be able to estimate more
detailed models.

Notes
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed
as representing the opinions or policies of the Employee Benefit Research Institute or
any sponsoring agencies.
1. Those workers with single coverage may not need family coverage if there are no
dependents.
2. Some of the evidence attributes the lower turnover rates to nonportability and
backloading of pensions. Other studies present evidence that pension-covered
jobs offer higher levels of total compensation; hence, the compensation premium
accounts for the lower turnover rate.
3. Unionization and the role of collective bargaining have also been shown to affect
an employer's decision to offer employee benefits (Freeman 1981; Belman and
Hey wood 1991).
4. This is the maximum wage rate that the individual would earn, based on their
human capital and other characteristics, when no employee benefits were
received.
5. The parameter pz represents the rate of exchange between wages and employee
benefits on the boundary of the employee's choice set Competition will tend to
bring pz into equality both with the price at which workers would buy benefits in
the market and with the employer's marginal cost of providing the benefits (see
Atrostic [1982] and Triplet! [1983]).
6. Leisure refers to hours not worked that are not paid for by the employer. Paid
vacation, sick leave, and other paid time away from work are included in
employee benefits. For the purposes of this study, time used for home production
is included as leisure time.
7 In the Rotterdam model, the demand function is estimated in the logarithm of dif
ferentials instead of in levels of differentials.
8. The income term, log(m //?*), can be derived using the following steps. For a util
ity maximizing individual, total expenditures is a function of utility and prices.
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The expenditure function can be inverted to give utility as a function of income
and prices. We can do this for the expenditure function given in Eq. 12 and substi
tute the result into the budget share Eq 13 to get the budget share equations as a
function of income and prices.
9. See Michalopoulos et al. (1992) for an application of this method to child-care
demand.
10. Service collar workers include those employed as private household service work
ers, protective service workers, and other service workers.
11. The size of the match would be a better measure of employer contributions to the
plan than whether a match is available. Unfortunately, data on the size of the
employer match was missing for nearly a third of the sample.
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3 The Economics of Family and
Medical Leave in Canada
and the United States
Eileen Trzcinski
Wayne State University
William T. Alpert
University of Connecticut

This chapter explores the basic premise that family and medical
leave consists of two separate analytical components: the wage
replacement component and the job guarantee component. In legisla
tion and in private businesses, these two components typically are dealt
with separately. In the United States, for example, the Federal Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides job-guaranteed leave but no
wage replacement. Canada has legislation that compels businesses to
provide job guarantees during leave and legislation that grants wage
replacement administered through the unemployment insurance sys
tem. This dual system is also evident in the private practices of busi
nesses where paid sick leave policies are separate from policies that
deal with job guarantees.
The central hypothesis underlying this premise is that the factors
that determine the provision of wage replacement during leave differ
from the determinants of whether or not a job guarantee is provided. In
general this hypothesis implies that differences exist in the factors that
determine the provision of paid versus unpaid leave. It is specifically
hypothesized that the determinants of paid leave are similar to those
that account for other fringe benefits. Conversely, it is also hypothe
sized that the provision of unpaid leave will not be as fully explained
by the standard reduced form demand models specifying fringe benefit
determination as will the provision of paid leave. Instead, it is conjec
tured that the provision of unpaid leave can be explained by models
that stress issues such as workplace efficiency, hours of work, and/or
determinants of managerial control.
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These hypotheses are tested through a combination of empirical
approaches that involve 1) an examination of the incidence of leave in
the United States and Canada and 2) estimation of the determinants of
the incidence of leave and the conditions surrounding leave. In investi
gating the determinants of the incidence of leave among firms, we rely
on a standard theoretical and empirical model of fringe benefit deter
mination. This model consists of the estimation of a reduced form
demand equation for fringe benefits with various proxy variables repre
senting fringe benefit prices and other factors hypothesized to influ
ence the incidence or levels of fringe benefits. Although this paper
provides information on legislative mandates and information on the
incidence of private sector policies for both Canada and the United
States, the empirical analyses are limited to the United States and are
based on data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Leave Sur
vey. Overall, the findings presented below lend support to our central
hypotheses that family and medical leave consists of two separate ana
lytical components—a wage replacement component and a job guaran
tee component.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Canada and the United States offer an opportunity to perform natu
ral experiments in comparative social policies. The two countries
claim common political, legal, cultural, and constitutional legacies;
federal configurations; remarkably similar standards of living; and
diverse societies. Both are advanced industrial countries with substan
tial primary and manufacturing sectors and dominant rapidly growing
service sectors. Most recently, the adoption of the North American
Free Trade Agreement by both countries and the passage of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (Bill of Rights) in Canada are bound to make
the two countries more similar.
Important differences between Canada and the United States do
exist, however, and may grow—the melting pot versus the mosaic as
metaphor for society, universal health care in one country with no
equivalent system in the other, and numerous other distinctions ranging
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from Arctic policy to the status of urban minorities. Furthermore, Can
ada continues to endure a constitutional crisis while the United States
faces serious racial tensions. In the area of family leave policies, Can
ada and the United States share the basic problems of the changing
nature of the modern workforce, the altering roles of women and men
in the workplace, the changing contributions of men and women to the
workforce, and the shifting needs of families and businesses to be com
petitive in global markets (see Labour Canada, Women's Bureau
[1990] for a summary of the position of women in the workforce in
Canada).
Canada and the United States have a common, well-known postWorld War II labor-force experience. In 1991, 53 percent of all Cana
dian women aged 15 and over were employed while in the United
States 57 percent of women aged 16 and over were working. In both
Canada and the United States, half of all new mothers enter or reenter
the labor force within one year of their baby's birth. Married women
accounted for nearly all the growth in female employment during the
past decade in both countries. The employment rate among married
women in Canada grew from 47 percent in 1981 to 56 percent in 1991.
In the United States, the employment rate among married women
jumped from 48 percent to an identical 56 percent during the same
period. While women have historically experienced slightly higher
unemployment rates than men, the unemployment rates of women and
men have converged in both countries during the past several years.
In spite of progress in both countries, most women continue to
work in traditionally "female dominated occupations," such as teach
ing, nursing or related health professions, clerical, sales, and services.
Currently, however, women are entering "nontraditional" careers at
rates over five times greater than 30 years ago. The number of twocareer couples has increased by more than a factor of four in Canada
since 1960 and by a similar amount in the United States. In the United
States, more than 25 percent of all babies are now being born to single
women. In Canada, where the number has risen rapidly during the
past decade, the percentage is now 24.7 percent. The 1991 birth rate in
Canada was 15.3 per 1,000, while the 1991 rate for the United States
was 16.7 per 1,000. Birth rates have increased slightly in both coun
tries during the past few years (Statistics Canada 1993; U.S. Depart
ment of Commerce 1993).
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In Canada, family and medical leave and benefits are provided
through a combination of government mandates, private policies, and
union contracts. Wage replacement for medical, maternity, and paren
tal leaves are provided under the Canadian Unemployment Insurance
program. After 20 weeks of covered earnings in the year prior to a
benefit application, a worker may claim 15 weeks of maternity bene
fits, 10 weeks of parental benefits, and 15 weeks of sickness benefits up
to a maximum of 30 weeks of benefits per occurrence. Unemployment
insurance covers 57 percent of insurable earnings up to a maximum
amount. This figure is adjusted annually to reflect living cost changes.
The maximum earnings covered in 1993 was Can$745.00 per week,
yielding a maximum weekly benefit of Can$425.00. In addition, many
Canadian employees are covered either by paid sick leave or a supple
mental unemployment benefit plan that can pay up to 95 percent of the
employee's salary, including the unemployment insurance "clawback,"
which is designed to limit the liability of the unemployment insurance
system to highly compensated employees. 1 Additional maternity leave
policies are also provided by the private sector but, as noted in the fol
lowing section, private policies are less extensive for maternity leave
than they are for medical reasons.
In 1992, the Canadian Unemployment Insurance system covered
10.933 million workers and had 1.148 million "regular beneficiaries."
Approximately 235,000 workers received special benefits, such as
sickness or maternity benefits. About 2.5 percent of the female labor
force claims maternity benefits in a year, an amount equal to about 1
percent of the labor force. Tables 1 and 2 describe the growth of public
payments for sickness, maternity, adoption, and parental leave in Can
ada. Real family-leave-type benefits have grown rapidly for the past
decade and a half in Canada, keeping pace with the growth of real reg
ular unemployment benefits. Canada has relatively low take-up rates
for family-leave-type benefits. It is possible that the low Canadian
rates are caused by individuals who do not meet eligibility require
ments, by those who find the replacement rate too low to warrant filing
for unemployment insurance, and by those who are unaware of the
possibility of receiving benefits. Finally, it might be that many individ
uals use vacation, sick, and other paid leave time during their period of
family responsibility.
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Table 1 Canadian Unemployment Insurance: Nominal and Real Benefit
Payments by Type of Benefit and Percentage of Regular
Payments (Nominal Can$)a
Year

Regular

Sickness

Maternity

Adoption

1976

6,357,234
[3,019,686]

273,272
[129,804]
(4.3)

293,947
[139,625]
(4.6)

_b

-

Parental
-

1980

5,578,202
[3,748,552]

230,164
[154,670]
(4.1)

349,324
[234,746]
(6.3)

-

-

1984

9,551,002
[8,825,126]

221,304
[204,559]
(3.4)

428,483
[395,918]
(4.5)

3,324
[3,071]
-

-

1988

8,166,124
[9,309,381]

285,227
[325,159]
(3.5)

488,301
[566,663]
(6.1)

4,140
[4,720]
-

_
-

1992

13,508,947
[15,400,200]

383,596
[437,299]
(2.8)

732,562
[835,121]
(5.4)

4,570
[5,210]
-

431,525
[491,939]
(3-2)

1993

12,776,735
[14,569,478]

383,348
[437,017]
(3.0)

707,604
[806,688]
(5.5)

4,427
[5,047]
—

432,630
[493,198]
(3.3)

SOURCE: Labour Division, Unemployment Insurance Statistics Section, 1994
a Values in brackets represent real Canadian dollars (CPI=100 in 1986). Percent of regular
payment given in parentheses.
b - Not available or less than 0.1%.
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Table 2 Canadian Unemployment Insurance
Number of Weeks Paid by Type of Benefit and Percentage
of Regular Benefit (in Can$)a
Year
1976

Regular
32,419

Sickness
1,345
(4.1)

Maternity
1,399
(4.1)

Adoption
_b

"

1980

31,262

1,210
(3.8)

1,806
(5.8)

-

-

1984

55,130

1,193
(2.2)

2,218
(4.0)

15

-

1988

46,696

1,498
(3.2)

2,590
(5.5)

18

-

1992

60,821

1,714
(2.8)

3,062
(5.0)

16

1,784
(2.9)

1993

56,728

Parental

15
2,227
1,712
1,747
(3.0)
(3.9)
(3.1)
SOURCE: Labour Division, Unemployment Insurance Statistics Section 1994.
a Percent of regular benefit in parentheses.
b - Not available or less than 0.1%.

Job guarantees in Canada are mandated in provincial and territorial
legislation for most workers on maternity and parental leave. In gen
eral, Canadian women on maternity leave are guaranteed the same or
comparable employment upon their return to work, their seniority is
protected, and their benefits are continued. Most jurisdictions (except
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Yukon) have parental leave that allows
either parent from 12 to 34 weeks of job-guaranteed leave to care for a
newborn or newly adopted child. (See Labour Canada, Women's
Bureau [1993, 1988, 1984]; Maldonado and McDonald [1993]; Cana
dian Union of Public Employees [1991]; and Schwartz [1988] for cur
rent and historical summaries of leave legislation in Canada.)
Canadian law does not, however, provide specific provisions for job
guarantees surrounding medical leave. Instead, Canadians must rely
on interpretations of labor law regarding whether a termination of an
employee by an employer on account of illness is justifiable. In Can
ada, a contract can be terminated as a result of "frustration when it has
become impossible of performance because of a supervening event
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which is fortuitous and unforeseeable." In general, although there are
certain exceptions, temporary incapacity by one of the parties does not
result in frustration of the contract under Canadian law (Arthurs et al.
1988).
Until 1993, leave in the United States was provided either at the
discretion of the employer or mandated by state statute (for surveys of
state leave statutes, see Finn-Stevenson & Trzcinski [1991] and the
Women's Legal Defense Fund [1990]). With the exception of five
states that provide temporary disability insurance, all wage replace
ment during medical leave is provided through paid sick leave policies
and private sickness and accident insurance. Paid leave for other fam
ily reasons is largely unavailable. The Family and Medical Leave Act
was signed into law in February 1993 and became effective in August
1993. This legislation specifies that employees of companies with 50
or more workers are entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid leave per year for
childbirth, adoption, or to tend to the serious illness of a child, parent,
spouse, or the employee himself.
The legislation guarantees the continuation of all fringe benefits
(including health insurance). Upon return from leave, the employee
must be provided with the same or equivalent job, and seniority rights
must also be maintained. To be eligible, the employee must have
worked at the company for at least one year and have worked a mini
mum of 25 hours per week for that year. Under certain conditions, the
company may deny leaves to "key employees," defined in the law as
the highest paid 10 percent of its workforce. Finally, if the employer or
the employee desires it, the person on leave must use accrued paid
leave time for the leave in question. The law does not require, how
ever, that the employer allow paid sick leave to be used for other condi
tions covered under the law, such as parental leave or leave to care for
sick children, spouses, or parents.
An important distinction, then, between the U.S. and Canadian
cases is the general availability of paid maternity, parental, and medical
leave through the unemployment insurance system in Canada. A sec
ond major distinction between Canada and the United States is that
Canadian workers have no mandated leave for family responsibilities
other than parental leave for newborn children or newly adopted chil
dren. Only Quebec mandates five days unpaid leave for family respon
sibilities. Furthermore, it is also important to note that, in exempting
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companies with fewer than 50 employees, the Family and Medical
Leave Act eliminates 95 percent of all U.S. firms as well as 61 percent
of the workforce from the force of law (U.S. General Accounting
Office 1989). Thus, while a mandate exists in the U.S. case, fewer than
half of all U.S. workers are affected by it.

PROVISION OF LEAVE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES: A DESCRIPTIVE TREATMENT
For the U.S. analysis, we use data from the U.S. Small Business
Administration Employee Leave Survey commissioned in 1988 to
answer several major questions facing policy makers with respect to
mandated leave. An important aspect of the survey was the collection
of data on the leave policies of U.S. businesses in a nationally repre
sentative sample of firms. The survey instrument for the Small Busi
ness Administration's (SBA's) Employee Leave Survey was a fourpage questionnaire forwarded to 10,000 business executives. The
questionnaire requested information concerning company policies on
paid sick leave, sickness and accident insurance, vacation leave, unpaid
leave, leave to care for sick children and ailing parents, and the han
dling of work during leaves. It also contained questions on costs of
leaves and terminations to the firms, the benefits accruing to part-time
employees, and the firm's characteristics. The survey included an
instruction sheet that asked respondents to indicate whether they were
the only worker in their company or if the company employed only
members of the owners immediate family. In cases in which the firm
employed family members only, the respondent was requested to
return the blank questionnaire and the instruction sheet with an indica
tion that the firm employed only family members.
A random sample of 10,000 firms was obtained from the SBA's
Small Business Data Base (SBDB). The SBDB is a data file covering
some 3.8 million businesses (enterprises) with almost 5 million estab
lishments, representing 93 percent of private employment in the United
States. The file mainly consists of firms that have paid employees and
that have entered formal credit markets. It generally excludes partner
ships, sole proprietorships with no paid employees, and wage and sal-
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ary workers who maintain secondary businesses. The SBDB is
primarily drawn from Dun and Bradstreet's Small Business and Mil
lion Dollar Directory Files. The SBDB used in this study had been last
updated prior to this survey in 1986.
The SBA Employee Leave Survey was mailed in November and
December of 1988. To encourage responses, the questionnaire was
mailed to each potential respondent twice, approximately three weeks
apart. Each mailing contained a different cover letter from the SBA
underscoring the importance of the survey and urging the recipient to
respond to the questionnaire. A first-class return postage paid envelope
was included with each mailing to encourage responses.
Responses were received from 2,732 of the 10,000 firms for an
apparent overall response rate of approximately 27 percent. However,
some 2,551 of the surveys from both mailings were nondeliverable,
suggesting that about 1,275 of the mailed questionnaires should not be
counted as part of the 10,000 firm sample. If we discount the nondeliv
erable questionnaires, the sample size shrinks to 8,725 and the
response rate increases to 31.3 percent. Further details on the survey
design, the sample, and an analysis of nonresponse bias are presented
in Trzcinski and Alpert (1990).
Policies in the United States
This section presents findings from the SBA survey on the inci
dence of leave as well as on benefits and guarantees surrounding
leaves. Findings concerning leave for family responsibilities are also
presented. Although the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee
Benefits surveys provide information on the incidence of paid sick
leave, sickness and accident insurance, and maternity and paternity
leave, the SBA survey remains the only national survey that collected
information on the incidence of unpaid medical leave and on the condi
tions surrounding leave, such as health benefit continuation, seniority
protection, and job guarantees.
Incidence of Leave. Table 3 presents the incidence of leave poli
cies by firm size and differentiates among the separate categories of
leave. Table 3 shows that, for businesses in the SBA survey, the inci
dence of paid sick leave increased as firm size increased. In companies
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Table 3 Percentage of U.S. Firms with Leave, by Firm Size and Type
of Leave
Firm size3
1-15

16-49

50-99

100 or more

(#=1110)

(#=326)

(#=76)

(#=184)

Paid sick leave

31.5

48.5

61.8

75.0

Sickness and accident
insurance

16.1

26.9

36.0

41.0

Unpaid leave for
sickness/disability

74.1

84.7

89.5

90.2

Vacation that can be used
for sickness/disability

59.9

75.6

89.5

86.5

Separate maternity leave

6.1

15.7

20.0

22.8

Type of leave

SOURCE: Trzcinski and Alpert 1990.
a Firm size is determined by number of employees.

with 1-15 employees, 31.5 percent provided paid sick leave. This per
centage increased to 48.5 percent for firms with 16-49 employees and
to 61.8 percent for firms with 50-99 employees. In firms with 100 or
more employees, 75 percent provided job-guaranteed paid sick leave.
Regardless of firm size, firms were more likely to offer unpaid leave
than paid leave. Only 9.8 percent of the largest firms did not allow
employees to take unpaid leave for sickness. The percentage rose to
25.9 in the smallest firms.
Table 3 also shows the percentage of firms that both provided vaca
tion and allowed vacation days to be used for sickness. Firms some
times place restrictions on the use of vacation because the firms want to
maintain control over scheduling or are acting paternalistically. More
than 50 percent of all firms allowed employees access to paid leave for
sickness through reallocation of vacation days. The percentage of
firms either not providing vacation or not allowing the use of vacation
days for sickness ranged from 40.1 percent in the smallest firms to 11.5
percent in firms with 50-99 employees.
The 1978 U.S. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) stipulates that
employers who provide sickness or disability leave must also extend
this leave to women for pregnancy and childbirth-related disabilities.
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Thus, prior to the enactment of the FMLA, paid sick leave, short-term
temporary disability policies, and unpaid sick leave policies repre
sented the major source of leave available for pregnancy and child
birth-related disabilities. In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in
California Federal v. Guerra that separate maternity leave policies do
not violate the Civil Rights Act. Hence, firms may legally supplement
existing sick leave policies or implement sick leave policies that apply
exclusively to pregnancy and childbirth-related disabilities. The per
centage of firms implementing such policies range from 6.1 in the
smallest firms to 22.8 in the largest firms (Table 3). The percentages of
business reporting separate maternity leave policies in the U.S. Small
Business Administration survey were lower than the percentages
reporting such policies in Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employee
Benefits surveys, where the percentages reporting unpaid maternity
leave range from 17 percent in small establishments to 37 percent in
large establishments (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta
tistics 1991). The differences between the two surveys occur because
unpaid maternity leave that covers disabilities, but not care for new
born children, was usually reported under unpaid medical leave in the
SBA survey. Under EEOC guidelines, maternity leave for care-giving
purposes cannot be granted to women without equivalent leave also
being granted to men (U.S. EEOC 1990). The BLS survey found that
the incidence of unpaid paternity leave ranges from 8 percent in small
establishments to 18 percent in large ones. The higher rate of mater
nity leave as compared with paternity leave in the BLS surveys results
from the inclusion of unpaid leave for disabilities resulting from preg
nancy and childbirth in the maternity leave percentages as maternity,
but not paternity, leaves.
Benefits and Guarantees during Leave. All the enacted state and
federal legislation provide for unpaid leave. Thus, given the relatively
high incidence of unpaid leave policies in large firms and legislative
exemptions for small firms, the primary role of current legislative initi
atives centers on providing uniformity and certainty in leave policy to
employees in firms employing 50 or more. A critical aspect of any
leave legislation or firm-specific leave policy concerns how the law or
firm policy deals with the conditions under which the employee may
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return to work. Three major questions answered in the FMLA and in
firm-specific policy are as follows:
1) Upon returning from a leave for illness, disability, pregnancy,
or childbirth, are employees guaranteed the same or a
comparable job?
2) Are employees guaranteed seniority for promotion and other
purposes during the leave?
3) Does the employer continue to pay the employer share of
health benefits during the leave?
Information concerning guarantees and benefits during leave are
presented in Table 4. In general, the data indicate that, with the excep
tion of unpaid sick leave and maternity leave for firms employing
between 50 and 99 workers, the incidence of all forms of leave with
health insurance continuation and job and seniority guarantees
increases with firm size. The incidence of unpaid sick leave and mater
nity leave (and attendant guarantees and health insurance continuation)
in firms employing between 50 and 99 workers usually is slightly
higher than it is in the largest firms. This may simply be an anomaly in
this data or it might indicate that economies of scale for these benefits
cease at a firm size of approximately 50-99 workers. The data might
also be reflecting state-level legislation mandating that such leaves be
provided by firms employing in excess of 50 people.
Between 19 and 25 percent of all firms in the smallest firm size
category (1-15 employees) provide paid sick leave with seniority and
job guarantees and health insurance continuation for both managers
and nonmanagers (Table 4). Similarly, for both occupation groups,
approximately 40 percent of small firms provide unpaid sick leave with
a job guarantee, between 30 and 32 percent with a seniority guarantee,
and about a quarter continue to pay health insurance during sick leave.
Less than 5 percent of all firms in this category provide any job, senior
ity, or health insurance continuation benefits while an employee is on a
maternity leave.
In the two largest firm size categories for both managers and nonmanagers, the percentage of firms providing paid sick leave with a job
guarantee increases to about 60 percent, but paid sick leave with
seniority guarantees is provided by only about 45 percent of the firms.
The same pattern is followed with both unpaid sick leave (61-70 per-
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Table 4 Leaves with Benefits and Guarantees in U.S. Firms: Incidence by
Type of Leave and Firm Size (%)
Type of leave

Firm size
50-99

1-15

16-49
Managers
(#=311)

(#=1025)

Paid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Unpaid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Separate maternity leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance

(#=75)

(#=184)

24.6
194
20.7

47.6
30.2
38.2

592
453
520

62.5
45.3
41.9

396
30.1
262

62.2
38.7
47.2

69.7
52.6
61.8

64.3
44.8
43.7

4.7
4.1
3.8

12.7
7.8
112

19.7
13.3
15.8

16.8
10.9
11.4

(#=73)

(#=181)

(#=1041)

Paid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Unpaid sick leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance
Separate maternity leave
Job guarantee
Seniority guarantee
Employer continues to
pay health insurance

100 or more

Nonmanagers
(#=311)

24.6
19.3
204

45.1
30.8
36.7

58.9
44.4
51.4

60.2
446
409

42.3
31.6
25.8

59.6
38.3
429

65.8
48.7
57.9

61.3
44.1
39.8

49
4.2
3.9

12.5
7.8
10.3

18.7
12.2
14.7

15.9
11.0
10.9

SOURCE- Trzcmski and Alpert 1990.
a Firm size determined by number of employees
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cent of firms providing this benefit with a job guarantee and 44-53 per
cent providing such leave with a seniority guarantee) and separate
maternity leave (15-20 percent providing separate maternity leave with
a job guarantee but only about 11-13 percent providing seniority guar
antees). The proportion of firms with 50-99 employees providing
health insurance continuation is smaller than the proportion providing
job guarantees for each of the benefits listed in Table 4 but the propor
tion is larger for seniority guarantees. While in the largest firm size
category, however, the percentage of firms providing seniority guaran
tees is generally larger in each benefit category than the percentage
offering to pay for health insurance during an employee leave.
The data in Table 4 reveal a substantial percentage of the busi
nesses that provided leave did so without providing a job guarantee and
without providing for health benefit continuation. The major exception
is separate maternity leave policies, where the incidence of leave with
job guarantees quite closely matched the overall incidence of leave.
Thus, prior to the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act, a
substantial minority of firms provided neither health insurance contin
uation nor job or seniority guarantees with leave. While approximately
90 percent of businesses with 50-99 and with 100 or more employees
provided either formal or informal unpaid medical leave, a substantial
percentage of these businesses provided neither a job guarantee nor
health benefit continuation.
The same basic picture is presented in Table 5, where a tabulation
of the SBA survey results for questions concerning leave to care for
sick children and ailing parents is presented. Specifically, the survey
requested employers to note whether paid sick leave, vacation time, or
any other leave could be used by managerial or nonmanagerial
employees to care for their infirm children or parents. The question
was phrased so that it is not known whether such leave is discretionary
or whether it contains job guarantees.
As in the case of other leaves, the data in Table 5 show that, as firm
size increases, the percentage of firms allowing workers to use various
kinds of leave to care for sick children also increases. With the notable
exception of the other leave category (in which case employers' per
mission for use of other leave to care for sick children increases monotonically with our firm size groupings from about 6 or 7 percent in the
smallest firm size category to about 32 percent in the largest), employ-
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Table 5 Leave to Care for Sick Children and Leave to Care
for Ailing Parents in U.S. Firms, Incidence by Type of Leave
and Firm Size (%)a
Type of leave
Managers
Sick leave
Vacation
Other leave
Sick, vacation and/or
other leave
Nonmanagers
Sick leave
Vacation
Other leave
Sick, vacation and/or
other leave

Firm sizeb
16-49
50-99
Sick children
(#=978)
(#=281)
(#=68)
29.5
47.8
18.6
44.2
68.7
80.6
6.1
11.9
19.1
1-15

47.5
(#=988)
18.7
45.0
6.5

73.2
(#=281)
29.2
68.1
10.8

51.0
72.5
Ailing parents
(#=965)
(#=277)
27.4
16.6
42.3
68.8
5.8
11.2

100 or more
(#=168)
46.4
78.6
32.3

85.3
(#=67)
44.8
79.1
19.1

88.0
(#=167)
44.9
78.4
32.3

85.3

86.9

Managers
(#=67)
(#=167)
43.3
Sick leave
40.1
Vacation
77.6
78.3
Other leave
15.9
30.3
Sick, vacation and/or
other leave
45.2
71.5
80.0
86.2
Nonmanagers
(#=978)
(#=278)
(#=67)
(#=166)
Sick leave
16.6
26.6
40.3
38.6
Vacation
43.5
67.7
76.1
78.3
Other leave
6.0
10.9
15.9
30.3
Sick, vacation and/or
other leave
50.0
71.6
82.2
85.2
SOURCE: Trzcinski and Alpert 1990.
a Percentages include 1) discretionary and nondiscretionary leaves and 2) leaves with
and without job guarantees.
b Firm size determined by number of employees.
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ers' permission for their employees to use either sick or vacation leaves
for sick child care increases with firm size, usually reaching its maxi
mum in the category of between 50 and 99 employees. Between 45
percent (nonmanagers) and 48 percent (managers) of all employers in
this category allow sick leave to be used to care for sick offspring and
80 percent (nonmanagers) and 81 percent (managers) allow their
employees to use vacation to care for sick children.
Permission to use any form of leave for the care of ailing children
is granted about half the time in the smallest firm size category
(approximately 48 percent for managers and 51 percent for nonman
agers) increasing (monotonically) to almost 90 percent (88 percent for
managers and 87 percent for nonmanagers) in the largest firm size cat
egory.
The results for ailing parents are extremely close to those for sick
children. Between 45 percent (managers) and 50 percent (nonman
agers) of employers in small firms (1-15 employees) allow their
employees to use sick, vacation, or other leave to care for ailing par
ents. This percentage increases monotonically until, in the largest firm
size category, approximately 86 percent of employers allow their man
agers to use sick vacation or other leave to care for infirm parents.
In summary, permission to use other leaves to care for sick chil
dren and ailing parents were approximately equally available for man
agers and nonmanagers. The granting of permission to use sick,
vacation, and/or other leaves to care for ill children or parents is quite
common, ranging from 50 percent of employers in the smallest firm
size category to almost 90 percent in the largest. Firms most readily
allowed the use of vacation leave for the care of sick children or infirm
parents. Even in the smallest firm size category, between 40 and 45
percent of the employers surveyed allowed the use of vacation leave
for this purpose. This is understandable because vacation leave is one
of the most flexible benefits provided by employers. Ideally, an
employer would like an employee to take the vacation to "recharge"
him- or herself and to be more efficient upon return to work. However,
it appears that firms recognize that they will have little control over
how vacations are actually used by employees and that any attempt to
monitor and control vacation use will almost certainly be counterpro
ductive.
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Private Sector Policies in Canada
Table 6, which provides results from an employer survey con
ducted by the Pay Research Bureau (1988), shows that the types of
benefits provided in Canada mirror those provided in the United States.
The incidence of paid sick leave is high in Canada among managerial
and professional workers, while it is relatively low among non-office
workers. On the other hand, sickness indemnity insurance coverage
rate is lower among managerial and professional workers but is much
higher among non-office personnel. For virtually all covered workers
(non-office workers having the highest coverage rate at over 40 per
cent), employers pay all of the costs of sickness indemnity plans.
Most firms provide personal and parental leave; however, its length
and the conditions under which it is granted vary greatly. Likewise,
paid leave for an illness in the family is provided by about half of all
employers of white-collar workers, but much of this leave is discretion
ary—that is, granted at the discretion of the employer. Most non-office
workers do not have access to paid leave for family illness.
Table 6 Incidence of Medical and Family-Related Benefits in Canada
(% employees covered)
Management/
professional
Benefit
Supplementary health
98.3
insurance
86.6
Formal paid sick leave plans
5.0
Sickness indemnity plans
Combined formal paid sick
leave and sickness
8.0
indemnity plans
97.2
Long-term disability plans
96.6
Paid holidays
96.6
Paid vacations
814
Paid bereavement leave
79.2
Personal and parental leave
51.9
Paid leave—illness in family
SOURCE: Pay Research Bureau 1988.

Office

Nonoffice

97.3
78.8
4.1

93.2
44.7
40.3

16.6
85.3
100.0
100.0
86.9
85.9
50.1

12.5
76.7
100.0
100.0
98.6
79.1
19.4
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The duration of paid maternity leave varies greatly in Canada,
from one day to 18 weeks (Pay Research Bureau 1988). Employers are
permitted to supplement unemployment insurance through formalized
supplemental unemployment benefit plans. Among management and
professional workers, 33.7 percent are covered by such plans. Among
office workers, the percentage falls to 25.4 percent; for non-office
workers, the percentage covered is only 14.6 percent. For management
and professional workers, 3.3 percent of employees receive such leave
through a discretionary plan. For office workers, the proportion of
workers eligible for such plans is 4 percent. Among non-office work
ers, the percentage falls to 2.5 percent. Such plans can make up the
difference between an employee's unemployment benefit and their sal
ary, up to a maximum of 95 percent of the employee's regular salary
(Pay Research Bureau 1988).

MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF LEAVE AND CONDITIONS
SURROUNDING LEAVE
Theoretical Considerations
Using the data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Leave
Survey, we estimate two sets of models: the first deals with leave inci
dence and the second with benefits and guarantees available for leave
takers.
The model used to examine the provision of paid and unpaid leave
is conventional since we hypothesize that leave is provided as a result
of the interaction of employer supply and employee demand. The SBA
survey was designed to address the question of what factors influence
the incidence of leave and conditions surrounding leave. Specific
questions were included in the questionnaire to measure important sup
ply- and demand-side factors that theoretically influence whether or
not leave is provided.
Fringe benefit supply varies in response to differences in relative
costs of benefit provision (Rice 1966; Alpert 1982; Woodbury 1983;
Vroman and Anderson 1984; and Even 1992). The supply of fringe
benefits is hypothesized to vary with their costs to the firm. A principal

Family and Medical Leave

147

determinate of cost is thought to be the size of the firm because fringe
benefit provision is thought to be subject to economies of scale of
group purchase. Measures of firm size are usually utilized to act as
proxy variables for these economies of scale. We use several variables
to proxy for such economies, including number of employees, sales
volume, and type of firm ownership.
We also hypothesize that, in industries in which larger firms pre
dominate, leaves will be provided more frequently as a result of com
petition (for comparable compensation packages), follow-the-leader
relationships, and demonstration and/or learning effects among the
firms in such industries. In order to proxy these effects, we include in
our analysis a variable (Percentage Small in the Industry) that captures
the percentage of small firms in the industry in which the firm does
business. This variable measures the percentage of firms in the indus
try employing fewer than 100 workers. Unpublished data from the
SBA was used to construct this variable.
The model also contains several demand-side variables. Recogniz
ing that unionized workers often either demand larger quantities of
fringe benefits or can express their demand for more fringe benefits
through their union better than nonunionized workers, we include a
variable equaling one if a majority of the firm's workforce is unionized
and zero otherwise. We also include a variable reflecting the percent
age of workers in the firm's industry who are unionized (reflecting the
possibility of spillover effects of unionization on other union and non
union firms in the industry). It is important to recognize that such
spillover effects might operate in either direction since a heavily union
ized industry would be an industry in which, all else constant, workers'
tastes are better communicated to employers. If workers overall prefer
other forms of compensation (for example, cash wages) to leave and
insurance, a high rate of unionization might actually lower the likeli
hood that workers in a particular firm have such benefits (holding con
stant unionization in that firm). Conversely, if workers overall prefer
leave and insurance to other forms of compensation, high rates of
industry unionization could raise the likelihood that workers in a par
ticular firm have such benefits.
In addition, workers' tastes (and hence their demand) for fringe
benefits are likely to vary with certain demographic characteristics.
Here, we hypothesize that tastes for leave can be proxied by the gender
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and age of a firm's workforce. We use a variable measuring the per
centage of the firm's workforce that is female of childbearing age (1644 years old) and the percentage of the firm's workforce that is over the
age of 55 to measure two subgroups of workers more likely to demand
leave than are other groups. Testing the hypothesis that women work
ers prefer leave and insurance-type benefits to other forms of compen
sation, we include a variable reflecting the percentage of female
workers in the industry in our estimating equations. Finally, we con
trol for the unemployment rate (at the time of the survey) in the state in
which the firm is located, the percentage of the state's workforce
located in rural areas, and several industry categorical variables to cap
ture industry effects. An important variable omitted from the equations
is worker income. Other variables, such as firm size and age, will act
as proxies for income, but readers should be aware of the bias created
in the estimated coefficients by the omission of a variable that directly
measures worker income.
The following sections present bivariate logit estimates (and OLS
equivalent coefficients) of the incidence of paid and unpaid medical
leave and the incidence of different types of family leave.
Incidence of Medical Leave
Table 7 displays estimates of logit regressions in which employer
provision of some types of medical leave are regressed on a variety of
independent variables, including three measures of scale of firm: num
ber of employees, sales volume, and ownership type. Across the differ
ent firm size measures, smaller firms are generally significantly less
likely than larger firms to provide medical leave. For paid sick leave
only and combined paid sick leave and sickness and accident insur
ance, firms with 15 or fewer employees are significantly less likely to
provide these benefits than firms employing 100 or more workers.
Thus, there appears to be a threshold effect for paid leave, with the
threshold occurring at the smallest firm size category. It is interesting
to note that no such effect is apparent for sickness and accident insur
ance. For formal unpaid leave, the effect suggested in the two-way
analysis continues to be present. Each included firm size category
variable's coefficient shows that firms within that firm size category are
significantly less likely to provide this benefit than firms employing
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Table 7 Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides
Medical Leave (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3

Variable5
Firm size
1-15 employees

Paid sick
leave

Sickness and
accident
insurance

-0186
[-0.772***]
(0.253)

-0.065
[-0.387]
(0.274)

-0.081
[-0.377]
(0.265)
-0007
[-0 029]
(0.338)
-0.314
[-1 304***]
(0 349)

-0.153
[-0912***]
(0 356)

$250,000-$ 1,000,000

-0207
[-0.861***]
(0 349)

$1,000,000-$ 10,000,000

1 6-49 employees

50-99 employees
Sales volume
Less than $250,000

$10,000,000-$50,000,000
Ownership type
Sole proprietorship

Partnership

Either paid
sick&
sickness &
accident
insurance

Unpaid
leave
(formal)
-0.266
[-1.540***]
(0310)

-0018
[-0.105]
(0.284)

-0.156
[-0.626**]
(0 258)
-0.002
[-0.010]
(0.274)

0.031
[0.186]
(0.347)

0068
[0.274]
(0.362)

-0.144
[-0.837**]
(0.412)

-0157
[-0.911***]
(0.316)

-0.190
[-1.102***]
(0.406)

-0.138
[-0.821**]
(0.354)

-0.420
[-1.684***]
(0 375)
-0.341
[-1 368***]
(0.376)

-0.174
[-0.722**]
(0.334)
-0.160
[-0.663*]
(0 384)

-0.071
[-0.424]
(0 324)

-0.266
[-1.068***]
(0.364)

-0.087
[-0.503]
(0 349)

-0.003
[-0.020]
(0.361)

-0.114
[-0.457]
(0 434)

-0.055
[-0.320]
(0.391)

-.0131
[-0.542***]
(0.197)

-0.028
[-0.165]
(0 237)

-0.107
[_0 430**]
(0.190)

-0.079
[-0 457]
(0 332)

-0.158
[-0.656**]
(0.295)

0.005
[0.029]
(0.327)

-0.150
[-0.601**]
(0.284)

0.014
[0.082]
(0 402)

-0.139
[-0.805**]
(0.404)

(continued)
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Table 7 (continued)

Variable5
Corporation

Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction

Paid sick
leave
0.016
[0.066]
(0.160)

-0046
[-3.838**]
(0.1820)

-2.057
[-8.253***]
(1.974)

0309
[1.790]
(2 286)

-0.279
[-1 159***]
(0.283)

-0.009
[-0.052]
(0.303)

-0.260
[-1.043***]
(0.273)

-0.108
[-0.626]
(0.470)

-0.061
[-0.244]
(0.310)

-0.010
[0.058]
(0.384)

0.100
[0.403]
(0.490)

-0.001
[-0.003]
(0 626)

-0.159
[-0.659**]
(0.307)

Transportation

0.009
[0.037]
(0.489)

Wholesale trade

0010
[0.042]
(0.212)

Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry
Percent female age 16-44,
managers

Unpaid
leave
(formal)
0.017
[0 101]
(0.229)

-0.151
[-6.255***]
(1.854)

Manufacturing

Retail trade

Sickness and
accident
insurance
0.058
[0.343*]
(0 182)

Either paid
sick&
sickness &
accident
insurance
0055
[0.220]
(0.160)

-0.331
[-1.137***]
(0.180)

0.198
[1.176***]
(0.329)
0285
[1 692***]
(0 524)
0.030
[0.176]
(0 239)
-0.038
[-0.225]
(0.210)

-0.001
[-0.003]
(0.216)
-0.218
[-0.873***]
(0.172)

0.028
[0.164]
(0.348)
0.017
[0.096]
(0.258)

0.069
[0.285]
(0.288)

0.107
[0.634**]
(0.273)

0.090
[0.360]
(0.301)

0013
[0 076]
(0.341)

-0.454
[-1.885]
(1.556)

-0.872
[-5.182***]
(1.652)

-0.648
[-2.602*]
(1.559)

0.243
[1.410]
(1.759)

0.078
[0.311*]
(0.189)

0.040
[0.234]
(0.286)

0.079
[0.328*]
0.191)

0.028
[0.167]
(0.221)
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Variable15
Percent female age 16-^44,
nonmanagers

Percent female in industry
Percent age 55 or more,
Manager
Percent age 55 or more,
nonmanager

State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area

Paid sick
leave
0.193
[0.802***]
(0.173)
-0.191
[-0.793*]
(0.456)
0.140
[0.581***]
(0 207)
-0.041
[-0.171]
(0.285)
-1.46
[-605]
(380)
-0.037
[-0.152]
(0.442)

Sickness and
accident
insurance
0.024
[0.140]
(0.200)

Either paid
sick&
sickness &
accident
insurance
0.143
[0.575***]
(0.171)

-0.216
[-1.286***]
(0.507)

-0.391
[-1.568***]
(0.454)

0.070
[0.419*]
(0.237)

0198
[0 796***]
(0.205)

-0019
[-0.115]
(0.335)
-2.346
[-13 947***]
(4.339)
-0.053
[0316]
(0 489)

-0.048
[-0.191]
(0.274)
-2420
[-9710***]
(3.754)
-0.024
[-0.0963]
(0.437)

151

Unpaid
leave
(formal)
0.034
[0.197]
(0 265)
0.258
[1.497**]
(0.679)
0.053
[0.307]
(0.333)
-0.011
[-0.063]
(0.478)
0.144
[0.833]
(5601)
-0282
[-1.637**]
(0.676)

1599
1585
N
1594
1564
367.43***
149.13***
395 94***
157.91***
Chi-square
-2 log L
-1790.72
-1509 19
-1812.48
-967.00
-2 log L (intercept only) -2158.15
1658 32
-2208.43
-1124.91
1 Original logit coefficient given in brackets and standard error of the original logit coeffi
cient in parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser
vices (industry), and nonunion workers.
***sigmficant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**sigmficant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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100 or more workers, and the likelihood that a business provides
unpaid leave increases steadily as the number of the firm's employees
increases.
These scale effects are quite small, however. The OLS equivalent
coefficients of all forms of paid leave show that a 10 percent decrease
in the size of the firm decreases the odds that a firm will offer leave by
1 or 2 percent. However, in the case of unpaid leave, a decrease in firm
size decreases the odds that the firm will offer leave substantially. For
example, as the size of the firm falls below 100 employees, a 10 per
cent reduction in firm size lowers the likelihood that a firm will provide
unpaid leave by about 8.4 percent.
For both paid and unpaid leave, increases in sales volume also pos
itively affect the likelihood that businesses provide leave. For paid
leave, this effect is consistent across three of the sales volume catego
ries and is not limited to the type of threshold effect observed for a
number of employees. In the case of paid sick leave, all four sales vol
ume categorical variables have significant and negative effects relative
to the excluded category, sales volume equal to or exceeding $50 mil
lion. In this case, the lower the sales volume, the greater the negative
effect on the incidence of leave relative to the excluded sales size cate
gory. For example in firms with annual sales volumes of less than
$250,000 a 10 percent reduction in sales volume will result in a 3 per
cent reduction in the likelihood of paid leave, while in a firm with sales
volume between $10 and $50 million, a 10 percent reduction in sales
volume will yield a 1.6 percent lowered probability of paid sick leave
provision. In the estimate of combined paid sick leave/sickness and
accident insurance, the significant effects hold for the three lowest
sales volume categories, while for unpaid leave, only the two lowest
sales volume categories show significantly lower incidences of leave
compared with businesses with higher sales volumes. Ownership type
also affects the incidence of paid leave but not unpaid leave. Sole pro
prietorships and partnerships tend to be less likely to provide leaves
than are corporations and Subchapter S Corporations. This effect is
relatively large with the OLS equivalent coefficient in the paid leave
equation equaling -0.66.
The variable, Percentage Small in the Industry, has significant and
negative coefficients in Table 7 in the paid medical leave and combined
paid sick leave and sickness and accident insurance equations, but it
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has no statistically significant effect in the unpaid medical leave equa
tion.
The five dummy variables included to control for industry are agri
culture, mining, and construction; manufacturing; transportation;
wholesale trade; and retail trade. The excluded category is the service
sector. Industry effects are limited to paid leave and sickness and acci
dent insurance. There are large and significant differences between
service and manufacturing firms in the provision of paid sick leave and
sickness and accident insurance. In these cases, the OLS equivalent
coefficients are -0.66 and +1.18. Firms in agriculture and in retail
trade are less likely to provide paid sick leave than are firms in the ser
vice sector. Firms in transportation are more likely than service sector
firms to offer sickness and accident insurance, but this difference is not
observable in the joint variable of paid sick leave and/or sickness and
accident insurance. No statistically significant industry effects are
observed in the unpaid leave equation.
A firm-specific variable and an industry-specific variable are
included in the equation to measure the effects of unionization. These
two unionization variable coefficients indicate that unions tend to
affect the provision of leave and insurance in opposite directions.
Firms whose workers are covered by a union contract are significantly
more likely to provide sickness and accident insurance compared with
firms whose workers are not unionized, but this variable has no effect
on the joint provision of paid leave policies (Table 7). The findings
also indicate that a spillover effect may be occurring. The percentage
of workers unionized in the industry depresses the likelihood that a
particular firm in that industry provides sickness and accident insur
ance. As noted above, this result is plausible since, in spite of the fact
that unionized workers are able to raise the level of a particular benefit
in a given firm (industry unionization rate constant), it is also possible
that even though unionization in a particular firm may raise the likeli
hood of the presence of leave and/or insurance-type benefits in that
firm, a high rate of unionization in an industry (reflecting overall
worker preferences in that industry) may lower the likelihood that a
particular firm in that industry offers leave and/or insurance-type bene
fits. The latter result applies in this case for sickness and accident
insurance. Neither the firm-specific nor the industry-specific union
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coefficient achieves statistical significance in the unpaid leave equa
tion.
The firm level demographic variables (percent female aged 16-44
and percent aged 55 or more) are entered separately in the equation for
both managers and nonmanagers. The empirical analyses suggest that
firm-specific and industry-specific demographic variables operate on
two separate and conflicting levels where the negative effects of per
cent female in the industry are counterbalanced by the effects of the
firm-specific demographics. More specifically, the two variables, per
cent female of the firm's managerial and nonmanagerial workforce
aged 16-44, exert positive effects on the incidence of paid sick leave.
This effect carries over to the combined incidence of paid sick leave
days and sickness and accident insurance. In the unpaid leave equa
tion, no effects are observed for the firm-specific measures of percent
female, but the negative industry-specific effect remains. Although
both coefficients of the variables percent female of the managerial and
nonmanagerial workforce achieved statistical significance, the effects
of firm-specific demographics concerning older workers are limited to
effects stemming from the percent of older managers. In no case does
the percent of the firm's nonmanagerial workforce aged 55 or older
exert a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent variable.
The percent of the firm's managerial workforce, aged 55 or older
affects the likelihood of paid leave in the incidence equations, but it
exerts no effect on incidence of unpaid leave.
As the state unemployment rate increases, the likelihood that a
firm offers sickness and accident insurance significantly declines, as
does the likelihood of the firm offering either paid sick leave days and/
or sickness and accident insurance. These effects are large. For exam
ple, a 1 percent increase in the state unemployment rate reduces the
likelihood that a firm will offer sickness and accident insurance by 2.35
percent. No statistically significant effect of the state unemployment
rate is observed in the unpaid leave equation.
The final control variable in this analysis is the percentage of the
state's population that resides in a rural area. Here, the only significant
effect occurs for the provision of formal unpaid medical leave policies:
the greater this percentage, the less likely is a firm to have a formal,
unpaid leave policy.
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Table 7 indicates that, although the unpaid leave equation does
achieve statistical significance, the overall explanatory power as mea
sured by chi-square is far below the level achieved by the paid leave
equation. Several variables that consistently achieved significance in
the paid leave equations do not to achieve significance in the unpaid
leave equation, including ownership type, industry type, unionization
(firm specific and industry), percent managers aged 55 or older, and
state unemployment rate. As we noted at the beginning of this paper,
we expected that a reduced form demand framework would better
explain the provision of paid leave and insurance-type benefits than
unpaid leave. From the results presented in Table 7, this appears to be
the case.
Incidence of Family Leave
Table 8 presents logit estimates for four types of family leave:
maternity leave (separate policy for disability and infant care), mater
nity leave (separate policy for infant care only), leave to care for sick
children, and leave to care for ailing parents. In the latter two cases,
the existence of such leave typically indicates that the firm permits the
use of other types of leave for caring for sick children and/or ailing par
ents.
Only two coefficients of the categorical variables for economies of
scale of group purchase are statistically significant at conventional lev
els in Table 8. Thus, only in the smallest firm size category do signifi
cantly fewer firms offer their workers maternity leave (either with
disability and infant care or infant care only). In this set of four equa
tions, two coefficients of the dummy variables for number of employ
ees attain statistical significance. Firms employing 1-15 workers are
less likely than other firms to have either separate maternity leave for
disability and/or infant care. In no case does number of employees
affect the likelihood that a firm provides leave to care for sick children
or ailing parents. Sales volume, on the other hand, significantly affects
the probability that a firm provides leave to care for ailing parents only
in the smallest sales volume category. Sales volume has more perva
sive effects on the provision of leave to care for sick children than it
does for ailing parents, with the coefficient of the sick children variable
achieving statistical significance in the smallest three sales size catego-
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Table 8 Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides Separate
Family Leave Policies (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3

Variable15
Firm size
1-15 employees

Maternity leave
Separate
Separate
policy,
policy:
disability &
infant care
infant care
only

Leave
to care
for sick
children

Leave
to care
for ailing
parents

-0.024
[-1.259**]
(0.332)

-0.069
[-1 295**]
(0.567)

-0.053
[-0.245]
(0.282)

-0.045
[-0.183]
(0.305)

16-49 employees

-0060
[-0.314]
(0.336)

-0.031
[-0.586]
(0.593)

-0.012
[-0 058]
(0.293)

0.032
[0.131]
(0.316)

50-99 employees

-0.062
[-0.100]
(0.410)

-0.006
[-.111]
(0.709)

0.120
[0.559]
(0.350)

0.149
[0 604]
(0.379)

0.004
[0212]
(0.435)

0.022
[0.419]
(0 685)
0037
[0.697]
(0.723)

-0.279
[-1 295***]
(0361)
-0.144
[-0.669*]
(0.354)

-0.239
[-0.970***]
(0 384)
-0.120
[-0.489]
(0.378)

-0.153
[-0 709**]
(0 329)
-0.097
[-0.452]
(0.376)

-0.122
[-0.496]
(0351)
-0.030
[-0.120]
(0.402)

Sales volume (annual)
Less than $250,000

$250,000-$ 1,000,000

0.006
[0.338]
(0.444)

$1,000,000-$ 10,000,000

0.005
[0.242]
(0.401)

$ 1 0,000,000-$50,000,000

0.000
[0.004]
(0.477)

-0.006
[-0.119]
(0.668)
0.013
[0.252]
(0.783)

0.005
[0.259]
(0.327)

-0.063
[1.186*]
(0.622)

-0.145
[-0.675***]
(0 243)

-0.179
[-0.729***]
(0.260)

Partnership

0.003
[0.177]
(0 450)

0.001
[0.027]
(1.144)

-0025
[-0.116]
(0.320)

-0045
[-0.181]
(0.339)

Corporation

0008
[0.393]
(0.256)

0.069
[1.284**]
(0.534)

0.022
[0.101]
(0.177)

0.036
[0.147]
(0 190)

-0.051
[-2.646]
(2 294)

-0.515
[-9.617***]
(3 698)

-0.929
[-4.308**]
(1.803)

-1.056
[-4.296**]
(1.946)

Ownership type
Sole proprietorship

Percentage small in industry
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leave
Separate
policy:
infant care
only

Leave
to care
for sick
children

Leave
to care
for ailing
parents

-0.008
[-0.408]
(0.436)

-0.061
[-1.140]
(0.908)

-0.382
[_1 774***]
(0 382)

-0.477
[-1.938***]
(0411)

Manufacturing

0000
[0.001]
(0.402)

-0.041
[-0.780]
(0716)

-0.173
[-0.804**]
(0.334)

-0.228
[-0 928***]
(0.363)

Transportation

0.003
[0.140]
(0 666)

0015
[0.281]
(1.060)

-0.152
[-0.706]
(0 546)

-0.196
[-0.799]
(0.605)

Wholesale trade

0.008
[0.427]
(0.321)

0.014
[0.262]
(0 576)

-0079
[-0.365]
(0.240)

-0106
[-0 430*]
(0 253)

Retail trade

-0.014
[-0 709**]
(0.306)

0.004
[0.086]
(0.459)

0.204
[_0946***]
(0.213)

-0.280
[-1.138***]
(0.228)

Unionized

-0.003
[-0.134]
(0.394)

-0.020
[-0.377]
(0.724)

-0.055
[-0.253]
(0.322)

0.043
[-0.173]
(0 336)

Percent unionized in
industry

-0.003
[-0.131]
(1.916)

-0013
[-0 240]
(2.826)

-0.049
[-0.226]
(1 604)

0.094
[0 383]
(1.737)

Percent female age 16-44,
Managers

0.003
[0.186]
(0.284)

0.028
[0.529]
(0.468)

0.085
[0 394*]
(0.215)

0.125
[0.509**]
(0.229)

Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers

0.016
[0.822***]
(0.267)

0.006
[0.116]
(0.461)

0.082
[0.383**]
(0.197)

0.106
[0431**]
(0.210)

Percent female in industry

0.001
[0 066]
(0.704)

Variableb
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction

Maternity
Separate
policy
disability &
infant care

0.038
[-0.708]
(1.123)

-0.116
[-0.540]
(0.513)

-0.177
[-0.727]
(0.549)
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Table 8 (continued)

Variable5
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers

Maternity leave
Separate
Separate
policy:
policy:
disability &
infant care
infant care
only
-0.025
0.001
[-0 469]
[0.064]
(0.340)
(0.685)

Leave
to care
for sick
children
0.073
[0341]
(0.243)

Leave
to care
for ailing
parents
0.140
[0.571**]
(0 257)

Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers

0.004
[0.202]
(0.469)

0.014
[0.266]
(0771)

-0.101
[-0.470]
(0.367)

-0.099
[-0.402]
(0.390)

State unemployment rate

-0.029
[-1 495]
(5.492)

-0.395
[-7.386]
(9.324)

0.531
[2.467]
(4.243)

0.646
[2.629]
(4.488)

Percent of state population
in rural area

0.012
[0.631]
0(.651)

-0.038
[-0.176]
(0.505)

0.049
[0.201]
(0 534)

0.165
[3.096***]
(1.110)]

AT
1601
1574
1601
1399
86.62***
47.78***
209.76***
194 15***
Chi-square
-2 log L
-1464.09
-1280.69
-962.62
-388.99
^36.47
-1673.85
-1474.85
-2 log L (intercept only) -1049.24
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses.
Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser
vices (industry), and nonunion workers
***sigmficant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**sigmficant at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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ries. The statistically significant effects of ownership type also vary
across the four equations. Corporations are more likely than other
types of firms to provide separate maternity leave policies for infant
care only, while sole proprietorships are less likely than other firms to
provide separate parental leave policies and policies to care for sick
children and ailing parents. As the percentage of small firms in the
industry increases, the likelihood that a firm offers these same three
types of leave also decreases significantly. Significant industry effects
are more pronounced for leave to care for sick children and ailing par
ents, with firms in agriculture, manufacturing, and retail trade less
likely to provide these policies than firms in the service industry.
Neither of the coefficients of the unionization variables achieve
statistical significance in any of the four cases examined here. In con
trast to the effect of the percent female in the industry variable on med
ical leave, the percent female in the industry variable exerts no effect
on the incidence of different types of family leave. However, the likeli
hood that a firm provides leave to care for sick children and for ailing
parents increases significantly as the variable percent female aged 1644 increases for both the managerial and nonmanagerial workforce.
These effects are quite small, however. The OLS equivalent coeffi
cients indicate that a 10 percent increase in any of these variables will
lead to about a 1 percent increase in the likelihood that the firm in
question will provide leave to care for sick children or ailing parents.
The percent female, aged 16-44 of nonmanagers variable (but not the
percent of managers variable), also affects the provision of separate
policies for maternity leave. The percent of the firm's managerial
workforce aged 55 or more has statistically significant effects on the
incidence of leave to care for ailing parents.
In contrast to its negative effect on the provision of unpaid medical
leave, the percent of the state population that resides in rural areas vari
able shows a positive and significant relationship to the incidence of
separate maternity leave policies for infant care only. The state unem
ployment rate has no significant effects in any of the equations.
Many of the predictions of the model are demonstrated to be accu
rate. The results in Table 8 show that limited economies of scale of
group purchase exist for maternity leave for firms with more than 15
employees, but no scale effects (as measured by numbers of employ
ees) are present in the provision of leaves to care for sick children or
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ailing parents. Firms with less than $10 million in annual sales are sig
nificantly less likely to provide leave to care for sick children than are
firms with annual sales in excess of $50 million and very small firms
(annual sales of less than $250,000) are significantly less likely to pro
vide leave to care for ailing parents than are firms in the largest firm
category. Few industry effects exist for these benefits; however, in gen
eral, there is a significantly lower incidence of leave to care for sick
children in all industries (except transportation and wholesale trade)
than in services. Similarly, leave to care for sick children and ailing
parents is significantly positively related to the percent of females
(both managers and nonmanagers) variables. Only in the case of the
leave to care for ailing parents equation does the percent of the firm's
managerial workforce aged 55 or more have statistically significant
effects. Thus, the most important determinants of maternity leave and
leave to care for sick children and ailing parents are scale of firm (as
measured by annual sales) and the percentage of small firms in the
firm's industry. In the case of the latter variable, several industry
effects and the percentage of managerial and nonmanagerial female
employees between the ages of 16 and 44 are also important. The only
other coefficient achieving statistical significance in any equation is
that the larger the percent of a state's population that resides in rural
areas the more maternity leave for infant care is provided.

Benefits and Guarantees Surrounding Medical Leave
Since most large firms provide both paid and unpaid medical leave,
the major impact of the FMLA and state leave legislation centers on
the mandating of conditions surrounding leave. As Table 4 indicates, a
substantial percentage of firms, including large firms, provide leave
without providing health benefit continuation or job guarantees.
Although the lack of a job guarantee does not necessarily imply that an
employee will be terminated, analysis of the SBA survey concerning
terminations in businesses with and without job guarantees did find a
significantly higher rate of terminations on account of illness and dis
ability in businesses without job guarantees in their plans as compared
to businesses with such job guarantees. Conversely, the analysis also
found a correspondingly higher rate of leave-taking in businesses with
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job guarantees than in businesses without job guarantees (Trzcinski
1994).
We provide multinomial logit estimates of the incidence of paid
and unpaid leave with and without health benefit continuation (Tables
9 and 10) and with and without job guarantees (Tables 11 and 12). The
equations are estimated separately for managers (Tables 9 and 11) and
nonmanagers (Tables 10 and 12).
In general, we hypothesize that the same variables that have signif
icant effects in Table 7 for paid medical leave also have significant
effects in Tables 9-12. Minor variations may occur, however, because
a firm was designated as having paid or unpaid medical leave if either
managerial and/or nonmanagerial employees had access to leave in
Table 7. In a small percentage of cases, managers had access to leave,
while nonmanagers did not (or the converse). Hence, the exact per
centages reporting leave may vary slightly across the equations. The
unpaid medical leave variable used in Table 7 refers to formal unpaid
leave plans, while Tables 9-12 classify a firm's unpaid leave policy
into three categories of unpaid leave: formal leave with a job guaran
tee, leave with no guarantee (including informal plans and formal plans
without job guarantees), and no unpaid leave.
The major issue in examining Tables 9-12 centers on determining
when a variable operates differently in its effect on whether a leave is
provided with or without the benefit continuation or a job guarantee.
The most potentially interesting cases are 1) those in which the vari
able's coefficient achieves statistical significance for one of the options
but not the other, and 2) those in which the variable's coefficient
achieves significance for the two options, but the effect is different in
magnitude or operates in a different direction or both. In this set of
four equations, there is no instance in which a variable significantly
affects health benefit continuation and job guarantees and where these
effects are statistically significant and in different directions.
Health Benefit Continuation. The only significant economies of
scale of group purchase effects occur in firms employing more than 15
workers (Tables 9 and 10). Firms in the smallest employment size cat
egory provide significantly fewer paid leaves with and without benefit
continuation for managers and nonmanagers. They also provide sig
nificantly fewer unpaid leaves with benefit continuation for managers
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and nonmanagers than do firms with more than 100 employees. These
effects are generally small, as shown by the OLS equivalent coeffi
cients, which indicate that a 10 percent increase in the independent
variable will result in about a 1 percent increase in the probability that
a firm will provide paid medical leave (with or without benefit continu
ation).
Other measurers of firm size have significant coefficients in the
paid medical leave (managers and nonmanagers) equations. Firms
with less than $50 million in sales provide significantly fewer paid
medical leaves for managers and nonmanagers than do other firms. The
only similar scale effects for unpaid medical leave occur for nonman
agers' unpaid medical leave without benefit continuation for workers
in firms with annual sales volumes of less than $250,000, with signifi
cantly fewer firms providing such leaves.
Sole proprietorships offer significantly fewer formal unpaid medi
cal leaves for managers (not surprisingly, since the proprietor is often
the only manager in a sole proprietorship). The likelihood of firms in
industries with a higher percentage of businesses employing fewer than
100 workers providing paid medical leaves (with or without benefit
continuation) for either managers or nonmanagers is significantly
lower than for firms in industries where the percentage of small firms
in those industries is higher. The OLS equivalent coefficients show
that the effect of the sole proprietorship form of business organization
on the provision of paid leave with and without benefit continuation is
small.
Tables 9 and 10 show few industry effects on leave for managers
and nonmanagers. There is only a significantly negative coefficient on
the retail trade dummy variable, indicating that firms in retail trade pro
vide significantly fewer paid medical leaves (with or without benefit
continuation) for either managers or nonmanagers than do firms in ser
vices. In the case of paid leaves (with or without benefit continuation),
firms in agriculture, mining, and construction are significantly less
likely to provide such leave than are service sector firms.
Other variables that significantly affect the provision of paid and
unpaid medical leave are the percentage of female managers in a firm,
which positively affects the likelihood that a firm will provide both
types of medical leave for managers and nonmanagers with or without
benefit continuation. Across the board, the higher the percentage of
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Table 9 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave With and Without
Health Benefit Continuation, for Managers (OLS Equivalent
Coefficient)3

Variable13
Firm Size
1-15 employees

Paid medical leave
Without
With benefit
benefit
continuation continuation
-0.104
[-0.746**]
(0.332)

Unpaid medical leave
With benefit
Without
continuation
benefit
continuation and formal plan
0.028
[0.129]
(0.304)

0.279
[-0.125**]
(0.489)

0.115
[0.523]
(0.331)
0.155
[0.701]
(0.475)

-0.098
[-0.393]
(0.511)

16-49 employees

-0.005
[-0.033]
(0.348)

50-99 employees

-0.003
[-0.023]
(0 466)

-0.095
[-0.528*]
(0.305)
0.021
[0.119]
(0318)
0.111
[0.619]
(0.398)

-0.281
[-2.01***]
(0.455)
-0.248
[-1.773***]
(0461)

-0.413
[-2.302***]
(0 438)
-0.251
[-1.401***]
(.422)

-0.122
[-0.555]
(0.406)
0.017
[0.077]
(0.416)

$1,000,000-$ 10,000,000

-0.191
[-1.366***]
(0.428)

-0.192
[-1.071***]
(.403)

$ 1 0,000,000-$50,000,000

-0.039
[-0.276]
(0.491)

-0.110
[-.611]
(0.477)

-0.069
[-0.315]
(0.398)
0.120
[0.892]
(0.568)

-0.432
[-1.739**]
(0.683)
-0.223
[-.0900]
(0.642)
-0.189
[-0.761]
(0.566)
-0.144
[-0.581]
(0.794)

-0.066
[-0.473*]
(0.286)
-0.081
[-0.582]
(0.414)
0.025
[0.178]
(0.223)

-0.169
[-0.940***]
(0.249)

-0.017
[0.078]
(0.203)

-0.307
[-1.236**]
(0.616)

-0.147
[-0.820**]
(0.360)
0.045
[0.248]
(0.184)

-0.083
[-0.376]
(0.292)
0.019
[0.084]
(0.183)

-0.117
[-0.471]
(0.648)
0.110
[0.445]
(0.354)

Sales volume (annual)
Less than $250,000

$250,000-$ 1,000,000

Ownership type
Sole proprietorship

Partnership
Corporation

0.151
[0.608]
(0.636)

(continued)

164 Trzcinski and Alpert

Table 9 (continued)
Paid medical leave
Without
With benefit
benefit
continuation continuation
Variable5
-1305
Percentage small in industry -1.143
[-10.163***] [-7.268***]
(2.285)
(2.450)
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
-0.121
-0.259
construction
[-1.442***]
[-0.868**]
(0 395)
(0.352)

Unpaid medical leave
Without
With benefit
benefit
continuation
continuation and formal plan
1 236
-0.736
[-3.337]
[4.978]
3.936)
(2.142)
-0.075
[-0.340]
(0.282)

-0285
[-1.148]
(0.718)

Manufacturing

-0.037
[-0.265]
(0 405)

-0.062
[-0.344]
(0.375)

-0.052
[-0 235]
(0.341)

Transportation

-0.002
[0.011]
(0671)

-0.117
[-0.531]
(0.521)

Wholesale trade

0.019
[-0.138]
(0.324)

0.015
[0 083]
(0.596)
-0.010
[0.056]
(0.249)

0056
[0.224]
(0.634)
-0046
[-0.187]
(1.003)

-0.047
[-0213]
(0.249)

0.035
[0.139]
(0.473)

Retail trade

-0.132
[-0.945***]
(0.271)

-0.139
[-0.773***]
(0.207)

-0.022
[-0 099]
(0.185)

0002
[0.010]
(0.375)

Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry

0.076
[0 543]
(0.377)

0091
[0.506]
(0.346)

0.009
[0.041]
(0.324)

0.096
[0.386]
(0.526)

0327
[-2.340]
(1 958)

-00390
[-2.174]
(1.885)

0.207
[0.940]
(1 605)

0.402
[1.620]
(3.149)

Percent female age 16-44,
Managers

0.120
[0.855***]
(0.261)

0044
[0 244]
(0.232)

0.080
[0.366*]
(0.221)

0.130
[0.525]
(0.435)

Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers

0076
[0.544**]
(0.247)

0.103
[0.572***]
(0.209)

0.202
[0.915***]
(0.200)

0.234
[0941**]
(0.399)

Percent female in industry

-0.150
[-1.069]
(0.656)

-0317
[-1.768***]
(0.542)

-0.151
[-0.683]
(0.484)

0.173
[0.698]
(0.999)
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Variable13
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers

Paid medical leave
Without
With benefit
benefit
continuation continuation
0136
0.133
[0.756***]
[0.953***]
(0.248)
(0.307)

Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers

-0.089
[-0637]
(0.465)

State unemployment rate

-1.108
[-7 917]
(5.509)

Percent of state population
in rural area

-0.027
[-0.152]
(0.342)
-2.204
[-12.279***]
(4.540)
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Unpaid medical leave
With benefit
Without
continuation
benefit
continuation and formal plan
0.088
-0.017
[0 355]
[0.077]
(0 468)
(0 229)
-0.016
[0.074]
(0.280)

0.044
[0.178]
(0.638)

-0896
[-4.062]
(4.130)

-1.750
[-7.050]
(8.250)

0.125
0.109
0.087
-0.224
[-0 503]
[0.494]
[0.482]
[-1.598**]
(0.977)
(0.489)
(0.514)
(0.653)
1590
1485
N
164.233
513 162
Chi-square
-1065.228
-1201 739
-2 log L
-1147.344
-1458.320
-2 log L (intercept only)
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include' 100 or more employees, sales vol
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser
vices (industry), and nonunion workers.
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 10 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without
Health Benefit continuation for Nonmanagers (OLS
Equivalent Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave

Variable5
Firm size
1-15 employees

Without
benefit
continuation

With
benefit
continuation

Unpaid medical leave
Benefit
Without
continuation
benefit
and formal
plan
continuation

-0.113
[-0.760**]
(0.324)

-0079
[-0.468]
(0.306)

0.025
[0.107]
(0.303)

-0.240
[-0.982**]
(0.496)

16-49 employees

0.007
[0.045]
(0.339)

0.026
[0.154]
(0.320)

0115
[0.502]
(0.330)

-0.062
[-0.254]
(0.520)

50-99 employees

-0.015
[-0.098]
(0.462)

0.122
[0.662*]
(0.401)

0.161
[0.699]
(0.474)

0.165
[0.674]
(0 647)

-0.285
[-1.922***]
(0.446)

-0.355
[-2.093***]
(0.436)

-0.141
[-0.614]
(0.405)

-0.276
[-1.128*]
(0.662)

$250,000-$ 1,000,000

-0.266
[-1.790***]
(0.454)

-0.237
[-1.399***]
(0.426)

-0.028
[-0.123]
(0.415)

0.175
[-0.717]
(0.663)

$1,000,000-$10,000,000

-0.052
[-1.348***]
(0.422)

-0.187
[-1.103***]
(0.406)

-0.082
[-0.356]
(0.397)

0.152
[-0.621]
(0.589)

$ 10,000,000-$50,000,000

-0.057
[-0.381]
(0.491)

-0.091
[-0.536]
(0.479)

0.187
[0.813]
(0.567)

-0.015
[-0.061]
(0.775)

-0.060
[-0.404]
(0.274)

-0.150
[-0.886***]
(0.250)

-0.020
[0.088]
(0.203)

-0.178
[-0.726]
(0.555)

-0.095
[-0.639]
(0.408)

-0.118
[-0.697b]
(0.353)

-0.089
[-0.386]
(0.292)

-0.073
[-0.298]
(0.654)

Sales volume
Less than $250,000

Ownership type
Sole proprietorship

Partnership

Family and Medical Leave
Paid medical leave

Variable1*
Corporation

Without
benefit
continuation
0.020
[0.137]
(0.218)

With
benefit
continuation
0.043
[0.255]
(0.186)
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Unpaid medical leave
Benefit
continuation
Without
and formal
benefit
plan
continuation
0.0188
0.135
[0.082]
[0.550]
(0.183)
(0.370)

-1.429
[-9.626***]
(2.388)

-1.129
[-6.659***]
(2.277)

-0.747
[-3.251]
(2 142)

1.113
[4.548]
(4.021)

-0.090
[-0 605]
(0.371)

-0.218
[-1 283***]
(0.345)

-0.076
[-0.330]
(0.282)

-0.313
[-1.279*]
(0.724)

Manufacturing

-0.024
[-0.164]
(0.388)

-0.044
[-0.262]
(0.368)

-0.053
[-0.229]
(0.341)

0.031
[0.126]
(0.638)

Transportation

0.036
[0.241]
(0.637)

0074
[0.438]
(0.576)

-0.121
[-0.525]
(0.522)

-0.076
[-0.312]
(1.011)

Wholesale trade

0.006
[0.039]
(0.310)

-0.011
[-0 064]
(0.251)

-0.047
-0.047
(0.249)

-0.003
[-0.014]
(0.479)

-0.146
[-0.859***]
(0.211)

-0.020
[-0.085]
(0.185)

-0.062
[-0.254]
(0.389)

0.095
[0.560*]
(0.337)

0.005
[0.023]
(0.324)

0.130
[0.533]
(0.521)

-0.392
[-2.310]
(1.844)

0.213
[0.928]
(1.608)

0.461
[1.882]
[1.882]

Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agri., mining, const.

Retail trade

Unionized

Percent unionized in
industry

-0.168
[-1 129***]
(0 276)
0.068
[0.458]
(0.364)
-0.380
[-2.557]
(1.869)

Percent female age 16-44,
Managers

0.097
[0.652**]
(0.255)

0.021
[0.125]
(0.233)

0.086
[0.375*]
(0 221)

0.083
[0.339]
(0.444)

Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers

0.086
[0 580**]
(0.241)

0.119
[0.702***]
(0.209)

0.209
[0.910***]
(0.200)

0.252
[1 028***]
(0.399)
(continued)
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Table 10 (continued)
Paid medical leave

Variable13
Percent female in industry

Percent age 55 or more,
Managers

Without
benefit
continuation
-0.121
[-0.813]
(0 642)

With
benefit
continuation
-0.290
[-1.709***]
(0.543)

0.114
[0.769**]
(0.301)

0102
[0.600**]
(0.253)

Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers

-0.019
[-0.133]
(0.412)

State unemployment rate

-0812
[-5 469]
(5.292)

Percent of state population
in rural area

-0007
[-0.040]
(0.343)
-2.298
[-13.552***]
(4.564)

Unpaid medical leave
Benefit
Without
continuation
benefit
and formal
continuation
plan
-0153
0097
[-0 666]
[0.398]
(0.484)
(1.013)
-0.015
[-0.066]
(0 228)

-0043
[0.176]
(0.480)

-0.142
[-0 620]
(0 279)

-0.020
[-0 084]
(0.685)

-0.965
[-4.198]
(4.131)

-1.088
[-4448]
(8312)

-0.234
0.056
0116
-0.184
[-1 573**]
[0 330]
[0.506]
[-0.751]
(0634)
(0517)
(0.489)
(1.007)
N
1485
1590
141.402
Chi-square
485 347
-2 log L
-1227.464
-1063 651
-1134.353
-2 log L (intercept only)
-1470 138
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales
volume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership
type), services (industry), and nonunion workers.
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test)
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Table 11 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm Provides
Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without Job Guarantee, for
Managers (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave

Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee
and formal
Without
plan
guarantee

Without
guarantee

With
guarantee

-0.046
[-0.515]
(0.393)

0137
[-0.631**]
(0.284)

0.035
[0.225]
(0 306)

-0.288
[-1.361***]
(0.428)

16-49 employees

-0.009
[-0.098]
(0.410)

0.027
[0.126]
(0.298)

0092
[0 589*]
(0 333)

0080
[-0.378]
(0.447)

50-99 employees

0013
[0 140]
(0.527)

0106
[0.487]
(0.382)

0.137
[0.877*]
(0 476)

-0.041
[-0.195]
(0.627)

Variable5
Firm size
1-15 employees

Sales volume
Less than $250,000

-0.174
[_1 937***]
(0 543)

-0.456
[-2.099***]
(0.402)

-0073
[-0 469]
(0.409)

-0351
[-1 661***]
(0.582)

$250,000-$ 1,000,000

-0.126
[_1.4H***]
(0.536)

-0336
[_1 544***]
(0.399)

-0.002
[-0.013]
(0418)

-0.139
[-0.657]
(0.564)

$1,000,000-$10,000,000

-0102
[_1 141**]
(0501)

-0.255
[-1.175***]
(0381)

-0.039
[-0.249]
(0.401)

-0128
[-0 606]
(0501)

$ 10,000,000-$50,000,000

-0.005
[-0.051]
(0.550)

-0129
[0.594]
(0.455)

0.141
[0.904]
(0 572)

0.055
[0.262]
(0.670)

-0.098
[-1 093***]
(0.369)

-0.103
[-0.473**]
(0.221)

-0.018
[-0.081]
(0.204)

-0.013
[-0531]
(0 420)

-0.091
[-1 015*]
(0.535)
0.018
[0.202)
(0.247)

-0.135
[-0621*]
(0.329)
0.062
[0.286]
(0.178)

-0.065
[-0.414]
(0.295)
0018
[0.112]
(0.184)

-0.005
[-0.022]
(0.492)
0.024
[0.113]
(0.298)

Ownership type
Sole proprietorship

Partnership

Corporation
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Table 11 (continued)
Paid medical leave
Without
guarantee
-0.593
[-6.615**]
(2.828)

With
guarantee
-1.75
[-8.074**]
(2.136)

Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee
Without
and formal
plan
guarantee
-0.449
-0.432
[-2.125]
[-2.765]
(2.152)
(3.102)

-0224
[-2 498***]
(0.577)

-0204
[-0 937***]
(0.312)

-0059
[-0.379]
(0.284)

-0.068
[-0.322]
(0.569)

Manufacturing

-0060
[-0.672]
(0.461)

-0.065
[-0.299]
(0.351)

-0.035
[-0.222]
(0.342)

-0035
[0 164]
(0.527)

Transportation

-0.093
[-1 032]
(0.780)

0.043
[0.199]
(0.559)

-0.901
[-0 582]
(0.524)

0.083
[0.394]
(0.806)

Wholesale trade

-0.040
[-0.442]
(0.357)

0.021
[-0.097]
(0.239)

-0.039
[-0.248]
(0.250)

0.108
[-0.513]
(0.435)

Retail trade

-0.083
[-0 927***]
(0.300)

-0.177
[-0.814***]
(0 196)

-0.017
[-0.109]
(0.186)

0.026
[0.125]
(0.339)

0126
[0.578*]
(0.320)

0.008
[0.050]
(0.326)

0009
[0.042]
(0.464)

0.157
[1.005]
(1.610)

0.102
[0.484]
(2.391)

Variable15
Percentage small in industry

Industry
Agn , mining, const.

Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry

0.022
[0.249]
(0.460)
0.116
[1.297]
(2.314)

-0.585
[-2.692]
(1.744)

Percent female age 16-44,
Managers

0.038
[.426]
(0.317)

0117
[.536**]
(0.210)

0056
[.360]
(0.221)

0.103
[0.485]
(0.379)

Percent female age 16-44,
Nonmanagers

0.074
[0.826***]
(0.285)

0.103
[0.474**]
(0.194)

0.146
[0.930***]|
(0.200)

0.163
[0.771**]
(0.348)
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Paid medical leave
Variable15
Percent female in industry

Percent age 55 or more,
Managers

Without
guarantee
0.158
[-1.766**]
(0.735)
0.092
[1.023***]
(0.335)

Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers

0.078
[-0.867]
(0.581)

State unemployment rate

-0.728
[-8.122]
(6.311)

Percent of state population
in rural area

With
guarantee
-0.278
[-1.279**]
(0513)
0.184
[0.848***]
(0.232)
-0 047
[-0.215]
(0.315)
-0.624
[-12.076***]
(4.256)
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Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee
and formal
Without
plan
guarantee
0.278
-0.119
[1.315]
[-0.758]
(0.879)
(0.486)
-0.014
[-0.091]
(0229)

0.094
[0446]
(0.415)

-0.009
[0.050]
(0.280)

-0.017
[-0.078]
(0.579)

-0671
M.292]
(4.147)

-0920
M.354]
(7.151)

-0.114
0.082
0.082
-0 149
[-0.537]
[0.521]
[0.378]
[-1.664**]
(0.856)
(0.491)
(0.485)
(0.752)
1590
1505
TV
190.557
Chi-square
480.657
-1144.188
-2 log L
-1167.943
-1241.466
-2 log L (intercept only)
-1408.271
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales
volume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership
type), services (industry), and nonunion workers.
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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Table 12 Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability that a Firm
Provides Paid and Unpaid Medical Leave with and without Job
Guarantee for Nonmanagers (OLS Equivalent Coefficient)3
Paid medical leave
Without
guarantee

With
guarantee

-0.051
[-0.552]
(0.381)

-0.120
[-0.566**]
(0.283)

16-49 employees

-0.006
[-0.061]
(0.397)

50-99 employees

-0.007
[-0.073]
(0.532)

Variable5
Firm Size
1-15 employees

Sales volume
Less than $250,000

Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee
and formal
Without
plan
guarantee
-0.032
[0.198]
(0.306)

-0.293
[-1.203***]
(0.428)

0.027
[0 128]
(0.297)

0.093
[0571*]
(0.332)

-0.076
[-0.314]
(0.451)

0.110
[0.519]
(0.381)

0.141
[0.866*]
(0.475)

-0.042
[-0.173]
(0.641)

-0177
[-1.908***]
(0.528)

-0.406
[-1.921***]
(0.400)

-0084
[-0.520]
(0.408)

$250,000-$ 1,000,000

-0.120
[-1.295**]
(0.518)

-0.326
[-1.541***]
(0.399)

-0.007
[-0.044]
(0.418)

-0.311
[_1 277**]
(0 559)
-0.159
[-0.653]
(0.566)

$1,000,000-$10,000,000

-0.102
[-1 103**]
(0.487)

-0.250
[-1 185***]
(0.381)

-0.045
[-0 275]
(0.400)

-0.159
[-0.653]
(0.507)

$ 1 0,000,000-$50,000,000

-0.011
[-0.121]
(0.546)

-0.117
[-0.553]
(0.456)

0.140
[0.861]
(0.571)

0078
[0.320]
(0.672)

-0.070
[-0.754**]
(0.339)

-0099
[-0.468**]
(0.217)

-0015
[-0.092]
(0 204)

-0.075
[-0.308]
(0 402)

Partnership

-0.061
[-0 654]
(0.477)

-0.114
[-0.541*]
(0.317)

-0066
[-0.409]
(0.294)

Corporation

0.025
[0.270]
(0.245)

0042
[0 198]
(0.176)

0.017
[0.107]
(0.183)

-0.020
[-0.082]
(0 506)
0.042
[0.171]
(0 302)

Ownership type
Sole proprietorship
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Without
guarantee
-0.556
[-5.998**]
(2.774)

With
guarantee
-1.769
[-8.370***]
(2.115)

Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee
Without
and formal
guarantee
plan
-0.458
-0411
[-2.821]
[-1 687]
(2.151)
(3 143)

-0.160
[-1.728***]
(0.487)

-0182
[-0 860***]
(0.302)

-0.056
[-0.346]
(0.284)

-0183
[-0.753]
(0.590)

Manufacturing

-0.053
[-0.575]
(0 438)

-0034
[-0 163]
(0.341)

-0035
[-0.213]
(0.342)

-0.020
[-0.083]
(0.527)

Transportation

-0.085
[-0.919]
(0 755)

0.134
[0.636]
(0 535)

-0.094
[-0.567]
(0.525)

0.062
[0.256]
(0.804)

Wholesale Trade

0022
[-0.238]
(0.343)

0.010
[0.046]
(0.239)

-0.041
[-0.250]
(0.250)

0.105
[0.432]
(0.424)

Retail Trade

-0101
[-1.086***]
(0.301)

-0176
[-0.834***]
(0.196)

-0.017
[-0 107]
(0.186)

0.014
[0.057]
(0.336)

0.018
[0.194]
(0.434)

0.123
[0.582*]
(0.315)

0002
[0010]
(0.326)

0.076
[0314]
(0.453)

0.105
[1.133]
(2.177)

-0.697
[-3.298*]
(1.685)

0154
[0.951]
(1.614)

0175
[0.717]
(2.399)

Percent female age 16-44,
Managers

0.018
[0.198]
(0 307)

0.086
[0 409*]
(0.209)

0.059
[0.361]
(0.222)

0118
[0.486]
(0 376)

Percent female age 1 6-44,
Nonmanagers

0.090
[0 975***]
(0.271)

0128
[0606***]
(0.192)

0.151
[0.928***]
(0.200)

0.193
[0.792**]
0(.345)

Variable6
Percentage small in industry
Industry
Agriculture, mining,
construction

Unionized
Percent unionized in
industry

Percent female in industry

-0.119
[-1.283*]
(0 723)

-0.315
[_1.490***]
(0.507)

-0.116
[-0716]
(0.486)

0.176
[0.722]
(0.867)
(continued)
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Table 12 (continued)
Paid medical leave
Variable6
Percent age 55 or more,
Managers
Percent age 55 or more,
Nonmanagers
State unemployment rate
Percent of state population
in rural area

Without
With
guarantee
guarantee
0.146
0.082
[0.880***]
[0.692***]
(0.323)
(0.233)
-0.041
-0.005
[-0.022]
[-0.437]
(0.308)
(0.515)
-2.351
-1.147
[-12.378**] [-11.124***]
(4.208)
(6.178)

Unpaid medical leave
With guarantee
Without
and formal
guarantee
plan
-0.014
0.092
[-0.089]
[0.377]
(0.229)
(0.412)
-0.009
-0.036
[-0.052]
[-0.147]
(0.280)
(0.580)
-0.696
-0.991
M.283]
[-4.073]
(4.148)
(7.120)

-0.181
0.037
0.084
-0.103
[-1.959***]
[0.175]
[0.514]
[-0.425]
(0 723)
(0.485)
(0.491)
(0.857)
1512
1590
N
442.006
169.102
Chi-square
-1211.842
-2 log L
-1150.392
-1234.943
-2 log L (intercept only)
-1432.845
a Original logit coefficient in brackets and standard error of original logit coefficient in
parentheses.
b Excluded categories of categorical variables include: 100 or more employees, sales vol
ume greater than $50 million annually, Subchapter S Corporations (ownership type), ser
vices (industry), and nonunion workers
***significant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
**significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
* significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
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women nonmanagers or the larger the percentage of managers aged 55
or more in a firm, the more likely a firm will provide paid or unpaid
medical leave (with or without benefit continuation).
The higher percentage of female managers (aged 16-44) in a firm,
the more likely that firm will provide unpaid medical leave without
benefit continuation for both managers and nonmanagers. The per
centage of women in the industry has significant negative impacts on
the likelihood that a firm will provide either paid or unpaid medical
leave to its workers with benefit continuation to its workers.
Finally, the higher the unemployment rate in the state in which the
firm does business, the less likely it will be to provide paid or unpaid
medical leave with benefit continuation. The effect of the unemploy
ment rate on the likelihood that a firm provides paid medical leave with
benefit continuation is relatively large according to the OLS equivalent
coefficients—a 1 percent increase in the state unemployment rate vari
able results in a lowering of the probability that a firm will provide paid
medical leave for its managers or nonmanagers by more than 2 percent.
The larger the percentage of a state's population that resides in rural
areas, the less likely a firm will be to provide paid or unpaid medical
leave without benefit continuation. Again the OLS equivalent coeffi
cients indicate that these effects are relatively small.
The story here appears to be that, for paid leave, the reduced form
demand model fits the data well. Thus, in the paid medical leave with
benefit and without benefit guarantee equations for managers, the chisquare statistics are 513 for managers and 485 for nonmanagers and 25
coefficients attain statistical significance. In the unpaid medical leave
equations for managers and nonmanagers, however, the chi-square sta
tistics are only 164 and 141, respectively, and only six coefficients
attain significance at conventional levels. The latter chi-square statistic
(for nonmanagers) is not significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the
model performs much better in describing the provision of paid rather
than unpaid leave. We speculate that the reason for this superior per
formance is that unpaid leave is a benefit that whose value is difficult
for both employers (suppliers) and employees (demanders) to assess
and therefore the "market" for such leave does not fulfill the assump
tions necessary for the existence of a well functioning market and a
model of behavior that assumes the existence of such conditions will
not perform well in describing behavior.
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Job Guarantees. The overall pattern of relationships observed in
Tables 9 and 10 for health benefit continuation are also observed in
Tables 11 and 12, which provide the multinomial logit estimates that
differentiate between the three choices: no leave, leave without a job
guarantee, and leave with a job guarantee. This section will focus on
the small number of variables where differences do occur.
The most noticeable difference in the set firm size variables occurs
for unpaid leave without a job guarantee in terms of the effects of the
variables for 16^-9 and 50-99 workers. The results suggest that such
firms are significantly more likely than firms employing 100 or more
workers to provide the option of leave without a job guarantee for both
managers and nonmanagers. It may be that the costs of such an option
are lower in midsize firms than in larger or smaller firms. Simply put,
smaller and larger firms might be required to formally replace the
leave-taker for different reasons. This is necessitated because there is
no one available to do the leave-takers work in smaller firms, and jobs
in larger firms are so specialized that such a replacement is required. It
is only in medium-sized firms where there are enough other workers to
"cover for" the absent worker and full job specialization has not
become so pronounced as to make substitutions within the firm's own
workforce possible. This is consistent with Trzcinski and Alpert
(1990), in which they found that large firms were more likely than
small ones to use formal temporary workers.
The second difference occurs in the effects of demographic vari
ables. In the job guarantee equations, as the percent female of the
firm's managerial workforce increases, the likelihood also increases of
leave with a job guarantee relative to the other two options. The per
cent female of the firm's nonmanagerial workforce has significant
effects for the two categories of leave with and without a job guarantee,
but the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the category, leave
with no guarantee. This pattern is also observed for the percent of the
firm's managerial workforce, aged 55 or older. The third and final dif
ference occurs in the effects of the percent female in the industry vari
able. In the job guarantee equations, the variable's coefficient is
significant and negative for leave with and without a job guarantee,
with the absolute magnitude greater in the case of leave with no guar
antee.
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Summary
Overall, the variables included in the models tend to predict the
provision or nonprovision of leave better than they predict the provi
sion or nonprovision of health benefit continuation or job guarantees.
What is particularly striking in comparing the results in Table 7 with
the set of results in Tables 9-12 are the effects of the firm-specific
demand-side variables. Although Table 7 suggests that unionized firms
are no more likely than nonunionized firms to provide paid sick leave,
Tables 9-12 indicate that unionized firms are more likely to provide
health benefit continuation and job guarantees than are other firms. In
Table 7, the significant effects of demographic variables are all consis
tent with the predictions of the model in terms of their effects on influ
encing the incidence of leave. In the conditions of leave equations,
however, these variables either did not predict whether leave was pro
vided with or without health benefit continuation or job guarantees, or
they tended to have signs that were inconsistent with our expectations.
As an additional caveat, the reader should bear in mind that several of
the variables may be acting as proxy variables for income and, hence,
their coefficients may be biased.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter explored two aspects of family and medical leave
with the basic premise that family and medical leave consists of two
separable analytical components—a wage replacement component and
a job guarantee component. We found that these components are dealt
with separately in both Canada and the United States. We examined
the incidence of leave to verify our hypothesis for both countries. We
further investigated the correlates of two types of family and medical
leave for two types of family and medical leave provision in the United
States.
The central hypothesis is that the factors determining the provision
of wage replacement during leave differ from the determinants of
whether or not a job guarantee is provided. In general, this hypothesis
implies that differences exist in the factors that determine the provision
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of paid versus unpaid leave. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the
determinants of paid leave are similar to those which account for other
fringe benefits. It is further hypothesized that the provision of unpaid
leave will not be as fully explained by the standard reduced form
demand models specifying fringe benefit determination as will the pro
vision of paid leave.
Our findings indicate that the standard reduced form demand
model provides a strong basis from which to predict the provision of
paid leave, but it is considerably weaker in explaining the incidence of
unpaid leave and conditions surrounding leave. Our findings thus sug
gest that different theoretical approaches need to be developed if we
are to understand the provision of unpaid leave with job guarantees in
the private sector and if we are to analyze actual effects of exiting leg
islation and potential effects of future legislative initiates.

Note
1. The clawback operates as follows:
Net income = $80,000
UI clawback level
$58,110
Difference
$21,890
30% of difference
$6,657
UI benefits
$6,375
30% of benefits
$1,913
Amount to be repaid to UI $1,913
(UI clawback is the lesser of $1,913 and $6,657)
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The past 30 years has been marked by rapid growth in mandated
employer contributions for social insurance programs in both the
United States and abroad. Payroll taxation is a large and growing
source of public finance in the United States: 38 percent of federal rev
enues in 1993 were raised by payroll taxation while this figure was
only 12.4 percent percent in 1960 (Economic Report of the President
1992). This corresponds to a similar growth in the reliance on payroll
taxation in other developed countries. For example, the payroll tax rate
in Sweden grew from 6 percent in 1950 to 40 percent by the late 1970s
(Holmlund 1983). At the same time, employer-mandated provision of
insurance benefits to workers has risen as well, through programs such
as Workers' Compensation in the United States and maternity leave in
both the United States and many other nations.
The growth in employer-financed social insurance programs has
been criticized along a number of dimensions. Perhaps the most
important criticism has been that payroll taxation and other mandates
raise labor costs, thereby reducing competitiveness and leading to disemployment. This argument has found casual support in the high level
of unemployment in Europe, where employer mandates have grown
rapidly since 1960. Furthermore, payroll taxation and, in particular,
lump-sum employer mandates have been labeled inequitable relative to
broad-based income taxation.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess these criticisms of man
dated employer contributions in the United States. This type of analy
sis is particularly important now given the recent proposal to finance
the largest social welfare program of the last 60 years, National Health
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Insurance, through an employer mandate. In the debate over the wis
dom of employer-mandate-financed health reform, the criticisms noted
above have taken center stage. Furthermore, as I show below, payroll
taxes represent the majority of the tax burden for over 80 percent of
taxpayers in the United States, highlighting the importance of assess
ing the efficacy of this particular mode of raising revenue.
I analyze payroll taxation and employer mandates in the United
States in four steps. First, I present a brief overview of payroll tax
financed and employer-mandated social insurance programs in the
United States. Second, I discuss the basic theory and evidence on the
labor-market effects of payroll taxes and employer mandates, high
lighting the similarity between the two types of interventions. I note
that while there is a growing body of reduced form literature, suggest
ing that the costs of mandated benefits and payroll taxes can be shifted
to wages, we still have not resolved the critical structural question of
whether this shifting is due to full valuation of these benefits or inelas
tic labor supply.
I then extend this basic analysis to consider a number of real world
complications in analyzing the labor-market effects of these interven
tions: minimum wage constraints on wage shifting; group-specific
mandates which cause employer costs to rise significantly more for
some types of workers than for others; and the fact that many mandates
are a fixed cost of employment which may distort the margin of hours
choice. Finally, I consider the efficiency and equity implications of
shifting the financing of federal social insurance programs from the
payroll tax to the income tax and of removing the current cap on earn
ings subject to federal payroll taxation.
I conclude with two points. First, while we have learned much in
recent years about the effects of payroll taxation and mandates on the
labor market, there remain a number of important unanswered ques
tions. Second, there is a critical gap in the empirical literature which
makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the overall efficacy of
government interventions financed by payroll taxes and mandates:
information on the benefits of these interventions for the affected par
ties.
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BACKGROUND ON PAYROLL TAX FINANCED AND
MANDATED PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES'
Payroll Tax Financed Programs
At the federal level, there are three major payroll tax financed pro
grams. The first is Social Security (SS), which provides income sup
port to workers upon their retirement (at age 62 or greater). 2 The
program is "unfunded;" that is, the benefits paid to current retirees are
financed by taxation of current workers. Social Security benefit levels
are not a direct function of the taxes paid by a worker but rather of his
or her earnings history; earnings in the highest 35 of the 40 earnings
years from age 21 to age 60, relative to average earnings in the econ
omy, are used to determine benefits levels. Earnings histories are then
translated to benefits through a formula that, in effect, favors low wage
workers.3 Benefits are paid as an annuity, yielding a fixed amount (in
real terms) from the point of retirement until death.
Benefits to retirees are financed by equal payroll taxation of work
ers and firms. Wages, salaries, and self-employment income are tax
able; other forms of capital income, such as dividends, are not. Both
sides of the payroll tax are capped at the "Social Security Taxable
Maximum" earnings, so that the average tax burden is actually decreas
ing with wages above this maximum. In recent years, payroll tax col
lections have greatly exceeded benefit expenditures, with the
difference being used to create a trust fund for financing the retirement
of the baby boomers. This trust fund is projected to be insufficient to
meet the needs of future cohorts, however, leading to recent proposals
to slow the growth of Social Security benefits and/or raise tax rates.
This highlights the importance of reconsidering the fundamental struc
ture of social insurance financing.
The second federal payroll tax financed program is Disability
Insurance (DI), which provides income benefits to workers who have
become so disabled that they must leave the labor force. The structure
and financing of DI is very similar to Social Security along a number
of dimensions: individuals must have worked a minimum number of
quarters, and benefits are based on past earning history. Unlike Social
Security, however, there is no age restriction on the receipt of benefits.
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The major restriction, instead, is that individuals be physically or men
tally incapable of gainful employment. Disability is assessed in a com
plicated (and highly imperfect) process, which begins with state
examination boards and which can be ultimately appealed to the fed
eral level.4
The third program is Medicare, public health insurance for all per
sons age 65 and above. Medicare consists of two parts. Part A
finances the hospital expenditures of the elderly (along with some
copayment by the elderly themselves). This part of Medicare is
financed by a payroll tax similar to that of Social Security, levied
equally on workers and firms. The Medicare payroll tax differs in two
important respects from the Social Security payroll tax, however: it is
much lower and, in recent years, the taxable maximum has greatly
exceeded that for Social Security and the cap was removed altogether
in 1994. The second part of Medicare, Part B, finances physician
expenditures of the elderly. This portion of Medicare is financed by
premium payments by elders and from general revenues.
Table 1 presents the history of the tax rates and taxable maxima for
the major federal payroll tax financed programs. There was a dramatic
rise in both the tax rate and the taxable maximum from 1950 to 1980.
Thereafter, both have continued to rise, but at a much slower pace
(except for the Medicare taxable maximum, which again rose rapidly
in recent years). The fraction of workers under the taxable maximum
has remained relatively constant in recent years. The growth in the size
of these programs is documented in Table 2. Each program has grown
very rapidly over time, although the growth of Medicare has recently
been the fastest.
At the state level, the major payroll tax financed program is Unem
ployment Insurance (UI), which provides limited income support to
workers who lose their jobs. Qualification for UI is a function of statespecific minimum work requirements. Benefits are then paid to indi
viduals who are laid off, but not (in most states) those who quit or are
fired for cause. Benefits are a redistributive function of previous earn
ings, with a minimum and maximum benefit and less than one for one
conversion of wages to benefits in between, and are generally paid for
26 weeks. UI is financed by payroll taxation of employers, up to a tax
able maximum of earnings.5 Employers tax rates are partially experi-

Table 1 History of the Payroll Tax3
Total rate
Medicare rate
DI rate
SS rate
Year
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
0.25
2.75
1960
3.00
4.80
3.65
1970
0.60
0.55
4.38
1975
5.85
0.90
0.58
1980
6.13
1.05
0.56
4.52
4.70
1981
6.65
1.30
0.65
1.30
0.83
4.58
1982
6.70
1.30
4.78
1983
6.70
0.63
5.20
1984
7.00
1.30
0.50
1985
7.05
1.35
0.50
5.20
7.15
1.45
0.50
5.20
1986
7.15
1.45
5.20
1987
0.50
1.45
1988
7.51
0.53
5.53
7.51
1.45
0.53
5.53
1989
7.65
1.45
0.60
5.60
1990
1.45
5.60
1991
7.65
0.60
1992
7.65
1.45
0.60
5.60
7.65
1.45
0.60
5.60
1993
SOURCE: EBRI( 1992).
a Figures in first four columns are tax rates, levied equally on employees and employers.
b Nominal dollars.

SS&DI
maximum
($)"

Medicare
maximum
($)b

4,800
7,800
14,100
25,900
29,700
32,400
35,700
37,800
39,600
42,000
43,800
45,000
48,000
51,300
53,400
55,500
58,000

4,800
7,800
14,100
25,900
29,700
32,400
35,700
37,800
39,600
42,000
43,800
45,000
48,000
51,300
125,000
130,200
135,000

% Below
maximum
72.0
74.0
84.9
91.2
92.4
929
93.7
93.6
93.5
93.8
93.9
93.9

SS: Social Security; DI: Disability Insurance.
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Table 2 History of Program Size (in millions of dollars)
DI benefit
SS benefit
Medicare benefit
Year
payments
payments
payments
1950
NA
NA
961
1960
10,677
568
NA
1970
3,085
1,975
28,798
1975
8,505
4,273
58,517
1980
15,515
10,635
105,083
1981
123,803
17,192
13,113
1982
17,376
15,455
138,806
17,524
1983
149,221
18,106
1984
157,841
17,898
19,661
1985
18,827
22,947
167,248
1986
176,813
19,853
26,239
1987
20,519
183,587
30,820
1988
195,454
21,695
33,970
1989
22,911
38,294
207,791
1990
222,987
24,829
42,468
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1991).
NA = Program did not exist in these years.

ence rated as a function of previous layoff histories; see Anderson and
Meyer (1993) for details.
Table 3 presents details of UI payroll taxation in 1993 and histori
cally. UI payroll tax rates, as measured by the maximum rate, are
fairly high, reaching 10 percent in some states. The tax base, however,
is fairly small. In 1993, many states had taxable maxima below
$10,000 of earnings; for the federal FUTA tax, the base was only
$7,000. The striking historical trend, particularly in comparison to
Table 1, is the falling coverage of the UI taxable wage base. In 1947,
over 90 percent of wages were covered in most states; by 1990, many
states' bases extended to less than 30 percent of payroll.
Employer Mandates for Employee Workplace Benefits6
Along with the payroll tax financed programs discussed above,
employers in the United States also are mandated to provide a wide
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Table3 The UI Payroll Tax
1993
Maximum
1993
tax rate
Taxable
(%)
maximum ($)
State
NA
7,000
United States
674
8,000
Alabama
6.5
Alaska
23,200
5.4
Arizona
7,000
6.0
8,000
Arkansas
5.4
California
7,000
5.4
Colorada
10,000
64
Connecticut
7,100
8.0
Delaware
8,500
5.4
9,000
Dist. of Columbia
5.4
Florida
7,000
8.64
Georgia
8,500
5.4
Hawaii
23,900
6.8
Idaho
19,200
6.4
Illinois
9,000
5.7
Indiana
7,000
9.0
Iowa
13,100
5.4
Kansas
8,000
10.0
Kentucky
8,000
6.0
Louisiana
8,500
6.5
Maine
7,000
8.1
Maryland
8,500
9.3
10,800
Massachusetts
100
Michigan
9,500
9.0
Minnesota
14,300
6.4
Mississippi
7,000
7.8
Missouri
7,500
6.4
Montana
14,500
5.4
Nebraska
7,000
5.4
Nevada
14,800
6.5
New Hampshire
7,000

1990 Max.
over avg.
earnings
0.31
0.34
0.48
0.29
0.36
0.25
0.36
022
0.29
0.21
0.31
0.33
0.55
0.54
0.30
0.28
0.41
0.42
0.33
0.33
0.29
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.39
0.34
0.27
0.65
0.29
0.50
0.27

1960 Max.
over avg.
earnings
0.61
0.67
0.87
0.62
0.74
0.65
062
0.59
0.61
0.60
0.67
0.69
0.69
0.67
0.56
0.59
0.63
0.63
0.65
0.64
0.70
0.63
062
0.54
0.59
0.74
0.60
0.67
0.65
0.71
0.70

1947 Max
over avg.
earnings
0.84
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.92
0.83
0.86
0.85
0.80
0.82
0.88
0.88
0.89
0.90
0.81
0.86
0.88
0.88
0.90
0.87
0.91
0.87
0.85
0.83
0.85
0.92
0.84
0.90
0.86
0.87
0.91
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Table 3 (continued)
1993
Maximum 1990 Max.
1993
Taxable
over avg.
tax rate
maximum ($)
State
(%)
earnings
New Jersey
16,100
6.47
0.38
New Mexico
12,600
5.4
0.41
New York
6.4
7,000
0.20
North Carolina
12,500
0.42
5.7
North Dakota
12,600
54
0.39
Ohio
8,500
0.29
6.5
Oklahoma
10,400
6.2
0.37
Oregon
18,000
0.49
5.4
Pennsylvania
9.2
8,000
0.28
Rhode Island
8.4
15,600
042
South Carolina
5.4
7,000
0.31
South Dakota
9.5
7,000
0.33
Tennessee
10.0
7,000
0.31
Texas
6.0
9,000
0.33
Utah
15,700
8.0
0.45
Vermont
8.4
8,000
0.31
Virginia
8,000
0.28
6.2
Washington
0.48
5.4
18,500
West Virginia
0.31
7.5
8,000
Wisconsin
10,500
8.9
0.37
Wyoming
11,100
0.36
8.5
SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means (1993).

1960 Max.
over avg.
earnings
0.57
0.65
0.57
0.73
0.68
056
0.64
0.73
0.60
0.74
0.74
0.67
0.68
0.63
0.62
0.69
0.67
0.60
060
0.58
0.66

1947 Max.
over avg.
earnings
0.84
0.91
0.79
0.91
0.88
0.84
0.86
0.87
0.86
0.87
0.92
0.89
089
0.86
0.88
0.91
0.89
0.87
0.87
0.85
0.89

Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 191

variety of benefits for their workers. Federal law explicitly mandates
the provision of maternity leave to most employees in firms with more
than 50 employees (under the Family and Medical Leave Act). While
not requiring employers to offer health insurance, federal law regulates
the structure of insurance for those firms that do offer coverage, man
dating the inclusion of comprehensive maternity health insurance cov
erage (under the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act) and continuation
of coverage benefits (under the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Reconcili
ation Act) in health insurance packages.7
State law in 48 states mandates that employers purchase workers'
compensation (WC) insurance against workplace injuries. 8 Workers'
compensation is the oldest and largest mandated benefit in the United
States, with benefit payments amounting to $37 billion in 1990. This
program pays both the medical bills of the injured worker and an
indemnity benefit, which is a redistributive function of their pre-injury
wage (the benefits structure is similar to that of UI). States legislate the
level of benefits that must be paid to workers for a variety of different
types of injuries. Firms can then purchase insurance from either the
state or private firms to cover these costs or (in most states) they can
self-insure. Workers' compensation insurance costs averaged 2.1 per
cent of payroll in 1987, but there was a high variance. Table 4, from
Gruber and Krueger (1991), shows the level and change in workers'
compensation costs for the trucking industry from 1978 to 1987. 9
These costs grew dramatically during the 1980s, due both to rising
medical costs and to changes in state benefits legislation, and costs
were over 25 percent of payroll in some states in 1987.
States also mandate that employers include a number of particular
benefits in their health insurance packages. There are over 1,000 such
"state mandated benefits," covering benefits ranging from alcoholism
treatment to in vitro fertilization (see Gruber [1994b] for details). In
addition, several states mandate the provision of insurance to tempo
rarily disabled workers. There are also a variety of mandates for mini
mal levels of workplace safety at both the federal and state levels, in
addition to the compensation for workplace accidents provided by WC.

Table 4 Workers' Compensation Costs as a Percentage of Payroll
Change3
State
1978
1987
1978-87
State
Alabama
4.49
10.07
5.58
Mississippi
Alaska
10.55
17.41
6.86
Missouri
Arizona
11.68
11.22
-0.46
Montana
Arkansas
15.94
10.86
-5.08
Nebraska
California
17.26
10.04
7.22
New Hampshire
Colorado
11.91
5.88
6.03
New Jersey
Connecticut
12.91
6.78
6.13
New Mexico
-066
Delaware
10.45
9.79
New York
Dist. of Columbia
15.04
16.04
1.00
North Carolina
Florida
17.71
15.12
-2.59
Ohio
Georgia
4.70
7.73
3.03
Oklahoma
Hawaii
9.71
20.29
10.58
Oregon
Idaho
6.39
15.50
9.11
Pennsylvania
Illinois
6.01
11.45
5.44
Rhode Island
Indiana
2.39
3.01
0.62
South Carolina
Iowa
5.89
8.77
2.88
South Dakota
Kansas
4.59
6.85
2.26
Tennessee
Kentucky
7.04
8.05
1.01
Texas
Louisiana
1066
10.65
-0.01
Utah

1978
6.27
NA
8.27
504
4.16
7.36
8.60
9.62
2.42
5.32
7.81
14.68
NA
5.15
3.68
5.87
2.88
6.83
4.92

1987
7.98
5.16
25.40
6.47
12.55
7.89
12.23
5.97
5.16
12.20
11.55
23.46
15.97
7.27
8.12
8.22
4.37
9.98
9.23

Change
1978-87
1.71
NA
17.13
1.43
839
0.53
3.63
-3.65
2.74
6.88
3.74
8.78
NA
212
4.44
2.35
1.49
3.15
4.31

916
7.05
Maine
1109
5.85
Maryland
8.48
5.50
Massachusetts
9.24
15.05
Michigan
20.93
11.50
Minnesota
SOURCE: Gruber and Krueger (1991)
a Change is in percentage points.

2.11
5.24
2.98
5.81
9.43

Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

3.11
4.28
NA
3.41

6.53
6.51
5.67
8.86

3.42
2.23
NA
5.45
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THE INCIDENCE OF PAYROLL TAXATION AND
EMPLOYER MANDATES
Basic Model
Figure 1 displays the standard diagrammatic analysis of the labormarket effects of payroll taxation levied on the firm. The market is ini
tially in equilibrium at the intersection of the labor supply (S0) and
demand (D0) curves, at the employment and wage package (L0,W0)Payroll taxation of an amount T lowers the amount that the firm can pay
for a given level of employment, shifting labor demand inward to Dj.
This reduces the wage that workers are paid to W\, and employment
falls to LI\ the tax has a deadweight loss equal to the area ABC. The
difference L0 - LI represents the disemployment effect of payroll taxa
tion highlighted by critics of this form of revenue raising. This analy
sis applies equally well to a mandate that costs the employer a fraction
1 of wages (such as workers' compensation); this mandate raises the
cost of hiring workers, shifting demand inward and leading to disem
ployment.
Figure 1 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation
w

W0

W2
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However, this basic tax incidence diagram misses an important
feature of payroll taxes and mandates: tax/benefit linkages. Most of
the payroll taxes described above, such as those for Social Security,
disability insurance, and unemployment insurance, are financing bene
fits to the workers who are taxed. Similarly, mandates such as that for
maternity leave or workers' compensation are providing (potentially)
valuable benefits to workers in the firms that are affected by the man
date. This tax/benefit linkage is not perfect; for many workers, one
more dollar of taxation does not represent one more dollar of benefits.
The fact that such a linkage exists, however, affects this analysis. The
key point is that, since some of taxes paid come back to the worker in
the form of future benefits, the disemployment effects of payroll taxes
will be reduced because workers will be more willing to accept lower
wages.
This point is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the presence of tax/benefit
linkages, workers are now receiving higher net compensation than in
the pure tax case, because the tax is buying them some benefits. Work
ers are therefore more willing to work for a given wage, shifting labor
supply outward to Si . As a result, employment falls only to L^. That
is, due to this tax/benefit linkage, there is a much smaller distortion
from payroll taxation: the deadweight loss from taxation has been
reduced from ABC to DBF.
The extent of the tax/benefit linkage will depend on the extent to
which workers perceive that the taxes are returned to them as benefits.
If every dollar of taxes paid were perceived by the worker to be return
ing in benefits, this would not be viewed as a tax at all, and there would
be no distortion. 10 This can be readily seen in the simple model used
by Gruber and Krueger (1991), for the case of a lump sum mandate.
Suppose that labor demand (Ld) is given by:
(1)
and that labor supply (Ls) is given by:
(2)
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where C is the cost of the mandate, W is the wage rate, and ocC is the
employee valuation of the mandated benefit. In equilibrium, the effect
of the mandate on wages will be:
dWI dC = - (t|D - ari s) / (r|D - t|s)

(3)

where T| D and T|s are the elasticities of demand for and supply of labor,
respectively. It is clear from this equation that, if a = 1, there will be
full shifting of the cost of the mandate to wages, and no effect on
employment as a result. On the other hand, for a = 0, this expression
simplifies to that for the incidence of a payroll tax in the absence of tax
benefit linkages. The analysis would be similar for a marginal payroll
tax rather than a lump sum mandate; in that case, a would measure the
employee's valuation on the margin.
There are two key points that must be noted in reference to this
analysis and that of Summers (1989). First, the general distinction
between payroll taxes and mandates is a false one. The salient feature
is not the form of revenue raising but the extent of tax/benefit linkages.
In both cases, employers are paying some cost and employees are
receiving some benefit. This point is made most starkly by contrasting
Unemployment Insurance, a payroll tax financed benefit, with Work
ers' Compensation, a mandated employer-provided benefit: in both
cases, employers pay some fixed portion of their payroll to insure their
workers. If the perceived benefits of working an additional hour under
each program is the same, and the payroll cost to the employer for that
hour is the same, these programs will have exactly the same effect on
the labor market. Of course, in practice there are some important dif
ferences, such as the fact that mandates are often lump sum while pay
roll taxes are not (a point I return to below), but as a matter of general
principle the two can be analyzed in a parallel manner.
Second, a key determinant of tax/benefit linkages for both man
dates and payroll taxes will be the extent to which benefits are provided
to both workers and nonworkers. If equal benefits are provided to nonworkers, then there is no linkage between taxes paid and benefits
received, because individuals could have not worked and received the
same benefit. This point is especially important when assessing the
efficiency implications of financing National Health Insurance through
an employer mandate. If, as seems politically likely, coverage is
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extended to the unemployed for free, or at least at a highly subsidized
rate, it will mitigate any tax-benefit linkages for workers and may
increase the efficiency cost of financing.
Evidence

Research on the incidence of payroll taxation has a long history.
Early incidence research involved time-series studies of changes in
payroll taxes in the United States and abroad. This research produced
mixed results. Brittain (1972) reported that the payroll tax was fully
shifted to wages, but his finding was criticized by Feldstein (1972).
Vroman (1974) found that 1/4 to 1/2 of the payroll tax was shifted to
wages in United States manufacturing. Holmlund (1983) used the
time-series data on payroll taxes in Sweden to study a period when the
payroll tax increased from 14 to 40 percent and found that roughly 50
percent of the tax was shifted to wages in the short run. A different
approach was pursued by Hamermesh (1979), who used the variation
in payroll tax rates due to the Social Security payroll tax limit to esti
mate wage offsets. His estimates indicated that from 0 to 35 percent of
the Social Security tax is shifted to wages.
This "first generation" of studies, however, generally suffered from
being unable to control for important potential omitted variables. In
the time-series studies, for example, there may have been unobserved
economic trends that affected both wages and tax-setting institutions.
What is needed to overcome these problems is variation in employer
costs within arguably homogenous locations over time, so that both
time and location omitted variables can be controlled for in the analy
sis.
More recent research has attempted to follow this approach, using
variation across U.S. states in the cost of employer mandates and pay
roll taxes. Gruber and Krueger (1991) studied the incidence of work
ers' compensation; as noted previously, even though a mandated
benefit in name, workers' compensation is similar to a payroll tax for
the purposes of incidence analysis. We model wage incidence by
exploiting the large change in workers' compensation costs over time
and across states in several high cost industries during the 1980s.
Table 4 shows that this variation is quite sizeable in the trucking indus
try. Using a large sample of workers in these industries from the Cur-
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rent Population Survey, we find that 85 percent of this cost increase
was shifted to wages. We are able to exactly replicate our micro-data
findings using aggregate industry/state/year data on wages. Further
more, using this source of data on employment, we find no significant
employment decrease from these increases in workers' compensation
cost.
Anderson and Meyer (1997) focused on the incidence of the
Unemployment Insurance payroll tax at both the market and firm level,
using a very large dataset of individual UI wage records from several
states. UI tax costs differ systematically across markets due to differ
ences across states in the structure of the experience rating schedule.
The costs also differ across firms due to different firm locations on that
schedule (which imperfectly ties a firm's current tax rate to its past lay
off experience). These tax costs have changed over time at both the
state and firm level due to legislated changes in experience rating
schedules. Anderson and Meyer found that there is full shifting of
market level differences in UI costs but not full shifting of firm level
differences. Thus, the more recent evidence, which uses legislative
variation in payroll costs across states, seems to suggest that payroll
taxes and mandates are fully shifted to wages.
What Can We Learn from the Empirical Work?
This new reduced form evidence, however, leaves an important
structural question unanswered. In the simple labor-market framework
above, there are two reasons why increased costs might be shifted to
wages: because individuals value the benefits that they are getting fully
or because labor supply is perfectly inelastic. 11 Disentangling these
alternatives is very important for future policy analysis. Consider the
example of national health insurance, which is financed by a mandate
and an additional payroll tax to cover nonworkers. If full shifting is
due to full employee valuation with a somewhat elastic labor supply,
then national health insurance will have important disemployment
effects because supply will not shift for a policy not restricted to work
ers. If full shifting is driven by inelastic supply, however, then the pop
ulation receiving benefits is irrelevant. In either case, the costs will be
passed onto workers' wages, so national health insurance will not
cause disemployment.
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There is no evidence which bears on this question in Gruber and
Krueger (1991). Anderson and Meyer (1997) provided some informa
tion in their firm/market level distinction, but it is not enough to distin
guish the two structural hypotheses. It seems likely that both the
elasticity of labor supply between firms is higher than that between
markets and that employees may not value the extra marginal cost to
the firm from experience rating. Both of these structural interpreta
tions would therefore be consistent with their finding. Evidence from
elsewhere in the empirical labor economics literature suggests that the
labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic, while the labor sup
ply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic, but there is consid
erable uncertainty about the reliability of previous attempts to measure
this crucial parameter (Heckman 1993).
What is needed to convincingly disentangle these views is some
variation in one or the other of these dimensions only. For example, is
the incidence of employer mandates/payroll taxes significantly differ
ent across groups with plausibly different elasticities of labor supply,
such as married men and married women? Is there differential inci
dence with respect to elements of a policy that are likely to be valuable,
such as cash benefits for work injury, as opposed to elements that are
less likely to be valued, such as insurance administrative loading fac
tors?
There are two additional limitations in applying the reduced form
results from past research to modeling the incidence of future govern
ment interventions, or even the incidence of other programs. The first
is that this research has examined the medium to long run incidence of
the cost of mandates and payroll taxes. 12 The short run incidence is
much more uncertain. It is often assumed that shifting to wages does
not occur through nominal pay cuts but, rather, due to worker money
illusion, through inflation erosion of the real wage. 13 There is little
work addressing the important questions of whether incidence signifi
cantly differs in the short and long run or whether it varies according to
differences in the inflationary environment when the mandate is
enacted.
Second, the extent of tax/benefit linkages may vary substantially
across different interventions. National health insurance provided to
nonworkers is one example of a program with no tax/benefit linkages
so that the existing incidence studies may not be relevant; this is also
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true for Medicare. For Social Security, the extent of tax/benefit linkage
varies along a number of dimensions: it is lower for high wage earners
due to the progressive manner in which earnings are converted to bene
fits; it is lower (and often zero) for secondary earners because they
receive the higher of their accrued benefit and 50 percent of their
spouse's benefit so that often their earnings record is irrelevant; and it
is zero for workers in the five lowest earning "dropout years," which
are not used in benefits computation. Furthermore, the perceived tax/
benefit linkage may be weaker still because workers may not under
stand that the "PICA" contribution on their pay stub is actually a form
of retirement savings. The recently announced policy of informing
workers as to their retirement savings entitlement under SS might serve
to improve the efficiency of SS financing, to the extent that it increases
perceived tax/benefit links. Future work which could cleverly incorpo
rate these different kinds of linkages could ideally answer the structural
question posed previously.
Equity

In interpreting the empirical work in this area, it is important to
understand the goal of government policy. If the government is inter
vening to correct a market failure and the payroll tax/mandate is simply
a means of financing that intervention, then shifting to wages can be
viewed as the "price" that is being paid for government provision of
insurance. In the case of full valuation, perhaps due to adverse selec
tion in the private insurance market, government mandates will be an
efficient and equitable policy; the mandate is a perfect "benefits tax."
If the goal of a mandate is not to correct a market failure, however,
but rather to provide benefits to some deprived group in society, then
full shifting to wages may not be viewed as a desirable outcome.
Rather, this may be viewed as the mandate being "undone" by the
adjustment of wages. In this case, the additional deadweight loss from
broad-based financing that does not have tax/benefit linkages may be a
price that society is willing to pay in order to direct more resources
towards one group. Thus, it is important to understand the goal of gov
ernment mandate policy: is it to correct a market failure or to redirect
resources across groups? 14
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THE MINIMUM WAGE
The analysis above assumed that firms could readily pass on their
costs of taxation to workers in the form of lower wages. However, if
workers are already earning the minimum wage, such "shifting to
wages" is not possible. This is illustrated in Figure 2, for the case
where the minimum wage is equal to the equilibrium wage pre-tax. In
this case, a tax on firms causes a much larger fall in employment
because worker wages cannot be reduced, so that the net compensation
cost to the firm has risen. Employment now falls to L2 and the pres
ence of the minimum has increased the disemployment effects of taxes
levied on firms. This disemployment effect is independent of the valu
ation of the benefit by workers since equilibrium is determined on the
demand side of the market; the shift in the supply curve to S\ has no
effect on employment or wages.
How important is this effect quantitatively? Recent research (Card
1992a,b; Katz and Krueger 1992; Card and Krueger 1994) has shown
that changes in the minimum wage cause no significant decrease in
employment and may actually cause increases. 15 There are two possi
ble interpretations of these findings, both of which suggest that the
minimum is a less important consideration for the incidence of
employer taxation than is implied by Figure 2.
The first, which takes the employment increase estimates seriously,
is that the neoclassical model is not appropriate and that low-wage
labor markets are more precisely described by a monopsony model.
The effect of payroll taxation or mandates in such a model is shown in
Figure 3. Demand is described by curve D0, supply is curve SQ, and the
marginal factor cost is curve MFC0. The competitive wage is Wc, and
the competitive employment level is Lc ; the monopsony wage is Wm
and the monopsony employment level is Lm. When a minimum wage is
imposed at Wmm, employment rises for the monopsonist to Lmm. This is
the positive employment effect estimated by some of these studies.
In such a model, a small mandate or payroll tax shifts demand to
Dj. There is no effect on employment from this change; it is paid out
of employer profits. Thus, a small mandate or payroll tax acts as a pure
profits tax in this model. A larger policy change, however, can have
real effects. If demand falls all the way to D2 (if the increased cost to
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Figure 2 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation, with an Effective
Minimum Wage

= Wmln

Figure 3 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation, with an Effective
Minimum Wage under Monopsony

MFC0
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the employer is larger than the difference between the competitive
wage and the minimum wage), then employment will fall to the same
level as in the competitive case (L2). The employment change, how
ever, will still be smaller than in the competitive case because some of
the cost of the mandate has still been absorbed in profits.
The second interpretation of the new minimum wage research is
that it provides evidence of fairly inelastic labor demand in the low
wage labor market. Indeed, even the traditional time series studies of
the effects of the minimum wage suggested elasticities of demand as
low as 0.1 (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). In this case, once again,
the minimum will not cause mandates to have significant disemployment effects, as the cost primarily is paid from profits or prices. So,
under either interpretation, the "new" minimum wage research sug
gests that the minimum wage may not be an important impediment to
the shifting of mandate costs to wages.

GROUP-SPECIFIC MANDATES
Analytical Framework
The previous analysis has highlighted the parallels between
employer mandates and payroll taxation. However, there are many
important differences between these two forms of regulation in prac
tice. The first is that, unlike payroll taxes, which are generally uniform
across all workers, mandates may cause employer costs to rise signifi
cantly more for one group of workers than for another. This can arise,
for example, because the mandate is explicitly group specific, as in the
case of maternity leave legislation. Alternatively, it can arise due to
experience rating in private insurance markets, which raises the costs
of insuring some workers above the costs of others. For example, man
dated workers' compensation insurance in an experience-rated firm
costs much more for a very accident-prone worker than for a safe one.
Similarly, mandated health insurance costs significantly more for
sicker workers, as well as for married workers and those with large
families. Such problems could arise with payroll taxation in theory,
but payroll tax costs rarely vary by worker characteristic. 16
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Group-specific differences in costs may complicate the analysis of
a mandate's effects. If the group that benefits from the mandate (group
A) fully values the intervention at the cost to the employer and if
employers are able to shift those costs to group-specific wages, then
there will be no effect of the mandate on either that group or on other
groups (group B). That is, for group A, the analysis will be the same as
above; since the employer costs have not changed for group A, there is
no spillover onto other segments of the market. 17
There may, however, be a number of barriers to full group-specific
shifting not present in this simple model. Most obviously, there are
antidiscrimination regulations that prohibit differential pay for the
same job across groups or that prevent differential promotion decisions
by demographic characteristic. 18 Furthermore, workplace "norms,"
which prohibit different pay across groups, or union rules about equal
ity of relative pay may have similar effects as antidiscrimination rules.
These will not be important considerations for workplace-wide man
dates or payroll taxation.
Barriers to group-specific adjustment operate in exactly the same
fashion as the previously discussed minimum wage effects for the
group benefiting from the'mandate. Returning to the competitive
model, there will be disemployment of group A if there are such barri
ers because wages cannot adjust to offset the new employer costs. As a
result, if there is some substitutability between groups A and B,
employers will substitute towards group B. Fears of group-specific
disemployment were at the heart of the debate over mandated mater
nity leave—since the cost of employing women of child-bearing age
would rise, opponents claimed that employers would discriminate
against this group in hiring. Thus, even with full valuation and no
explicit regulatory barrier such as the minimum wage, there can be a
distortion from a group-specific mandate.
Previous Evidence
Evidence on the incidence of a group-specific mandate is provided
in Gruber (1994a). In that paper, I studied the effects of state and fed
eral mandates that employers include comprehensive coverage for
maternity in their health insurance plans. A commonly accepted fea
ture of health insurance benefits before the mid 1970s was limited cov-
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erage for childbirth. Maternity coverage was sometimes excluded
from basic health benefits; if included, it was often subject to flat rate
cash amount limits, regardless of the cost of delivery. This differential
coverage was widely perceived as discriminatory (Leshin 1981; Alan
Guttmacher Institute 1987). Many states responded to this perception
in the 1975-1978 period by passing laws prohibiting treating preg
nancy differently from "comparable illnesses" in health insurance ben
efits. Then, in October 1978, the Federal Government passed the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which prohibited any differen
tial treatment of pregnancy in the employment relationship.
These laws affected a readily identifiable group, women of childbearing age and their husbands (under whose insurance these women
may have been covered), so that I was able to study the impact of these
laws based on observable characteristics. They were also fairly costly
for these individuals, due both to the widespread existence of differen
tial maternity benefits before 1978 and the large fraction of health
insurance costs which are accounted for by maternity benefits for
women of child-bearing age. I found that there was full group-specific
shifting: the wages of the affected groups fell by enough to offset the
cost of the mandate to their employers. As a result, there was no effect
on their net labor supply. Since women are generally modeled as hav
ing much more elastic labor supply than men, the fact that there was
full shifting for this group is suggestive that such shifting arose from
movements in the supply curve and not from demand shifts along an
inelastic supply curve.
Further evidence on this point is provided by Olson (1993), who
examined the wages and health insurance coverage of single men, rela
tive to single women and married males, during the era that saw
increased incidence of AIDS. Olson did find a significant narrowing of
the positive wage gap between single men and single women over this
era, although he found no effect on the relative wages of single and
married men. He also found that there was a drop in employer-pro
vided health insurance for single men relative to both control groups. 19
This work suggests that employers can shift mandated costs to the
wages of demographically identifiable groups within the workplace.
However, it leaves unanswered the important question of how finely
employers can shift mandated increases in benefits costs. Did the shift
ing estimated in Gruber (1994a) arise from reduced average wages in
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firms with a high proportion of women of child-bearing age or from
shifts in the wage structure within the workplace? In the latter case,
how finely can the wage structure be manipulated to shift group-spe
cific costs? The extent to which within-workplace shifting is possible
is an important question for analyzing employer-mandated national
health insurance. In a small firm with one very sick worker and, as a
result, very high medical costs, it will almost certainly be impossible to
shift these high costs to the wages of that single worker. As a result, it
will be in the firm's interest to discriminate in the hiring of sick work
ers. On the other hand, an entire workplace of sick workers could pre
sumably be paid less to compensate for employer insurance costs
differences. How large does the group of sick workers have to be
before employers are able to shift their excess costs of health insurance
to them? It would be useful to understand the trade-off made by firms
between shifting costs to very small groups in the workplace and dis
criminating in their hiring.
One means of addressing the first of these questions is to return to
my earlier analysis and model the effect of the mandates on both indi
vidual and firm average wages. If the earlier findings are driven by
lower average wages in firms with many women of child-bearing age,
then including the fraction of firm employment that is in this demo
graphic group, or the average cost to the firm, should explain all of the
drop in wages for this group. If there is within-workplace shifting,
however, then the individual measure will still enter the model signifi
cantly because there will be some explanatory power for the deviation
of individual from firm average costs.
New Evidence—Individual or Workplace-Specific Shifting?
The data used for this analysis is the May Current Population Sur
vey (1978) for the years 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978. I focus on 3 of
the 23 states that passed "maternity mandates" in the 1975-1979
period: Illinois, New Jersey, and New York (the "experimental"
states).20 I also use a set of "non-experimental" states designed to cap
ture any regional shocks to the experimental states. For Illinois, the
control states used are Ohio and Indiana; for New Jersey and New
York, the controls are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina.
The data consist of observations on all individuals in these set of exper-
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imental and non-experimental locations, for two years before the legis
lation (1974, 1975), and two years after the legislation (1977, 1978).
The goal of the empirical work is to identify the effect of laws
passed by certain states ("experimental states") which affected particu
lar groups of individuals ("treatment group"). Identifying this effect
requires controlling for any systematic shocks to the labor-market out
comes of the treatment group correlated with, but not due to, the law. I
do so in three ways in the estimation. First, I include year effects, to
capture any national trends in the earnings of the treatment group. Sec
ond, I include state effects, to control for secular earnings differences
in the states that passed the laws and those that did not. Finally, I
include state-by-year effects to control for state-specific shocks corre
lated with the passage of these laws over this period; that is, I compare
the treatment individuals in the experimental states to a set of control
individuals in those same states and measure the change in relative out
comes. This change is then compared to the change in relative out
comes in states that did not pass maternity mandates to control for
national shocks to the relative earnings of these groups. The identify
ing assumption of this "differences-in-differences-in-differences"
(DDD) estimator are fairly weak: it simply requires that there be no
contemporaneous shock that affects the relative outcomes of the treat
ment group in the same state-years as the law.
The treatment group here are those insured workers who are "at
risk" for having a child, or whose health insurance covers someone
who is at risk of having a child. The controls are other individuals who
were directly unaffected by the law. However, the CPS (before May
1979) contained no information on health insurance coverage. I am
thus unable to exactly identify the employees for whom this was a
costly mandate.
I address this problem in two ways in the empirical work. First, I
use women aged 20-40 as the treatment group. This group will con
tain the individuals for whom the mandate was most costly. My con
trol group is all individuals over 40 and single males aged 20-40. I
exclude 20^K)-year- old married males, who may also be affected by
the laws if their insurance covers their wives. This "treatment dummy"
approach has the virtue that it is relatively "nonparametric."
Second, I use data on insurance coverage from other datasets to
model the likelihood that individuals were covered by insurance and
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the type of insurance coverage that they receive, and I assign each indi
vidual a cost of the mandate based on these predictions and outside
data on the cost of maternity health insurance. This approach has the
advantage that I use individual variation, rather than differences across
broad demographic groups, to identify the impact of the law. However,
it has the disadvantage that it imposes strong parametric assumptions.
If the functional form for the expected cost of the mandate is incorrect,
then the demographic group dummy may be a more effective means of
capturing the law's impact. Thus, in the empirical work, I rely on both
the treatment group dummy and the individually parameterized cost
measure.
I estimate regressions of the form:
Wljt = a + (Uy, + (32T, + P3o, + hTREAT, + |35o, • T,
+ p6T, • TREAT, + fadj • TREAT, + pg8, • lt • TREAT,

(4)

where i indexes individuals
j indexes states (1 if experimental state, 0 if non-experimental)
t indexes years (1 if after the law, 0 if before)
W is the log real hourly wage
X is a vector of observable characteristics
57 is a fixed state effect
T, is a fixed year effect
TREAT is a dummy for treatment group (1 if treatment, 0 if con
trol), and
• denotes interaction between effects
In this regression, the fixed effects control for time-series changes
in wages (J32), the time-invariant characteristics of the experimental
states (J33), and the time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group
((34). The second-level interactions control for changes over time in the
experimental states (|35), changes over time for the treatment group
nationwide (b6), and time-invariant characteristics of the treatment
group in the experimental states ((37). The third-level interaction ((38)
captures all variation in wages specific to the treatments (relative to
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controls), in the experimental states (relative to the non-experimentals), and in the years after the law (relative to before the law). This is
the DDD estimate of the extent of shifting of the cost of the mandate to
group-specific wages. The set of demographic covariates used
includes years of education, experience and its square, sex, marital sta
tus, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for nonwhite, a con
trol for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate
year dummies for 1974 and 1978.
Table 5 presents the estimates from Eq. 4. In the first column, I
show that there is a significant fall in the wages of women of childbearing age in the state that passed the mandate, relative to the control
groups of single men and older workers, of 4.4 percent. This is some
what larger than the average cost of the mandate for this group; I inter
pret these magnitudes in more detail below. The coefficients on the
demographic covariates (not reported) are of their expected signs and
magnitudes. There is a 1.2 percent fall in wages for the within-state
control group (the coefficient on "After»Experimental," the state-byyear effect). This finding has one of two implications: either the exper
imental states, on average, saw a negative shock over this period or the
effect of the mandates are "spilling over" onto the control group.
These two interpretations cannot be fully distinguished within this
framework, although the latter seems unlikely given the finding of full
shifting to group-specific wages.
This regression is unable to disentangle whether this shifting to
wages is the result of within-workplace wage adjustments or drops in
average wages in firms with a high proportion of women of child-bear
ing age. Unfortunately, I cannot precisely distinguish these alterna
tives either because I do not have information on the firms in which
these women work. However, I can use information on their occupa
tion and industry to create "synthetic firms" of individuals with the
same occupation/industry type. I do so by dividing the data into 15
major industries and 10 major occupations, and then calculating the
fraction of workers in each cell who are 20-40-year-old women. 21 I
then use this in place of the individual treatment dummy in the DDD
regression framework of Eq. 4.
The results of doing so are reported in the second column of Table
5. In fact, there is a negative coefficient on the third level interaction in
this regression although it is only significant at the 13 percent level.
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Table 5 New Evidence on the Incidence of Maternity Mandates3
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(5)
(6)
Treat
Treat
Treat
Mandate Mandate Mandate
dummy
dummy
dummy
cost
cost
cost
After
0.009
0.018
0.019
-0.003
-0.007
-0.005
(0.013
(0.013)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.009)
(0.008)
Experimental
0.101
0.091
0.094
0.120
0.120
0.090
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.007)
(0.022)
(0.022)
state
(0.007)
After*
-0.006
-0.007
-0.012
-0.003
-0.005
-0.006
experimental
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.010)
(0.031)
(0.031)
2.321
2.048
Treatment/cost
0.077
0.078
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.428)
(0.433)
Treatment/cost*
0.009
0.341
0.253
0.003
after
(0.014)
(0.511)
(0.523)
(0013)
Treatment/cost*
3.052
3.148
0.040
0.033
(0.540)
experimental
(0.013)
(0.015)
(0.529)
Treat/cost»after -0.044
-0.041
-2.476
-2.393
•experimental
(0.018)
(0.020)
(0.756)
(0.772)
Firm treatment/
-0.147
-0.138
16.15
16.24
cost
(0.027)
(0.029)
(2.067)
(2.096)
1.542
1.111
Firm treat/cost
-0.022
-0.037
•after
(2.660)
(0.034)
(0.037)
(2.598)
Firm treat/cost
0.075
0.040
-0.530
-3.098
•experimental
(2.530)
(2.584)
(0.033)
(0.036)
-2.126
0.143
Firm T/C »after
-0.069
-0.023
•experimental
(0.046)
(0.050)
(3.551)
(3.626)
N
30,862
30,862
30,862
40,895
40,895
40,895
a Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also include years of education, experi
ence and its square, sex, marital status, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for
nonwhite, a control for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate year
dummies for 1974 and 1978. "After" is dummy for being after mandate; "Experimental"
is dummy for being in a state that passed a mandate. In columns 1-3, "Treatment" is a
dummy for being a woman between 20 and 40 years old, and "Firm treatment" is the per
centage of 20^0-year-old females in the worker's industry/occupation cell, regressions
exclude married men In columns 4-6, "cost" is the predicted cost of mandate for the
worker, and "Firm cost" is the average predicted cost in the worker's industry/occupation
cell.
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The coefficient is actually more sizeable than that from the individual
treatment regression; it implies that a workplace entirely made up of
20-40-year-old females would see wages fall by almost 7 percent. In
the individual regression, such a workplace would see wages fall by
only 4 percent. Once again, however, this regression is unable to dis
entangle whether workplace-wide shifting or within-workplace shift
ing is the driving force behind this fall in wages.
In order to distinguish these views, I include both the individual
and industry/occupation measure in column 3. If the results are a
result of workplace-wide shifting, the inclusion of the average "firm"
cost should significantly weaken the individual cost coefficient. In
fact, the individual DDD coefficient is roughly unchanged, while the
industry/occupation DDD coefficient falls to -0.023. Thus, the results
imply that it is not just drops in average wages at workplaces with
many women that is driving the basic finding. The latter estimate,
however, is very imprecise, and one could not reject that it was either
zero or much larger than the individual DDD coefficient.
The second empirical approach discussed above was to individu
ally parameterize the cost of the mandate. Gruber (1992) described the
methodology for generating individual-specific predicted increases in
insurance costs from the mandate. The cost averages 2 percent of
wages for the treatment individuals, but it ranges up to 28 percent of
wages. The cost is normalized by hours per week and by predicted
wages to yield a cost as a percentage of hourly wages, which is readily
interpretable in this log wage framework.22 The individually parame
terized cost measure can be introduced in place of the treatment
dummy in Eq. 4; to the extent that my estimate of the cost of the man
date is correct, a coefficient of -1 on the third-level interaction would
indicate full shifting to wages.
The results using this individual parameterization at both the indi
vidual and the industry/occupation level are presented in columns 4-6
of Table 5. For the individual cost regressions, there is a sizeable and
negative coefficient that is significantly different from zero and not sig
nificantly different from one. For the industry/occupation level cost
measures, the coefficient is similar. When the two measures are
entered together, the individual-level cost coefficient is essentially
unchanged, while the industry/occupation-level cost coefficient is zero.
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Once again, however, there is a very large standard error on the indus
try/occupation-level cost.
Thus, this work provides some evidence that the shifting to wages
uncovered in my earlier paper arises from within-workplace changes in
the wage structure. This evidence is only preliminary, however, due
both to my very rough proxy for "firms" (industry/occupation cells)
and the large resulting standard errors on the estimates. In particular,
these findings may only be demonstrating that the individual is a better
proxy for their own firm than is their industry/occupation cell. Future
work, perhaps with true firm data, could fruitfully refine these esti
mates.

COMPOSITION OF LABOR SUPPLY
Another important difference between mandates and payroll taxes
in practice is that mandates are often lump-sum benefits, such as with
mandated health insurance, whereas payroll taxes are paid as a fraction
of wages. Since mandates represent an increase in the fixed costs of
employment, they will be more costly for employees working fewer
hours. If employers are able to shift the cost to wages in a lump-sum
fashion and if the benefit is fully valued by employees, then there will
be no effect on desired hours for either employees or employers. But,
if such lump-sum shifting is impossible, then a natural employer reac
tion to fixed cost mandates would be to increase hours and reduce
employment. This would enable the employer to reduce the cost per
hour of the mandate while leaving total labor input unchanged.
There may be forces, however, working in the opposite direction.
Consider the case of a health insurance mandate. Since part-time
workers may be readily excluded from health insurance coverage,
employers would like to replace full-time employees with their (rela
tively less expensive) part-time counterparts. 23 In this case, hours
would fall and employment would rise, and total labor input would
remain unchanged. Furthermore, the desired supply response to these
mandates from the individual perspective is for increased employment
among those out of the labor force and for part-time workers to
increases their hours in order to qualify for health insurance, so that
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both employment and hours rise. Thus, the effect on hours and
employment are uncertain, even if the cost of the mandate is able to be
shifted to wages on average.
Evidence on this question is provided in Gruber (1994a) and Cutler
and Madrian (1996). Gruber found that, while the cost of the "mater
nity mandates" of the 1970s was fully shifted to wages on average with
no effect on total labor supply, there was some compositional effect on
labor supply: employment fell and hours of work rose, as would be
expected under the first scenario above. This suggests that employers
could not shift the cost of the mandates in a perfect lump sum manner
so they adjusted on the margin using the composition of the work
schedule. Cutler and Madrian showed that hours rose in those indus
tries which saw the greatest rise in health care costs during the past
decade, once again suggesting that employers are adjusting to these
increased fixed costs using the hours margin.
Even this difference between mandates and payroll taxes, however,
is not as large as it appears because payroll taxes are generally capped.
For UI taxes, as noted previously, these caps can be quite low; with
very low caps, payroll taxes essentially operate as lump-sum mandates.
If employers can shift the proportional payroll tax cost to wages below
the cap only and not to wages above the cap, then there will be no
incentive to change hours for either the employer or employee. But if
employers cannot, they may have to reduce wages proportionately for
all workers, regardless of their position relative to the cap. In this case,
there will be opposite hours of work incentives for employers and
employees. Employers will see higher costs below the cap and would
therefore like to increase work above the cap and reduce employment;
employees will see net benefits below the cap (once again assuming
full valuation) and only net taxes above it, so they would like to reduce
hours and increase (below cap) employment. It would be fruitful to
investigate the effect of payroll tax caps on the choice of hours vs.
employment, as has been done for health insurance.
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REFORMING PAYROLL TAXATION
In this section, I consider two reforms to the current system of pay
roll taxation. I do not discuss alternatives to mandates because the
alternative generally is simply to not have the policy. In the final sec
tion, I return to the overall question of whether such policies should
exist and be financed through employers.
Financing Social Security and Disability Insurance Through
the Income Tax
A natural alternative to financing social insurance programs
through payroll taxation is to finance them through general revenues.
In this section, I contrast the economic effects of payroll taxes with
those of one form of general revenue raising, the individual income
tax.24 In doing so, I hold the benefits side of these programs constant.
For example, I assume that the Social Security benefits paid to retired
workers remain a function of their lifetime work experience in the
same way that they are under earmarked payroll taxation. In terms of
efficiency, this implies that the tax/benefit linkage-induced shift in
labor supply previously discussed will remain under income taxation—
that is, so long as benefits are calculated based on past earnings histo
ries, regardless of the source of financing, tax/benefit linkages will
operate. Once again, the key in Summers' (1989) analysis is not the
form of revenue raising, but that benefits are restricted to be a function
of work effort.
In terms of equity, this approach means that I am not considering
the net equity implication of these programs as a whole, but rather only
the differential impact of alternative sources of finance. For example,
the SS program as a whole may be progressive, even as the tax that
finances this program is regressive. In this case, moving to more equi
table income taxation would be a further increase in progressivity.
Efficiency. The deadweight loss from financing a social insurance
program from two alternative revenue sources is a function of two fac
tors: the breadth and the elasticity of the relative tax bases. The distor
tion of raising a given amount of revenue will be smaller as the tax
base is more inelastic. At the same time, if a tax base is small, the tax

Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 215

rate must be higher to raise the requisite funds; because the deadweight
loss from a tax rises as the square of the tax rate, a higher rate will lead
to a higher distortion. Thus, for a given level of elasticity, the dead
weight loss will also fall as the tax base is more broad.
Income taxes offer a potentially much larger tax base than payroll
taxation because of the inclusion of unearned income and the fact that
payroll taxes are capped while income taxes include all wage and sal
ary income. However, this simple intuition is rendered incorrect by the
nature of the income tax system in the United States. The income tax
base has a large number of exclusions (such as those for dependents,
charitable giving, and mortgage payments) that make it a very incom
plete measure of total income in the United States.
The base for income taxation, total taxable income, is reported by
Internal Revenue Service. I use data from the Treasury Department's
Individual Tax Model, along with the NBER's TAXSIM program, to
measure the base of taxable payroll below the Social Security maxi
mum. This data provides information on the tax returns for a large
sample of taxpayers, and TAXSIM calculates the tax rates paid by
those taxpayers.25 I use data from 1989, the last year for which data are
available.
The total taxable income base was $2.173 trillion in 1989. In con
trast, the taxable base of wage and salary earnings below the taxable
maximum was only $12.9 million smaller, which is trivial relative to
the size of the social insurance programs under discussion. Thus, the
relative sizes of these tax bases are virtually equal. Capped earnings
may be a smaller base for taxation compared with a comprehensive
income definition, but capped earnings provide a base of roughly the
same size compared with income taxation as it is carried out in the
United States.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the income tax base is almost cer
tainly higher than the elasticity of the payroll tax base. As noted ear
lier, although controversial, the empirical literature on labor supply
suggests that the labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic and
that the labor supply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic.
On the other hand, other forms of income taxed under the personal
income tax (e.g., capital gains) appear to be much more elastic with
respect to taxation, although this evidence is also controversial (Auerbach 1988). Similarly, charitable deductions, which lower the taxable
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income base, are also very sensitive to tax rates (Clotfelter 1990).
Recent evidence also suggests that overall taxable income is more elas
tic with respect to the tax rate than is labor income alone (Feldstein
1993; Navratil 1994).26
Thus, it seems clear that income taxation would be a more ineffi
cient source of revenue raising than payroll taxation: the size of the tax
base would be no larger, and the tax base would be more elastic.
Equity. The other important consideration for examining income
versus payroll taxation is the distribution of the tax burden across tax
payers. A standard criticism of payroll taxation, relative to broader
income taxation, is that it is less equitable. This criticism is true for
two reasons. First, unearned income is distributed in a much more prorich fashion than earned income so that a tax on all income is more
progressive by definition. Second, payroll taxation is capped, so that
high-income individuals escape this tax burden on income above the
cap. In order to contrast the equity of payroll and income taxation, I
compare the effective tax rates paid by taxpayers of different income,
once again using data from the Treasury model and TAXSIM. Follow
ing the evidence provided above, I assume that all of the tax is borne by
workers in the form of lower wages. The base for my definition of
income is "total positive income"—the sum of the positive income ele
ments reported on tax returns, with negative elements being set to zero.
This approach is taken to avoid the problem that much of the negative
income reported on tax forms is tax shelter activity, rather than true
economic losses.
The left side of Table 6 compares the distribution of effective tax
rates across income groups under the current system for the income
tax, the payroll tax, and the combination of the two. As expected, the
income tax is found to be much more progressive than the payroll tax.
For the bottom 5-10 percent of taxpayers, the effective income tax rate
is actually negative due to the presence of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, which subsidizes labor supply for low earners. The average
rate then rises gradually, reaching a maximum of 17.4 percent for the
top 5 percent of taxpayers.
In contrast, the effective payroll tax rate is virtually flat for the bot
tom 80 percent of taxpayers. Note that for this group, payroll taxation
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Table 6 The Progressivity of the Income and Payroll Taxes3
Uncapping tax base
Current system
SSDI
Income
SSDI
Income
Income
Combined
tax
tax
tax
Combined
tax
group
0-5%
11.0
10.6
11.0
0.3
10.6
03
-0.4
-0.4
12.2
12.6
12.2
5-10%
12.6
127
11.3
1.3
1.3
10-20%
12.7
11.3
14.3
11.3
3.0
14.3
11.3
3.0
20-30%
15.2
11.5
3.7
30-40%
3.7
15.2
11.5
18.5
11.9
18.5
6.6
40-50%
6.6
11.9
20.7
8.4
12.3
8.4
20.7
123
50-60%
12.7
22.5
9.8
9.8
22.5
12.7
60-70%
23.3
12.7
10.6
233
12.7
10.6
70-80%
24.0
12.3
11.7
24.0
11.7
12.3
80-90%
26.4
13.9
12.5
13.9
24.0
10.1
90-95%
28.1
17.4
10.7
17.4
23.8
6.4
95-100%
a Author's tabulations using U.S. Department of Treasury tax data and NBER TAXSIM
model.

represents the majority of their tax bill. For the top 20 percent of tax
payers, payroll tax rates actually decline. Payroll taxes are therefore
much less equitable than income taxes, and this becomes a key equity
consideration when payroll taxes represent the majority of taxes paid
for such a high fraction of taxpayers. Thus, the consideration of pay
roll vs. income taxation comes down to the classic trade-off between
efficiency and equity.
Of course, this discussion has taken the structure of income and
payroll taxes as given. If the income tax base were widened, for exam
ple, by the removal or limitation of the deduction for mortgage interest,
the attractiveness of income taxation would rise for three reasons.
First, the tax base would be larger, so that there would be a lower effi
ciency cost per dollar of revenue raised. Second, the income tax base
would be less elastic. The increased elasticity of income taxation rela
tive to payroll taxation described above derives largely from the fact
that, under the income tax, there are a number of ways to protect
income from taxation, such as the mortgage interest deduction. Limit
ing these exclusions would reduce the extent to which reported income
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can be lowered in response to higher taxes and thus limit the efficiency
cost of income taxation. Finally, income taxes would become even
more equitable in many cases. This is because any deduction from tax
able income is regressive because tax rates rise with income. Thus,
removing the mortgage interest deduction would make the income tax
system more progressive.27

Raising the Taxable Maximum for Payroll Taxation
An alternative to shifting to income taxation would be to change
the structure of payroll taxation to make it more equitable. A natural
means for doing so would be to remove the cap on taxable earnings for
SS and DI, which was removed for Medicare beginning in 1994.
Under the principle of maintaining some tax/benefit linkages, if bene
fits are not going to be paid based on earnings above this level, then
taxes must be limited as well. However, the tax/benefit linkages are
likely to be small for this top group of earners because the benefits for
mula used by SS only converts each dollar of earnings to 15 cents of
benefits at the top of the earnings distribution.
The efficiency consequences of uncapping the payroll tax are
mixed. On one hand, it substantially increases the payroll tax base. If
all wage and salary income were subject to the payroll tax, the tax base
would rise from $2.16 trillion to $2.61 trillion (based on calculations
using the Treasury data and TAXSIM), an increase in the tax base of
over 20 percent. In 1989, the total tax rate used to finance SS and DI
was 12.12 percent. If the same revenues were raised by an uncapped
tax, this combined tax rate could have been reduced to 10.03 percent.
Using the rule that the efficiency cost of a tax rises with the square of
the tax rate, the efficiency cost of financing these programs could have
been reduced by 32 percent by extending the tax base to all wages and
salaries.
On the other hand, the wage and salary income of top earners may
be more elastic than that of earners lower down the income distribu
tion. High-income individuals receive more fringe benefits and other
diverse sources of compensation, allowing for more discretion in the
form in which compensation is paid. For example, if the payroll tax
were uncapped, executives might switch from cash compensation to
stock options. While other workers have some opportunity for this
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type of arbitrage using fringe benefits such as health insurance, the
opportunities are more abundant for top earners. Feenberg and Poterba
(1993) documented that wage and salary income for the top 1 percent
of taxpayers rose dramatically after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 low
ered marginal tax rates on earned income. And Navratil (1994) also
found that the wage and salary income of top earners (more than
$50,000 per year in 1980 dollars) is much more elastic with respect to
tax changes than is that of all earners.
Furthermore, to the extent that high wage earners reduce their
reported earnings in order to avoid increased payroll taxation, there is a
spillover into the revenues collected under the ordinary income tax.
Since the marginal income tax rate on top earners is over three times as
high as the marginal payroll tax rate would be, reduced earnings by top
earners could quickly mitigate any potential gains from extending the
payroll tax.
Navratil (1994) estimated an elasticity of earned income with
respect to payroll taxation for high-income earners of approximately
one. One can use this estimate, along with information on the revenues
collected from both the payroll and income taxes, to estimate the reve
nue effect of uncapping the payroll tax. In fact, the net revenue
increase from uncapping the payroll tax would only be $11.7 billion, or
21 percent of what would be assumed based on naive application of the
12 percent payroll tax to the incremental $450 billion in revenues
because the tax would raise only $43.2 billion in payroll tax revenues
but would cost $31.5 billion in income tax revenues. 28 This policy
could therefore have a relatively high efficiency cost per dollar of reve
nues raised.
Table 6 explores the equity implications of uncapping the tax base
by presenting the payroll and total tax burdens, by income class, under
the current system and with the tax base uncapped. There is no effect
of this policy on the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution.
However, there is a large net increase in taxes paid for the wealthiest
taxpayers; the top 5 percent would experience and increase in their
effective tax rate of approximately 20 percent. Thus, uncapping the SS
tax may raise a relatively small amount of revenues, but it would sub
stantially raise taxes on the very upper end of the distribution of earn
ings.
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Uncapping payroll taxes for UI would have larger effects since, as
documented in Table 3, the current taxable maximums are so low. It is
difficult to replicate the calculation performed above for uncapping UI
taxes, however, because we do not have a good estimate of the elastic
ity of earned income for lower wage earners, nor is there readily avail
able data on the marginal UI tax rate faced by workers at different
income levels. Undertaking this kind of calculation could be useful for
assessing the implications of uncapping UI taxes as well.

CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has tried to highlight what we know and what we
don't know about the labor-market effects of payroll taxation and
employer mandates in the United States. While recent evidence sug
gests that mandates and payroll taxes are fully shifted to workers'
wages with little disemployment effect, there remains important ques
tions and complications that must be explored by future research. In
addition, I discuss the benefits and costs of shifting from payroll taxa
tion to income taxation, as well as of uncapping the payroll tax.
There is a larger question avoided by this discussion: should pay
roll tax financed and mandated employer benefits exist at all? There
are three components to the welfare analysis of social insurance inter
ventions: the deadweight loss from financing, other distortions to
behavior from the existence of public insurance, and the benefits for
the party on whose behalf the intervention is occurring. This chapter
has focused on the first of these components. There is also a large liter
ature on the second, which has explored the distortive effects of the
perverse incentives inherent in a number of different social insurance
programs. However, there is little work on the third area—the benefits
of social insurance interventions. Without evidence on this front, we
cannot conclude as to the optimal level of government intervention in
private insurance markets.
Consider the case of workers' compensation. Gruber and Krueger
(1991) showed that there is little deadweight loss from financing this
program. Meyer (1990) and Krueger (1990, 1992) showed that there
are important distortions to worker injury reports and duration of job
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absence, but there is little evidence on the benefits of WC. To what
extent does WC reduce the deadweight loss that would otherwise be
incurred through the tort system as workers and firms tried to resolve
workplace injury cases? To what extent does it smooth the consump
tion of myopic or liquidity constrained workers who would otherwise
see a large drop in their standard of living when they were truly injured
on the job? Until these benefits are measured, we have no way of
assessing the optimal level of government intervention in this market;
how else can we assess whether the distortions measured by the earlier
work are "large"?
Similar problems exist in evaluating the optimal level of the Social
Security program. In this case, we don't necessarily even know the
deadweight loss from financing. There are a number of reasons, noted
previously, why the results from previous incidence research may not
apply to Social Security. Once again, there is a long line of research on
the distortive effects of the program to savings and retirement behavior
by Feldstein (1974), Burtless (1986), and Diamond and Hausman
(1984). In this case, however, there is also only sketchy evidence on
the benefits of the program. There has been some attention paid to
issues of benefit adequacy; see Diamond (1977), Kotlikoff, Spivak, and
Summers (1982), and Hamermesh (1984) for somewhat different con
clusions on this adequacy issue. None of these studies, however, has
been able to assess convincingly the effects of varying Social Security
benefits on the welfare of retirees because they have not been able to
fully model the alternative consumption smoothing opportunities avail
able to the retiree in the absence of Social Security. Feldstein (1985)
conjectured on the optimal Social Security benefit level using a model
where some fraction of the population is myopic and concluded that
the optimal program should be quite small. This work could be use
fully extended by incorporating liquidity constraints and other capital
market failures into the model and, more convincingly, by providing
empirical evidence on how the living standards of the elderly change as
Social Security benefits vary.
Perhaps the most complete picture can be painted for unemploy
ment insurance. The evidence in Anderson and Meyer (1997) suggests
that there is little deadweight loss at the market level from the financing
of UI, although there may be a distortion at the firm level. Meyer
(1990) showed that there is a large distortion of generous UI benefits to
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unemployment durations, and Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983), and
Anderson and Meyer (1994) showed that there are also distortions of
imperfect experience rating to firm layoff decisions. On the other hand,
there are two forms of benefit of this program for individual workers.
The first is that it helps to subsidize efficient search by liquidity con
strained unemployed workers. But recent research has shown that the
longer search induced by more generous unemployment insurance ben
efits does not result in better job matches, as measured by the ultimate
wage received (Meyer 1989; Woodbury and Speigelman 1987). The
second is that it smooths the consumption of individuals who, due
either to myopia or some capital market failure, are unable to smooth
their own consumption during unemployment spells. 29 Some prelimi
nary evidence on this front is provided by Gruber (1997, 1998), who
found that the consumption of those becoming unemployed falls signif
icantly more if there is less generous UI. In that paper, I attempted to
use a simple optimal benefits model to compare the costs and benefits
of UI into a simple optimal benefits model, but there is clearly room for
more systematic incorporation of the costs and benefits of social insur
ance programs in order to assess optimal intervention levels.

Notes
I am grateful to Jeff Liebman for research assistance.
1.

The description of these programs is current as of 1993. Most information is from
Committee on Ways and Means (1993) and Employee Benefits Research Institute
(1992).
2. The normal age of retirement under Social Security is 65. Individuals can retire
as early as age 62, but benefits are then adjusted downwards to reflect the fact that
they are received for a larger number of years. Similarly, individuals can retire
after age 65, and benefits are adjusted upwards, through a "delayed retirement
credit." If individuals wish to both continue working and receive benefits, they
can do so, but benefits are taxed away at a rate of $1 of benefit for every $3 of
earnings [above some minimum threshold ($10,560)]; this is known as the "earn
ings test."
3. Although, for past cohorts, the system actually redistributed (in total dollar terms)
towards higher income workers; see Stuerle and Bakija (1994) for an overview.
This trend is projected to end for future generations, as the program becomes
more progressive.
4. The problems in defining disability for the purposes of Disability Insurance are
well known; see Parsons (1991) for a detailed discussion of these issues
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5. While this is primarily a state-run program, employers are obligated to pay a 0 6
percent payroll tax to the federal government (FUTA tax).
6. It is difficult to decide where "mandates" end and other workplace regulations
begin. The dividing line chosen here is that mandates are government regulations
of the provision of employee benefits; thus, particular regulations pertaining to
health insurance benefit plans are mandates, while workplace antidiscrimination
rules are not. It remains unclear whether government regulations of workplace
safety should be counted as a mandate in this context
7. Continuation of coverage benefits provide that the employee can continue to pur
chase health insurance from the firm at the average group rate following his or her
voluntary or involuntary termination. See Gruber and Madrian (1993) for more
details on these laws.
8. Workers' compensation is not mandatory in New Jersey, South Carolina, and
Texas. See Deere (1994) for an analysis of the implications of voluntary workers'
compensation in Texas.
9. These are the "manual rates," which provide the basis for firm insurance pay
ments. The actual cost of insurance may differ from these rates for some firms
due to within-industry experience rating; see Burton et al. (1985) for details.
10. One may wonder why, if this program is fully valued by workers, a government
mandate is required. As Summers (1989) discusses, a variety of different market
failures (such as adverse selection in the choice to insure) may make it difficult for
these type of arrangements to emerge in the free market even if there is full valua
tion; government intervention may improve welfare in this case.
11. A third alternative for full shifting to wages would be perfectly elastic demand,
but this would imply much larger disemployment effects than those found by Gru
ber and Krueger (1991).
12. The variation in payroll costs in Gruber and Krueger (1991) is over a 10-year
period; for Anderson and Meyer (1997), there is a 6-year window.
13. Whether this assumption of money illusion is warranted, of course, is the subject
of a large macroeconomics literature not addressed here.
14. Vergara (1990) showed that, if the social welfare function values poor individuals
more highly, it will in general be optimal to have some degree of public provision
financed by income taxation instead of having all of the intervention financed by a
mandate.
15. These findings have not been without their critics; see Neumark and Wascher
(1992), and the debate between Neumark and Wascher (1994) and Card, Krueger,
and Katz (1994).
16. For example, the costs of unemployment insurance are roughly equal across all
workers, unless some workers are "layoff-prone."
17 Even if the costs can be shifted on average, however, if there is not perfect lumpsum shifting, there will still be a distortion to the hours margin which may spill
over to other groups. This is discussed further below.
18. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1987) for a discussion of U.S. antidiscrimination legis
lation, which was in place well before the mid 1970s In this discussion, I focus
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19.

20.
21.
22.
23
24.

25

26.

27.
28.

only on laws prohibiting discrimination in rates of pay and/or promotion. In fact,
if there are also binding restrictions on relative hiring practices, then employers
may be forced to bear the cost of the mandate. If discrimination rules are only
binding on the hiring side, then they will not impede group-specific shifting in the
case of full valuation.
These findings highlight another margin of employer response not emphasized
here: reducing other (nonmandated) benefits when there are increases in man
dated benefits. This margin has the advantage that existing benefits are often
lump sum, so that they provide a natural means of offsetting new lump-sum costs
imposed on employers.
In Gruber (1994a), I discuss the motivation for my choice of these states as well
as a large range of empirical issues that are mentioned only briefly here.
The results are similar if I use other methods of creating synthetic firms. This
approach allows for a relatively fine division of the data without creating many
cells which have just a few women.
The pros and cons of this approach, as well as the robustness of the results to
functional form, are discussed in Gruber (1992).
Under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), employers
who offer health insurance must make that insurance available to any worker who
works 1,000 hours per year or more.
Of course, there are other forms of revenue raising available to the government,
such as corporate taxation or federal excise taxation. However, the taxation of
individual incomes is the dominant source of revenue at the federal level, so it
provides a natural point for comparison; this analysis could readily be extended to
consider alternative forms of taxation. I only consider the Social Security and
Disability Insurance payroll tax because the structure of the Medicare payroll tax
is now fundamentally different (since there is no taxable maximum).
Earnings is defined as wage and salary earnings plus self-employment earnings
plus farm income Where these elements are reported to be negative, I replace
them with zero, under the assumption that negative earnings reflects tax shelter
behavior.
This is true for a number of reasons, including the following- a less elastic behav
ioral response of labor supply than of other forms of economic activity, more
scope for relabeling other forms of income to avoid taxation than is possible with
labor income (i.e., shifting from dividends to capital gains when the capital gains
tax rate is lower), and more scope for evasion with other forms of income (i.e.,
claiming artificially high chantable contributions).
While the first two comments apply to the removal of any exclusion in the tax
code, the last does not; some tax breaks, such as the earned income tax credit, are
progressive.
This calculation is done as follows. Assume that the currently marginal tax rate
on earnings in the uncapped range is 35 percent. Uncapping the payroll tax would
raise that rate to 47 percent. Navratil finds that the elasticity of earnings with
respect to after-tax shares is one. Since the after-tax share is reduced by 20 per-
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cent, this would mean that the additional $450 billion in earnings in the uncapped
range would be reduced to $360 billion. Thus, the uncapped payroll tax would
raise an additional $43.2 billion, but income tax revenues would be reduced by
$31.5 billion.
29. A third traditional justification for UI is that it serves as an automatic stabilizer,
reducing the seventy of recessions by redistributing from good times to bad.
There is little direct evidence on the automatic stabilization properties of UI. A
finding that UI smooths consumption at the level of the individual, discussed
below, may provide indirect evidence on its success as an automatic stabilizer.
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5 Fringe Benefits and Employment
Masanori Hashimoto
Ohio State University

The past few decades have witnessed dramatic growth in the fringe
benefits component of total labor compensation in the United States
and other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
Development (Hart et al. 1988). According to the conventional wis
dom, an exogenous increase in nonwage labor costs adversely impacts
employment. For instance, researchers have linked increases in quasifixed labor costs with reductions in employment.' Often overlooked,
however, is the fact that voluntarily provided fringe benefits have
grown by as much as legally required fringe benefits over the past 40
years, with the voluntary component in fact outpacing the legally
required component after the early 1980s. Although legally required
fringe benefits may be viewed as exogenous for the purposes of model
ing, voluntarily provided fringe benefits must be treated as endogenous
in any comprehensive analysis.2 In this chapter, we undertake just such
an analysis. In particular, we discuss a market level model in which
wages and employment are permitted to respond to changes in the
demand for and the cost of fringe benefits and in which increases in
legally mandated fringe benefits are permitted to alter the market equi
librium.
Anticipating the results, the employment and wage effects of
increases in nonwage payments vary with the source of the increase.
We analyze the following three such sources: 1) an increase in worker
demand for benefits, 2) a reduction in the cost of providing benefits,
and 3) an increase in legally mandated benefits. Although these are
obvious sources, the literature does not seem to have taken them into
account. Our analysis is conducted primarily in a model in which no
distinction is drawn between the number of workers and the hours of
work or between straight-time and overtime hours. The final sections
discuss how the results are altered by incorporating such distinctions
and offer some concluding remarks.
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BACKGROUND
Figure 1 shows that, in the United States, both legally required and
voluntary fringe benefits grew significantly over the past 40 years, with
the voluntary component outpacing the legally required component
after the early 1980s. As Table 1 makes clear, growth in Social Secu
rity was the single most important factor behind the upsurge in legally
required fringe benefits between 1951 and 1994. As for voluntary
fringe benefits, growth in health and medical insurance far outpaced
growth in any other component. Table 2 depicts industry differences in
the changes in nonwage payments from 1966 to 1994. In general, the
percentage of nonwage labor costs in total labor costs rose steadily
during this period, with growth for all industries combined reaching
almost 48 percent. This rate of increase varied among industries, rang
ing between 1.2 percent in finance to 67.9 percent in wood products. It
was higher for manufacturing industries overall (over 50 percent) than
for nonmanufacturing industries (39 percent).
The observed increase in the importance of nonwage labor costs
most likely affected the relative attractiveness of various labor inputs,
for example, part-time versus full-time workers or additional hiring of
full-time workers versus additional hours worked by incumbent work
ers. In particular, the existing analyses predict that part-time workers
should have become more attractive than full-time workers and that
additional hours should have become more attractive than additional
hiring.
It is unclear whether these predictions are supported by the data, at
least on the aggregate correlation level. Figure 2 indicates that there is
no discernible relationship across industries between changes in the
ratio of full-time to total employment and changes in the importance of
nonwage labor costs. Figure 3 shows that, if anything, hours worked
per employee decreased in industries that experienced increases in
nonwage labor costs, a finding that seems at odds with the theoretical
prediction. Although a multivariate analysis using a more comprehen
sive data set is needed to test these predictions rigorously, the marketlevel theory discussed in this essay suggests that such ambiguous find
ings are to be expected.

Figure 1 Fringe Benefits of Workers in Firms Surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce
(Indices of Benefits as a Percent of Total Compensation, 1951=100)
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Table 1 Components of Fringe Benefits in Firms Surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce. Indices of Benefits as a
Percent of Total Compensation (1951=100)
Legally required

1951

Voluntary

Inside payroll

Social Security

Workers'
comp.

Other

Retirement

Insurance

Misc.

Paid rest

Paid leave

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

10000

174.81

145.741

16.54

104.93

1955

174.81

87.41

58.27

102.04

1959

172.74

138.16

69.11

115.20

207.33

115.16

138.22

117.50

1963

240.98

120.49

100.44

110.50

240.98

160.65

140.60

126.55

1967

315.88

157.89

52.63

114.10

263.25

140.41

157.96

126.40

126.95

360.71

146.93

173.68

144.31

1971

360.71

160.34

40.10

1975

439.47

198.50

56.70

141.81

42528

132.33

189.04

155.97

1979

435.71

249.06

82.83

138.36

477.16

152.13

179.82

143.18

1984

494.36

179.51

89.91

117.42

62152

144.17

92.92

138.52

43.80

126.29

711.84

46.37

117.11

16007

1988

522.56

166.73

1992

517.48

221.80

34.59

152.80

805.83

54.20

123.18

155.25

1993

495.39

172.18

30.33

15798

83994

76.50

110.03

149.35

1994

514.29

165.98

30.39

175.65

788.06

93.98

107.83

141.87

SOURCE: See Appendix A.

Table 2 Indices of Nonwage Labor Costs as a Proportion of Total Labor Compensation by Industry (1966=100)
1966
Values

1966

1971

1976

1981

1985

1988

1992

1993

1994

All

(0.198)

100.0

118.7

135.4

137.4

138.4

136.4

144.8

147.6

146.1

Manufacturing

(0.191)

100.0

122.5

142.4

144.5

148.7

139.7

152.8

150.4

153.3

Food, tobacco

(0.214)

100.0

116.4

1252

127.6

132.7

123.4

145.5

121.4

127.4

Textiles, apparel

(0.159)

100.0

120.1

141.5

149.1

153.5

157.1

146.6

158.9

143.6

Wood products

(0 169)

100.0

130.8

150.3

157.4

154.4

149.1

164.2

167.9

161.4

Printing & publishing (0.174)

100.0

123.6

148.9

154.6

146.6

134.0

165.7

1642

169.1
130.7

Industry

Chemicals

(0.215)

100.0

118.6

140.5

140.9

140.0

118.5

134.8

144 1

Petroleum

(0.219)

100.0

120.1

132.4

140.6

128.3

144.1

132.3

1325

130.2

Rubber and plastics

(0.201)

100.0

115.9

136.8

134.8

142.3

144.9

166.7

148.6

145.9

Stone, glass

(0.188)

100.0

126.6

142.0

146.3

135.1

1391

144.5

143.9

152.8

Primary

(0.200)

100.0

129.0

151.0

151.0

166.0

149.9

149.6

1446

127.4

Fabricated

(0.186)

100.0

119.9

147.3

147.8

159.1

152.2

169.1

1585

149.2

Electrical

(0.192)

100.0

118.8

139.6

142.2

146.4

135.3

150.7

148.0

163.4

Other

(0.194)

100.0

119.1

140.7

143.3

147.4

137.3

149.9

144.1

154.2

Metals:

Machinery

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)
Industry

1966
Values

Transportation equip.

(0.188)

100.0

137.8

Instruments, other

(0.192)

100.0

123.4

Nonmanufacturing

(0.212)

100.0

111.8

(0.212)

100.0

Department stores

(0.188)

Other
Finance

Utilities

1966

1971

1976

1981

1985

149.5

148.9

155.9

149.0

163.3

162.0

187.6

132.3

145.8

152.6

134.7

127.2

139.8

144.2

124.5

125.5

125.5

128.4

134.3

138.8

136.0

115.6

134.0

139.2

137.7

140.2

140.0

148.6

148.4

100.0

103.7

128.7

124.5

125.0

136.4

128.9

123.4

152.2

(0.194)

100.0

101.5

121.1

120.6

123.7

153.2

143.8

153.7

144.6

105.8

99.5

100.5

101.2

98.3

136.8

134.6

1988

1992

1993

1994

Trade

(0.243)

100.0

108.2

117.3

114.4

Insurance

(0.213)

100.0

130.5

120.2

132.5

100.0

116.2

125.5

121.6

123.8

134.7

131.9

Other

(0.252)

-

128.2

(0.204)

113.1
-

99.1

Hospitals

-

100.0

98.4

100.4

107.4

116.8

116.6

109.5

SOURCE: Calculated from Table 6 of Employee Benefits (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, various years) by taking
l/(l+(100/x)), where x is employee benefits.

Figure 2 Manufacturing Industries (U.S. Chamber of Commerce Survey)
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THEORY AND PREDICTIONS
In contrast to the conventional approach of analyzing a single
firm's decision, we consider a model that addresses the effects of
increased fringe benefits on market wages and employment. To focus
on the bare essentials of the analysis, we restrict ourselves to a simple
model that abstracts from the distinction between the size of the work
force and the hours of work per worker. Following this simple model,
we consider the implications from an extended model that includes
such a distinction.
Beginning first with a firm level analysis and then extending to the
market level analysis, suppose that an industry consists of identical
firms whose production functions are given by
Q = F(n)

(1)

where Q is output and n is a firm's level of employment. The market
level of employment is then given by E = kn, where k is the total num
ber of firms. Each firm faces a labor expense function,
Q = Q(n,h,G) = whn + C(G,n)n,

(2)

where w is the wage and G is the quantity of fringe benefits per worker.
Equation 2 is assumed to satisfy
Ci > 0, Cn > 0, C2 ^0, C12 = C21 ±0, C22 = 0,
so that the marginal cost of G is positive and rising (Cj > 0, Cn > 0).
Equation 2 allows for the existence of either internal diseconomies or
economies in providing fringe benefits. Thus, as the firm expands its
workforce, the cost per worker of providing fringe benefits might
increase or decrease, depending upon whether scale diseconomies (C2
> 0) or economies (C2 < 0) exist. More importantly, the sign of C12 =
C21 is critical to the analysis. We interpret C12 < 0 as an indicator of
cross-economies of scale and C12 > 0 as an indicator cross-disecono
mies of scale. Cross-economies of scale (diseconomies of scale) imply
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that the marginal cost of G falls (rises) with the size of the workforce.
For simplicity, we assume that C22 = 0.
The /th employee is assumed to view G as having a constant mar
ginal value of A, dollars, making her indifferent between receiving A,
dollars in w or in G. To simplify, we assume that all employees have
the same marginal value, A. As a result, 8w/3G = -A from the
employer's perspective; if G is increased by one unit, all employees are
willing to work for A dollars less in w.
An employer selects the optimum n and G by solving the following
problem:
Max ji(n, G) = pF(n) - [ w + C(G, n)]n,

., .

n,G

(J)

where p is the product price. The first order conditions are given by
= pF'(n) -[w + C(G, n) + nC2 ] = 0 and
= 0.

(4a)
(4b)

A firm's labor demand is traced by Eq. 4a, rewritten as:
w = pF'(n) - [C(G, n) + nC2 ].

(4a*)

The optimum quantity of G is given by Eq. 4b, implying that the mar
ginal cost of G is equal to A dollars at the optimum point.
Allowing for the product price changes that occur as all firms
change outputs, the market demand curves for labor can be obtained by
horizontally summing the firms' demand curves. To facilitate the anal
ysis, we linearize the market demand curves as follows (see Appendix
B for the details of this linearization).

where w* is the employers' wage offer, w is employment, and a, t|, p,
and P are parameters. The expression represents the cost of providing
G, and P depends on G if there are cross-scale effects in providing the
benefits. Equations 2 and 4a* imply the following restrictions:
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P/dG2 =0,

(6)

where the condition d$ldG^ 0 corresponds to C, 2 JO and the condi
tion J2p / dG2 = 0 corresponds to C12 = 0 (see Appendix B). Figure 4
depicts the demand curves associated with three different quantities of
G. If the marginal cost of G slopes upward, the demand curves diverge
as G is increased, reflecting the rising cost of fringe benefits.
The supply side of the model is straightforward. As emphasized
earlier, workers are assumed to be homogeneous while w and G are
assumed to be perfectly substitutable at a rate of A dollars per unit of
G. As a result, the market supply of labor depends upon w + AG.
Because workers are assumed homogeneous, the supply curve depicted
as a function of w is horizontal and shifts down as G is increased
according to the following equation.
ws = y - AG,

(7)

where w5 is the asking wage and y (>0) and A (>0) are parameters.
Figure 5 depicts the supply curves.
The competitive market equilibrium is the solution that maximizes
the sum total of the surpluses for both employers and employees. The
process of reaching this equilibrium involves two steps. First, the mar
ket optimizes on the E associated with various quantities of G. This
optimization generates a locus of the intersections of demand and sup
ply curves corresponding to different values of G. Second, the market
chooses the optimum quantity of G by equating the marginal cost of G
with its marginal value. By doing so, the market in effect selects a
point on the intersection locus that maximizes the sum of the surpluses.
Figure 6 depicts the demand and supply curves together for three dif
ferent levels of G as well as the corresponding intersection points on
the intersection locus L.
The market equilibrium—the intersection of demand and supply
that maximizes the joint surplus Z—is obtained by solving the follow
ing optimization problem:
£

MaxZ= j[v/(e)-v/
E, G

= [a - (t|G + pG2 )- y + KG\E + 0.5(3E2 + Constant.
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Figure 4 Demand Curves

w

Figure 5 Supply Curves
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The first order conditions are given by

0

and

- -[r| + 2pG - Q.5(d$ /dG)E]E + kE = 0

(9a)
(9b)

Equation 9a optimizes Z with respect to E, resulting in a locus of inter
sections between the demand and supply curves for different values of
G. Equation 9b optimizes on G, equating the marginal cost (the first
term) with the marginal value (the second term). Equations 9a and 9b
together describe the point of market equilibrium. 3
Figure 7 portrays the market equilibrium for three cases: no crossscale effects (dft/dG = 0) cross-economies of scale (d$/dG > 0), and
cross-diseconomies of scale (dft/dG < 0). The L curve is the locus of
the intersections of the demand and supply curves for the different lev
els of G. There is a unique L curve associated with each of these three
values of d$ldG; however, in Figure 7, only one L curve is depicted to
conserve space. Moving downward along this locus, G is increased
and w is decreased. We should point out that the market equilibrium
level of employment is not necessarily at its maximum attainable level.
In particular, Figure 7 shows that if there are cross-scale effects (d$l
dG * 0), equilibrium employment is less than the maximum feasible
level of employment on the relevant L curve.4 Only in the absence of
cross-scale effects (d$/dG = 0) is equilibrium employment at its maxi
mum feasible level (see Appendix C for a proof).
We are now in a position to evaluate the effects of nonwage pay
ments on employment. Since G is endogenous in our model, changes
in its magnitude must be traced to changes in worker demand for, and
the cost of, G. These exogenous factors are represented by K and r|,
respectively. In addition, we evaluate the effects of changes in legally
required fringe benefits on employment and wages.
Changes in the Demand for G
A secular increase in nonwage payments can arise as a result of an
increase in the demand for fringe benefits. Such an increase in demand
occurs if, for example, a new law taxes nonwage benefits less heavily
than wage earnings or if real income grows and fringe benefits are
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Figure 6 Intersection Locus

Figure 7 Market Equilibria

w
B (dp/dG > 0)

A (dp/dG = 0)
C (dp/dG <0)
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superior goods. An increased demand for G is represented by an
increase in A,, yielding the following comparative statics results:
dGld\ = (1 /|//|)[-P + 0.5G(d(3 / dG)]E

(10a)

dEldk = (1 /|//|)[2pG + 0.5E(d$ I dG)]E,

(lOb)

Clearly, if there are no cross-scale effects (d$ldG = 0)or if there are
cross-economies of scale (d$ldG > 0), both equations are positive so
that both G and E increase with A. In other words, an increase in
worker demand for fringe benefits increases both the amount of bene
fits provided and the level of employment. If a secular increase in nonwage payments is the result of an increased demand for these
payments, such an increase in benefits should have the effect of stimu
lating employment.
If there are cross-diseconomies of scale (dft/dG < 0), conditions
lOa and lOb seem to suggest that either G or £ or both could decrease
when A, increases. Such an outcome seems implausible, however,
because it would imply that, as employers expand G in response to the
increased demand for it, cross-diseconomies cause the cost of provid
ing fringe benefits to rise, forcing employers to reduce the quantities of
both G and E. For cross-diseconomies to remain operative, however,
the aggregate amount of G must rise. On the basis of this argument,
we conjecture that G, and possibly E, increase even in this case.
Because w = ws = w at the point of equilibrium, the effect on
the wage is ascertained by evaluating the effect of a change in A, on ws,
or
G

(10c)

Equation 10 implies that, if G and E increase in response to an
increase in the demand for G, then dwld\ is negative and the wage
falls. Employees, in effect, trade their wages for larger benefits.
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Changes in the Cost of G
Nonwage payments may also increase as a result of a decrease in
the cost of providing fringe benefits. A change in the cost of G is rep
resented here by a change in rj. Not surprisingly, the comparative stat
ics analysis reveals that cost effects are mirror images of demand
effects. In other words,
and

(lla)

If (dfi/dG > 0) both G and E increase when r| falls. Thus, if the
observed increase in nonwage benefits is the result of a decrease in the
cost of providing benefits, employment as well as benefits should rise.
As in the case of increased demand for fringe benefits, even if there are
cross-diseconomies (d$ldG < 0), we conjecture that G, and possibly E,
increase when costs fall.
The wage effect is evaluated from the following equation:
dw/dn = A,(dGdn).

(lie)

The term dw I dT\ is positive when (dfi/dG > 0). If a decrease in r\ is
the cause of the observed increase in nonwage payments, then, as G
and E increase in response, w should decrease.
Effects of Government Control of G

As Figure 1 demonstrates, legally required benefits have risen over
time. If a government regulates the quantity of employer provided
fringe benefits, then G in the previous analysis is replaced by the man
dated quantity, G . Given that dw I dG = —A, < 0, it is clear that the
wage will fall unambiguously when G is increased. The effect on
employment is not clear-cut, however.
To begin, E is now the only endogenous variable, making
3Z/8E1 = 0 the only first-order condition. This first-order condition
yields the following optimum level of employment: 5
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31

(12)

The effect of an increased G on employment is given by
(13)
+ (d{3 / dG) x (a positive term).
Suppose the market is initially at its competitive equilibrium so
that G = G*, where G* is the competitive equilibrium level of the
benefits. In this case, the term (V| + 2pG - A,)/(37 is zero because
(r| + 2pG)and A, are, respectively, the marginal cost and marginal
value of G. We already know that in the absence of cross-scale effects
(d(3 I dG = 0), the competitive equilibrium corresponds to the maxi
mum feasible level of employment. 6 It is clear, therefore, that the
introduction of legally required benefits lowers employment regardless
of whether the mandated G is larger or smaller than G * . In other
words, there is little that the government can do to increase employ
ment by regulating G.
If there are cross-economies of scale (d$ I dG > 0), employment
increases because dE * / dG = (d(3 / dG) x (a positive term) > 0. The
government in effect forces the market to experience cross-economies
of scale beyond what is efficient. If there are cross-diseconomies of
scale (d$/dG<0), employment decreases because
dE*/dG= (d$ I dG} x (a positive term) < 0 • In this case, the govern
ment in effect forces the market to experience cross-diseconomies
beyond what is efficient.
Now assume that legally required fringe benefits already exist.
What happens to employment if G is increased? Consider the case of
no cross-scale effects (dft/dG = 0). If G is already set above the mar
ket equilibrium level, then the marginal cost is above the marginal rev
enue so that (t| + 2pG) > A. As a result, dE * /dG < 0, implying that
employment decreases when G is increased. On the other hand, if G
is initially set below the market equilibrium level, then the marginal
cost is lower than the marginal revenue so that (T| + 2pG) < A . As a
result, dE* IdG > 0, implying that employment increases when G is
increased. With respect to the latter of these policy moves, the govern
ment forces G to move closer to the market equilibrium level.
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Allowing cross-scale effects to exist complicates the analysis.
Suppose there are cross-economies of scale (d$ldG > 0). If G is ini
tially set above the competitivejnarket level, then the effect of changes
in employment of changes in G is ambiguous given that dE*ldG can
not be signed. In this case, there are opposing forces at work. On one
hand, the government forces G to increase beyond its already ineffi
ciently high level, thereby adversely affecting employment. On the
other hand, an increase in G forces the market to enjoy cross-econo
mies of scale, thereby positively affecting employment. The net out
come depends upon the relative strength of the opposing forces. If G
is initially below the competitive market level, then employment unam
biguously increases because dE * IdG < 0. In this case, the govern
ment forces the market to move towards the competitive level of G,
thereby reinforcing the stimulating effect on employment originating
from cross-economies of scale.
_ Turning to the case of cross-diseconomies of scale (d$ldG < 0), if
G is initially above the competitive market level, then employment
declines unambiguously when G isjncreased because (d$ldG < 0).
In this case, the government forces G to move further away from the
competitive equilibrium, thereby reinforcing the disemployment effect
caused by cross-diseconomies of scale. If G is initially below the
competitive market level, then employment effects are ambiguous
given that dE * IdG cannot be signed. The government forces G closer
to the market equilibrium level, causing employment to expand, but
cross-diseconomies of scale cause employment to decline. The net
effect is uncertain.
To summarize, if an increase in nonwage payments is caused by an
increase in the legally required benefits, wages fall unambiguously;
however, employment effects are ambiguous. An important result is
that, even in the case of an exogenous increase in legally required
fringe benefits, employment can increase rather than decrease as con
ventionally thought. Whatever happens to employment, an increase in
legally mandated fringe benefits tends to be inefficient. An exception
is when the fringe benefits level is initially set below the competitive
equilibrium level. In this case, it is obvious that an increase in fringe
benefits increases efficiency so long as the increase does not overshoot
the competitive equilibrium level.
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AN EXTENSION: A MODEL WITH OVERTIME HOURS
Previous analyses assume that the relevant range of hours of work
includes only the standard hours, omitting consideration of overtime
hours and the potential ramifications of the overtime wage premium.
Our model may be extended by assuming that the equilibrium num
ber of hours of work incorporates overtime hours. Such an extension
is important if exogenous changes in nonwage payments affect the
marginal cost of increasing the labor input via increases in the hours
of work beyond the standard hours. We are also interested in the
effects of changes in the standard hours (or in the overtime wage pre
mium) on employment and fringe benefits. For a fuller exposition on
the technical aspects of such an extended model, the reader is referred
to a companion paper (Hashimoto and Zhao 1996). Here, we simply
outline some of the key predictions that emerge from this extended
analysis.
The predictions discussed in the preceding section are generally
unchanged in the extended model. We do, however, obtain additional
predictions. First, suppose the government increases the standard
hours of work. If there are no cross-scale effects, neither fringe bene
fits nor hours of work are affected by the changes in standard hours.
Employment increases if the positive effect of the increased standard
hours on labor demand dominates the negative effect on labor supply;
it decreases otherwise. The effects on hours of work and fringe bene
fits depend on how the slope of the labor demand curve, (3, changes.
The straight-time wage rate rises as a result of an upward shift of the
worker supply curve. The effects of an increase in the overtime wage
rate are opposite of the effects of an increase in standard hours.

CONCLUSION
The importance of nonwage payments has risen noticeably in the
United States over the past 40 years. Contributing to this trend are
increases in both voluntarily provided and legally required fringe bene
fits. Furthermore, since the early 1980s, the growth of the voluntary
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component has outpaced that of legally required component. These
developments suggest the importance of evaluating how employment
and wages are affected by the demand and supply forces that lead to
increases in voluntarily provided fringe benefits. This chapter has
addressed this issue. We find that predictions based upon the conven
tional firm-level analysis in which nonwage payments are assumed to
be exogenous are misleading. In particular, contrary to the conven
tional wisdom, an increase in nonwage payments does not necessarily
imply any adverse effects on employment and wages.
This outcome depends jointly on the source of the increase and the
existence of cross-scale effects in the cost of providing fringe benefits.
If the increase in nonwage payments is the result of either an increase
in employee demand for fringe benefits or a decrease in the cost of pro
viding benefits, employment may increase and the wage rate may
decrease. More importantly, employment effects are ambiguous even
when legally mandated fringe benefits are involved. To be sure, wages
always fall when legally required fringe benefits are increased; how
ever, employment may fall or rise depending on the initial condition
and the existence and the nature of cross-scale effects.
In the special case in which there are no cross-diseconomies of
scale, there is no presumption that an increase in nonwage benefits
reduces employment so long as competitive market forces are respon
sible for such an increase. If new legally required fringe benefits are
introduced into a labor market that is already at a competitive equilib
rium, employment decreases regardless of whether the mandate is to
increase or decrease such benefits. In this case, a government cannot
increase employment by manipulating the levels of legally required
fringe benefits.
Incorporating the distinction between standard hours of work and
overtime hours of work does not change these results. Not surpris
ingly, we find that there is a symmetry of effects with respect to the
standard hours and the overtime premium. In particular, the effects
of increased standard hours of work on employment, wages, and
fringe benefits are opposite of the effects of an increased overtime
premium.
We end with a discussion of some of the restrictions and limita
tions imposed on the analysis of this paper. Relaxing these would
undoubtedly make the model more complete. Given, however, that
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our objective is to demonstrate that making nonwage payments endog
enous changes some of the conventional results, we have chosen to
use a simplified model here. In any event, four limitations warrant
mention.
First, we abstract from the worker's choice of the number of hours
to work. Incorporating such a decision, while making the model more
complete, would greatly complicate our analysis. The same may be
said with respect to the second limitation of our analysis—namely, our
treatment of all nonwage labor as quasi-fixed benefits that are indepen
dent of the number of hours of work. Thus, we are talking about a
quasi-fixed wage component that is approximately 20 percent of total
labor compensation. Third, we abstract from higher order terms in the
linearly specified demand and supply functions. More complicated
specifications of the demand and supply curves may be desirable,
although such extensions are likely to make the predictions ambiguous.
Fourth, we assume that all employees are homogeneous with respect to
the marginal value of fringe benefits. If they were made heteroge
neous, the supply specification would need to incorporate distribution
parameters determining the taste for fringe benefits. Relaxing these
four restrictions is the subject of future research. In this chapter, how
ever, our goal is simply to demonstrate that some of the conventional
predictions are modified once analysis is conducted in a more general
equilibrium framework.

Notes
I thank Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Susan N. Houseman, Todd Idson, Jacob Mincer, Hajime
Miyazaki, James Peck, Sherwin Rosen, Jingang Zhao, and participants at the Labor
Economics Seminar at Columbia University and the 1995 Seventh World Congress of
the Econometric Society for useful comments and suggestions. I also thank Tracy Foertsch for research assistance
1. When models of employment-hours decisions are expanded to allow for changes
in capital, many of the results concerning hours become ambiguous; however,
the fixed-cost effect on employment remains intact (Hamermesh 1993; Hart
1984).
2. Almost all existing analyses focus on the behavior of firms for which it is reason
able to assume that fringe benefits are strictly exogenous. For example, see Rosen
(1968), Ehrenberg (1971), Hamermesh (1993), and Hart (1984).
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3. The second order conditions are given by 32 Z/8G2 = -2p£ < 0 and |H| = -2$pE
-\Q.5E(d$ I dG)]2 > 0,and where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. It
is straightforward to show that if the demand curves are all parallel to one another,
i.e., d$/dG = Q, the above conditions are implied by the assumptions made with
regard to the demand and supply curves If they are not parallel, these conditions
must be imposed on the model.
4. Since the L curve is unique to the value of dB/dG, the maximum employment
level is different for each case.
5. The equilibrium point corresponds to the intersection of the respective demand
and supply curves. The second order condition is satisfied because d Z*/3E

= p<o.

6. This can be seen from d2 El(dG] =2p/p<0 when G = G*.
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Appendix A
Table A, an extension of Table 1 in Woodbury (1983), gives the data on
which Figure 1 is based. This appendix describes the procedures used to com
pute the entries in Table A and in Table 1 of the text. To simplify our exposi
tion, we begin with a discussion of the construction of Table A.
Woodbury used two sources in demonstrating the growth of employee ben
efits from 1965 to 1978: the U.S. Chamber of Commerce publication Employee
Benefits (various years) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) bulletin Em
ployee Compensation in the Private, Nonfarm Economy (1974). It is helpful to
discuss each of these sources individually.
The data available in Employee Compensation in the Private, Nonfarm
Economy is the product of the Employer Expenditures for Employee Compen
sation survey (EEEC). This survey was discontinued in 1977; however, begin
ning in March of 1987, the BLS started publication of Employment Cost
Indexes and Levels (ECI), which includes a measure of "Employer Costs for
Employee Compensation." 1 The data provided under this heading appears to
be comparable to that provided in the older publication, from which Table 1 in
Woodbury (1983) is derived. The one significant difference stressed in Nathan
(1987) concerns its means of measuring these costs. In particular, the EEEC
focuses upon past expenditures—or, the actual money an employer spends on
compensation during a specified time. The compensation levels given in the
new BLS publication rely upon current costs—or, the annual costs based upon
the current price of benefits under current plan provisions. Aside from this
measurement difference, however, the ECI and EEEC appear quite similar,
with both covering virtually the same benefits and, more importantly, reporting
costs on the same per hour basis.2 In addition, the ECI preserves the scope of
the EEEC by reporting survey coverage of the private, nonfarm workforce.
Derivation of the entries given in the last three columns of Table A simply
entails the application of the per hour costs reported in the ECI to the defini
tions utilized by Woodbury in his calculations. These per hour costs are sub
sequently expressed as a percent of total compensation per hour and indexed to
equal 100 in 1966.
With respect to the Chamber of Commerce data, a comparison of this table
with that of Woodbury shows that the pre-1983 entries have been recalculated.
This is done for reasons of data availability. In particular, the Table 19 that
Woodbury used to construct his numbers is no longer included in Employee
Benefits. To construct similar numbers for this table, it is necessary to use other
sources within the publication. Two of these are selected. The first is a table
giving wage data by industry (Table 17 in 1967 and 1969, Table 18 through
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Table A Trends in Wage and Nonwage Compensation, 1951-1995
(benefits expressed as indices of % total compensation)
Compensation
(Chamber of Commerce, 1951=100)
Total
comp.
per hr.
($)a

Legally
required

Voluntary13

1951

1.88

100.00

100.00

1953

2.02

93.10

118.46

1955

2.15

102.19

127.18

Benefits

1957

2.43

103.13

133.68

1959

2.72

115.36

131.97

1961

2.85

131.97

143.93

1963

3.12

150.78

147.86

1965

3.33

131.66

138.63

1966
1967

3.57

157.99

4.09

168.65

4.69

167.08

174.87

5.65

199.69

17556

1972
1973

Benefits
Legally
required

Voluntary5

3.43

100.00

100.00

3.90

92.76

115.45

4.54

96.57

127.68

5.23

105.52

139.48

6.32

120.57

156.22

150.43

1970
1971

Total
comp.
per hr.
($)a

148.38

1968
1969

Compensation
(BLS, 1966=100)

1974
1975C

6.63

208.15

190.77

1977

7.60

214.42

207.01

1979

9.06

228.53

203.76

1980

9.85

222.88

204.79

1982

12.08

233.54

198.12

1984

13.00

238.87

216.92

1986

15.89

222.38

229.06
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Compensation
(Chamber of Commerce, 1951=100)
Benefits

Total
comp.
per hr,
($)a

Legally
required

1987

16.49

1988

17.44

1989

Compensation
(BLS, 1966=100)
Benefits

Voluntary15

Total
comp.
per hr.
($)a

Legally
required

Voluntary13

226.33

222.91

13.40

157.71

195.28

224.76

209.74

13.77

165.90

194.85

18.41

217.87

218.29

14.26

167.05

194.21

1990

19.64

220.38

228.03

14.93

168.38

197.00

1991

2051

220.06

239.15

15.37

169.71

203.86

1992

20.81

226.02

241.54

16.11

171.43

213.09

1993

22.67

209.09

259.32

16.68

173.52

221.24

1994

22.66

214.42

264.79

17.09

177.14

225.97

17.07

174 10

21245

1995

a Total Compensation includes legally required contributions to Social Secunty, federal
and state unemployment insurance, and Workers' Compensation.
b Benefits provided voluntarily by the employer include private insurance (life, health,
and accidental), privately sponsored retirement and savings plans (pensions, savings
and thrift plans), as well as other items (severance pay, supplemental unemployment
benefits, and other miscellaneous benefits).
c Comparable BLS benefits data are unavailable for the period extending from 19751986.

1984, Table 16 after 1988); the second is a chart detailing average annual em
ployee benefits and earnings (Chart 2 in all publications). The first of these,
Table 16, gives average gross payroll for all private industries included in the
survey not only on an annual basis but also on an hourly basis. That gross pay
roll is expressed on a per hour basis is important because such a frequency
makes it possible to construct entries that are compatible with those provided
by Woodbury (1983). Chart 2 categorizes employee benefits and earnings in
the following manner: 1) benefits are the sum of outside payroll and inside
payroll. Inside payroll encompasses paid vacations and holidays, employee
rest periods, and lunch breaks; outside payroll is made up of legally required
payments, pensions, insurance, and other agreed upon items, and other bene
fits; and 2) earnings include total pay for all time worked; they comprise
straight-time and premium-time pay, a shift differential, production bonuses,
and other agreed upon items.
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It should be noted that Woodbury could easily make comparisons among his
entries for the various years because the Table 19 he used in their construction
was a summary of employee benefits for only those companies submitting data
over the entire interval of 1957-1977. The entries given in Table A are con
structed for all companies reporting data in the various years listed. Because
of changes in the number and composition of companies reporting benefits be
tween 1951 and 1992 (N = 736 and N = 1194, respectively), these entries are
not strictly comparable. They do, however, indicate the trend in benefits over
time. In addition, Woodbury's calculations for supplements (% of total) in
1967 through 1977 are larger because the average benefits of the few compa
nies included in the old Table 19 are somewhat higher than those for the full
sample. The reason for this lies in the fact that those companies reporting over
the entire period have larger, more established benefits programs than those
companies included in the full sample but excluded from the Table 19 sample.
A two-step procedure is utilized to construct the entries shown in the first
three columns of Table A. To begin, the information in Table 16 regarding av
erage annual and average hourly gross payroll is used to determine the average
number of hours for which an employee is paid. Given this information, Chart
2 is employed to determine the average benefits received per hour per employ
ee.3 After calculating such benefits on per hour basis, these are applied to
Woodbury's definitions of the three entries; the results reported in Table A are
expressed as a percent of total compensation per hour and are indexed to equal
100 in 1951.
The entries given in Table 1 of the text are derived in a similar manner. In
this case, however, we take from Table 7 of the Employee Benefits publications
estimates of the average hourly employer contributions to the following com
ponents of legally required, voluntary, and inside payroll labor costs:4 1) So
cial Security, workers' compensation, and other legally required benefits
(unemployment insurance, state sickness benefits, etc.); 2) pension plan premi
ums and retirement savings plan contributions; contributions to employee life,
death, and medical (and medically related) insurance, as well as miscellaneous
voluntary benefits (supplemental unemployment insurance, employee dis
counts on company goods and services, employee meals, childcare, and other
benefits payments); and 3) paid rest (coffee and meal breaks, setup and wash
up time, travel time, etc.) and paid leave (paid vacations and holidays, sick
leave, parental leave, etc.). These benefit costs per hour are in turn expressed
as a percent of total compensation per hour using data from the first column of
Table A; the results are subsequently indexed to equal 100 in 1951.
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Notes
1. The ECI was only implemented in stages. Beginning in 1976, published statistics
covered only quarterly changes in wages and salaries of private, nonfarm workers.
In 1978, the BLS expanded the survey to include 13 additional statistical series
(e.g., union/nonunion, manufactunng/nonmanufactunng); by 1980, it had incor
porated into the survey the publication of quarterly changes in total employee
compensation. What the BLS Handbook of Methods (Chapter 8, p. 56) terms the
third stage in the development of the ECI involved the expansion of the survey to
state and local (not federal) government employees Finally, the most recent
development in the ECI involves the inclusion of actual compensation costs on a
per hour basis; the BLS has included these measures in the ECI since March of
1987.
2. These benefits include paid leave (vacations, holidays, sick leave, and other), sup
plemental pay (premium pay for overtime and for work on weekends and holi
days, nonproduction bonuses), insurance benefits (life, health, sickness and
accident insurance), retirement and savings benefits (pension and other retirement
plans, savings and thrift plans), legally required benefits (Social Secunty, Work
ers' Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, and other), and other benefits (sev
erance pay, supplemental unemployment plans, and employee merchandise
discounts in department stores).
3. In other words, average benefits received per hour equal the ratio of average
annual benefits to average hours for which the employee is paid per year.
4. All entries after 1979 are computed from Table 7 of the Employee Benefits publi
cation (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, various years) for the corre
sponding year; all pre-1980 entries are computed from Table 7 of Employee
Benefits Historical Data, 1951-1979 (Chamber of Commerce of the United States
1981).
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Appendix B
Derivation of Market Labor Demand Function
Assume that F and C are both quadratic as follows:

F(n) = 1/2 Fnn2 + 6
C(G,ri) = 1/2 Q { G2 + Cl2Gn +
We first show that the individual labor demand functions have the following
form:

where
A = /?Fn -2(C12 G + <|> 2 ),

To prove the above, note that we have the following expressions:

l

3C
>
C2 = -r— = C12 G + §2 = 0.
on
<
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Now, the firm's labor demand function given by Eq. 4a* is expanded so that

= \pFn - [l/2 Q jG2 + Cu Gn + (j
= [PFn - (l/2 C, !G2 + <hG + <|)o) - 2(C12G + 4>2 )n

As a result,
(B2)

n = i ( "~ Q)

is the firm's new labor demand function. Note that

so that the right hand side of Eq. B2 is a function of w, parameterized by G and
P-

Next, we show that if all K firms are identical and if the price feedback is
given by p = p(E), pf < 0, , where E = Kn, then the inverse market labor
demand function has the form

(B3)

w = T(G) + P(G)E + e(G, E),
where
T(G) = [const. - 1/2 q tG2 - (j)^],

(B4)

l ],

(B5)

and e(G,£) is an error term.
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To prove the above, note that since p=p(E) is a function off, the right-hand
side of Eq. B2 contains the term E. This implies that the market labor demand
function cannot be obtained by simply multiplying Eq. B2 by K. Instead, one
must first gather all the E terms on the left-hand side as follows:
Multiplying Eq. B2 by K, we have
= — (w-Q).
As such,

Substituting Fn = Fnn + Q ,, and p(E) = p0 +p'E+ . . . into the above ex
pression, we obtain
w = const. —

where e(G,£) is an error term containing all higher order terms of £. Letting
T(G) = a0 + a(G),we have fl(G) = (co«5?. - 1/2 CU G2 - <J>iG). Thus
CB6)

2C12

/<:

(B7)

2
d
Note that Eq. B3 is approximated by Eq. 5 as w = a - (TjG + pG ) + p(G)£.
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Appendix C
This appendix describes the logic behind Figure 7. Let us first prove the
proposition that the competitive equilibrium occurs at the maximum feasible
level of employment on the L curve only when d$/dG = 0. By solving Eq. 9a
for E and computing dEldG = 0 to select the maximum employment point, we
obtain
(t| + 2pG-X)-£(</P/dG) = 0.

(Cl)

Now, the competitive equilibrium point on the L curve is now obtained by com
bining Equations 9a and 9b to obtain

(Tj + 2pG - X) - 0.5E(d$ I dG) = 0.

(C2)

Clearly, Equations Cl and C2 are equivalent only when d$/dG = 0; therefore,
the competitive equilibrium employment level is the maximum employment
level only when d$/dG = 0.
We now demonstrate the locations of points A, B, and C in Figure 7. Rear
ranging Eq. 9b, we obtain

(TJ + 2pG - X) = Q.5E(d$ I dG) = 0.

(C3)

Assuming that fiPpYdG2 = 0, an increase in G increases the left-hand side of Eq.
C3; as a result, the right-hand side must also increase. If dft/dG > 0, the righthand side will increase only when E rises. This result implies that, in this case,
we are at point B in Figure 7. Similarly, if d$/dG < 0, E must decrease when
G increases; in this case, we must be at point C in Figure 7.

Part III
Labor Market Adjustment
and Equity
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6 Family Health Benefits
and Worker Turnover
Dan A. Black
Syracuse University

One of the major differences between the labor markets in the
United States and Canada lies in the treatment of health benefits.
While Canada relies on government provision of health care, employ
ers in the United States provide health insurance to most of the
employed. The U.S. government's role is primarily to provide health
insurance to those over 64 years of age through the Medicare system
and to the poor through the Medicaid system. Despite the recent calls
for health care reform in the United States, the reliance on employerprovided benefits appears to be a feature of the U.S. system for some
time to come. The Clinton health care proposal of 1994 and the
numerous Congressional alternatives rely on employer-provided health
benefits.
In this chapter, I examine the impact of employer-provided health
benefits on job turnover. I focus on a peculiar aspect of employer-pro
vided health benefits: because many employer-provided plans extend
coverage to a worker's entire family, the value of an employer's
employment offer to a worker depends on whether the worker's spouse
provides the family with health benefits. If a worker's spouse has
employer-provided health insurance for his family, the worker will
value employment offers with and without health insurance benefits
differently than a worker whose spouse does not have employer-pro
vided health benefits. Importantly, this distortion arises from the reli
ance on employer-provided benefits and is independent of any
preexisting conditions clauses or issues concerning the portability of
health plans. As I show in a later section (p. 273), this is potentially a
large distortion. According to the April 1993 Supplement of the Cur
rent Population Survey (CPS), among full-time workers, at least 23
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percent of the women and 12 percent of the men have coverage from
their spouses.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is no obvious reason why employers should provide health
benefits. While health insurance is less expensive in groups, there is no
particular reason the groups should be based on place of employment.
Indeed, the initial growth in employer-provided health was the result of
firms offering health insurance to their workers during World War II to
avoid wage controls. As Long and Scott (1982) and Woodbury (1983)
emphasized, the U.S. tax codes provide the major impetus for the
employer provision of health and other benefits. The magnitudes of
the tax savings are surprising. Consider a university in the Common
wealth of Kentucky that offers an insurance policy whose market value
is $131 a month to a college professor who has a 28 percent marginal
tax rate for the federal income tax (family income between $36,900
and $89,150 for married couples filing jointly). How much would it
cost to increase the professor's after-tax income by $131 per month in
1993? Assuming the professor's wages are not over the social security
cap of $57,600 and taking into account Kentucky's 6 percent state
income tax and the deductibility of state income taxes from the federal
tax bill, the university would have to pay more than $250 a month.
As a result of the substantial tax savings associated with the
exemption of health benefits from federal and state taxation, employers
have become the major providers of health benefits in the United
States. The tax expenditures for the tax deductibility of employer
health care premiums now exceed tax expenditures on the home mort
gage deduction. 1
Economists have long recognized that the association of fringe
benefits and employment may affect the employment relationship.
Lazear (1979, 1981) argued that firms use defined-benefit pensions to
defer compensation in jobs with agency problems or in jobs with large
investments in specific human capital. In jobs with agency problems,
the deferred compensation deters the worker from shirking; while, in
jobs with specific human capital, the deferred compensation reduces
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job turnover.2 Thus, employers in the United States may use their pen
sion plans to improve the efficiency of labor contracts, an option that
many Canadian employers do not have. Lazear and the literature that
his papers generate (e.g., Ippolito 1985; Hutchens 1987; Dorsey 1987)
recognized that deferred compensation is not without its costs and may
have to be implemented with other policies such as restrictions on
hours and mandatory retirement to mitigate those costs. 3
Firms are not, however, perfectly able to tailor the parameters of
their pension plans to meet contracting needs of individual employees.
As Scott, Berger, and Black (1989) and Scott, Berger, and Garen
(1995) emphasized, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires
firms to offer fringe benefits in a manner that does not discriminate
against the firm's low-wage employees. If the firm wishes to offer an
executive a defined-benefit pension plan that defers compensation, the
firm must offer her secretary a similar plan. Thus, firms are not able to
structure fringe benefit packages to match perfectly the optimal con
tract for each employee.
The requirement that fringe benefits be offered in a nondiscriminatory manner has a special bite in the provision of health benefits. 4
While firms may tie pension benefits to the earnings of the worker, the
firm must offer all full-time workers the same health benefits, which
has the predictable consequence that high-wage firms will avoid hiring
low-wage workers (Scott, Berger, and Black 1989). Madrian (1994)
identified another possible distortion that employer-provided health
benefits create: the possibility that workers will be locked into their
jobs because they or family members have preexisting conditions and
would lose their medical coverage if they changed employers. Using
the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, she estimated that job
lock reduces voluntary job turnover by 25 percent as compared with a
system of perfectly portable health insurance. Madrian's results are
controversial. Holtz-Eakin (1994) found no evidence of job lock. 5 If
her results are correct, however, Madrian has identified a potentially
important distortion in the U.S. labor market that employer-provided
health insurance creates. Obviously, labor markets in Canada, with its
perfectly portable health insurance, are free from such distortions.
Madrian argued that job lock arises from coverage gaps that preex
isting conditions clauses and length-of-service provisions create. If a
worker must wait, say, six months before being covered by a new
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employer's plan, then the worker may choose not to switch employers.
Because this coverage gap is unrelated to the efficient allocation of
labor, such a reduction in mobility is inefficient. She suggested that
eliminating preexisting condition clauses and increasing the portability
of health insurance would largely eliminate the inefficient reduction in
job turnover. In the next section, I offer a theoretical model that chal
lenges this suggestion. I show that when dual-earning couples con
sider employment offers, the value placed on a job offer will depend on
the coverage of the spouse's health plan. As I demonstrate in the next
section, this difference in valuation may explain the turnover pattern
that Madrian uncovered.

JOB SEARCH WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE
COVERAGE OF HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section, I construct a simple model to examine the impact of
the double coverage of health benefits on labor turnover. To abstract
from other issues, I will assume that there are no preexisting conditions
provisions and no length-of-service provisions. If a worker finds
employment at an alternative employer who is offering health insur
ance, the coverage begins immediately.
To begin, first consider a worker who has no spouse. The worker is
currently employed at a firm paying wage w0 and a health plan indexed
by the value h0. I assume that all health plans may be indexed by a sin
gle value, h, and that workers always strictly prefer plans with a greater
h. Workers without health coverage have a plan with the value of h0 =
0. Let the worker have a utility function u(») that depends on the level
of wages, WQ, and the level of health benefits, /i0, or
V°= W(w0 ,^).

(1)

The value of current employment, V°, forms the reservation utility for
all subsequent employment offers. The worker has worked for the cur
rent employer for one period and will work, at most, one additional
period for the employer. In Figure 1,1 depict an indifference curve for
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Figure 1 Indifference Curve for Worker's Utility Function

W

h
the worker's utility function as a convex function. If firms could indi
vidually tailor their fringe benefit packages to the needs of a worker,
the worker would simply pick the amount of health benefits he desires.
If the worker had adequate coverage from another source, he could
simply elect to take all compensation as wages. Unfortunately, IRS
regulations preclude such a design.
Before beginning employment in the second period, the worker
entertains employment offers from other employers, which I assume
are exogenously determined. The worker's utility in the second-period
is
V = max[«(wfl ,/ifl ),V0 ].

(2)

where u(wa,ha) is the utility associated with the best alternative offer.
In Eq. 2, the set of acceptable offers is simply all combinations of (w,/z)
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that are above the indifference curve V° depicted in Figure 1. The
probability that a worker leaves his current employer, therefore,
depends on the joint distribution of wages and health benefits offered.
Now consider a worker with a spouse. Let hs denote the value of
the worker's coverage under his spouse's health plan. If the worker has
no such coverage, then hs = 0. The worker's utility from employment
in the first period is
V°=M[w0 ,max(/?0 ,/iJ )].

(3)

Again, before beginning employment in the second period, the
worker entertains offers from alternative employers. The utility from
second-period employment is
(4)

The value of the right-hand sides of Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 depends on the
value of hs. Spouse-provided health care benefits, therefore, alter the
value of current employment and thus alter the value of alternative
offers.
Figure 2 illustrates how the coverage by a spouse's plan affects the
worker's job mobility decision. In Figure 2A, I consider the case
where hs < hQ, or the worker's own plan is more generous than his
spouse's plan. The indifference curve V° denotes a worker's indiffer
ence curve if hs = 0, with the point (w0, /z0) denoting the worker's cur
rent contract. From Eq. 3, spouse-provided coverage (h0 > hs > 0)
clearly does not alter the value of current employment, but it may
affect the value of alternative offers. To see why, consider the point
(WP/ZJ), where ws is implicitly defined as
V° = u(ws ,hs ).

(5)

The wage ws leaves the worker indifferent to his current position and
the job offering ws and consuming his spouse's health insurance. Any
job that pays a wage greater than ws will be strictly preferred to his cur
rent position. Thus, the area under the indifference curve V° and above
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Figure 2 Indifference Curves for Worker's Utility Function When
(A) Worker's Own Benefits are More Generous (hs < HQ)
and (B) Spouse's Benefits are More Generous (hs
Panel A

Panel B
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the wage ws, denoted as A in Figure 2A, becomes a part of the set of
acceptable offers. For workers with spouse-provided coverage, there
fore, the likelihood of turnover unambiguously increases whenever hs <
h0. Unlike the analysis of Madrian, this result does not depend on the
lack of portability of benefits but is the direct result of the increase in
the acceptable offer set that double coverage provides.
In Figure 2B, I consider the case in which hs > h0, where the
spouse's benefits are more generous than the worker's own. Again,
the indifference curve V° corresponds to the worker without coverage
by his spouse's benefits, or hs = 0. When a worker's spouse provides
access to more generous benefits, the worker's utility increases. The
indifference curve V 0', depicts the worker's indifference curve when
hs > h0. In comparing the values of current employment of workers
with and without spouse-provided coverage, there are two regions of
interest. First, the area under the indifference curve V0 ' and above V°,
denoted as region B, represents offers that would be acceptable to
workers without spouse-provided coverage but that are not accept
able to workers with spouse-provided coverage. Thus, one effect of
spouse-provided coverage, when hs > hQ, is to reduce this portion of
the acceptable offer set. The second region of interest, however, off
sets this result. The region that lies above vv0 and below the indiffer
ence curve V°, denoted as region C, represents an area of offers that
are acceptable to the workers with spouse-provided coverage but are
unacceptable to workers without spouse-provided coverage. As the
worker does not use his own health benefits, any job that offers a
wage greater than w0 is strictly preferred to his current situation,
regardless of the level of health benefits associated with the job. For
workers with hs > hQ, therefore, spouse-provided coverage has an
ambiguous impact on turnover probabilities.
My analysis has abstracted from the search decision of the
worker's spouse. When allowing for joint search decisions, the
worker's valuation of his current job and alternative offers depends not
only on his spouse's current position but also her best alternative offer.
While the impact of the spouse-provided coverage on a worker's turn
over probabilities is ambiguous, the impact on efficiency is unambigu
ous—having a worker's valuation of an employment offer depend on
his spouse's health insurance plan only limits the efficient allocation of
labor.6
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Of course, my analysis has not considered the possible responses
of firms. One obvious response to double coverage is to offer employ
ees the ability to select other benefits or cash in the place of health care
benefits. The Revenue Act of 1978 permitted establishment of such
cafeteria plans. The economic rationale for offering such plans is obvi
ous: by allowing employees who already have other sources of cover
age to select from other benefits or cash payments, firms may reduce
their turnover.
Another way in which firms may counter the problem of dual cov
erage is to attempt to specialize in the hiring of workers of one type of
coverage or another. For instance, a firm may seek to hire only work
ers with access to alternative forms of health care coverage by offering
jobs with higher wages and no health benefits. Another firm may seek
to specialize in the hiring of workers who wish to provide coverage to
their entire families by offering low wages but a generous health plan
with family coverage. See Dye and Antle (1984) for a model of such a
separating equilibrium applied to fringe benefits.

COVERAGE, DOUBLE COVERAGE, AND REFUSAL OF
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section, I present an overview of employer-provided health
benefits from the April 1993 Supplement to the CPS. The supplement
provides detailed information about employee benefits. I limit my
sample to workers between the ages of 18 and 64 for all of the tables.
In addition, I report most statistics for full-time workers, which I define
to be those who usually work at least 35 hours a week and those who
work at least 47 weeks a year. I demonstrate that neither the use of caf
eteria plans nor sorting strategies on the part of firms have solved the
problem of double coverage. I show that a significant portion of the
population has double coverage, that a surprising number of people
turn down coverage, and that among those who turn down coverage,
most do so without explicit compensation.
Nearly 90 percent of the male workers and 90 percent of the
female workers have health insurance from some source (Table 1). For
female workers, 88.0 percent reported that they are at a firm that offers
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Table 1 Mean Coverage Rates for Employer-Provided Health Benefits for
Full-Time Workers
Benefit situation
Covered by some form of health insurance
Employed at firm that offers health insurance
Eligible for employer-provided health insurance
Covered by employer-provided health insurance
Refused employer-provided health insurance
Covered by spouse's health insurance
Sample size

Female
(%)

Male
(%)

90.7

89.6
88.5

88.0
83.7
72.5
11.2

85.0
79.5

22.0

5.6
10.7

6,987

9,023

SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.

health insurance to at least some workers at the firm, and 88.5 percent
of males responded similarly. Firms can place some restrictions on
who may qualify for insurance. Often times, temporary, part-time, or
leased employees may not be eligible for health benefits. Also, many
firms require length-of-service requirements a worker must complete
before qualifying for health benefits. To see who is and is not eligible
for health benefits, I identify workers as eligible for health benefits if
they reported that their firm offers health insurance to some of its
workers and either reported that they received those benefits or explic
itly stated that they declined those benefits. Using this definition, 83.7
percent of female workers and 85.0 percent of male workers reported
that they are eligible for benefits.
Looking at the coverage rate of employer-provided health plans,
79.5 percent of all men but only 72.5 percent of women reported that
they have employer-provided health benefits. Thus, gender differences
in wages understate the true compensation difference. Nearly 8.2 per
cent of women and 10.1 percent of men do not receive health insurance
from their employers but do receive it from another source. The differ
entials between the eligibility rates and the coverage rates suggest that
many workers refuse health insurance coverage and, indeed, 11.2 per
cent of all women and 5.6 percent of all men decline coverage from
their employers.7 Among full-time workers, 22.0 percent of all women
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and 10.7 percent of all men reported that they have health insurance
under their spouse's plan.8
The CPS Supplement also gives us an opportunity to examine
another issue: the health insurance coverage of the self-employed.
Folklore suggests that the spouses of the self-employed provide the
health coverage for the family. I examine this issue in Table 2 by com
paring the rate at which the spouses of the self-employed provide
health insurance to their spouses as compared with the rate at which
the spouses of wage and salary workers provided health insurance to
their spouses. In Panel A we see no evidence supporting this folklore.
The husbands' provision of health insurance to their wives is indepen
dent of their wives' self-employment status, which is surprising. In
contrast, in Panel B wives are more likely to provide self-employed
husbands with health insurance than are wives of wage and salary
workers. Women with self-employed spouses are 66 percent more
likely to provide their husbands with health insurance than are women
whose spouses are not self-employed.
Table 2 Spouse's Provision of Employer-Provided Health Benefits by
Self-Employment Status
Insurance provision

Spouse is not
self-employed

Spouse is
self-employed

n

Panel A: Husband's provision of health insurance to spouse
by wife's self-employment status
Husband does not provide spouse
with employer-provided insurance

56.6%

56.3%

4006

Husband provides spouse with
employer-provided insurance

43.4%

43.7%

3077

696

7083

n

6387

Panel B: Wife's provision of health insurance to spouse
by husband's self-employment status
Wife does not provide spouse
with employer-provided insurance

84.5%

74.0%

7297

Wife does provides spouse with
employer-provided insurance

15.5%

26.0%

1527

7314

1510

8824

n

SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.

276

Black

The model presented in the previous section suggests that employ
ees whose spouses also have employer-provided coverage may value
job offers differently than employees whose spouses do not have such
coverage. For dual coverage to have an important effect on labor-mar
ket transitions, however, there must be a sizable portion of the working
population that may have double coverage. To determine what fraction
of dual-earning couples have dual health coverage, I matched hus
bands' and wives' responses to the April Supplement for those house
holds in which both members are full-time, full-year workers. In Table
3, I present evidence about the possibility of double coverage. For
males, 80.3 percent of the men from dual-earning households are eligi
ble for health insurance from their employers, and their spouses are also
eligible for family benefits. Thus, over 80 percent of these males could
be covered by their wives' plans, and 38.5 percent of these men have
wives who elect to provide family benefits. Similar stories arise for
men whose employers offer family coverage: 80.6 percent of men who
are eligible for family coverage have wives whose employers offer fam
ily plans. Interestingly, 38.0 percent of men from dual-earning house
holds who are eligible for family health plans have wives who provide
family health plans, representing a sizable segment of the married,
dual-earning families. Workers with spouses who have their own
employer-provided health benefits may value family health benefits dif
ferently than workers whose spouses do not have employer-provided
health benefits: 84.9 percent of these male workers have spouses who
are eligible for employer-provided health benefits, and 62.4 percent
have spouses who receive employer-provided health benefits.
Table 3 presents similar statistics for full-time female employees:
84.6 percent of women in dual-earning households who are offered
health insurance have spouses who are eligible for family plans, and
58.6 percent have spouses who provide family health benefits. Thus,
women are more likely to have access to health benefits from multiple
sources than are men. Of women who are eligible to provide family
health benefits, 84.9 percent of their spouses are eligible for family
health benefits, and 58.0 percent provide such benefits. Finally, of
women in dual-earning households who are eligible for family health
benefits, 87.7 percent are married to men who are eligible for health
benefits, and 76.5 percent are married to men who have employer-pro
vided benefits.
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Table 3 Dual Health Care Coverage of Married, Full-Time Couples3
Coverage

Percentage

n

Health benefits and spouse is eligible for family
health benefits

80.3

2636

Health benefits and spouse provides family health benefits

38.5

2636

Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for family
health benefits

80.6

2630

Family health benefits and spouse provides family
health benefits

38.0

2630

Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for health
benefits

84.9

2650

Family health benefits and spouse receives health benefits

62.4

2645

Health benefits and spouse is eligible for family
health benefits

84.6

2650

Health benefits and spouse provides family health benefits

58.6

2222

Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for family
health benefits

84.9

2085

Family health benefits and spouse provides family
health benefits

58.0

2085

Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for health
benefits

87.7

2636

Family health benefits and spouse receives health benefits

76.5

2636

Husband's employer offers

Wife's employer offers

SOURCE- April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
a To be included in this sample, workers must be working full-time and eligible for
employer-provided health benefits. Spouses may or may not be eligible for health
benefits but must be full-time workers.

When employers only partially pay for health benefits, employees
have an incentive not to accept health benefits when they receive cover
age from their spouses' plans. The refusal of health benefits is not
uncommon; 11.2 percent of all female workers and 5.6 percent of all
male workers decline employer-provided health benefits (see Table 1).
In Table 4,1 examine the incidence of workers from dual-earning
households refusing employer-provided health benefits by whether or
not the workers' spouses are eligible for family health benefits. The
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table indicates that 3.1 percent of male workers whose spouses are not
eligible for family health benefits refuse coverage, but 12.9 percent of
workers whose spouses are eligible for family health benefits refuse
coverage. Thus, male workers who have spouses who are eligible for
family health coverage are more than four times more likely to refuse
employer-provided health benefits than are men whose wives are not
eligible for family health benefits. The impact for females is even
more dramatic. Only 4.1 percent of women whose spouses are not eli
gible for family health benefits refuse employer-provided benefits, but
26.7 percent of women whose spouses are eligible for family health
benefits refuse employer-provided benefits. Thus, women whose hus
bands have access to family health benefits are six times more likely to
refuse health benefits than women whose husbands do not have access
to family health benefits.
Table 4 Full-Time, Married Couple's Refusal of Employer-Provided
Health Benefits"
Spouse is eligible
Spouse is not eligible
for family
for family
Decision
health coverage
health coverage
Panel A: Husband's decision to accept or refuse
employer-provided health insurance
Husband accepts employer96.9 %
87.1%
provided insurance
Husband refuses employer3.1%
12.9%
provided insurance
451
n
1835
Panel B: Wife's decision to accept or refuse
employer-provided health insurance
Wife accepts employer95.9%
73.3%
provided insurance
Wife refuses employer4.1%
26.7%
provided insurance

n

2035
251
2286

1707
515

n
343
1879
2222
SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
a To be included in this sample, workers must be working full-time and eligible for
employer-provided health benefits. Spouses may or may not be eligible for health
benefits but must be full-time workers.
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When husband and wife search for employment and employers
offer health insurance coverage for the whole family, my theory pre
dicts that the husband's and wife's health care coverage decision
should be negatively correlated. Thus, controlling for other factors that
affect the demand for health insurance coverage, we should see the
likelihood of a worker choosing employer-provided health insurance
declining when his spouse has selected employer-provided health
insurance. To test this hypothesis, I estimate a bivariate probit model
that allows for correlation between the husband's and wife's decisions.
I limit the sample to couples where both are full-time, full-year work
ers.9 For covariates, I use a vector of race dummies (whites are the
excluded category), a vector of education variables (high school gradu
ates are the excluded category), the number of children in the house
hold less than 18 years old, a quadratic in the worker's age, a quadratic
in the worker's tenure at the firm, and a dummy variable indicating that
the worker's tenure is less than a year. The method of estimation is full
information, maximum likelihood. The starting values were taken
from probits on the individual equations, and the starting value for the
correlation coefficient, p, is zero.
The estimated coefficients on the covariates provide few surprises
(Table 5). Workers of both genders have strong tenure effects. It seems
unlikely that length-of-service requirements would account for the
strong tenure-health benefits relationship, so the strong relationship
may simply reflect the fact that matches that offer health benefits tend
to survive while those that do not offer health insurance do not survive,
a point that Mortensen (1989) and Garen (1988) made in examining
the wage-tenure relationship. Workers with at least a BA degree are
more likely to have health insurance than less educated workers. A
larger number of children reduces the likelihood of having employerprovided health insurance for women, while the relationship is not sta
tistically significant for men. Interestingly, hispanic wives are more
likely but hispanic husbands are less likely to have employer-provided
health insurance than similar whites. Similarly, black wives are more
likely to have employer-provided health insurance than are white
wives.
Controlling for the worker's own characteristics, there is a strong,
negative correlation between husbands' and wives' health care deci
sions. The estimated correlation coefficient is -0.35 and the z-statistic
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Table 5 Health Insurance Coverage for Dual Earning Couples,
Estimated Coefficients from a Bivariate Probit Model
Female

Male

Worker is Hispanic

0.273
(2.06)

-0.289
(2.29)

Worker is Black

0.230
(2.03)

0.090
(0.77)

Worker is Asian

-0.011
(0.08)

0.246
(1.32)

Worker is Native American

0.716
(1.52)

0.020
(004)

Worker's age

-0.028
(1.27)

0.019
(0.84)

Age squared /1 00

0.018
(0.63)

-0.031
(1.13)

Worker has less than one year of tenure

-0.231
(2.40)

-0.271
(2.69)

Worker's tenure

0.090
(7.29)

0.092
(7.80)

Tenure squared / 100

-0.194
(4.13)

-0.180
(4.75)

Number of children

-0.069
(2.54)

-0.025
(0.82)

Worker did not begin high school

0.058
(0.27)

-0226
(1.26)

Worker did not complete high school

0.067
(056)

-0.209
(1.78)

Worker attended college but has no degree

0.069
(0.96)

0.137
(1.68)

Worker has a vocational degree from junior
college

0.038
(0.34)

-0.067
(0.56)

Worker has an associate's degree

0.272
(1.97)

0.020
(0.12)

Worker has a bachelor's degree

0.289
(3.84)

0.154
(1.87)

Worker has a master's degree

0.300
(2.68)

0.265
(2.04)
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Female

Male

Worker has a Ph.D. degree

0.161
(0.39)

0.623
(2.31)

Worker has a professional degree

0.431
(1.46)

0.542
(1.95)

Constant

0.681
(170)

0.001
(0.00)

P

-0.350
(9.03)

Likelihood function
Number of observations

-2798.59
2600

NOTE- Mean of the dependent variable for females 0.6465 and for males is 0.7727.
Absolute values of z-statistics are given in parentheses.

is -9.03. Thus, the data overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that the
health care decisions of dual-earning couples are independent and
accept the hypothesis, which my theory implies, that the decisions are
negatively correlated. Husbands and wives appear to coordinate their
search activities, presumably looking for other forms of compensation
when their spouses provide health benefits. Thus, within households,
there is some evidence that workers do indeed trade off health benefits
for other forms of compensation.

DOES SPOUSE-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECT
TURNOVER PROBABILITIES?

The analysis earlier suggested that coverage under a spouse's
health insurance plan alters the worker's likelihood of accepting an
offer. If the spouse's plan is less generous than the worker's own
health insurance plan, then coverage by the spouse unambiguously
increases the likelihood that a worker will accept another offer. In
equilibrium, therefore, we should see such workers more likely to
change jobs than workers without spouse-provided coverage. When
the spouse's plan is more generous than the worker's own plan, there is
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an ambiguity, but it remains possible that spouse-provided coverage
would result in higher turnover rates.
Unfortunately, the CPS is a less than ideal data set to use to exam
ine job transitions. Because the CPS is a short panel and provides few
details about a worker's employers, it is often impossible to spot jobto-job transitions. In the April 1993 Supplement, however, workers
were asked directly if they have less than one-year tenure, and answers
to this question allow me to identify those individuals who have
changed jobs in the last year. It is not possible, however, to determine
whether the transition was a result of a quit, layoff, or dismissal.
The CPS provides only workers' current health insurance and not
their coverage at the time of their job transitions, which causes a poten
tially serious problem. If workers who have recently had an involun
tary job transition (layoff or dismissal) are likely to enroll in their
spouses' health care plans, then there is a correlation between current
health care coverage under a spouse's plan and turnover that is unre
lated to any search story. In addition, the CPS provides no information
about the generosity of workers', or their spouses', health care plans.
As the generosity of the two plans affects the likelihood of turnover in
my model, this data limitation is particularly serious. Finally, the CPS
provides no information about tenure on the previous job. As virtually
all research has found that hazard functions for employment spells
exhibit duration dependence (e.g., Farber 1994), the failure to include
tenure in a turnover equation may cause a specification bias. 10
With these caveats in mind, I can examine the relationship between
job transitions and health insurance coverage provided by a worker's
spouse with the equation:
Pi(job change) = F(Xfi + Sfi + ut ).

(6)

where Xt is a vector of controls, (3 is the corresponding vector of
parameters, Sl is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the worker
is covered by his spouse's plan and zero otherwise, 8 is the correspond
ing parameter, u, is the error term that I assume is identically and inde
pendently distributed, and F(«) is a logistic distribution function.
Because males and females may have much different patterns of
turnover, I run separate equations for male and female workers. In addi-
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tion to controls for whether the spouse is employed or self-employed, I
use the same control variables as those I use in Table 5 except, of course,
I use no controls for tenure. In column 1 of Tables 6 and 7,1 present the
estimates for Eq. 6 for male and female workers. I limit my sample to
workers who are married, full-time, full-year workers who have at least
two years of potential experience, where potential experience is defined
to be age minus years of schooling minus six. This restriction should
exclude most school-to-work transitions, which presumably occur
regardless of the spouse's provision of health benefits. 11
A common feature of the results from both samples is that having
an employed spouse substantially reduces the likelihood of workers
changing jobs. (This result remains regardless of whether I control for
coverage by the spouse's health insurance plan.) Spouse-provided
coverage has a large impact on the likelihood of turnover for male
workers; evaluated at the mean, spouse-provided coverage increases
the likelihood of a male worker changing jobs from about 0.10 to
0.16. 12 For females, the impact is smaller but still large; evaluated at
the mean, spouse-provided coverage increases the likelihood of a
female worker changing jobs from about 0.10 to 0.14.
My estimates for males are somewhat higher than those of
Madrian (1994), who found that not having other health insurance cov
erage lowered male job transitions by about 26 percent. 13 Importantly,
Madrian was able to control for whether the job transition was volun
tary, and I am unable to do so. 14 To guard against the possibility that
spouse-provided coverage is somehow indicative of an involuntary
transition from the last job, I reestimate the equation, limiting my sam
ple to those workers who report that they are eligible for employer-pro
vided health insurance (see column 2 of Tables 6 and 7). For this
sample, workers who made job transitions at least have the option of
taking their employer-provided plan. While clearly this does not pre
clude a worker from having been laid-off or dismissed from his past
position, this does eliminate any workers who have spouse-provided
benefits because they have no alternative source of health care. With
this sample restriction, the coefficients on the spouse-provided cover
age are reasonably stable. Evaluated at the means, spouse-provided
coverage increases the likelihood of a male worker changing jobs from
0.07 to 0.11 and the likelihood of a female worker changing jobs from
0.07to0.12. 15

Table 6 Turnover Propensities and Health Insurance Coverage Status, Married Males

Worker is Hispanic

Means
0.066

Worker is Black

0.054

Worker is Asian

0.028

Worker is Native American

0.006

Worker' sage

40.9

Age squared /1 00

1772

Worker did not begin high school

0.034

Worker did not complete high school

0.069

Worker attended college but has no degree

0.187

Worker has a vocational degree from junior college

0.052

All workers
(1)
0.336
(2.03)
0.417
(2.38)
0.178
(0.68)
-0.089
(0.16)
-0157
(4.52)
0.123
(2.86)
0.162
(0.62)
0.382
(2.29)
0.150
(1.18)
0.119
(0.59)

Means
0.051
0.051
0.027
0.005
413
1804
0.026
0.057
0.0188
0.053

Workers eligible for
health insurance
(2)
0.407
(1.83)
0527
(2.48)
0.361
(1.23)
-1.045
(1.01)
-0.125
(2.83)
0.089
(1.63)
0.037
(0.09)
0286
(1.21)
0.156
(0.97)
0222
(0.90)

0.031
0.506
0.082
(1.76)
(0.30)
0.198
0.202
Worker has a bachelor's degree
0.186
0.088
(1.28)
(0.67)
0.492
0.082
0.075
0.192
Worker has a master's degree
(2.35)
(1.00)
0.020
0.199
0.017
-0.104
Worker has a Ph.D. degree
(0.45)
(0.24)
0.019
0.540
Worker has a professional degree
0.018
0065
(1.52)
(019)
1.152
-0.062
1.152
-0047
Number of children
(1.18)
(112)
-0.430
-0.487
0.635
Spouse is employed
0.629
(3.44)
(5.68)
-0.023
0.046
Spouse is self-employed
0.045
-0.177
(009)
(0.77)
0.129
0.697
Worker is covered by spouse's plan
0.149
0.762
(4.58)
(6.28)
0.051
1.095
Worker is covered by other plan
1.045
0.070
(5.63)
(7.33)
0.775
1.818
Constant
(0.93)
(283)
-1304.81
-1839.97
Likelihood function
5457
Number of observations
6235
NOTE: Mean of the dependent variable for column (1) is 0.096 and for column (2) is 0.069. Absolute values of z-statistics are given in
parentheses.
Worker has an associate's degree

0.0300
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Worker is Hispanic

Means
0.055

Worker is Black

0.065

Worker is Asian

0.032

Worker is Native American

0.008

Worker's age

39.4

Age squared /1 00

1652

Worker did not begin high school

0.021

Worker did not complete high school

0.054

Worker attended college but has no degree

0.194

Worker has a vocational degree from junior college

0.054

All workers
(1)
-0234
(0.89)
-0.329
(1.31)
0.248
(0.85)
0.366
(0.72)
-0.029
(0.58)
-0.041
(0.63)
-0.172
(0.58)
0.688
(3.25)
-0.302
(1.85)
-0.190
(0.75)

Means
0.048
0.065
0.031
0.007
39.5
1656
0.015
0.046
0.197
0.057

Workers eligible for
health insurance
(2)
-0.029
(0.09)
-0.563
(1.66)
-0.135
(0.33)
-0.043
(0.06)
-0.044
(0.70)
-0.033
(0.39)
-0.091
(0.12)
0.567
(1.87)
0.008
(0.04)
0.120
(0.41)

Worker has an associate's degree

0039

Worker has a bachelor's degree

0.174

Worker has a master's degree

0.066

Worker has a Ph.D. degree

0.006

Worker has a professional degree

0.009

Number of children

0.885

Spouse is employed

0.980

Worker is covered by spouse's plan

0365

Worker is covered by other plan

0058

_

0.122
(0.46)
-0.062
(0.40)
-0.194
(0.74)
0.422
(0.67)
-1.277
(1.25)
0.014
(0.25)
-0.834
(2.75)
0.527
(4.55)
0.471
(1.98)

0.038
0.184
0.072
0.008
0.009
0.866
0.983
0.339
0.040

0.346
(1.08)
0.179
(0.94)
0.187
(0.63)
0.929
(1-45)
-0.693
(0.67)
0.002
(0.03)
-0.284
(0.63)
0.693
(4.92)
0.792
(2.42)

-0.547
0049
(1.18)
(0.05)
-820.36
-1179.74
Likelihood function
3940
3320
Number of observations
NOTE: Mean of the dependent variable for column (1) is 0.097 and for column (2) is 0.074. Absolute values of z-statistics are given in
parentheses.
Constant
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Thus, the CPS data seem to support the conclusion that spouseprovided coverage does encourage job transitions, and the results are
largely consistent with those of Madrian (1994) for workers with dual
coverage. Her interpretation, however, is that workers without dual
coverage are possibly "locked-out" of jobs that offer insurance with
preexisting conditions clauses or length-of-service requirements.
Health care reform that eliminates preexisting conditions clauses and
length-of-service requirements and requires employers to offer health
insurance would virtually eliminate job-lock. Unless the employer
mandate also eliminates variations in the type of employer-provided
coverage, my analysis suggests that the turnover that spouse-provided
coverage creates is likely to persist. Ideally, therefore, we would like
to be able to distinguish my search explanation from her job-lock
explanation and be able to decompose the turnover effect into a search
component and a job-lock component.
That is likely to prove a difficult task. Gruber and Madrian (1994)
and Holtz-Eakin (1994) contended that most job-lock appears to be a
short-run problem, presumably arising more from the length-of-service
requirements than from preexisting conditions. 16 Individuals without a
preexisting condition, however, have the option of purchasing insur
ance from the private market, or, as Gruber and Madrian emphasized,
some workers may purchase health care from their previous employers
to bridge the gap in coverage that length-of-service provisions create.
This solution to a coverage gap is expensive: the worker loses the tax
exemption of health care insurance premiums, and, if purchasing
health insurance from the private market, individual policies are often
more expensive. Yet for these workers, a solution does exist, and a suf
ficiently generous offer will induce the worker to change jobs.
Because this solution is expensive and because workers with spouseprovided coverage avoid these costs, workers differ in their valuation
of offers from alternative employers, which, of course, is the essence of
my search explanation for the turnover effect from spouse-provided
coverage. In my view, distinguishing between these two explanations
would be difficult.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
My results support the findings of Madrian (1994) and Gruber and
Madrian (1994) that employer-provided health insurance does affect
the turnover propensities of workers. Indeed, the magnitude of my
results for male workers is somewhat larger than Madrian's estimate,
and I find that female workers are similarly affected. While I have
offered no formal welfare analysis of this effect, it is difficult to believe
that a policy that makes a worker's turnover propensity dependent on
the health care policy of his spouse would improve the efficiency of
labor markets.
Why have employer-provided health insurance? Friedman (1993)
argued that many firms initially offered health care as a fringe benefit,
as a means of avoiding the wage-price controls of World War II. As the
IRS did not initially count fringe benefits as a part of taxable income,
the tax system encouraged firms to offer health care, and Congress
eventually codified the tax exemption. As health benefits are income
elastic (Woodbury and Huang 1991), the tax exemption favors those
with high earnings. Therefore, equity concerns suggest that a change
is in order as well. When efficiency and equity concerns agree, one
hopes that economists would find the course of action uncontroversial.
The political appeal of continuing the employer-provision of
health benefits or the expansion of the system through mandates seems
to arise because the costs remain hidden from consumers. Gruber
(1994) and Gruber and Krueger (1992) suggested that most, if not all,
costs of mandated benefits are passed through to the workers as lower
wages, but if the mandated program is sufficiently small, these wage
pass-throughs may be difficult for workers to perceive. Moreover, the
tax expenditure that arises from the exemption of employer-provided
health insurance is not readily apparent. Those of us who are benefi
ciaries of the tax expenditure probably do not appreciate the largesse of
the U.S. government, at least not until the exemption is threatened.
Unfortunately, any elimination of the tax subsidy of health insur
ance benefits would not be invisible. Consider a reform along the lines
that Diamond (1992) suggested, but one without any tax subsidy for
middle-class families. In such a plan, employer-provided health insur
ance is replaced with a system of mandatory coverage where, at least
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for most middle class households, consumers pay the full cost of their
health insurance. Those workers who previously had employer-pro
vided health insurance should receive a nice increase in compensation.
Under Diamond's proposal, regional "HealthFeds" negotiate several
different policies with insurance companies, and consumers within the
region choose among the approved policies. When consumers begin
looking at the prices of the various policies, however, they will notice
that, even if firms increased their compensation by the exact cost of the
previously provided health insurance, the increase in their compensa
tion is not enough to allow them to purchase an insurance plan of com
parable quality to their employer-provided plan. Because the tax
subsidy is eliminated, the income and substitution effects presumably
would move most consumers to purchase less generous insurance
plans. Woodbury and Huang's simulation results suggest that the full
taxation of health benefits may result in up to a 15 percent decline in
the amount of health insurance. They calculated these estimates for the
1986 U.S. tax codes, and marginal tax rates have increased since then.
Forcing consumers to understand fully the costs of health care may not
be good politics but, in my view, it is good economics.

Notes
I thank Susan Black and Mike Clark for research assistance. Paul Anglin, Michael
Baye, William Custer, Daniel Hamermesh, and seminar participants at the University
of Kentucky provided useful comments. The National Institutes for Health provided
research support.
1. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993, Table 515. The tax expenditure on
employer-provided pension plans is the largest single tax expenditure ($70.5 bil
lion), followed by employer contributions to health insurance ($63.2 billion), and
the mortgage interest deduction ($48.1 billion).
2. See Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) and Luzadis and Mitchell (1991) for
recent evidence.
3. The U.S. government no longer allows firms to use mandatory retirement provi
sions.
4. Hutchens (1986) presented evidence that pensions, when coupled with the nondiscriminatory provision of the IRS codes, causes firms not to hire older workers.
Scott, Berger, and Garen (1995) argued that health benefits may dissuade firms
from hiring older workers as well.
5. Monheit and Cooper (1994), who also used the National Medical Expenditure
Survey, found evidence of job lock using a much different methodology than
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6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

Madrian. Using SIPP data, Gruber and Madrian (1994) found evidence that the
1985 COBRA legislation that allows workers to buy insurance from past employ
ers as well as earlier state legislation that also allowed limited portability
increased labor turnover and substantially mitigated job lock.
My analysis ignores many other issues that concern most search models. To name
but a couple, I have not considered the distinction between unemployed and onthe-job search, nor have I considered the intensity at which workers attempt to
generate new offers. Given the underlying ambiguity about the impact of double
coverage on the workers' turnover decisions, these extensions would not appear
too useful. Perhaps more important, for simplicity, I do not consider the joint
search problem of a wife and husband. In a model with such a joint search deci
sion, a worker may refuse a job with a higher wage and more health benefits if it
will allow his spouse to take a sufficiently attractive offer.
Not all workers decline extra coverage: 12.1 percent of all women and 8.7 percent
of all men in the sample of full-time workers reported that they have coverage
from at least two sources.
This estimate of 10.7 percent differs considerably from Madrian's estimate of
33.5 percent using the National Medical Expenditure Survey, although it is condi
tional on being married. Of course, our two samples differ considerably because I
am requiring males to be full-time, full-year workers to be in the sample. As a
consistency check on the data, I matched the husbands and wives in the April Sup
plement. Among married males, 15.1 percent reported that their spouses' plans
cover them; 30.8 percent of spouses of these men, however, reported that they
chose a family health insurance plan, which is clearly closer to Madrian's estimate
of 33.5. It is important to keep in mind, however, that offering a family plan does
not imply that this coverage is free. Employers may charge the employee some or
all of the additional costs for obtaining family coverage.
Olson (2000) looked at the labor-supply decision and how it may be affected by
the spouse's health insurance coverage.
The CPS is not the only data set that suffers from these limitations. To my knowl
edge, no data set with good labor-market information provides detailed analysis
of health insurance benefits. As Madrian (1994) notes, the National Medical
Expenditure data lack measures of worker tenure; workers' insurance coverage
can only be determined at two points in time, 7 to 15 months apart, and not at the
time of job transition. As she notes, there are similar problems with the use of the
PSID and NLSY. I am currently working with my colleagues Mark Berger and
Frank Scott to use the SIPP data set to examine the impact of insurance coverage
on worker turnover. While the SIPP does contain continuous information on
health insurance coverage, it does not contain information about the generosity of
workers' health care plans nor of their spouses' plans.
I am grateful to Daniel Hamermesh for this suggestion.
Recall that, in logit models, the change in the probability of the dependent vari
able equals one for a change in they'th independent variable is, for the ith worker,
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13. In her specification, Madrian included health care coverage from any source, not
simply spouse-provided coverage. As sources of coverage other than the worker's
spouse include Medicaid and Champus, I was afraid that these individuals may be
different from the population as a whole. For this reason, I use dual coverage aris
ing from some source other than a spouse as a separate variable.
14. It is by no means obvious that we should exclude involuntary transitions. If
spouse provision of employer-provided allows workers to accept jobs in riskier
occupation, higher involuntary turnover rates may be an outcome of spouse-pro
vided health benefits.
15. These results are robust to various other specification checks. For the male por
tion of the sample, I divided the sample into age categories and reestimated the
equations for each category. Despite the relatively small cell size, the coefficients
on spouse-provided coverage are always positive and generally statistically signif
icant. Similarly, if I include a family income variable, undoubtedly endogenous,
the coefficient remains statistically significant and of similar magnitude to that
reported in Table 4. Moreover, if I included nonmarried workers, the coefficient
remains statistically significant.
16. Among full-time employees who have changed jobs within the last year and have
jobs with firms that offer health insurance, 14 percent report that they are ineligi
ble for coverage because they have not completed a "probationary period," which
I interpret as a length-of-service requirement. In contrast, 0.7 percent claim to be
ineligible because of a preexisting condition, and another 3.0 percent report that
they have a preexisting condition not covered by their health care plan.
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7 Part-Time Work, Health
Insurance Coverage, and the
Wages of Married Women
Craig A. Olson
University of Wisconsin-Madison

One of the most significant and persistent differences between the
behavior of men and women in the U.S. labor market is the greater
variability in hours worked per week by women. In 1991, the median
number of weekly hours worked by women in the labor force who
were 18-60 years old was 40 hours, with substantial variation around
this median. The first decile of the hours distribution for working
women was 20 hours per week and the first quartile was 32 hours. This
distribution has remained basically unchanged since at least 1979.'
The dominant factor thought to account for the greater variability
in hours worked among women is gender specialization in household
production activities, with women choosing to adjust the intensity of
their labor-market activities in response to the demands placed on their
time by other household members. In a simple labor-supply model,
womens' wages are taken as exogenous to their labor-supply decisions,
and women select hours of work based on other household income and
the relative value of their market and household time. Thus, as the
value of household time changes relative to market activity, the simple
theory predicts that adjustments will be made in hours worked. How
ever, research in recent years suggests that adjusting hours worked in
response to changing labor-supply preferences is costly for women
because of employer constraints on hours worked and incomplete
information about the wage-hour combinations available in the market
(e.g., Blank 1988; Altonji and Paxson 1988, 1991; Dickens and Lundberg 1993). These constraints call into question the assumption that
the wage rate is exogenous to the labor-supply decision.
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This chapter investigates a different demand-side constraint that
may influence the labor-supply decisions of married women and that
has not been previously investigated. I investigate how the correlation
between hours worked per week and the structure of the compensation
package offered by employers alters the labor-supply decisions of mar
ried women in the United States. This study focuses on employer-pro
vided health insurance and investigates how the demand for health
insurance by married women alters their labor-supply decisions. 2 I
hypothesize the demand by a married woman for a job with health ben
efits is greater among those wives whose husbands do not have
employer-provided health insurance as compared with households
where husbands have jobs that provide health benefits. Because health
insurance is typically not available to employees working less than 35
hours per week, married women without spousal health insurance cov
erage adjust their labor-supply decisions to obtain health benefits. To
test this prediction, I use data on weekly hours worked and employerprovided health insurance (EPHI) for 1982 and 1992 as reported in the
1983 and 1993 March Current Population Survey (CPS).
The results in this paper show that in 1992, married women whose
husbands lacked employer-provided health benefits worked more hours
per week than wives in households where their spouses had health
insurance. In contrast, the 1982 estimates show no effect of husbands
health insurance coverage on the labor supply decisions of wives. The
differing results for the two time periods is explained by the decline in
employer provided health insurance among married males between
1982 and 1992. In 1982 some wives seeking a job with employer pro
vided health insurance because their husbands lacked these benefits
would have worked full time even if their husband had a job with
EPHI. However, the decline in EPHI coverage among married males
over the 1982-1992 time period from 0.67 to 0.62 caused working
wives in some households in 1992 to seek full-time jobs with health
benefits. By 1992 this included some households where the wife
would have preferred to work part time if her husband had a job that
provided health benefits. Thus, the employer constraint that full-time
work is required to obtain health benefits was not binding on married
women in 1982 but became binding by 1992 because of the decline in
married male health insurance coverage.
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Compensating wage theory predicts that women choosing to work
full time to obtain health insurance receive a lower wage compared to
what they could earn if they accepted a full-time job without health
insurance. Using the husband's health insurance coverage as an instru
ment that is correlated with his wife's health insurance coverage but
assumed to be uncorrelated with his wife's wage. I find the predicted
negative relationship between the hourly wage of wives working full
time and their estimate suggests that married women working full time
accept about a 10 percent wage reduction in exchange for employerprovided health benefits.

EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE
The application of standard compensating wage theory to fringe
benefits predicts that workers differ in their demand for employer-pro
vided benefits and sort themselves across firms so the mix between
wages and fringe benefits matches their preferences. Holding human
capital and other variables influencing wages constant, workers that
receive more generous fringe benefits receive a lower wage than com
parable workers that prefer fewer fringe benefits (Rosen 1986). The
standard figure illustrating this prediction is shown in Figure 1, where
workers maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint that is
defined by the human capital and ability levels. Worker A prefers a
compensation package without any fringe benefits and Worker B
accepts a job that provides both wages (WB) and fringe benefits (FBB).
This standard story of the relationship between wages and fringe
benefits is complicated in the case of employer-provided health bene
fits because of the private information employees and potential
employees have about their demand for health care. Private informa
tion held by individuals about their demand for health care creates an
adverse selection problem for the firm if all employees are charged the
same price for health insurance through an identical wage adjustment.
There are several ways firms may respond to this adverse selection.
Firms could individually adjust worker wages ex post based on the pat
tern of health expenditure claims observed as worker tenure increases. 3
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Figure 1 Wage-Fringe Benefit Trade-off
Wages

W(a)

Worker A
W(b)

Worker B

FB(b)

Fringe Benefits

Firms could also create rate classes based on expected health care costs
(e.g., younger versus older workers) and adjust wages differently for
workers in the different rate classes.4 Although it is unclear which
alternative firms will select, I hypothesize that most firms simply
charge all employees the same price for health benefits in the form of
lower wages and, like an insurance company, screen out less healthy
workers and try to create a workforce with homogenous health
demands that minimizes the subsidies from healthy to less healthy
workers. This approach, of course, provides less healthy workers with
a strong incentive to seek employment in firms that offer health insur
ance so they can receive health benefits at a price that is less than their
expected health care expenditures.
One strategy firms follow to screen out workers with high demand
for health care is to limit health insurance coverage to full-time work
ers. Such a policy reduces adverse selection in two ways. First, the
ability to work full time may screen out workers with costly health care
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problems because these same health problems may preclude full-time
employment. Second, limiting health insurance to only full-time
workers ensures health care benefits are a small share of total compen
sation. Health benefits are a relatively larger share of total compensa
tion when they are provided to part-time workers, and this may cause
some workers with very high demands for health insurance to work
part time just for the health benefits.
Table 1 reports data from the health insurance questions in the
1983 and 1993 March CPSs; the data show a strong positive relation
ship between hours worked per week and health insurance coverage.
The probability of having a job that provided health insurance
increases modestly with hours worked up to 30 hours per week,
increases substantially for those working 30-34 hours per week, and
then increases very significantly at 35 or more hours per week (fulltime employment).
Table 1 Employer Health Insurance Coverage by Hours Worked, 1982
and 1992 (%)
1982
9.8
17.4
27.7
47.6
73.1
tabulations from the March 1983 and 1993 CPS.

Usual hours per week
1-10
11-20
21-30
30-34
>35
SOURCE: Author's

1992
14.3
17.9
24.6
38.8
64.2

More direct evidence showing how employer policies prevent parttime workers from receiving health benefits is provided by the Fringe
Benefit Supplement to the April 1993 CPS. This supplement included
questions asking the reasons why respondents were not covered by
employer-provided health benefits. Thirty-one percent of those work
ing were not covered by employer-provided health benefits. Among
those uncovered, 81 percent worked for an employer that did not pro
vide health insurance to any of its employees and 19 percent were
uncovered even though they worked for an employer that offered insur
ance to some employees. Of the 19 percent uncovered, 11.17 percent
(more than half) were ineligible because of their status as part-time
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employees. To summarize, the data suggest firms hiring part-time
workers frequently do not offer health insurance to any employee or do
not extend health insurance to the part-time workers in their workforce.
I hypothesize this discrimination reflects firm efforts to minimize
adverse selection by part-time workers who, for reasons unobserved by
the firm, have a high demand for health insurance.

THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
AMONG MARRIED FEMALES
The prediction that married women adjust their labor-supply deci
sions based on their husbands' health insurance coverage assumes the
demand by wives for jobs with employer-provided health benefits is
influenced by spousal coverage. In this section, I test this assumption
and report estimates of the effect of husbands' health insurance cover
age on the probability that wives have health insurance coverage
through their employers. Table 2 shows the two by two table of own
employer health coverage for working couples. The percentage of cou
ples where neither individual had own employer health insurance
increased slightly from 15.8 percent in 1982 to 17 percent in 1992. In
1982, 31 percent of the sample included couples where both the hus
band and wife were covered by their respective employers. By 1992,
this percentage had dropped to 24.2 percent. Over the 10-year period,
Table 2 The Joint Distribution of Own Employer Health Insurance
Coverage For Working Couples (%)a
_______Husband's coverage from own employer_______
Covered
Uncovered
Wife's coverage
from own employer
Uncovered

1992
1982
1992
1982
38.0
36.70
17.03
15.77
(7,086)
(5,872)
(3,170)
(2,523)
24.21
30.80
Covered
20.79
16.62
(4,491)
(4,943)
(3,870)
(2,661)
'The top number is the cell percentage. The number in parentheses shows the cell
sample sizes.
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there was also a slight increase in the share of couples where only the
husband had coverage and a larger increase, from 16.6 to 20.8 percent,
in the share of couples where only the wife had own employer cover
age. This increase is consistent with data from other years (Olson
1995) and suggests coverage through the wife's employer became a
more important source of family coverage over the 10-year period.
One statistical model for describing the relationship between spou
sal health insurance coverage is a binary probit model where the equa
tion describing a wife's health insurance coverage from her own job
includes her husband's coverage through his job as a covariate. Unfor
tunately, the estimates from this single equation approach are likely to
be biased because of the correlation between unobservables affecting
the demand for health insurance coverage for both the husband and wife.
To overcome this problem, I jointly estimate the husband's and wife's
coverage and include the husband's coverage on his job in her health
insurance equation. This model, a bivariate probit model with a struc
tural shift (Heckman 1978), is described by the following equations:

$H +eH

(1)

HI* W - Xw $w + aHIH + zw

(2)

HI, = 1 if ///*, > 0, otherwise HI, = 0 where i = H or W

(3)

)

(4)

The subscripts in each equation refer to the husband (//) or wife
(W), and HI*t is a latent variable indicating the propensity that a job
provides health insurance. HI*, is a function of a set of observable
exogenous factors and an unobserved, normally distributed error term.
In this recursive model, a husband's health benefit status directly
affects the probability that his wife has a job with health benefits, and
a describes the causal effect of the husband's health benefits on the
probability his wife has a job with health benefits. I hypothesize that
a < 0. In other words, own employer coverage by the husband lowers
the wife's demand for coverage through her job.
This model permits a nonzero correlation between the error terms
in Eqs. 1 and 2 and is identified if there is at least one variable in Eq. 1
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that is excluded from Eq. 2. This exclusion restriction is satisfied by
assuming the characteristics of the husband (e.g., education, age, race)
that affect the probability that he has health benefits on his job do not
directly affect HI* W The Xl matrices include individual characteristics
typically used in an earnings function: years of completed education,
age, age2, age3, three race and ethnic variables, the number of children
in the household under the age of 6, the number of children aged 6-17
years old, and three region dummies. The data for each year were con
structed by creating separate data files from the 1983 and 1993 March
CPSs for husbands and wives and merging these files using the house
hold, family, and individual identification codes.
The results in Table 3 show health insurance coverage increases
with age and level of education and is lower for minorities than for
white workers. The coefficient on husband's health insurance coverage
is in the expected negative direction in both 1982 and 1992, and the
parameter estimates are virtually the same. The negative coefficients
on husband's coverage imply that women married to husbands without
health benefits were more likely to be working on jobs that provide
health insurance than working wives whose husbands had health bene
fits. In 1993, the predicted probability that an "average" working wife
had a job with health benefits was 0.533 if the husband did not have
health benefits and 0.302 if the husband had a job with health benefits. 5
Alternatives to the Bivariate Probit Model
The recursive structure of the bivariate model describes by Equa
tions l~4 is a necessary assumption of the statistical model because of
the cross-sectional data and the latent variable formulation of health
insurance coverage. As Heckman (1978) showed, a simultaneous
latent variable model where each individual's health insurance cover
age casually affects the coverage of his or her spouse is logically
inconsistent. However, there is another recursive model, alternative to
Equations 1-4, which reverses the recursive structure and assumes a
wife's coverage is exogenous and has a causal effect on the coverage of
her husband. Such a model may be appropriate for some couples, and
the model reported in Table 3 is obviously misspecified for these cou
ples. Choosing between these two alternative recursive models is diffi
cult. The best solution is to have sample information (e.g., longitudinal
data) that could be used to identify which spouse's coverage is exoge-
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Table 3 Bivariate Probit Estimates of Own Employer Health Benefit
Coverage For Married Couples
1982

1992

Education
(years)
High school

Wife's
coverage
-3.538
(0.504)
-0.249
(0.018)
-0.207
(0.012)
-0.185
(0.031)
-0.005
(0.030)
-0.085
(0.032)
0.050
(0.004)
-

Husband's
coverage
0.477
(0.392)
0.033
(0.018)
0.031
(0.012)
-0.095
(0.032)
-0.121
(0.032)
-0.158
(0.033)
0.067
(0.004)
-

Some college

-

-

College

-

-

Graduate school

-

-

0.327
(0.043)
0.194
(0.039)
0.024
(0.058)
0.291
(0.041)
-0.737
(0.107)

-0.034
(0.045)
0.042
(0.042)
-0.290
(0.063)
-0.100
(0.029)
0.354
(0.067)

Variable
Constant
Kids < 6
Kids 6-17
North central
South
West

Black
Hispanic
Other race
Age
Age2/100

Wife's
coverage
-4.563
(0.566)
-0.209
(0.018)
-0.181
0.011)
-0.067
(0.028)
0.003
(0.028)
-0.056
(0.029)
0.297
(0.038)
0.392
(0.040)
0.598
(0.044)
0.823
(0.052)
0.171
(0.040)
0.019
(0.035)
-0.033
(0.046)
0.359
(0.045)
-0.869
(0.113)

Husband's
coverage
-0.934
(0.394)
-0.015
(0.017)
0.004
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.028)
-0.122
(0.027)
-0.076
(0.029)
0.414
(0.033)
0.498
(0.034)
0.638
(0.037)
0.698
(0.042)
-0.066
(0.040)
-0.165
(0.035)
-0.185
(0.049)
-0.042
(0.028)
-0.042
(0.062)
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
1982
Wife's
Husband's
Variable
coverage
coverage
-0.371
Age3/10,000
0.572
(0.050)
(0.090)
-0.634
Husband's///
_
(0.104)
0.311
P
_
(0 065)
N
15,999
20107.1
-Log!
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

1992
Wife's
coverage
0.663
(0.093)
-0.602
(0.134)
0.092
(0.085)

Husband's
coverage
-0.010
(0.045)
_
_
18,617
24142.9

nous and then estimate different recursive models for the two types of
couples. Unfortunately, this sample separation information is not
available in the March CPSs.
An alternative method of investigating the sensitivity of the esti
mates obtained from the recursive structure defined by Equations 1-4
is to use Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and estimate a two equation
simultaneous equation model of husbands' and wives' coverage where
the coverage of each spouse affects the coverage of the other. Each
equation in this two equation system is identified because the hus
band's (wife's) individual characteristics (age, race, and education) are
assumed to be exogenous to the own employer health coverage of the
wife (husband). TSLS avoids the recursive structure constraint
required of the bivariate probit model because it ignores the latent vari
able formulation. However, like a single equation linear probability
model, the TSLS does not account for the fact that health insurance
coverage can only take on a value of 0 or 1. The coefficients are, how
ever, unbiased if the exclusion restrictions are appropriate.
The TSLS model estimates in Table 4 suggest a wife's coverage
does affect her husband's coverage, and the point estimate of this effect
was larger in 1982 than in 1992. However, the estimated effect of the
husband's coverage on the wife's coverage was much larger than the
effect of wife's coverage on husband's coverage in both years—nearly
twice as large in 1982 and almost three times larger in 1992. In addi-
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Table 4 TSLS Estimates of Wives and Husbands Own Employer Health
Insurance (HI) Coverage3
Dependent variable
Wife's HI
Independent
variable
Wife's HI

1982

Husband's HI
1992

1982
-0.1775
(0.0622)

1992
-0.1055
(0.0458

Husband's HI

-0.3205
-0.2953
(0.0461)
(0.0500)
'Each model also includes the variables reported in Table 3. Standard errors are in
parentheses.

tion, the coefficient of-0.295 on husband's coverage in 1992 implies an
almost 30 percentage point effect of a husband's coverage on the prob
ability that his wife is covered by health insurance from her employer.
This value is close to the predicted 23.1 percentage point difference
(0.533 - 0.202) previously reported from the bivariate probit estimates
for an average couple.
These TSLS results suggest that there are some couples where the
husband's coverage is affected by his wife's coverage. However, the
more common occurrence appears to correspond to the model
described by Equations 1-4, where the husband's coverage is exoge
nous. While the joint determination of spousal coverage deserves addi
tional research with better data, these results support the conclusion
that, for many couples, a wife's demand for employer-provided health
insurance is causally affected by her husband's coverage.
Coverage Versus Eligibility for Health Insurance

The health insurance questions in the two March CPSs solicit
information on whether or not household members are covered by
employer-provided health insurance obtained from an employer. As
previously discussed, there are two distinct subgroups among uncov
ered workers. An uncovered individual could be ineligible for insur
ance because the employer does not offer insurance or because he/she
works for an employer that offered health insurance but, for various
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reasons, the individual was not eligible for coverage. It is also possible
an uncovered individual is eligible for employer-provided health bene
fits but voluntarily decides not to accept the coverage, perhaps because
of the cost of health insurance (e.g., substantial premium copayments)
or because of spousal coverage.
The distinction between uncovered individuals who are ineligible
for coverage but select out of coverage is critical for this analysis. The
bivariate probit and TSLS estimates show wives whose husbands are
uncovered by health benefits are more likely to be covered by own
employer health benefits. I interpret this estimate to mean a husband's
coverage affects a wife's demand for a job where she is eligible for
insurance, and it is this demand for health insurance eligibility that
leads some women to adjust their labor supply and shift from part-time
to full-time employment. In the March CPS data, it is impossible to
distinguish between this explanation and the alternative explanation
that wives with spousal coverage choose not to accept coverage even
though they are eligible because of their husbands' insurance coverage.
If this latter explanation is the dominant causal explanation, then the
estimates in Table 3 are biased estimates of the effect of husbands'
coverage on the labor-supply decisions of wives.
While the March surveys do not identify the reasons individuals
are not covered by employer health insurance, this information is avail
able from the April 1993 CPS. Figure 2 shows a tree diagram of the
distribution of coverage and eligibility for working wives included in
the April survey. Of those not covered by own employer health insur
ance, 62.4 percent are ineligible for coverage through their employer.
The remaining share of uncovered wives are eligible for coverage but
have not taken advantage of the health benefits. Most (87.8 percent) of
those that elect no coverage are covered by their husband's employerprovided health insurance (EPHI); overall, 29 percent of those not cov
ered by their own EPHI are covered by their husband's EPHI.
Fully modeling the joint decisions of couples that determine both
coverage and eligibility is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I
did estimate the bivariate probit model described by Equations 1-4
using the April data, for which the dependent variable for the wife indi
cates eligibility for coverage. The coefficient on spouse's coverage in
the wife's eligibility equation was -0.6975 with a standard error of
0.260, very similar to the estimates reported in Table 3. These results

Figure 2 Health Insurance Coverage and Eligibility for Wives in the Labor Force, April 1993
(EPHI=Employer-provided health insurance)

Wife is...
0.689

0.311

Eligible for
Own EPHI

NoTEIigible for
Own EPHI
0.033

0.728

Covered By
EPHI
0.878

Covered By
Spouse's EPHI

Elected not to
accept
coverage

Not covered
for other
reasons

0.121

Not Covered
By Spouse's
EPHI

SOURCE: Author's calculations from the April 1993 CPS (n = 5077 married couples).
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suggest that the effect of spousal coverage reported in Table 3 is domi
nated by the effect of husband's coverage on eligibility and not seri
ously biased by wives who are eligible through their employers for
coverage but decide to decline coverage.

LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS OF WORKING WIVES
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 show spousal health insurance cov
erage significantly increases a working wife's demand for a job with
health benefits. To meet this demand, I hypothesize that some wives
lacking spousal coverage work full time to obtain health insurance but
would have preferred to work fewer hours if their husbands had jobs
with health benefits. This labor-supply adjustment occurs because of
the limited supply of part-time jobs offering health insurance.
Table 5 provides simple descriptive statistics from the 1983 and
1993 March CPSs that are consistent with this hypothesis. The table
shows hours worked per week by working, married women as a func
tion of husband's health insurance coverage. The mean number of
hours worked per week was 33.9 in 1982; the median was 40 hours per
week and two-thirds of the wives in the sample usually worked 35 or
more hours per week. Rows 2 and 3 of the table breakdown the sample
based on husband's health insurance coverage. The mean number of
hours worked per week in 1982 was 1.5 hours greater for wives whose
Table 5 Wives' Average Hours Worked per Week by Spousal Health
Insurance Coverage, 1982 and 1992
1982
1992
Median Fraction
Mean
Median Fraction
Mean
hours > 35 hours
hours
hours > 35 hours
hours
0.667
35.7
40
All married females 33.9
40
0709
40
40
0.649
34.9
0.678
Husband's HI = l a
33.4
0.703
37.0
40
0.759
34.9
40
Husband's HI = 0
SOURCE: Authors calculations from 1983 and 1993 March CPS.
a If HI = 1, the husband has health insurance; if HI = 0, he does not.
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husbands did not have health insurance. In addition, the percentage of
wives working 35 or more hours per week was 64.9 percent for house
holds where the husband had health insurance and 70.3 percent in
households where the husband lacked health insurance. The difference
by spousal health benefit coverage in the fraction of married women
working 35 or more hours per week had increase in 1992 to 8.1 per
centage points.
While other factors correlated with labor supply and husbands
health insurance coverage (e.g., husband's income) are not controlled
for in Table 5, a simple difference-in-difference estimator calculated
over the time period suggests spousal coverage had an effect on the
labor-supply decisions of some wives. Specifically, the change over
the 10 years in the fraction of married women working full time (e.g.,
35 hours/week) was 0.0423 and the fraction of husbands with health
insurance declined by 0.054. This implies a one point decline in the
fraction of husbands without health benefits led to 0.78 point increase
in the percentage of wives working full time (e.g., 0.0423 / -0.0541).
The other noteworthy fact from Table 5 is the difference in the fraction
of wives working full time by spousal coverage may have had a bigger
effect on labor supply in 1992 than in 1982.
The inferences that can be drawn from Table 5 obviously do not
control for individual and family characteristics that influence labor
supply and are possibly correlated with husbands health insurance cov
erage or change in the status of husbands health insurance coverage.6
To address this concern, Table 6 reports ordinary least square
(OLS) estimates of the hours worked per week in 1982 and 1992 as a
function of education, three race/ethnicity dummies, age, the presence
and age of children in the household, husbands income, and whether or
not the husband has health insurance on his job.7 The parameter esti
mates on the control variables are all in the expected direction and con
sistent with prior research. The estimate on husband's health insurance
coverage is also in the predicted negative direction in both years. How
ever, the estimated parameter is smaller in 1982 and is not significantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level. In 1992, however, the coefficient
is much larger and more precisely estimated. The 1992 estimate sug
gests that married women whose husbands did have health insurance
worked an average of 1.5 hours less per week relative to women whose
husbands did not have health insurance. I interpret this estimate as the
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Table 6 OLS Estimates of Hours Worked per Week by Wives in the
Labor Force
Variable
Constant
Kids < 6
Kids 6-17
Education
High school
Some college
College
Graduate school
Black

1982
23.237
(4.530)
-3.316
(0.158)
-1.610
(0.103)
0.083
(0.039)
_
_
_
_

2.901
(0.389)
Hispanic
2.878
(0.349)
3.094
Other race
(0.525)
Age
1.078
(0.374)
Age 2/100
-2.602
(0.972)
Age 3/10,000
0.180
(0.081)
Husband's HI
-0.351
(0.230)
Husband's salary ($1,000)
-0.062
(0.008)
R2
0.0517
N
15,999
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

1992
23.980
(4.749)
-2.988
(0.143)
-1.879
(0.092)
0.549
(0.312)
0.595
(0.324)
2.007
(0.351)
4.517
(0.413)
2.100
(0.347)
1.168
(0.288)
2.138
(0.400)
1.058
(0.378)
-2.126
(0.961)
0.109
(0.079)
-1.458
(0.182)
-0.036
(0.004)
0.0634
18,617
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average labor-supply response of women caused by the effect of spou
sal coverage on the choice between a part-time job without health ben
efits and a full-time job with benefits.
There are several alternative explanations for the results in Table 6.
First, husband's health insurance coverage may simply index "better"
jobs. Thus, in households where the husband has a better job as mea
sured by the presence of health insurance, the wife works fewer hours
per week because her husband has a "good" job. This alternative
explanation could conceivably explain the difference between the esti
mated effect of husband's health insurance coverage in 1982 and 1992
because there was a decline in health insurance coverage among men
over this time period that was most pronounced among less educated
men with little work experience (Olson 1995). Thus, health insurance
coverage in 1992 was a better predictor of "good" jobs than health
insurance coverage in 1982. While it is difficult to rule out this alterna
tive explanation, I think it is an unlikely explanation for the results
since the model also controls for husbands earned income. Therefore,
this explanation requires that the distinction between "good" and "bad"
jobs is correlated with health insurance coverage after conditioning on
husband's income.
A second explanation for the results in Table 6 is that the effect of
husband's health insurance coverage on the labor supply simply
reflects the income effect of these health benefits. However, the mag
nitude of the coefficient on husband's health coverage in 1992 is sim
ply too big for this explanation to be plausible. Ten thousand dollars in
husband's income in 1992 produces a predicted 0.4 hour decline in the
work week. If the effect of husband's health coverage was due only to
the income effect, the estimate of 1.458 on the health coverage variable
corresponds to an income effect equivalent to about $40,000 (e.g.,
1.458 / 0.036). Since health insurance is substantially less expensive
than $40,000, the estimated effect of husband's health insurance in his
wife's labor supply cannot be accounted for by the income effect of the
benefit. This explanation is more plausible in 1982 because the coeffi
cient on husband's health insurance implies the income value of health
benefits was about $5,600 (e.g., 0.351 / 0.062). While group health
insurance in 1982 was also less expensive than this point estimate,
given the standard errors around the parameter estimates, it is possible
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that a husband's health insurance had an effect on his wife's labor sup
ply in 1982 due primarily to the income effect.
What accounts for the different effect of husband's health insur
ance coverage on their wives' labor-supply decisions in 1982 and
1992? One explanation is that the relative increase in the cost of health
care between 1982 and 1993 increased household demand for health
insurance because the higher cost of health care raised the risk of not
having health insurance. This increase in demand caused more wives
without health insurance to work full time to obtain employer-provided
health insurance. While this explanation is intuitively appealing, it is
not consistent with the bivariate probit results reported in Table 2. If
this explanation accounted for the differing results, I would have
expected husbands health insurance coverage to have a bigger effect on
the probability a wife held a job with health benefits in 1992 than in
1982. As discussed above, this is not the case; the coefficient on hus
band's health insurance coverage in the wife's health insurance equa
tion is virtually the same for the two time periods.
The differing effect of a husbands coverage on his wife's hours
worked in the two time periods is more easily explained by the decline
in health insurance coverage among married males. The probability
that husbands in the sample had employer-provided health benefits
declined from 0.67 in 1982 to 0.62 in 1992. This fact suggests that
wives who worked full time in 1982 and were married to husbands
without coverage would have worked full time even if their husbands
had held a job with health insurance. In 1992, however, the decline in
health insurance coverage among husbands meant that more house
holds were faced with the prospect of not having any employer-pro
vided health insurance. This new segment of potentially uninsured
households included families where the woman would have preferred
to work part time if her husband had a job with health benefits but
increased her work week to full time to obtain health benefits. This
explanation suggest the full-time hours constraint that had to be met to
obtain health insurance was not binding on wives in 1982 but was
binding on the labor-supply decision of some wives in 1992. 8
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QUANTILE REGRESSION AND MULTINOMIAL LOGIT
ESTIMATES OF HOURS WORKED
The OLS estimates reported in Table 6 will not adequately capture
the changes in the hours distribution resulting from differences in hus
band's health insurance coverage if the impact of spousal coverage var
ies at different values of the hours distribution. The OLS estimates for
1992 that describe a simple mean shift in the conditional hours distri
bution by the 1.5 hours is not sufficient to move workers from parttime to full-time status except for those workers already very close the
margin between full-time and part-time employment. Moreover, it is
likely that those women close to the margin between full-time and parttime work were most affected by their husbands' health insurance sta
tus because a full-time job with health insurance involves only a mod
est increase in hours worked.
This suggests the difference in the hours distribution between
wives with and without spousal health benefits will look like Figure 3
if the employer constraint hypothesis is correct. Compared to house
holds where the husband has health benefits, in households where the
husband does not have health insurance, the distribution has less mass
immediately below full-time employment and more mass at full-time
employment (e.g., 35-40 hours per week). However, the tails of the
two distributions are similar for two reasons. First, the lower tails of
the hours distributions are similar because of the high cost of full-time
employment for wives that would otherwise prefer to work substan
tially less than full time. The upper tails do not differ by husbands
coverage because working substantially more than 35-40 hours per
week has no impact in the probability a woman has a job with health
benefits. The OLS estimates cannot capture the differential behavioral
responses of women at different points of the hours distribution.
Quantile regression was used to test if the impact of husbands cov
erage on the distribution of hours worked by married women is consis
tent with Figure 2. 9 Separate quantile regression models were
estimated for the 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, 30th, 35th, 40th, and 90th percentiles of the conditional hours distribution, where each model
included the same exogenous variables used in the OLS estimates. A
comparison of the coefficients on husband's health insurance coverage
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Figure 3 Predicted Effect of Husband's HI on f(hours)
for Working Wives
f(hours/wk)

Husband has HI
Husband has no HI

20

40

Hours/wk

across these different quantile regressions identifies the portion of the
conditional hours distribution most affected by husband's health insur
ance overage.
Table 7 reports the key results from the quantile regressions for
each of the two years. Consistent with the OLS results, the coefficient
estimates for 1982 are all insignificant and show husbands health
insurance had no impact on any point of the hours distribution for mar
ried working women. In contrast, the negative and significant coeffi
cients for 1992 show fewer women worked part time when their
husbands did not have health insurance. Furthermore, the larger (in
absolute value) coefficients at 21-30 hours suggest that the lack of
spousal coverage had the biggest impact on women that were already
working more than half time. However, at the 40th percentile (about
40 hours per week), there was only a very modest difference (0.7 of an
hour) between those with and without spousal health insurance. This
pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesized effect summarized
in Figure 3, where the differences in the distribution become very mod
est once the full-time threshold is reached.
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Table 7 Summary of the Quantile Regression Estimates of the Effect of
Husband's HI on Hours Worked by Spouse
1982
1992
Hours worked
Hours worked
Estimated
per week at
Coeff. on
per week at
Coeff. on
quantile
this quantile
husband's HI
this quantile
husband's HI
0.10
16
20
0.775
-1.939
(0.582)
(0.466)
0.15
20
21
0.284
-2.843
(0.432)
(0.364)
24
0.441
0.20
25
-2.738
(0.513)
(0.416)
27
0.25
30
0.049
-2.253
(0.486)
(0.324)
30
0.021
0.30
35
-2.084
(0.442)
(0.238)
35
0.001
0.35
36
-.307
(0.291)
(0.191)
0.40
36
40
0.086
-0.678
(0.202)
(0.125)
40
0.90
45
-1.587
-1.023
(0.190)
(0.254)
NOTE: Each quantile regression includes controls for education, race, age, children in
the family, and husband's earning. Standard errors are in parentheses.

I next estimated separate quantile regressions for points of the
cumulative hours distribution over two ranges—(0.01, 0.46) and (0.87,
0.95)—to more fully describe the impact of husband's health benefits
on hours worked by women in 1992. 10 Models were estimated at 0.01
intervals, and the results were then used to predict and plot the esti
mated cumulative conditional weekly hours distribution for two work
ing wives that were identical except for husband's health insurance
benefits."
Figure 4 shows that, among women with average sample charac
teristics, those wives most likely to increase hours from part time to
full time because their husbands lack coverage were wives who would
have been working close to full time even if their husbands had health
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benefits. 12 Figure 4 shows that about 29 percent of those without spou
sal health insurance would have worked 30 or fewer hours. In contrast,
about 33 percent of those with spousal coverage would have worked 30
or fewer hours per week. Note, however, that the distributions are very
similar up to about 15 hours per week and then converge once again at
about 37 hours per week. These differences correspond to the hypoth
esized differences in the probability density functions shown in Figure
3. In other words, the estimates suggest that in 1992 the lack of spou
sal coverage caused a small fraction of wives to work full time and
obtain a job with health insurance instead of working 15-35 hours per
week without health benefits.
Figure 4 shows the predicted marginal effect of husband's cover
age on hours worked for a wife with average sample characteristics.
The position of this predicted conditional density of hours worked by
spousal coverage will differ from Figure 4 for women with different
characteristics. For this reason, Figure 4 cannot be interpreted as the
average effect in the sample of spousal coverage on hours worked but
only the marginal effect for wives with the average characteristics.
Estimates from a multinomial logit model of hours worked can be
used to obtain an estimate of the average effect of husband's coverage
on hours worked for the sample, which does permit husband's cover
age to have a different effect on different portions of the hours distribu
tion (e.g., Figure 3). This is accomplished by dividing the hours
distribution into non-overlapping intervals and predicting the effect of
spousal coverage on the probability that hours of work for wives fall in
each interval.
Such a model was estimated for 1992 using the same independent
variables included in the OLS and quantile regression models. The
dependent variable was constructed by classifying the hours worked by
wives into one of the following ranges: 1-10 hours, 11-20 hours, 2130 hours, 31-34 hours, 35-39 hours, exactly 40 hours, and more than
40 hours.
To conserve space, I have not reported the coefficients for the mul
tinomial model. 13 However, the hypothesis that husband's health insur
ance has no effect on wife's coverage was easily rejected, as was the
hypothesis that husband's coverage had the same effect on the proba
bility of being in each interval of the hours distribution. 14 Table 8 illus
trates the predicted effect of husband's coverage on wife's coverage

Figure 4 Predicted Conditional CDF (Hours) for an Average Wife

0.1

0.2

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
CDF(Hours Worked/Week)

0.8

Husband's Hl=0 — Husband's Hl=1

0.9

1
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Table 8 Predicted Average Effect from Multinomial Logit Model of
Husband's Coverage on Hours Worked by Wives, 1992
Predicted percentage in each weekly hours range
Hours/week range_____Husband is covered_____Husband is uncovered
I-10
4.70
4.36
II-20
12.42
9.33
21-30
12.75
10.31
31-34
2.79
2.48
35-39
10.23
10.85
Exactly 40
44.20
47.51
>40
12.92
15.16
Total_________________100.00_____________100.00_____
NOTE: These predictions are based on a multinomial logit model that includes all of
the variables reported in column 2 of Table 3.

obtained from the multinomial logit model. The estimates were used
to calculate two probabilities for each person—one where husband's
coverage is set equal to 0 and a second probability where husband's
coverage is set equal to 1. The probabilities for each hours range were
then averaged over the entire sample and are reported in Table 8. The
differences between columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show the predicted
average effect of spousal coverage on the probability wives worked in
each hours range. For example, the first row shows husband's cover
age had a very small effect (4.7 - 4.36) on the probability wives
worked 1-10 hours per week.
Overall, the results reported in Table 8 are consistent with the theo
retical predictions and the OLS and Quantile regression estimates. The
average effect of spousal coverage on the probability a wife works full
time (35 or more hours) was 6.17 percentage points (e.g., 47.51 +
15.16 + 10.85 - 44.20 - 12.92 - 10.23). As rows 2 and 3 of the table
show, this shift to full-time work was generated primarily by a reduc
tion in the probability of working 11-30 hours per week.
The estimates reported in Table 8 were used to generate an esti
mate of the impact of husband's coverage on the expected number of
hours worked by wives. This was obtained using the midpoints of each
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hours range to calculate a weighted average for hours worked using the
estimates in each column as weights. 15 This exercise produced the fol
lowing values:
E (Hours \HIH =l) = 34.31
E (Hours !#/„ = 0) = 35.74
The difference between these two values, 1.43 hours, is an estimate
of the average effect of husbands' coverage on wives' labor supply.
This is about a 4 percent effect (1.43/34.31) and very close to the 1.5
hours obtained from the OLS model.

ESTIMATES OF THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WAGES
AND HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section I report estimates of the wage-health benefit trade
off faced by married women predicted by compensating wage theory.
To estimate this trade-off, I confined the sample to married women that
were in the Outgoing Rotation Group subsamples in the March 1993
CPS and that worked 35 or more hours per week. The sample was lim
ited to wives working 35 or more hours per week because this appears
to be the threshold between full-time and part-time employment
(Hotchkiss 1991). Restricting the sample to the Outgoing Rotation
Group allowed use of union status and usual weekly earnings ques
tions. The latter question permits a better measure of the hourly wages
than that which is available for the entire March CPS.
The usual empirical strategy for determining the magnitude (and
existence) of the wage-fringe benefit trade-off is to estimate a standard
earnings equation and include as one of the independent variables the
presence or absence of health insurance. Frequently, however, this
strategy does not provide results consistent with the theory, and the
usual explanation is that the fringe benefit dummy is correlated with
the error term in the wage equation because of unobserved factors
(e.g., unobserved human capital) that have an impact on both wage lev
els and health insurance coverage (Smith and Ehrenberg 1983). The

320

Olson

OLS estimate reported in Table 9 suffers from this problem. The OLS
coefficient on wife's coverage in a standard wage model is positive,
highly significant, and implies married women with coverage receive a
17.8 percent wage premium. 16
Table 9 OLS and IV Estimates of the Trade-Off between Wages and
Health Insurance for Wives in the Labor Force, 1992
Constant
North Central
South
High school
Some college
College
Grad. school
Black
Hispanic
Other race
Age
Age 2/100
Age 3/20,000
Wife's HI
Union
R2

OLS estimates
-0.213
(0.454)
-0.103
(0.022)
-0.143
(0.021)
-0.037
(0.023)
0.386
(0.031)
0.611
(0.033)
0.742
(0.037)
-0.029
(0.030)
-0.088
(0.026)
-0.041
(0.036)
0.147
(0.036)
-0.327
(0.091)
0.241
(0.075)
0.164
(0.016)
0.088
(0.020)
0.327

N = 2,790.
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

IV estimates
-0.255
(0.479)
-0126
(0.024)
-0.147
(0.022)
-0.030
(0.024)
0.418
(0.034)
0.665
(0.038)
0.801
(0.043)
-0.041
(0.032)
-0.000
(0.039)
-0.073
(0.038)
0.161
(0.038)
-0.364
(0.097)
0.273
(0.080)
-0.113
(0.084)
0.135
(0.025)
0.252
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An unbiased estimate of the health insurance/wage trade-off can be
obtained using an instrument correlated with wife's coverage but
uncorrelated with the error term in her wage equation. The variable I
used as an instrument for her coverage is her husband's coverage
through his employer. 17 As the estimates in Table 2 show, husband's
health insurance coverage has a strong effect on the probability his
wife has health insurance on her job. Using this variable as an instru
ment for HIW , the coefficient on HIW is negative and implies women
with health insurance earn about 11 percent less than comparable
women without health insurance. This estimate is consistent with the
theory of compensating wage differentials.

SUMMARY

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the relation
ship between employer-provided health insurance and the labor-supply
decisions of married women. I argue that the demand by a married
woman for a job with health insurance is heavily influenced by
whether or not her husband has health insurance through his employer.
Where husbands lack health insurance coverage, married working
women are more likely to be found in jobs that provide health benefits.
This bivariate estimates using both 1982 and 1992 data strongly sup
port this prediction.
Employer efforts to minimize adverse selection in the provision of
health benefits limits the supply of part-time jobs that provide health
benefits. As a result, individuals typically have to work full time to
obtain a job with health insurance. This constraint implies husbands
health insurance coverage will have an effect on the labor supply deci
sions of working wives without spousal coverage who seek health
insurance through their employer. The estimates for 1982 fail to sup
port the hypothesis that spousal health insurance coverage changed the
labor supply of women in 1982. In contrast, there was a small but sig
nificant increase in hours worked in 1992 by those women married to
men without health insurance. The differing results for the two time
periods is explained by the decline in employer-provided health insur
ance among husbands. In 1982, the requirement that wives worked full
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time to obtain health insurance was not binding, but the decline in cov
erage among husbands became binding by 1992 and caused some
wives to shift from part-time to full-time employment to obtain health
coverage.
The quantile regression and multinomial logit estimates for 1992
suggest that most of the shift in hours occurred among women who
would have preferred to work 10-35 hours with spousal coverage but
increased their work week to 35-50 hours per week to obtain health
insurance. The multinomial logit estimates suggest that, on average, a
change in husband's coverage alters the probability his wife works full
time by about 9.2 percent.
Finally, estimates of the determinants of the hourly wage for mar
ried women working full-time in 1993 supports the trade-off between
wages and health benefits that is predicted by compensating wage
theory.

Notes
The author has benefited from helpful comments by Ron Ehrenberg, Jonathan Gruber,
Doug Hyatt, and seminar participants at Princeton University and Columbia Univer
sity.
1. This statement is based on my tabulations of the usual weekly hours from the
1979-1991 Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) file of the Current Population Sur
vey. The data were from the National Bureau of Employment Research CD
extract of the ORG.
2. The analysis focuses on hours worked per week conditional on participation in the
labor market. I do not investigate the impact of health benefits on the labor-force
participation decision.
3. This approach is not without problems. First, it may take considerable time
before the firm is able to distinguish between claims due to purely random health
shocks and claims that reveal information about the underlying but unobserved
health status of the individual and other family members. Second, if the external
labor market doesn't observe the information on health status that is revealed to
the firm, the firm may be unable to retain the worker because his or her total com
pensation net of the firm's estimate of expected health claims will fall below the
worker's opportunity wage in the external market.
4. The firm may face discrimination charges if it adjusts wages based on certain pre
dictors of health claims such as age and sex.
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5. By "average" I mean a 30-year-old, white, high school-educated, working wife
living in the Northeast with one child under the age of 6 and one child 6 to 17
years old.
6. For example, the difference-in-difference estimator calculated from changes of
the 10-year period will substantially overstate the effect of husband's coverage on
the fraction of wives working full time if, between 1982 and 1992, broader
changes in the commitment of wives to full-time employment were occurring.
The difference-in-difference estimator would mistakenly attribute the impact of
these changes to the decline in husband's health coverage.
7. Whether or not the wife has health insurance on her job is not included in her
labor-supply equation because health insurance coverage and hours worked are
assumed to be jointly chosen by the wife, given the employer constraints that fulltime work is required to receive health benefits. Therefore, this labor-supply
equation is most appropriately thought of as a "reduced form" equation where
husband's health insurance coverage influences both the wife's coverage and her
labor-supply decision.
8. Another explanation for the differing results is that firms were less likely to offer
health benefits to part-time workers in 1992 and, therefore, the hours constraint
became binding on more households. The results in Table 1 do not support this
explanation.
9. Quantile regression is most commonly used to estimate how exogenous variables
influenced the median of the dependent variable.
10. Approximately 41 percent (0.87 - 0.46) of the sample worked exactly 40 hours
per week, which was the median for virtually all groups in the sample. Thus, dif
ferences in the exogenous variables had no impact on this mass point in the hours
distribution, and models for values in the (0.47, 0.86) range were not "identified."
11. The predictions were based on a 30-year-old, white, high school-educated woman
living in the Northeast with one child under 6 and another child between 6 and 17
years old.
12. Note that the axes in this graph are reversed from what is customary. The cumula
tive distribution function (CDF) of hours worked is on the horizontal axis and the
vertical axis plots the predicted hours worked at each point of the CDF.
13. These coefficients are available from the author upon request.
14. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that husband's coverage had no effect on
wife's coverage produced an ^ value of 77.82, and the critical value for 6 d.f. and
0.001 significance level is 22.5. The likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that
husband's coverage has an equal effect on the chances of being in each hours
interval produced an £ value of 76.78, and the critical value for 5 d.f. and 0.001
significance level is 20.5.
15. For the over 40 hours per week category, I used the average number of hours
worked for those working more than 40 hours per week (e.g., 50.33 hours).
16 The premium is equal to exp. (0.1636) - 1.
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17. The estimate of p, the correlation between the error terms in the two health insur
ance equations reported in Table 2, is not different from zero in 1992. This sug
gests husband's health insurance coverage is a plausible instrument.
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In this chapter, we investigate whether alternative methods of pro
viding health insurance have consequences for the labor market. In the
United States, public policy relies heavily on incentives to enhance the
ability and willingness of employers to voluntarily purchase group
health insurance for workers and their families. This approach con
trasts with that of Canada, where all persons are eligible for a mini
mum health benefit, which can be supplemented but not supplanted by
additional employer-provided benefits. Effectively, the U.S. system
bundles relatively high-wage full-time work with the health insurance
benefits, while in Canada work and health care coverage remain largely
independent. How these two disparate approaches to the provision of
health care affect the labor-force decision, hours of work, and the com
pensation mix is a largely unexplored subject, and it is the focus of this
research.
Ideally, we would like to empirically model and directly compare
the Canadian and the U.S. systems of health care provision and financ
ing to see how each affects the allocation of time between market and
nonmarket activities. However, differences in institutions and social
insurance provisions, along with data limitations, make such direct
comparisons impossible. Instead, we use U.S. data to draw conclu-
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sions about the two systems by analyzing two groups of U.S.workers.
In the first group, members are covered by health insurance whether or
not they are employed ("virtual Canadians") but, in the second, mem
bers must work to obtain equivalent insurance.
Canada has a system characterized by minimum basic coverage
available to everyone independent of work effort. Additional coverage
can be purchased on a tax-preferred basis, either through the employer
or individually. However, this additional coverage cannot compete
with the minimum benefits, so the private insurance purchased repre
sents a different set of goods and services. In the United States, a sub
set of the population operates under a similar system: persons who
obtain health insurance coverage through the employment of their
spouses. If one spouse has insurance, the other's labor supply is less
conditioned on and possible independent of the insurance decision.
For our purposes, such individuals will be used to simulate the Cana
dian experience.
Two aspects of the health insurance market are likely to affect
labor-market behavior. First, because of problems of adverse risk
selection, individually purchased insurance tends to be extremely
expensive or to have fewer benefits relative to employer-purchased
insurance. Second, employers usually require that employees work
close to full-time hours on the job as a condition for health insurance
eligibility. Taken together, when one spouse is not offered health
insurance at work, the other must generally work full time to obtain
such coverage.
The options of full-time employment with coverage and part-time
employment without health benefits may create a particularly difficult
choice for an individual who must provide both health insurance and
home production for the family. The full-time alternative may be
selected even if it results in a sub-optimal allocation of time in the
household. Thus, by comparing two groups of married women—those
covered by spousal insurance and those who are not—we can simulate
labor-supply responses under the U.S. and Canadian systems and try to
isolate the importance of this effect.
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EFFECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISION ON HOURS
WORKED AND COMPENSATION
The effects of employment-based health insurance on hours of
work follow from broad studies of the division of compensation
between fringe benefits and earnings. In competitive markets, firms
will only provide a more generous benefit, such as health insurance or
pensions, at the expense of wages that are lower than usual for workers
of a given skill level. Evidence on the trade-off can be found in Woodbury (1983) and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
Evidence of the effect of health insurance on labor supply has been
inconclusive and has generally tried to relate health status to work
effort. Women are disproportionately low-wage workers and, on aver
age, are less likely to be offered employment-based health insurance
than men. 1 Moffitt and Wolfe (1990) have examined the role of publicand employer-provided insurance on the work effort of female heads of
households. They found that there would be significant entry into the
labor force by women currently on Medicaid if employer benefits were
expanded. They estimate that a one-third increase in insurance offers
by employers would reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) rolls by 6 percent and raise labor-force participation by 12
percent. While this effect is largely confined to AFDC households with
relatively high demand for medical care, the pull into the workforce
from employment-related insurance also shows up more generally for
female household heads. Other labor-supply effects may be present for
another set of female workers, namely women in dual-earner house
holds. In related work, Wolfe and Hill (1992) simulated the effects of
mandated benefits for low-wage mothers under different health states
and varying hours of work. Health insurance appears to create a stron
ger work incentive than either a wage increase or a child care subsidy
when these women or their dependents are in poor health.
Changes in labor-supply behavior are also implied by studies of
job lock or immobility due to preexisting health conditions that would
limit coverage or make workers ineligible for health insurance benefits
in a new firm (e.g., Madrian 1994). Monheit and Vistness (1995)
showed that spouses appear to take efforts to avoid problems of risk
selection due to poor health. Among dual earners, if one is in poor
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health, the other tends to be the primary holder of employment-based
health insurance. On its face, recent legislation also seems based on
the assumption that labor-force effort and employment prospects are
constrained in the United States by tying insurance to the job. The
Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act of 1996 allows former employees to main
tain their health insurance indefinitely at the full-employment-based
premium, replacing COBRA legislation (Consolidated Omnibus Bud
get Reconciliation Act of 1985) that limited this option to about two
years.
Our analysis extends this research to the general case of health
risks, rather than existing health needs, and makes explicit the mecha
nisms that limit labor hours. Figure 1 shows the general case, based on
the household production model of Grossman (1972) in which health is
produced using time (h) and market-purchased medical inputs (M).
Further, total time in a week is limited to 168 hours, so hours not
devoted to home production (e.g., health production) must be used in
market-labor supply («). Given the shadow value of nonmarket time,
(w, usually the wage rate) and the market price of medical care PM , the
budget constraint for health is illustrated by the line h^M^. If all avail
able time is spent in nonmarket activity (Hl = 168, n { = 0), no medical
care is affordable. As we move down the budget constraint, more
hours are worked so more purchasing power is available for medical
care but fewer hours are available to provide health care services to the
family.
Because it can reduce the problem of adverse selection, group-pur
chased health insurance is cheaper than that purchased by individuals.
The lower price per unit of medical care paid for through employerprovided insurance rotates the budget constraint to h lM2, allowing
greater purchases of medical care for a given amount of work. Thus,
the indirect purchase of health insurance as a component of compensa
tion effectively results in an in-kind transfer of medical care to the
worker because the benefits of the price reduction accrue only if medi
cal care is consumed.
To obtain insurance, however, the worker generally has to commit
to a minimum work schedule. This convention may be imposed on
small firms by insurance companies to avoid expensive family cover
age that is disguised as employee coverage. Because health insurance
benefit premiums are somewhat indivisible, firms may also need a

Figure 1 Wage/Benefit Trade-off: Health Insurance and Work
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large commitment of hours of work to cover the premium expendi
tures. In Figure 1, we set the constraint at 35 hours per week. Effec
tively, the budget constraint becomes kinked at this point and shifts by
the amount of the subsidy (ab). The new budget constraint with health
insurance provided by the firm is the kinked line h labM2. Therefore,
an individual may be forced to work more hours than he or should
would normally desire in order to obtain health insurance. Any indif
ference curve such as 1C touching point h with a slope flatter than the
budget line represents such a worker.
We compare this case to that of a worker who has access to insur
ance whether or not he or she works. Such access would have two
effects on the budget constraint. It would clearly shift the constraint
out because even if one did not work, medical care would be available.
However, for our purposes, the more important effect is that the budget
constraint loses its kink because there is no longer a need to work a
minimum number of hours to qualify for insurance. Most of our atten
tion is focused on the effects of removing that kink. Provision of
health insurance through some mandatory scheme financed by taxes, as
in Canada, is equivalent to this latter effect. The slope of the budget
constraint would depend upon the exact funding mechanism for the
mandatory health insurance scheme or the effect on net wages in the
employer-provided mechanism and any differences in the relative effi
ciencies of the two systems.
In both cases, the minimum hours constraint is removed and the
worker may choose to reallocate hours of work. Given a high value of
nonmarket time, the incentive created by the need to work full time to
qualify for insurance is no longer as compelling. We would expect to
see hours worked fall for a person who had previously worked too
many hours for the purpose of obtaining health insurance coverage.

DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
To empirically test the proposition that the presence of employerprovided health insurance can affect labor-supply decisions, we evalu
ate the job characteristics of two samples of wives. In the first sample,
husbands hold employment-based health insurance. In the second
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sample, husbands are not covered by a job-related health policy. We
use a two-stage process to determine if there is self-selection of wives
into jobs with health insurance and whether self-selection differs
according to health insurance coverage of the spouse.
In the first stage, wives face a trichotomous choice of no work,
work without insurance, and work with health insurance coverage.
Using a multiple logit model, we estimate probabilities of working
with and without health insurance for both groups of wives (husbands
with and without coverage). The estimator we use is described in Trost
and Lee (1984) and Lee (1983).
We use the first-stage results to create selectivity adjustment terms
for our second-stage models of labor compensation. The signs and sig
nificance of the selection terms provide information on whether selfselection differs according to the spouse's coverage. In particular, the
second stage estimates hourly wages, annual earnings from the current
job, and two separate indicators of the share of annualized compensa
tion received in the form of health insurance. The shares consist of the
total premium and the employer-purchased premium. We expect that
the value of health insurance for wives whose husbands do not have
insurance would be greater than for wives whose husbands are cov
ered. We also expect to observe an inverse relationship between the
value of health insurance and other compensation (shown as a negative
sign on the selection term) if insurance is the result of deliberate selec
tion. This latter is the well-known compensation trade-off required if
labor markets are competitive.2
The main advantage of this two-step approach is that the estimator
is consistent with theory. The hours and compensation mix are treated
as jointly determined by the introduction of the trichotomous selection
terms that condition the second-stage coefficients. Further, rigidities in
the work schedule are implicit in the first-stage estimation of work
choices.
The main disadvantage is that the estimator does not allow us to
measure the magnitude of the trade-off between total compensation
and health insurance, if one exists. The effects of the characteristics
that affect the probability of working with insurance are highly nonlin
ear. Thus, measuring the unit change in compensation associated with
a fixed-interval change in the selection term (or its underlying odds) is
highly artificial. However, this procedure may still be preferred to
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attempts to estimate the trade-off without attention to self-selection of
hours and jobs. Any trade-offs observed otherwise may be biased
upward because only persons who choose insurance are observed, and
their preferences for insurance are likely to be higher than those whose
compensation consists of wages only. Additionally, the data we use
have limitations for trying to estimate the magnitude of compensation
trade-offs because we do not observe pension accrual benefits. Thus,
we are forced to omit an important component of compensation against
which health benefits could be exchanged.
Data and Sample Characteristics
Table 1 contains the variable symbols and definitions of the inde
pendent variables in the first-stage logit models, the characteristics
used to develop the dependent variables in the second stage, and the
independent variables of the second-stage analysis. The data on indi
vidual health insurance and labor-market characteristics were obtained
from Round 4 of the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES) and the supplemental Health Insurance Provider Survey,
1987. The NMES household survey uses a national probability sample
of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population. In the provider survey,
employers reported information on the kinds of insurance offered and
held by household respondents. It also contains data on total premi
ums and employee and employer share of total premiums. Individual
data are augmented by state and county level characteristics of firms
and state insurance regulations from Area Resource File, County-City
Data Book (Census Bureau), and from state Medicaid and insurance
regulation files. Area Resource Files contain a composite of survey
results pertaining to the health care market at the county level and are
produced biennially by the Bureau of Health Professions. State insur
ance regulations have been collected annually by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield. Medicaid data by state is made available from the Health Care
Financing Administration.
We included persons whose job or family status did not change
during the round (the quarter year) but, within this group, we focused
on married women between the ages of 19 and 62 whose husbands
were employed. For empirical purposes, this group was further
divided according to whether or not the husband had employment-
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Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable

Variable definition (data source)

Dependent variables
First stage logit
WORK= 1,2,3

Wife does not work outside home; works with no
employer-provided insurance; works with
insurance, respectively

Second stage
HOURLY WAGE ($)

Annual earnings/annual hours of work

EARNINGS ($)

Annual earnings (actual, dependent upon wages,
weeks, and hours per week)

COMP ($)

Annualized earnings plus annual insurance
premium calculated as if wife worked full time
and full year

PREMIUM/COMP (%)

Total annual health insurance premium as a
percent of COMP

EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION ($)The employer portion of the premium
Independent variables
NONEARNED INCOME ($)

All other household income reported in 1987

DEP

Number of dependents

ADL

Number of limitations of activities of daily living
of the wife (health limitations such as walking,
bathing, etc.)

AGE (years)

Wife's age in years

BLACK (0, 1)

Wife's race is Black

EDUCATION (years)

Wife's years of education

PROF(0, 1)

Wife is in professional occupation

TENURE (years)

Years at current job of wife

RISK POOL (0, 1)

State where wife resides has a high-risk pool to
covered uninsurable persons (Blue Cross Blue
Shield data)

CONVERSION^, 1)

State has a mandate requiring conversion to
private insurance if job loss occurs (Blue Cross
Blue Shield data)

TAX RATE (%)

Tax rate applied to insurance premiums by state
(Blue Cross Blue Shield)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable
MEDICARE CHARGE ($)
PER K INCOME ($)

Variable definition (data source)
Prevailing health care cost index by geographic
area (HCFA data)
Income per capita in state where wife resides
(area resource files)

MDS PER CAPITA (ratio)

Physicians per capita in state (area resource files)

COUNTY POP

Population of county of wife (city and county
data book)

MS A (0, 1)

Wife resides in metropolitan statistical area
(large urban area)

SOUTH (0, 1)
LAMBDA

Wife resides in South
Selection term in second state

based health insurance from his firm or union. Employment was by far
the major source of coverage for all of these households. Only 32 husbands had health insurance from other private sources.
The sample characteristics are described in Table 2. Of interest are
the lower wages, earnings, and job tenure of uninsured female workers
as compared with insured females. Since this table provides only the
analytic variables under investigation, data on hours or type of insur
ance are not provided. However, such data provide additional insight
about the way health insurance may influence work decisions. As
expected, there were differences in hours of work based on insurance
status. Within the group of women who received insurance, just over
80 percent worked more than 35 hours per week, averaging 39 hours
per week. By contrast, those who worked without insurance averaged
only 32 hours per week. Similarly, when dual health insurance cover
age occurred, 45 percent of sample women chose an individual over a
family plan. This contrasts with women who were the sole suppliers of
health insurance to their families. Only 19 percent of these women
chose individual coverage.

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Samples of Employed Wives: Means (Standard Errors)
Husband not insured

Husband insured
Variable
Sample size
HOURLY WAGE ($)
EARNINGS ($)

Wife - no insurance

Wife insured

Wife - no insurance

Wife insured

974

816
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547

7.32 (4.9)

9.04 (4.60)

7.8 (4.6)

8.95 (4.5)

4,294 (5,067)

7,208 (12,342)

4,781 (10,211)

7,047 (11,888)
9,191 (11,955)

9,368 (13,010)

COMP ($)
PREMIUM ($)

1,965 (1,573)

2,526 (1.862

EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION ($)

1,631 (1,261)

1,941 (1,392)

NONEARNED INCOME ($)
DEP

25,200 (21,908)

35,206 (24,267)

26,672 (23,934)

27,624 (22,720)

1.6 (1.40)

1.31 (1.30)

1.56 (1.5)

1.38 (1.2)

ADL

0.01 (0.1)

0.01 (0.1)

0.01 (0.2)

0.01 (0.2)

AGE (years)

36.7 (10.1)

37.7 (10.1)

36.2 (10.3)

36.7 (9.9)

BLACK (0, 1)

0.16 (0.4)

0.21 (0.4)

1.56 (1.5)

0.17 (0.4)

EDUCATION (years)

13.0 (3.0)

13.2 (2.8)

12.7 (3.1)

13.0 (3.0)

PROF (0, 1)

0.12 (0.3)

0.12 (0.3)

0.18 (0.4)

0.15 (0.4)

MANUF(0, 1)

0.10 (0.3)

0.12 (0.3)

0.16 (0.4)

0.6 (0.2)

TENURE (years)

4.3 (6.6)

7.8 (6.8)

1.56 (1.5)

7.3 (6.6)

RISK POOL (0, 1)

0.17 4

0.16 (0.41)

0.19 (0.4)

0.19 (0.4)

0.9 (0.3)

0.9 (0.3)

0.87(0.3)

0.87 (0.3)

CONVERSION (0, 1)

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)
Husband insured
TAX RATE (%)

Husband not insured

Wife - no insurance

Wife insured

Wife - no insurance

Wife insured

1.80 (0.8)

1.85 (0.8)

1.81 (0.8)

1.82 (0.8)

MEDICARE CHARGE ($)

27,600 (5,100)

28,008 (5,345)

27,289 (5,519)

27,261 (5,465)

PER K INCOME ($)

14,727 (3,540)

14,883 (3,776)

14,168 (3,327)

14,524 (3,465)

MDS PER CAPITA

0.01 (0.1)

0.01 (0.1)

0.01 (0.1)

0.01 (0.1)

776,550 (1,487,000)

COUNTY POP

798,533 (1,450,790)

885,441 (1,924,000

868,240 (1,648,652)

MSA (0, 1)

0.25 (0.4)

0.28 (0.4)

0.25 (0.4)

0.27 (0.4)

SOUTH (0, 1)

0.34 (0.5)

0.36 (0.5)

0.40 (0.5)
037 (0.5)
SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of the 1987 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey and Health Insurance Provider Survey.
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RESULTS
First-Stage Multinomial Logit
Separate logit models were estimated for each of the two subsamples. For brevity, we describe only the results for wives whose hus
bands worked with insurance. 3 Regression coefficients are reported for
those who work with insurance (Table 3) and those who work without
insurance (Table 4). These coefficients are calculated relative to those
who do not work.4 In multinomial logit estimation, the signs of coeffi
cients are not necessarily those of the marginal probabilities, so mar
ginal probabilities are calculated if the coefficients are statistically
significant.
The independent variables include both person-specific character
istics and area or market characteristics. Some of these variables are
excluded from the second-stage regressions so that they also fulfill the
theoretical requirement of model identification. Statistical identifica
tion is insured because of the nonlinear first-stage technique in which
the selection terms are created.
Table 3 shows that nonearned income, education, and per capita
income significantly and positively increase the odds of working with
insurance (relative to not working) and without insurance (relative to
not working). The number of dependents tends to encourage working
without insurance. Some area variables such as per capita income
affect both working groups while others, the prevailing Medicare
charge structure (a proxy for medical care costs), affect one group and
not the other.
Second-Stage Results
We estimate the second state as a function of personal and area
characteristics. Personal characteristics include the number of depen
dents, nonearned income, education, race, age, a measure of health sta
tus (the number of ADLs), 5 MSA residency, and job-related traits:
industry and occupation (MANUF and PROF), job tenure, and location
(South). The education and tenure variables should account for a sig
nificant part of skill formation on the job and its associated "internal
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Table 3 Multinomial Logit Results of the Work Decision of Married
Women: Husbands with Health Insurance on the Job
Work with insurance
Work without insurance
Coefficient
Coefficient
Variable
(f-statistic) Marg. prob.
(f-statistic) Marg. prob.
CONSTANT
-4.65
-2.56
(-8.22)
(-49.1)
-6.E-06
-2.5E-05
NONEARNED INCOME
1.8E-04
0.000045
(-6.38)
(-3.41)
DEP
-0.35
-0.079
0.0125
0.048572
(-8.67)
(7.05)
EDUCATION
0.21
0.030
0.125
0.002632
(9.77)
(7.08)
BLACK
0.55
0.143
-0.171
-0.11262
(3.56)
(-0.80)
MSA
-0.215
-0.172
(-1.54)
(-1.37)
SOUTH
10.52
0.096
10.32
(1.68)
(1.25)
-8.2E-09
COUNTY POP
-9.7E-08
-2E-08
l.OE-08
(-2.30)
(-0.219)
PER K INCOME
1. IE-04
l.OE-05
1. IE-04
l.OE-05
(4.51)
(4.92)
RISK POOL
0.153
0.204
(1.06)
(1.597)
CONVERSION
0.69
-0.23
(-0.41)
(-1.62)
UNEMPLOY
-2.05
-0.68
(-0.79)
(-0.29)
TAX RATE
-0.009
-0.088
(1.42)
(-1 58)
MEDICARE CHARGE
4.4E-05
9.0E-06
1.7E-06
(3.22)
(0.14)
MD PER CAPITA
-30.66
-56.69
(-0.61)
(-1.24)
a Marginal probabilities are calculated for statistically significant coefficients.
Dep var. = 1
925
=2
1,384
=3
1,099
-21ogL
-3,110
Chi-square
30
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Table 4 Multinomial Logit Results of the Work Decision of Married
Women: Husbands Have No Health Insurance on the Job
Work with insurance
Work without insurance
Coefficient
Coefficient
Variable
(f-statistic) Marg. prob.a
(/-statistic) Marg. prob.
-2.70
-4.429
CONSTANT
(-3.27)
(-5.32)
-1.9E-05
NONEARNED INCOME -4. IE-06
(-0.69)
(-1.59)
0.03
-0.207
-0.041
DEP
(-0.67)
(-3.90)
0.002
0.11
0.240
0.039
EDUCATION
(4.05)
(8.35)
-0.120
-0.59
-0.091
BLACK
(-2.11)
(-0.15)
-0.109
-0.61
-0.29
MSA
(-2.41)
(1.20)
10.58
10.53
SOUTH
(1.24)
(1.23)
-8.4E-08
3E-07
1.8E-07
COUNTY POP
(2.95)
(1.35)
1.3E-03
PER K INCOME
1.7E-04
0.00001
(3.2)
(4.11)
-0.13
-0.19
RISK POOL
(0.21)
(-0.96)
-7.9E-01
CONVERSION
-0.31
(0.25)
(-1.26)
0.112
0.35
-0.397
UNEMPLOY
(3.31)
(-0.12)
-0.18
-0.030
TAX RATE
-0.095
(-1.83)
(-0.95)
-9.3E-06
-8. IE-06
MEDICARE CHARGE
(-0.43)
(0.39)
17.42
MD PER CAPITA
73.30
(0.227)
(0.98)
1 Marginal probabilities are calculated for statistically significant coefficients.
572
Dep var. = 1
=2
462
=3
420
-1,288
-2 log L
594
Chi-square
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wage rate." The final variable in the regressions is the selection term
that is derived from the first-stage results.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the results for the sample of women whose
husbands have health insurance. The results for women whose hus
bands work without insurance are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Tables
5 and 7 present results for wives without insurance. In these cases, the
attributes of the job that are estimated are confined to the hourly wage
and the earnings on the present job. For wives with insurance, addi
tional dependent variables include total annualized compensation and
two compensation share equations. The first of the two share equation
is the total annual health premium as a proportion of annualized com
pensation and the second is the employer contribution to the premium
as a proportion of annualized compensation.
An important reason to elect nonwage compensation may be its
nontaxed status. If taxes, which are unmeasured but correlated with
income, influence this decision, their effect should appear in the latter
measure, which considers only the tax-shielded portion of the insur
ance premium. Presumably, both the demand for health and the desire
for a tax shield increase with income.
For wives married to husbands with insurance, no coefficient on
any selection term is statistically significant in either Table 5 or 6. In
the case of dual coverage, Table 6, we observe only the standard human
capital effects on hourly compensation, earnings, and total compensa
tion. MSA residency, education, tenure, and professional status
enhance earnings, while women from the South have lower average
hourly wages than other women. There is also a positive relationship
between wages and nonearned income, which includes earnings of the
husband as well as household nonwage income. Generally, this corre
lation occurs because of marriage between persons with similar human
capital and socioeconomic backgrounds, rather than as a pure income
effect.
When we evaluate the shares of annualized compensation attrib
uted to health insurance and to the employer's contribution to insur
ance in Table 6, we observe an inverse relationship to tenure and a
positive relationship to dependents. Earnings increase faster than pre
miums with tenure, but education raises the premium relative to total
compensation. The former result suggests the limitations of trading
benefits for wages as total compensation increases. The latter result
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Table 5 Regression Results of Compensation
Equations: Wives Without
Insurance and Husbands With
Insurance, Coefficients (^-statistics)3
Variable

Hourly wage

Earnings

2.49
(2.67)

-9,390.85
(-5.02)

NONEARNED
INCOME

4.4E-05
(8.07)

0.065
(5.94)

DEP

-0.139
(-1.32)

-431.49
(-2.04)

ADL

037
(0.33)

-879.22
(-0.35)

AGE

-0.007
(-0.49)

-15.03
(-0.49)

BLACK

-0.181
(-0.42)

8.83
(0.01)

EDUCATION

0.22
(4.29)

672.46
(6.35)

PROF

1.92
(5.13)

1,712.02
(2.33)

MANUF

0.37
(0.33)

-80.45
(-0.09)

SOUTH

-0.57
(-1-95)

800.55
(1.37)

MSA

142
(4.65)

1,693.37
(2.78)

TENURE

0.132
(4.89)

224.24
(440)

LAMBDA

-0.34
(-1.37)

540.48
(1.09)

0.10
974

0.17
974

CONSTANT

R2
n

a The model contains a dummy variable for missing
data on TENURE.
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Table 6 Regression Results of Compensation Equations: Wives With
Insurance and Husbands With Insurance, Coefficients
(^-statistics)3
Hourly
wage

Employer
share

Premium/
comp

0.15
(6.64)
-5.4E-08
(-0.44)
4.0E-03
(1.67)

0.02
(6.55)
3.01E-08
(0.21)
0.02
(1.70)

-0.02
(-0.37)

-0.01
(-0.42)

50.92
l.OE-03
3.98
(0.37)
(1.09)
(0.33)
BLACK
1,119.67
l.OE-03
987.53
(2.16)
(1.07)
(-1.82)
EDUCATION
1,359.11
-0.34
1,285.97
(8.14)
(-0.24)
(6.34)
PROF
-117.18
55.16
-0.002
(-0.11)
(-1.41)
(0.64)
MANUF
-887.97
-1,455.08
-0.01
(-0.74)
(-1.48)
(-0.37)
SOUTH
-3.02
-0.01
-376.89
(-0.37)
(-0.37)
(-0.38)
MSA
1,966.65
-0.05
2,208.22
(2.18)
(-0.54)
(1.89)
TENURE
186.22
-0.01
978.53
(0.72)
(2.76)
(-2.20)
LAMBDA
-417.08
^28.36
0.0002
(-0.22)
(0.29)
(0.24)
R2
0.19
0.24
0.23
0.22
n
816
816
584
565
a The model contains a dummy vanable for missing data on TENURE.

5.5E-05
(0.13)
0.01
(0.45)
4.0E-03
(3.07)
-0.02
(-1.71°

Variable
CONSTANT

212
(2.03)

NONEARNED
INCOME
DEP

2.2E-05
(3.51)
-0.14
(-1.41)

ADL

1.32
(0.95)
0.01
(0.47)
0.55
(1.51)
0.36
(6.12)
1.08
(2.41)
-0.24
(-0.69)
-0.91
(-3.08)
0.91
(2.86)
0.12
(5.09)
-0.18
(-0.29)

AGE

Earnings
-168.62
(-5.79)

Comp
-2,954.70
(-3.64)

0.08
(4.77)
-3.02.22
(-0.37)
8,712.42
(0.37)

0.06
(2.48)
142.28
(0.31)
-892.58
(-0.44)

(0.01
(-0.42)
-0.10
(-0.42)
-3.04E-04
(-0.40)
-1 OE-04
(-1.83)
0.0003
(0.24)
0.06
634
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implies more educated women may demand greater amounts of cover
age on the job. We have controlled for age, the wife's disabilities
(measured by ADLs), and other income sources. Thus, the link
between education and selecting higher levels of coverage appears as a
direct one. Such a link is consistent with research on consumption of
medical services, suggesting that the higher productivity in health pro
duction caused by additional education is offset by greater demand
(see, for example, Newhouse 1993).
In Tables 7 and 8, we examine the outcomes for uninsured women
married to men without health insurance. Since no feasible substitute
exists, household demand for insurance must be met through the wife's
job. These women should be more responsive to the offer of insurance
than wives whose families obtain insurance through the husband's job.
First, we look at uninsured women in Table 7. Again, we do not find
the selectivity term to be significant, and standard human capital fac
tors explain hourly wages or earnings (e.g., education, tenure, MS A
residency). Earnings on the current job are also positively related to
other income.
The most interesting effects of employment/insurance choices are
found in Table 8. They pertain to insured women married to men with
out health insurance. The selection terms are significant in all equa
tions, those explaining elements of compensation and those explaining
premium shares. In each case the selection term is signed depending
upon the covariance of working with insurance and the continuous
dependent variable in the second stage. All elements of compensation
fall with greater values of LAMBDA, suggesting a willingness to trade
compensation for access to health insurance. The coefficient of
LAMBDA, the selection term, is negative in the equation explaining
the employer share of total compensation but positive for the ratio of
total premiums to compensation. Because the difference between total
premiums and the employer share is paid by the employee, it appears
that at least some of the net gain accruing to women who select longer
hours shows up in the employee's (taxable) portion of the premium.
Taken together, these results imply that wives who select jobs that are
tied to insurance earn less than the would otherwise earn and receive
lower annualized compensation than they would otherwise attain.
Moreover, they are even willing to settle for a relatively smaller portion
of compensation in the form of nontaxed employer spending on health
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Table 7 Regression Results of Compensation
Equations: Wives Without Insurance
and Husbands Without Insurance,
Coefficients (^-statistics)3
Variable

Hourly wage

Earnings

CONSTANT

3.14
(2.21)

-1,689.98
(-1.05)

NONEARNED
INCOME

1. IE-05
(109)

0.02
(1.97)

DEP

-0.16
(-1.17)

-166.29
(-1.06)

ADL

-1.09
(-0.28)

-102.67
(-0.25)

AGE

-0.02
(-084)

-7.82
(-0.32)

BLACK

-0.39
(-0.61)

368.62
(0.51)

EDUCATION

0.23
(3.09)

184.83
(2.17)

PROF

1.54
(2.00)

35.97
(0.04)

MANUF

0.27
(0.42)

1,156.92
(1.59)

SOUTH

0.43
(0.92)

-105.16
(-0.20)

MSA

1.25
(2.23)

-133.80
(-0.21)

TENURE

0.39
(3.21)

155.83
(2.04)

LAMBDA

-0.46
(-0.42)

-277.37
(-0-19)

0.06
323

0.18
292

R2
n

1 The model contains a dummy variable for missing
data on TENURE.
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Table 8 Regression Results of Compensation Equation: Wives With
Insurance and Husbands Without Insurance, Coefficients
(^-statistics)3
Hourly
wage

Earnings

Comp

Employer
share

Premium/
comp

CONSTANT

-0.08
(-0.06)

-11,283
(-3.09)

-9,558.97
(-2.11)

8.02
(7.67)

0.32
(8.37)

NONEARNED
INCOME

1.9E-05
(2.52)

0.05
(2.22)

0.06
(2.48)

-9.8E-08
(-0.97)

-2.3E-06
(-2.71)

DEP

0.15
(1.06)

370.09
(-0.95)

142.28
(0.31)

-0.01
(-0.75)

-3.0E-04
(-0.02)

ADL

-3.17
-(0.95)

-334.32
(-0.17)

-892.58
(-0.44)

-0.03
(-1 57)

-0.85
(-0.70)

AGE

-0.04
(-2.06)

27.47
(0.49)

-17.86
(-0.27)

-0.01
(-4-32)

2.0E-05
(0.09)

BLACK

-0.04
(-0.08)

^,440.41
(-3.30)

-3,479.51
(-3-47)

-0.01
(-1.03)

0.04
(0.93)

EDUCATION

-0.08
(-0.06)

-1-.511.63
(-8.18)

1,598 63
(6.72)

-0.08
(-7.05)

-0.05
(-6.51)

PROF

0.39
(0.87)

-286.05
(-0.23)

-1,515.59
(-1.04)

-0.01
(-0.66) •

0.04
(0.93)

MANUF

090
(2.08)

2,737.21
(2.71)

2,621.28
(1.69)

9.0E-04
(0.08)

-0.01
(-0.16)

SOUTH

-1.11
(-3.17)

376.63
(0.39)

519.69
(0.46)

0.01
(0.66)

-0.10
(-0.18)

MSA

-1.25
(-3.16)

3,025.24
(2.71)

3,079.95
(2.30)

0.01
(0.72)

-0.02
(-0.46)

TENURE

016
(5.57)

255.56
(3.14)

230.18
(2.42)

1.9E-05
(0.03)

-0.10
(-0.18)

LAMBDA

-2.97
(-2.42)

-17,013
(-5.01)

-16,487
(-4.03)

-0.07
(-1.99)

0.39
(2.12)

0.30
547

0.28
497

0.29
395

0.11
384

0.06
373

Variable

R2
n

a The model contains a dummy variable for missing data on TENURE.

346 Hunt-McCool, McCool, and Dor

insurance premiums. When given the choice, women whose husbands
are not covered on the job will prefer jobs tied to insurance offers,
despite certain costs. It appears that at least one motivation for select
ing such jobs is access to health insurance.

CONCLUSIONS: IT'S AS EASY TO FALL IN LOVE WITH A
MAN WITH HEALTH INSURANCE ...
Our findings confirm the important work of Moffitt and Wolfe and
the suggestions of others that labor supply is affected by insurance
offerings. Women in the United States appear to have two options to
obtain covers, the "correct" marriage or full-time work. Thus, the
Canadian system appears to be less intrusive than the U.S. system of
health care delivery, at least in terms of labor supply and, therefore, the
household's optimal division of time.
While health benefits in the United States and Canada have both
suffered from rising costs, the U.S. system also leaves prominent gaps
in coverage (see, for example, Levitt, Olin, and Letsch 1992; Woodbury and Bettinger 1993). We have investigated only part of this prob
lem—the necessity to constrain hours of work to some minimum
before a worker becomes eligible for health insurance. Indirect evi
dence about the sufficiency of full-time work as a means of obtaining
insurance may be discerned by comparing wives who hold insurance
with wives who do not. Part-time versus full-time work also predicts
the returns to education in the form of wages. Wages range from about
22 to 23 cents per hour per year of schooling for wives working with
out insurance (Tables 5 and 7). In contrast, for other wives, a year of
schooling generates 36 to 50 cents extra an hour (Tables 6 and 8).
Arguing that obtaining insurance through full-time work is a viable
option for all women may be equivalent to arguing that all women can
attain high-wage jobs.
What we have been able to demonstrate is that health insurance
affects the labor-supply decision and that a trade-off appears to occur
between insurance and wage compensation—at least for one U.S. pop
ulation subgroup, wives who are the sole source of health insurance for
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their families. Presumably, they represent the conditions under which
the majority of U.S. workers operate.
Since their complement, wives whose husbands have health insur
ance, depict the Canadian case, we conclude that at least some Canadi
ans are likely to choose to work fewer hours than their U.S. counter
parts, other things equal. The equality of other things depends particu
larly upon whether, in which direction, and by how much the health
insurance financing scheme in Canada affects labor compensation.
Crude evidence suggests that U.S. workers do spend more time than
Canadians in labor supply. If a part of this extra effort results from
constraints of the health delivery system, social welfare is also
reduced.

Notes
The views in this chapter do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. General Account
ing Office. We are indebted to William Alpert and Paul Menchik, whose careful com
ments and advice contributed substantially to the development of this chapter.
1. In fact, more women than men are covered by health insurance in the United
States. The disproportionate coverage by women occurs through public coverage.
Adult enrollers in Medicaid and Medicare are disproportionately female, and
women are more often than men covered as dependents on group policies.
2. Until recently, little empirical evidence has supported its existence. High-wage
workers also tend to have generous benefits, and it is difficult to disentangle all
aspects of employment in secondary databases (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1983).
3. In the example we present, we do not deal with issues of joint labor supply by
family members. Instead, we act as if male labor supply decision is predeter
mined and see how this insurance coverage affects the wife's decision to work.
4. We also tested the effect of the husband's health insurance coverage on the wife's
labor supply using an alternative multinomial choice model. All wives were
pooled and the choices they faced involved full-time work, part-time work, and no
work. A dichotomous variable for the insurance status of the husband was
included as an explanatory variable. Coverage for the husband was found to be a
significant inverse predictor of female labor supply. Because we can only observe
insurance premiums for those who obtain insurance, we could not use such a
model to determine if trade-offs between wages and health insurance exist, as we
can in the alternative approach presented here.
5. ADLs stands for Activities of Daily Living. These include maintenance activities
such as bathing, dressing, and eating. The number of ADLs is the number of
activities a person is unable to perform and is therefore a measure of disability.
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Changes in the size distribution of income during the 1980s have
resulted in a proliferation of new research on the distribution of income
and earnings (for a review of the work through the 1980s, see Levy and
Murnane 1992). Most of the recent work has focused on explaining
increased earnings inequality in the United States during the 1980s,
although Raj and Slottje (1994) found that the trend of increasing ine
quality extends back further.
Far less is known about the size distribution once employer-pro
vided nonwage benefits are taken into account. It is well-known, how
ever, that employee benefits are a significant part of total compen
sation—voluntarily provided employee benefits such as pensions,
health insurance, and life insurance accounted for 9.2 percent of all
employer expenditures for employee compensation in 1994, and
legally required employee benefits such as Social Security, unemploy
ment insurance, and workers' compensation accounted for another 7.4
percent of compensation expenditures (U.S. Department of Commerce
1998). Two issues need to be explored: 1) whether the picture of
income inequality would change if employee benefits were taken into
account and 2) whether changes in the mix of total compensation have
occurred concurrently with changes in income inequality, hence alter
ing the picture of changes in inequality over time.
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The basic difficulty faced by researchers who would like to include
employee benefits in estimates of income distribution is that few exist
ing household surveys record the employer contribution in dollar terms
for major voluntarily provided benefits, such as health insurance and
pensions. It is now relatively common for household surveys to record
whether a worker is covered by an employer-provided health insurance
or pension plan—for example, the Current Population Survey (CPS),
National Longitudinal Surveys, and Panel Study of Income Dynamics
all include questions on health insurance and pension plan coverage at
least periodically. Coverage data are little help, however, in gaining an
understanding of how employer provision of benefits (or changes over
time in that provision) might bear on the size distribution of income (or
changes over time in that distribution).
The lack of household data on employer contributions for fringe
benefits explains the scarcity of research on how benefits bear on the
size distribution of income. In what is, to our knowledge, the first
attempt to examine the issue, Tim Smeeding (1983) linked establish
ment data on benefit contributions from the Survey of Employer
Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEEC) to household data
from the CPS, thereby imputing the dollar benefit contributions made
in behalf of individual workers. Lack of data directly linking a worker
to employer contributions in that worker's name necessitated such an
imputation procedure, although it is clearly a less than ideal way of
understanding how benefits bear on income distribution.
In this chapter, we attempt to improve on Smeeding's work in three
ways. First, we make use of two household surveys that provide data
on concurrent health insurance contributions, accumulated pension
contributions made by an employer in a worker's name, or the pension
benefits that a worker can expect to receive from participation in the
pension plan of a current or past employer. The direct link between a
worker and his or her employee benefits is clearly a desirable improve
ment. Second, we examine inequality in both the joint distribution of
total compensation and the marginal distributions of the income com
ponents. In particular, we present a decomposition of the Gini inequal
ity coefficient that gives a rough idea of the contribution of each
component of compensation to overall inequality. Third, by using
more recent data, we are able to draw inferences on whether and how
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the role of benefits in contributing to income inequality changed over
the decade of the 1980s.
Others have attempted improvements on Smeeding's work as well,
although most have focused exclusively on the effect of pensions on
the distribution of income and wealth. For example, Benedict and
Shaw (1995) used the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to
examine how annual pension accruals (calculated as the annual
increase in the present value of pension wealth) affect the distribution
of earnings. They found that pensions increased annual income ine
quality slightly in 1983. (Our work using the 1983 and 1989 SCF,
reported below, differs from that of Shaw and Benedict by focusing on
pension wealth—and changes in pension wealth—between 1983 and
1989.) Several others, including Weicher (1997), Wolff (1994), and
Kennickell and Sunden (1997), have done work yielding results that
can be compared with those in our fourth section, and we draw those
comparisons below.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we briefly
describe the measures we use to make inferences about inequality. In
particular, we develop the decomposition of the well-known Gini coef
ficient. We show that inequality can be decomposed by component of
compensation into inequality within each component of compensation
and inequality across components. We use the Gini coefficient to make
these decompositions meaningful within and across components of
compensation.
The second section presents results on the distribution of compen
sation using current contributions to health insurance and pensions
from an old establishment data set—the 1977 EEEC survey. Oddly
enough, the EEEC remains the most recent establishment-level data
available. (The establishment-level data underlying the Employment
Cost Index have never been made available to researchers.) Although
dated, the 1977 EEEC do provide a useful benchmark because they are
the data on which Smeeding's inferences were based.
The third section examines the distribution of personal income and
employer contributions to health insurance plans using the 1977
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) and the 1987
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). These two surveys
were fielded to improve understanding of a broad array of health care
issues, but they can also be used to obtain estimates of the extent to
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which employer contributions to health insurance plans increase or
decrease the distribution of compensation.
In the fourth section, we develop estimates of wealth inequality
using the 1983 and 1989 SCF. Much previous work on wealth inequal
ity has been based on the SCF (see, for example, Kennickell and
Sunden 1997; Weicher 1995, 1997; Wolff 1987, 1994, 1996), and we
attempt to expand on this work by adding private pension wealth and
Social Security wealth to the measurement of wealth inequality. We
argue that, for two reasons, wealth holdings provide the proper context
in which to examine the influence of employer-provided pensions on
inequality in the distribution of compensation. First, annual pension
contributions in behalf of an individual worker are frequently unobservable (as with defined-benefit plans). Second, when annual contri
butions are observable (as with defined-contribution plans), they may
vary from year to year in ways that have little to do with the ultimate
generosity of the retirement income to be derived from a pension plan.
(The argument for using pension wealth and Social Security wealth in
gauging the extent to which pensions contribute to inequality is similar
to the argument for using Social Security wealth and pension wealth in
analyzing retirement incentives; see, for example, Burkhauser and
Quinn 1983; Quinn and Burkhauser 1983.)
One disclaimer needs to be made at the outset. We have not
attempted to adjust the dollar contributions to health insurance or pen
sion plans to reflect the "value" to the worker of those contributions.
Since there are both tax advantages and scale advantages to receiving
health insurance and pensions from an employer, dollar contributions
by an employer may understate the value to workers of employer-pro
vided nonwage benefits (see, for example, Smeeding 1983, pp. 243245; Famulari and Manser 1989). We defer an examination of these
valuation issues for the time being.

INEQUALITY MEASURES AND A DECOMPOSITION OF
THE GINI COEFFICIENT

In this chapter, we use three measures of inequality: 1) the percent
age of compensation (or a component of compensation) received by
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the top 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of the size distribution, 2)
the coefficient of variation, and 3) the Gini coefficient, including a
decomposition of the Gini. Although other measures of inequality
could be used, all three of these measures (except for the Gini decom
position to be developed next) are well understood and should provide
useful estimates of the extent of inequality of total compensation and
its components. (For an accessible discussion of a variety of other ine
quality measures, see Cowell 1977.)
As already mentioned, a decomposition of the Gini coefficient is
useful in showing how changes in the distribution of employee benefits
have influenced the distribution of total compensation. Yitzhaki (1983)
has shown that the Gini coefficient can be written as:
G(JC) = 2 cov[jt, F(*)] / n*

(1)

where F(x) is the cumulative distribution of x, and \LX is the mean of jc.
Note that this formulation is similar to the coefficient of variation: writ
ing the variance as cov(jc, jc), the coefficient of variation is cov(;t, x) m -r
M*-

Suppose now that total compensation (x) is composed of wage and
salary earnings (w) and employee benefits (b}\

(2)

x=w+b

Since cov(w + b, z) = cov(w, z) + cov(b, z), where z is a random vari
able, the Gini coefficient can be decomposed as follows:
G(JC) = 2 cov[w, F(*)] / M* + 2 cov[fc, F(jt)] / \JLX

(3)

Now multiply the first term by the following well-chosen 1,
cov[w, F(w)](lvv / cov[w, F(w)]\iw

(4)

where |ix is the mean of w, and multiply the second term by a similar
well-chosen 1,
, F(b)] M*

(5)
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where [ib is the mean of b, and rearrange terms to obtain
cov[w, F(x)] 2 cov[w, F(w)]
cov[w,

\iw

Lf(X) = ——————————• ———————————— •——

| c
cov[b, F(b)]

\\,b

(6)
v '

(I x

The first part of the first term {cov[w, F(x)] I cov[w, F(w)]} is the
Gini correlation coefficient of w (wage and salary earnings) with x
(total compensation), which we denote R^ This correlation has a mix
ture of properties of the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coeffi
cients. Specifically, it is Pearson in w and Spearman in x. The second
part of the first term (2 cov[w, F(w)] I \\,w ] is the Gini coefficient of w,
which we denote Gw. The third part of the first term (\\,w I \JLX) is the
share of wage and salary earnings in total compensation, which we
denote S^ Defining Rb as the Gini correlation coefficient of employee
benefits (b) with total compensation, Gb as the Gini coefficient of
employee benefits, and Sb as the share of employee benefits in total
compensation, we can rewrite Eq. 6 as follows:

That is, the contribution of each component of compensation to the
inequality of total compensation equals the Gini correlation between
that component and total compensation (/?,), multiplied by that compo
nent's Gini coefficient (G(), multiplied by that component's share of
total compensation (5,).

FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF EMPLOYER
EXPENDITURES FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION (EEEC)
The EEEC was a survey of establishments conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1966 through 1977. The 1977 EEEC
sampled 3,320 establishments of all sizes in order to obtain detailed
data on wages and employer contributions to employee benefit plans.

Employee Benefits and the Distribution of Income and Wealth

355

From our standpoint, the main advantage of the EEEC is that it
includes data on dollar expenditures by the employer on health insur
ance and pension plans, as opposed to just employee benefit coverage.
Hence, it allows one to examine inequality in the distribution of three
components of compensation: wages and salaries (or payroll),
employer contributions to health insurance (a category that includes
life insurance in the EEEC), and employer contributions to pensions.
We derive inequality estimates from a sample of 5,714 groups of
workers from the 1977 EEEC. It is important to understand that,
although the EEEC are establishment-level data, we actually observe
workers disaggregated into two groups in each establishment: blue-col
lar workers and white-collar workers. Hence, the unit of observation is
not the establishment per se, but either a group of blue-collar workers
or a group of white-collar workers observed in an establishment
included in the EEEC survey.
Table 1 displays the basic results on the distribution of total com
pensation from the 1977 EEEC. The average payroll per worker of
establishments in the survey was just over $12,500, average contribu
tions to health and life insurance were nearly $550, and average pen
sion contributions were just over $550. As Table 1 shows, the median
level of each of the three components is lower than the mean, suggest
ing positively skewed distributions.
All the measures of inequality—shares of the top 5 percent, 10 per
cent, and 20 percent, as well as the coefficient of variation and the
Gini—suggest that payroll earnings are the most equally distributed
component of compensation and that pension contributions are the
least equally distributed component. This finding accords with Smeeding's (1983) basic finding although, as already noted, Smeeding linked
the EEEC data with individual CPS data.
The evidence suggests that health insurance and pension contribu
tions are highly correlated with total compensation—the Gini correla
tion coefficient between health contributions and total compensation is
0.75, and that between pension contributions and total compensation is
0.76. The findings suggest, then, that health and pension contributions
both tend to increase the overall inequality of total compensation: the
Gini coefficient for payroll is 0.265, whereas the Gini for total com
pensation is slightly higher, 0.277.

Table 1 Distribution of Total Compensation, 1977
Mean ($)
____________(std. dev )
Total compensation
13,688
™
(6,040)
Health and life
insurance
contributions

,>44..

PenS1°" .
contributions

^l,
(770)

_______% Share of_______ Coefficient
Median ($) Top 5%
Top 10% Top 20% of variation
n^
lu
^
^
Qm

Gini
correlation

Share of total
Gini
compensation
coefficient____(%)

_

n '898

10- 8

19- 3

34- 2

°-481

°-995

0265

91.9

423

177

29.7

48.4

0.899

0.749

0473

4.0

267

26.5

42.6

64.7

1383

0.760

0657

4.1

SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of 1977 EEEC data on 5,714 worker groups in 3,320 establishments.
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FINDINGS ON HEALTH INSURANCE FROM THE MEDICAL
EXPENDITURE SURVEYS
In this section, we examine two surveys that combine data on the
income of individuals with data on employer contributions to health
insurance that were made for an individual. The first is the 1977
National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES), and the second
is the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES). Our goal
is to understand the distribution of employer contributions to health
insurance and the extent to which that distribution adds to or subtracts
from overall inequality in the distribution of compensation.
Data Sources
The National Medical Care Expenditure Survey (NMCES) is a
1977-1978 survey of roughly 14,000 households. It was designed to
obtain data on the health status, access to health care, and health insur
ance coverage of a representative sample of the civilian, noninstitutional U.S. population. The NMCES has two parts. The first part—a
household survey—contains standard data on demographic character
istics and personal income, as well as the data on health status and
access to health care that were the primary reasons for conducting the
survey (Kasper, Walden, and Wilson 1983). The second part—the
Health Insurance/Employer Survey (or HIES)—is a supplement to the
NMCES that is highly unusual in that it includes data obtained from
employers on premiums paid for the health insurance of each covered
worker in the sample (Cantor 1986).
The National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) is a 1987 sur
vey of roughly 14,000 households whose purpose was the same as the
1977 NMCES (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1991).
Like the NMCES, the 1987 NMES includes both a household survey
and a supplement—the Health Insurance Plan Survey (or HIPS)—that
includes data on the characteristics of the employer-provided health
insurance (if any) covering each worker in the sample. As with the
NMCES, these data were collected from employers and include the
premiums paid by employers for health insurance.
Data on workers' wages and salaries are nonexistent in the 1977
NMCES sample and limited in the 1987 NMES sample, a drawback
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when using these data sets for the purposes we have in mind. We are
forced to use personal income from all sources as a proxy for wage and
salary earnings. The availability of accurate data on employer contri
butions to health insurance is the overriding reason for using these data
sets.
To examine how employer-provided health insurance contributed
to inequality in the distribution of compensation, we select samples of
workers aged 25 and over who were employed full-year from the 1977
NMCES and 1987 NMES. We have attempted to create samples that
are as comparable as possible, but the questions on employment in the
two surveys differ somewhat. Specifically, the 1977 NMCES includes
a single variable indicating whether a worker was "continuously
employed," whereas the 1987 NMES includes a series of questions
(and variables) in each of four survey rounds on whether the worker
was employed or unemployed and the number of weeks of employ
ment. For the 1977 NMCES, we have included workers in the sample
who are defined as "employed all year." (The definition of this variable
is rather problematic. It appears to include both workers who were
employed continuously during 1977 and workers who were employed
at some time during 1977 but whose employment continuity was
unknown.) In the 1987 NMES, we have included individuals who
worked 48 or more weeks during 1987. It is impossible to know pre
cisely how comparable these two sets of inclusion criteria are, but we
believe that, given the survey questions, we have created two samples
that are as comparable as possible. Ultimately, we have used a sample
of 7,963 workers from the 1977 NMCES and a sample of 6,009 work
ers from the 1987 NMES. (For the 1977 NMCES, we use the WTINSP
weight; for the 1987 NMES, we use the INCALPER weight.)
Findings
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and various measures of the
inequality of employer contributions to health insurance, personal
income, and total compensation for 1977 (from the NMCES) and 1987
(from the NMES). As already noted, because the NMCES does not
include information on wage and salary earnings, we define total com
pensation here as personal income plus employer contributions to
health insurance.

Table 2 Distribution of Personal Income and Employer Contributions to Health Insurance, 1977 and 1987

Median ($)

Top 5%

% Share of
Top 10%

Top 20%

Coefficient
of variation

14,120
(13,238)
13,705
(13,141)
415
(527)

11,683

19.8

296

44.9

0.938

-

0.403

100.0

11,150

20.2

30.1

45.4

0.959

0.999

0.407

97.1

243

22.7

37.4

60.4

1.270

0.434

0634

2.9

27,547
(24,598)
26,334
(24,265)

23,000

17.6

27.4

42.9

0.893

-

0.375

100.0

21,802

18.1

28.0

43.5

0.921

0998

0.381

95.6

873

19.4

32.7

54.1

1.088

0.479

0.569

4.4

Mean($)
(std. dev.)
NMCES (1977)
Total compensation
Personal Income
Employer
contributions to
health insurance
NMES (1987)
Total compensation
Personal income
Employer
contributions to
health insurance

Share of total
compensation
Gmi
(%)
coefficient

Gmi
correlation

1,213
(1,321)

SOURCE: Authors' computations from samples of workers aged 25 or older and employed "full-year" in the 1977 National Medical
Care Expenditures Survey (Af=7,963) and the 1987 National Medical Expenditures Survey (Af=6,009).
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In 1977, the average personal income of full-year workers aged 25
and over in the NMCES was about $13,700 (in current dollars), and the
average employer contribution to health insurance was slightly over
$400. In 1987, the average personal income of full-year workers aged
25 and over in the NMES was about $26,300 (in current dollars), and
the average employer contribution to health insurance was about
$1,200. Thus, in 1977 employer contributions to health insurance
made up 2.9 percent of what we are denning as total compensation
(personal income plus employer contributions to health insurance),
whereas in 1987 employer contributions to health insurance were 4.4
percent of total compensation. This roughly 50 percent growth in the
share of compensation accounted for by health insurance closely mir
rors the economy-wide growth in the share of total compensation
accounted for by employer contributions to health insurance observed
in the National Income and Product Accounts from 1977 to 1987 (U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1998).
In both 1977 and 1987, the median personal income and the
median employer contribution to health insurance are well below the
means for either of these variables in both years, suggesting positively
skewed distributions.
Figures on the share of personal income and of contributions to
health insurance going to workers in the top 5 percent, 10 percent, and
20 percent of the size distribution clearly show that, in both 1977 and
1987, personal income was more equally distributed than employer
contributions to health insurance. The coefficients of variation and the
Gini coefficients for personal income and employer contributions to
health insurance provide the same inference.
However, total compensation is more equally distributed than
either personal income or employer contributions to health insurance.
The Gini coefficients for personal income are 0.407 (in 1977) and
0.381 (in 1987), and the Ginis for employer contributions to health
insurance are 0.634 (in 1977) and 0.569 (in 1988). The Ginis for total
compensation, however, are slightly lower than the Ginis for either
component—0.403 (in 1977) and 0.375 (in 1987). That is, even
though employer contributions to health insurance were more
unequally distributed than personal income in both 1977 and 1987,
health contributions were distributed so as to slightly lower overall ine
quality. Similar inferences follow from an examination of the coeffi-
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cients of variation and shares of total compensation going to the top 5,
10, and 20 percent of individuals. The distribution of health insurance
contributions reduces the inequality of the distribution of total compen
sation, even though it is less equally distributed than personal income.
The finding that total compensation is more equally distributed
than its components suggests both the importance of micro data in
drawing inferences about compensation inequality and the usefulness
of the Gini decomposition. Also, it accords with the rather low correla
tions between total compensation and health contributions—the Gini
correlation coefficients of health contributions with total compensation
are just 0.434 (in 1977) and 0.479 (in 1987).
The finding from both the NMCES and the NMES that health con
tributions are more unequally distributed than personal income accords
(in a rough way) with the finding from the EEEC establishment data
that health contributions are more unequally distributed than is payroll.
But the conclusion from the NMCES and NMES that health contribu
tions decrease overall inequality is counter to the analogous finding
from the EEEC establishment data. The result suggests both the
importance of micro data in drawing inferences about compensation
inequality and the usefulness of the Gini decomposition.
In contrast to many studies of wage and income inequality in the
1980s, the NMCES and NMES suggest that the distribution of personal
income became somewhat more equal between 1977 and 1987. (On
the distribution of earnings, see Levy and Murnane 1992; on the distri
bution of personal income, see Raj and Slottje 1994.) Given the pre
ponderance of evidence that the distribution of earnings and income
became less equal during the 1980s, we are unwilling to place much
weight on this interyear comparison. It seems likely that the result is
due to the difficulty we had in creating comparable samples of workers
from the NMCES and NMES. In other words, the finding that personal
income inequality fell between 1977 and 1987 should probably be
viewed as an artifact of the way we had to draw our samples.
To summarize, employer contributions to health insurance in both
1977 and 1987 were far less equally distributed than personal income
among full-year workers aged 25 and older. However, although very
unequal, the distribution of employer contributions to health insurance
was such that it slightly lowered the distribution of total compensation
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(defined as the sum of personal income and employer contributions to
health insurance).

FINDINGS ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WEALTH
DISTRIBUTION FROM THE SCF
In analyzing the EEEC data, we took the annual employer contri
bution to the pension plan as an accurate reflection of the pension
plan's generosity. But the annual contribution may vary from year to
year depending on changes in the performance of the pension plan's
assets or in changes in actuarial assumptions. Hence, the annual con
tribution to a pension plan may be a poor reflection of the plan's gener
osity, understood as the stream of retirement income that the pension
plan ultimately will yield. In order to obtain a more accurate picture of
how pensions contribute to individual inequality, it is necessary to con
sider the asset value of a pension plan—that is, the present value of the
promised future income stream to be derived from the pension.
In this section, we use the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer
Finances (SCF) to examine the distribution of retirement and nonretirement wealth (Kennickell and Shack-Marquez 1992; Fries,
Starr-McCluer, and Sunden 1998). We construct estimates of both pri
vate pension wealth and Social Security wealth and compare the distri
bution of these with the distribution of other more conventional forms
of wealth, such as housing and business assets. Our premise is that
wealth holdings provide the proper context in which to examine the
influence of employer-provided pensions on inequality.
Data Sources and Variable Construction
The 1983 and 1989 SCFs are a natural choice for studies of the dis
tribution of wealth, and they have been used in previous work on
wealth inequality (Wolff 1987,1994, 1996, 1998; Weicher 1995, 1997;
Kennickell and Sunden 1997). The SCF is an extensive survey
designed to estimate the wealth holdings of a representative sample of
households in the United States. It includes information on pensions
and retirement wealth, as well as data on conventional asset holdings
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such as property and financial wealth. In addition, the SCF includes
retrospective data on the employment histories of both the respondent
and spouse (if present).
The main strength of the SCF, from our standpoint, is its data on
asset holdings and coverage by private pension plans. Although asset
holdings and pension coverage are self-reported, inspection of the
questionnaire and the asset and pension data themselves suggest that
considerable lengths were taken to obtain a consistent picture of house
holds' assets and pension expectations. Also, the SCF's employment
data are sufficient to construct a reasonable approximation to Social
Security wealth, as described below.
We draw samples of households from the 1983 and 1989 SCFs that
mirror those used by Feldstein (1976) in his pioneering study of Social
Security wealth. That is, we examine all households in which there
was a male aged 35 to 64 present. This basic selection criterion yields
samples of 1,721 households in 1983 and 1,572 in 1989.
Three forms of wealth are of main interest to us: 1) private pension
wealth, 2) Social Security wealth, and 3) nonretirement wealth. The
first two are the main forms of retirement wealth held by households,
and the third includes all forms of conventional (or nonretirement)
wealth. We discuss the construction of variables measuring each in
turn.
Private Pension Wealth. The present value of expected annual
pension benefits for which a household is eligible represents that
household's private pension wealth. Private pension wealth must be
computed separately for defined-benefit and defined-contribution pen
sion plans.
For defined-benefit pension plans, we have calculated the present
value of 1) pension benefits that are expected in the future from current
employment, 2) pension benefits that are expected in the future from
past employment, and 3) pension benefits currently being received
from past employment.
For both men and women expecting to receive a defined-benefit
pension from a current job or jobs, we use the self-reported age of
expected pension receipt and the annual pension amount to calculate a
present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the expected
age at which benefits begin until age 100. We adjust each year's bene-
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fit amount for the probability of death based on the worker's gender
and age at which the benefit would be received (National Center for
Health Statistics 1984). We subtract the present value of employee
contributions (also adjusted for the probability of death) from the cur
rent year until the expected retirement age. Benefits and contributions
are discounted back to the present (1983 or 1989) at a rate of 9 percent
(the Federal Funds rate in both 1983 and 1989).
For both men and women expecting to receive a defined-benefit
pension from a past job or jobs, the procedure is similar. We again cal
culate a present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the
age when benefits are expected to begin until age 100, adjusting for the
probability of death in each year. We subtract the present value of
employee contributions (again adjusted for the probability of death)
and again use a discount rate of 9 percent.
For both men and women who are currently receiving pensions, we
calculate a present value of the flow of future pension receipts from the
current age until age 100, using a 9 percent discount rate and adjusting
for the probability of death in each year.
For defined-contribution pension plans, we follow Wolff (1987),
McDermed, Clark, and Alien (1989), and Kennickell and Sunden
(1997) in using the current amount reported in a worker's defined-con
tribution account as the measure of pension wealth. The dollar amount
in any profit-sharing plan held by the individual is also included as
pension wealth. The 1983 SCF includes information on one
defined-contribution plan from a current employer for each individual
(respondent and spouse) and up to three plans (either defined-contribu
tion or defined-benefit) for each individual from past employers. The
1989 SCF includes information on up to three defined-contribution
plans from a current employer for each individual (respondent and
spouse) and up to six defined-contribution plans for each individual
from past employers.
To arrive at a summary measure of private pension wealth for each
household, we sum the pension assets from all sources except for Indi
vidual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh plans. We treat IRAs
and Keogh account balances as a separate category of retirement
wealth, using the current account balances as the measure of wealth in
each.
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Social Security Wealth. The present discounted value of the Social
Security old-age benefits for which a household is eligible represents
the household's Social Security wealth. We compute Social Security
wealth in a way resembling the method Feldstein (1976) used with the
1963-1964 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, a survey
that is similar to the SCF used here.
For a respondent and spouse who are not currently receiving Social
Security benefits, we impute the expected annual Social Security
old-age benefit by assigning a Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) based
on the relative position of the individual's earnings in the earnings dis
tribution of workers of his or her age and gender. (Five-year age
cohorts of workers were used to avoid using distributions based on
very small samples.) Specifically, we use the worker's current earnings
unless the worker was not currently employed, in which case we use
the highest earnings from past jobs and bring them forward to the cur
rent year (either 1983 or 1989) using the wage index factor used by the
Social Security Administration (Social Security Administration 1984).
For each respondent and spouse, we obtain the relative position in the
earnings distribution that the individual occupied in his or her gender
and five-year age cohort. If this relative position in the earnings distri
bution did not change over the working life, then the individual would
be at the same relative position in the benefits distribution at the time of
retirement. Each worker's Social Security benefit was imputed from
the distribution of benefits paid for newly retired workers using the rel
ative position of each worker in the earnings distribution.
Each household's Social Security benefits are then computed from
individual Social Security benefits. For a single-worker household, we
sum the worker's benefit amount and the spouse's benefit amount
(one-half the worker's benefit). For a two-worker household, we take
the larger of 1) the sum of the benefit amount of the worker with higher
benefits and the corresponding spouse's benefit amount or 2) the sum
of the two workers' imputed benefit amounts.
To convert each household's benefit amount into household Social
Security wealth, we calculate a present value of the flow of future
Social Security benefits from age 65 until age 100. We adjust each
year's benefit amount for the probability of death based on the
worker's gender and age. (Also, we take account of expected widow's
or widower's benefits by calculating the joint probability that the
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worker will be deceased and the spouse will be alive and by applying
this probability to the worker's benefit amount*.) We assume that the
annual benefit amount grows at 4 percent per year from the current
year onward, and we discount benefits back to the present (1983 or
1989) at a rate of 9 percent.
For all households currently receiving Social Security old-age or
disability benefits, we use current benefit amounts to calculate a
present value of the flow of future Social Security benefits from the
current age until age 100. We adjust for the probability of death in
each year, allow benefits to grow at an annual rate of 4 percent, and
discount to the present at a rate of 9 percent.
Nonretirement Wealth. Most forms of assets and wealth as con
ventionally defined are included in nonretirement wealth. In particular,
we consider the following six types of wealth.
1) Housing wealth, which we divide into two components: a)
equity in the principal residence and b) equity in other real estate,
including up to four (in 1983) or three (in 1989) additional properties,
plus the amount owed to the household for land contracts (less the
amount owed on land contracts). For each property, we compute
equity as the difference between the current market value of the prop
erty and the amount owed on that property (using up to two mort
gages).
2) Business assets, or the net value of the household's share in up
to two (in 1983) or three (in 1989) businesses in which someone in the
household had an active management role, plus the net value of the
household's share in businesses in which no one in the household had
an active management role.
3) Life insurance, the value of which was calculated by taking the
cash value of straight (or whole life) insurance and subtracting the
amount of borrowing against the policy. (The face value of term insur
ance was excluded because term insurance is not a financial asset, in
that it cannot be borrowed against.)
4) Liquid assets, or the sum of the average balance in all checking
accounts, all money market accounts, and all saving accounts, plus the
dollar value of short-term certificates and certificates of deposit.
5) Stocks and bonds, or the sum of a) the market value of all
stocks, call money accounts, and stock and other mutual funds held, b)
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the face value of U.S. savings bonds, government bonds and Treasury
bills, state and municipal bonds, and corporate or foreign bonds held;
and c) the value of trust accounts and managed investment accounts
held.
6) Other assets, comprising cars (net of outstanding car loans) and
tangible assets (such as gold, jewelry, and other objects).
Our results leave out debt that is not part of any of the other wealth
category; that is, consumer loans, home improvement loans, credit card
debt, and other lines of credit are not taken into account in any way.
Findings
Tables 3 and 4 report descriptive statistics and various measures of
the inequality of wealth distribution from the 1983 and 1989 Surveys
of Consumer Finance. It is useful to first examine the shares of the
individual components of total wealth. The largest single component
of wealth is housing (27 percent in 1983, 30 percent in 1989), followed
by business assets (19 percent in both 1983 and 1989), private pension
wealth (17 percent in 1983,14 percent in 1989), Social Security wealth
(17 percent in 1983, 15 percent in 1989), and stocks and bonds (9 per
cent in 1983, 8 percent in 1989). The other main forms of wealth—liq
uid assets, life insurance, IRA/Keogh plans, and other assets—each
account for 5 percent or less of total wealth. In aggregate, retirement
wealth made up 35 percent of total wealth in 1983, 32 percent of total
wealth in 1989, and was split roughly evenly between private pension
wealth and Social Security wealth in both years.
The computed Gini coefficients suggest that all forms of assets are
distributed highly unequally, except for Social Security wealth, which
has Ginis of 0.334 in 1983 and 0.352 in 1989. Principal residence
housing is next most equally distributed, with Ginis of 0.561 in 1983
and 0.615 in 1989. Private pensions are the third most equally distrib
uted form of wealth, with Ginis of 0.739 in 1983 and 0.765 in 1989.
The distributions of business assets, stocks and bonds, and other real
estate appear to be most unequal, with Gini coefficients of 0.90 or
higher. Life insurance, liquid assets, and other assets have Ginis that
are in the middle of the pack. Substantially the same inferences can be
drawn from the share figures and the coefficients of variation.

Table 3 Distribution of Wealth by Component, 1983

Total wealth
Retirement wealth
Private pension
wealth
Social security
wealth
IRA/Keogh plans

Mean ($)
(std. dev.)
262,643
(916,406)
92,786
(107,363)
45,790
(91,122)
43,628
(27,346)

3,369
(23,421)
Nonretirement
169,857
wealth
(891,456)
Housing
71,830
(190,049)
Principal
49,584
(74,409)
residence
22,246
Other real estate
(158,257)
49,128
Business assets
(553,086)

Median ($)
147,273

Top 5%
36.3

% Share of
Top 10%
47.0

60,469

22.3

35.2

10,644

356

36,666

Coefficient
of
variation

Share of
total
wealth

3.489

Gmi
correlation
-

Gim
coefficient
0.578

53.2

1.157

0796

0.489

35.3

534

75.8

1990

0.726

0.739

17.4

13.5

23.5

40.2

0.627

0.632

0.334

16.6

0

705

83 1

955

6953

0.768

0910

1.3

64,072

49.5

61.0

73.8

5.248

0.955

0.713

64.7

42,082

35.0

47.0

63.0

2.646

0.873

0.619

27.4

37,098

26.2

38.4

55.7

1.500

0.800

0.561

18.9

0

67.6

83.4

97.4

7.114

0.819

0.910

8.5

0

82.6

93.8

99.8

11258

0.916

0.948

18.7

Top 20%
61.4

(%)
100.0

1.8
0.852
0.503
4.130
89.2
725
55.2
4,626
0
(19,103)
4.9
0.761
0730
3.409
78.9
61.2
45.4
12,881
Liquid asset
3,009
(43,906)
9.3
0.963
0930
20010
99.0
95.3
88.2
24,533
Stocks/bonds
0
(490,904)
2.6
0719
0621
4204
69.3
54.9
43.4
Other assets
3,650
6,859
(28,831)
SOURCE Authors' tabulations of 1983 SCF data on 1,722 households with a male aged 35 to 64 present. See text for variable definitions.
Life insurance

Table 4 Distribution of Wealth by Component, 1989

Total wealth
Retirement wealth
Private pension
wealth
Social security
wealth
IRA/Keogh plans
Nonretirement
wealth
Housing
Principal
residence
Other real estate
Business assets

Mean ($)
(std. dev ) Median ($)
362,183
185,571
(1,643,389)
114,887
72,646
(149,094)

% Share of
Top 5%
42.4

Top 10%
52.7

Top 20%

Coefficient
of
variation

65.7

4537

Gim
correlation
-

242

36.9

54.2

1.298

0.824

0.500

31.7

Gim
coefficient
0.622

Share of
total wealth
(%)
100.0

51,519
(123,461)

10,000

41.3

591

78.3

2.396

0751

0.765

14.2

53,558
(35,312)

44,329

139

23.9

410

0.659

0.594

0.352

148

0

58.2

739

91.5

4.114

0.773

0.869

2.7

89,809

55.0

65.6

76.6

6.518

0.969

0743

68.3

107,766
(512,182)

52,409

41.9

53.6

68 1

4753

0.894

0.676

29.8

68,825
(133,577)

41,000

30.0

43.3

59.8

1.941

0.796

0615

19.0

38,941
(459,591)

1,409

75.8

88.3

966

11.802

0869

0.928

10.8

0

91.4

98.1

100.0

17.365

0928

0.972

19.1

9,809
(40,350)
247,297
(1,611,928)

69,280
(1,203,050)

1.6
0886
0.546
6.731
91.8
74.1
59.8
5,886
0
(39,619)
4.9
0.824
0.799
6.545
855
72.7
58.8
17,865
2,800
Liquid asset
(116,921)
7.8
0.954
0.915
13.534
987
94.1
85.5
28,351
0
Stocks/bonds
(383,716)
5.1
0.774
0.786
78.4
9.933
672
56.4
18,148
Other assets
6,000
(180,269)
SOURCE. Authors' tabulations of 1983 SCF data on 1,722 households with a male aged 35 to 64 present. See text for vanable definitions
Life insurance

372

Slottje, Woodbury, and Anderson

Comparison of the Gini coefficients for overall retirement wealth
(0.489 in 1983 and 0.500 in 1989) with the Ginis for overall nonretirement wealth (0.718 in 1983 and 0.753 in 1989) suggests that retirement
wealth is considerably more evenly distributed than is nonretirement
wealth. The relatively equal distribution of Social Security wealth is
mainly responsible for this result. The Ginis for private pension wealth
(0.739 in 1983 and 0.765 in 1989) are similar to those for nonretire
ment wealth overall (0.713 in 1983 and 0.743 in 1989). Social Secu
rity wealth (with Ginis of 0.334 in 1983 and 0.352 in 1989) clearly
reduces inequality in the distribution of total retirement wealth. Again,
the share figures and coefficients of variation are consistent with the
Ginis.
However, the influence of private pension wealth on overall ine
quality is not simple. Substantially less private pension wealth is con
centrated in the top 5 and 10 percent of private pension holders than is
the case for nonretirement wealth overall. Also, the coefficient of vari
ation of private pension wealth is lower than that of nonretirement
wealth overall. But, as already noted, the Gini coefficients of private
pension wealth are slightly higher than those of nonretirement wealth
overall. It follows that private pension wealth tends to even out the
high end of the wealth distribution, but increases inequality below the
20th percentile or so of the wealth distribution.
A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that, overall, the distribu
tion of wealth grew more unequal between 1983 and 1989. With the
exception of IRA/Keogh plans and stocks and bonds, the Gini coeffi
cient of every category of wealth increased between 1983 and 1989.
The Ginis of principal residence housing, liquid assets, and other assets
increased especially sharply. The Ginis for both Social Security wealth
and private pension wealth increased moderately during the 1980s, and
the share figures suggest that much of the increased inequality of pri
vate pension wealth occurred because of greater concentration of pen
sion wealth at the very high end of the distribution (that is, above the
10th percentile).
It is useful to compare the findings in Tables 3 and 4 with other
empirical findings on the distribution of wealth. Kennickell and
Sunden (1997), Weicher (1995, 1997), and Wolff (1994) used the 1983
and 1989 SCF to examine nonretirement wealth and all found slight
increases (comparable to that which we displayed in Tables 3 and 4) in
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the Gini coefficients of nonretirement wealth between 1983 and 1989.
Kennickell and Sunden, Weicher, and Wolff all used more heteroge
neous samples that we do—we restrict our sample to households with a
male aged 35 to 64 present—and hence obtained higher Gini coeffi
cients than we do. The changes in the Ginis from 1983 to 1989 are
similar, however.
Other researchers have used the 1992 interview of the Retirement
History Survey (RHS) to examine the impact of Social Security and
private pensions on wealth inequality. Gustman et al. (1997) found
that Social Security reduces overall wealth inequality, whereas private
pensions increase overall wealth inequality. Gustman et al. found that
pensions account for 23 percent and Social Security about 27 percent
of total wealth—figures that are far higher than ours using the SCF.
McGarry and Davenport (1997) concluded that private pensions have
only slightly increased overall wealth inequality. Apart from the rela
tively high proportion of wealth that is accounted for by Social Secu
rity and private pensions (Gustman et al. 1997), the findings from the
RHS studies are broadly similar to those from our work with the SCF.
To summarize our results, Tables 3 and 4 show that there are five
major forms of wealth holding in the United States: housing (both prin
cipal residence and other real estate, which account for 27-30 percent
of all wealth), business assets (19 percent of all wealth), private pen
sions (14-17 percent), Social Security (15-17 percent), and stocks and
bonds (8-9 percent). The figures show clearly that business assets,
stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the principal residence are
the strongest contributors to overall wealth inequality (all have Gini
coefficients of at least 0.9), whereas Social Security wealth is the main
contributor to greater equality in the distribution of wealth (with a Gini
of 0.33 to 0.35).
Principal residence housing plays an intermediate role in the distri
bution of wealth. Principal residence housing has a Gini coefficient
(around 0.6) that is close to that of the total wealth distribution (when
Social Security wealth is included), although inspection of the wealth
share figures suggests that the distribution of principal residence hous
ing is equalizing at the high end of the total wealth distribution and disequalizing at the low end.
This leaves private pension wealth, which results essentially from
employer contributions to pension plans. The Gini coefficients associ-
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ated with private pension wealth (around 0.75) suggest that private
pensions do increase inequality in the total wealth distribution, when
total wealth is defined to include the present value of future expected
Social Security benefits. However, the Gini correlation of private pen
sion wealth with total wealth is relatively low: only the Gini correla
tions of life insurance and (in 1989) other assets with total wealth are
lower. Also, as noted above, the distribution of private pension wealth
tends to smooth out the high end of the wealth distribution. That is,
although the Gini coefficients of private pension wealth are slightly
higher than for nonretirement wealth overall, the coefficients of varia
tion of private pension wealth and the shares of private pension wealth
going to the top 5 and 10 percent of the distribution are lower than for
nonretirement wealth overall. This finding suggests that private pen
sions play an intermediate role in determining the distribution of
wealth. Although they clearly fail to help equalize the overall distribu
tion of wealth (as Social Security does), neither are private pensions a
driving force behind increased wealth inequality, as are business assets,
stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the principal residence.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

We have attempted to address a rather simple question: do
employer contributions to health insurance and pensions increase or
decrease inequalities in the distribution of compensation, income, and
wealth? Most existing evidence—and intuition informed by the obser
vation that highly paid workers tend to receive more generous nonwage
benefits—suggests that employee benefits tend to increase inequality,
but the answers we found are a bit more complicated.
First, we find that employer contributions to health insurance are
far more unequally distributed than is personal income (most of which
is earnings). Nevertheless, health insurance contributions are distrib
uted in such a way that they slightly reduce inequality in the overall
distribution of income (defined as the sum of personal income and
employer contributions to health insurance). We would not make too
much of this finding because the reduction of inequality accounted for
by health insurance contributions is small. It is clear, however, that

Employee Benefits and the Distribution of Income and Wealth

375

health insurance contributions made by employers, despite their highly
unequal distribution, do not exacerbate inequalities of compensation
and income. This is an unexpected result but one that is robust in both
the 1977 NMCES and the 1987 NMES (see the third section above).
Second, we find that employer contributions to pension plans are a
major form of wealth holding, about equal to Social Security wealth as
a proportion of total wealth, and surpassed only by housing wealth and
business assets. Stocks and bonds, the other major form of wealth
holding, are less significant than private pensions or Social Security.
Our main conclusion on the role of private pensions in the distribution
of wealth can be summarized in two parts. First, private pensions are
not one of the driving forces behind increased wealth inequality.
Rather, business assets, stocks and bonds, and real estate other than the
principal residence are the main contributors to wealth inequality. Sec
ond, it is clear that, when total wealth is defined to include Social Secu
rity wealth, private pensions do increase overall inequality in the total
wealth distribution. However, the distribution of private pension
wealth is quite different from that of overall nonretirement wealth.
Private pension wealth clearly smooths the high end of the wealth dis
tribution, increasing wealth inequality only below the 20th percentile
of the wealth distribution. Private pensions, then, seem to play an
intermediate role in determining the distribution of wealth. Although
they do not help to equalize the overall distribution of wealth (as does
Social Security), they are not one of the driving forces behind
increased wealth inequality, and they reduce inequality at the high end
of the wealth distribution.
What are the implications of these findings? Employer contribu
tions to both health insurance and pension plans receive favorable
treatment under existing tax law, and the continued favorable tax treat
ment of each is a key part of the ongoing debate over fundamental tax
reform (see, for example, Woodbury 1997 and the references cited
there). The main finding from the medical expenditure surveys—that
health insurance contributions have a slightly equalizing effect on the
distribution of income—tends to argue for continued favorable tax
treatment of employer-provided health insurance. It is not a strong
argument because the equalizing effect of employer contributions to
health insurance is not great. Moreover, the argument must be weighed
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against the various arguments for taxing employer contributions to
health insurance, most of which are based on efficiency considerations.
There were two main findings from the Surveys of Consumer
Finances: Social Security is the great equalizer of wealth and private
pensions are not a major force behind increasing wealth inequality.
There are two implications. First, Social Security's central role in
decreasing wealth inequality could well be an overriding reason to
avoid full privatization of Social Security because full privatization
would almost surely reduce the tendency of Social Security to equalize
the wealth distribution. Second, in that private pensions are not a
major force behind increasing wealth inequality, taxing employer con
tributions to pension plans would be a less effective wealth equalizer
than policies directed toward business assets, stocks and bonds, and
real estate other than the principal residence. Also, any increases in
wealth equality that might be achieved by taxing pension contributions
would need to be weighed against the decline in savings that would
likely result (Gale 1995).

Note
We are grateful to the William H. Donner Foundation and the WE. Upjohn Institute for
support.

References
Benedict, Mary Ellen, and Kathryn Shaw. 1995. "The Impact of Pension
Benefits on the Distribution of Earned Income." Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 48 (July): 740-757.
Burkhauser, Richard V., and Joseph F. Quinn. 1983. "The Effect of Pension
Plans on the Pattern of Life-Cycle Compensation." In The Measurement of
Labor Cost, Jack Triplett, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.
395^15.
Cantor, J.C. 1986. National Medical Care Expenditure Survey Health Insur
ance/Employer Survey Data: Person Record Public Use Tape Documenta
tion/or Premium Data and Benefit Data. Rockville, MD: National Center
for Health Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment.
Cowell, F.A. 1977. Measuring Inequality. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Employee Benefits and the Distribution of Income and Wealth

377

Famulari, Melissa, and Marilyn E. Manser. 1989. "Employer-Provided Bene
fits: Employer Cost versus Employee Value." Monthly Labor Review 112
(December): 24-32.
Feldstein, Martin. 1976. "Social Security and the Distribution of Wealth."
Journal of the American Statistical Association 71 (December): 800-807.
Fries, Gerhard, Martha Starr-McCluer, and Annika Sunden. 1998. "The Mea
surement of Household Wealth Using Survey Data: An Overview of the
Survey of Consumer Finances." Working paper, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, Washington, D.C.
Gale, William. 1995. "The Effects of Pensions on Wealth: A Re-Evaluation
of Theory and Evidence." Working paper, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C.
Gustman, Alan L., Olivia S. Mitchell, Andrew A. Samwick, and Thomas L.
Steinmeier. 1997. "Pension and Social Security Wealth in the Health and
Retirement Study." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 5912.
Kasper, J.A., D.C. Walden, and R. Wilson. 1983. National Medical Care
Expenditure Survey Household Data: Person Records Documentation and
Codebook. Rockville, MD: National Center for Health Services Research.
Kennickell, Arthur B., and Janice Shack-Marquez. 1992. "Changes in Family
Finances from 1983 to 1989: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances." Federal Reserve Bulletin (January): 1-18.
Kennickell, Arthur B., and Annika Sunden. 1997. "Pensions, Social Security,
and the Distribution of Wealth." Working paper, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, Washington, D.C.
Levy, Frank, and Richard J. Murnane. 1992. "U.S. Earnings Levels and Earn
ings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations."
Journal of Economic Literature 30 (September): 1333-1381.
McDermed, Ann A., Robert L. Clark, and Steven G. Alien. 1989. "Pension
Wealth, Age-Wealth Profiles, and the Distribution of Net Worth." In The
Measurement of Saving, Investment, and Wealth, Robert E. Lipsey and
Helen Stone Tile, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 689-736.
McGarry, Kathleen, and Andrew Davenport. 1997. "Pensions and the Distri
bution of Wealth." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 6171.
National Center for Health Statistics. 1984. Vital Statistics of the United
States, 1980, Volume II, section 6, Life Tables. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Quinn, Joseph F, and Richard V. Burkhauser. 1983. "Influencing Retirement
Behavior: A Key Issue for Social Security." Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 3 (Fall): 1-13.

378

Slottje, Woodbury, and Anderson

Raj, Baldev, and Daniel J. Slottje. 1994. "The Trend Behavior of Alternative
Income Inequality Measures in the United States from 1947-1990 and the
Structural Break." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 12 (Octo
ber): 479^87.
Smeeding, Timothy. 1983. "The Size Distribution of Wage and Nonwage
Compensation: Employer Cost vs. Employee Value." In The Measurement
of Labor Cost, Jack Triplett, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Social Security Administration. 1984. Social Security Bulletin Annual Statis
tical Supplement, 1983. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1998.
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States: Statistical
Supplement, 1929-1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Health Care Pol
icy and Research. 1991. National Medical Expenditure Survey, 1987:
Household Survey, Population Characteristics, and Person Level Utiliza
tion, Rounds 1-4 [Public use Tape 13]. Rockville, MD: U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research.
Weicher, John C. 1995. "Changes in the Distribution of Wealth: Increasing
Inequality?" Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 77(January/Febru
ary): 5-23.
____. 1997. "Wealth and Its Distribution, 1983-1992: Secular Growth,
Cyclical Stability." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 79(January/
February): 3-23.
Wolff, Edward N. 1987. "Estimates of Household Wealth Inequality in the
U.S., 1962-1983." Review of Income and Wealth 33 (September): 231256.
____. 1994. "Trends in Household Wealth in the United States, 1962-83
and 1983-89." Review of Income and Wealth 40(June): 143-174.
____. 1996. Top Heavy. New York: The New Press.
____. 1998. "Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Wealth." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 12(Summer): 131-150.
Woodbury, Stephen A. 1997. "Employee Benefits and Tax Reform." In Tax
Reform: Implications for Economic Security and Employee Benefits, Dallas
L. Salisbury, ed. Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute,
pp. 27-34.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo. 1983. "On an Extension of the Gini Inequality Index."
International Economic Review 24(October): 617-623.

Part IV
Pensions

379

10 Public Pension Plans in the
United States and Canada
Morley Gunderson
University of Toronto
Douglas Hyatt
University of Toronto
James E. Pesando
University of Toronto

Increased attention is being paid to the similarities and differences
between Canada and the United States in a variety of areas of social
policy. The similarities provide elements of a natural experiment to
facilitate controlling for the myriad of observable and unobservable
factors that can affect behavior. They also make it more likely that the
experiences in one country have relevance for the other country. The
differences provide variation in a number of factors that are of interest
for their possible impact on behavior. The differences are especially of
interest when they involve variables that are subject to a degree of pol
icy control.
These similarities and differences have been exploited in a number
of areas of social policy. Card and Freeman (1993) analyzed the
impact of differences in labor-market and social policies on various
outcomes, including wage and income inequality, poverty, union den
sity, unemployment, and immigration. Chiswick (1992) looked at the
impact of differences in immigration and language policies on such
factors as immigrant assimilation, fertility, domestic earnings, lan
guage fluency, and the economic returns to that fluency.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline important similarities and
differences between Canada and the United States in public pension
plans. While the focus is on public pension plans, brief mention is
made of private pensions, so as to put the public plans in perspective.
Particular attention is paid to the potential redistributive and incentive
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effects of the public plans, especially as they may shed light on the
trend towards earlier retirement.
The chapter begins with a description of the different components
of the Canadian public pension system, emphasizing features that have
potential redistributive and incentive effects. Private employer-spon
sored occupational pension plans are briefly discussed, and the impor
tance of both public and private pension plans are documented as
sources of retirement income. The extent to which public pension
plans serve to replace preretirement earnings is documented, as are
their potential redistributive effects. Intergenerational transfers
implied by the "pay-as-you-go" financing are then analyzed as is the
shift in policy emphasis from public to private pensions. A similar but
briefer description of the U.S. public pension system is provided, and
the similarities and differences are used to shed light on the trend in
both countries to reward earlier retirement. The paper concludes with
a brief summary of the salient points.

PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMS IN CANADA
The public pension programs provided by the Government of Can
ada consist of three components: 1) Old Age Security (OAS) payable
to all Canadians aged 65 and over regardless of means; 2) an incomestested supplement (the Guaranteed Income Supplement or GIS) pay
able, upon application, to recipients of the basic OAS pension who
have little or no other income; and 3) an earnings-related component
(the Canada Pension Plan or CPP) linked to an individual's average
lifetime earnings. 1 The basic features of these public pension programs
are summarized in Table 1. Unlike the situation in the United States,
health insurance is provided under the universal public programs in
each of the provinces, and coverage is unaffected by retirement status.
Old Age Security (OAS)
Old Age Security is a demogrant, financed out of general tax reve
nues and payable to those aged 65 and older and with 40 years of resi
dence. It is a flat-rate, universal benefit unrelated to work history. It

Table 1 Public Pension Programs: Government of Canada
Program

Nature

Benefit

Old Age Security (OAS)

Demogrant payable to those over 65 Maximum annual pension is
$3,472; fully indexed to CPI
subject to residency requirement;
benefits reduced for Canadians
with incomes over $39,911

Guaranteed Income
Supplement (GIS)

Income-tested benefit; recipient
must be over age 65 and in receipt
of OAS pension

Canada Pension Plan (CPP) Earnings-related; designed to
replace 25% of average lifetime
earnings, up to the average
industrial wage

Financing
General tax revenues

General tax revenues
Maximum annual pension is
$4,127; reduced by 50% of recipient's
income in excess of OAS benefits;
not taxable and fully indexed to CPI
Maximum annual pension is
$6,250; fully indexed to CPI

Equal employer/employee
contributions, set at 2.6% of
earnings between $3,300 and
$33,400

NOTE All amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents (U.S.) for each Canadian dollar, and pertain to January
1, 1994. The provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Ontano, and Saskatchewan provide income-tested supple
ments, thereby raising the guaranteed annual income of those aged 65 in excess of OAS/GIS benefits.
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began as a means-tested pension, introduced in 1927, payable to quali
fying individuals at the age of 70. By 1951, it had become a universal
flat-rate pension payable at age 70, and the age of eligibility was subse
quently reduced to 65 in concert with the introduction of the Canada
Pension Plan. The full OAS benefit is equal to $3,472 per year as of
1994. 2 (All dollar amounts hereafter are expressed in U.S. dollars, at
an exchange rate of 75 cents [U.S.] for each Canadian dollar.) Begin
ning in 1989, the OAS pensions of higher income Canadians have been
"clawed-back" at the rate of 15 percent after net income of $39,911 in
1993.
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
The Guaranteed Income Supplement is an income-tested transfer
payment given to residents of Canada who are in receipt of the basic
OAS pension and who have little or no other income. The GIS was
introduced in 1966. Like OAS, GIS is financed from general tax reve
nues. At the beginning of 1994, the maximum GIS pension was $4,127
for singles and $5,376 for married couples. The GIS places a floor on
the minimum income of those aged 65 and over. Unlike OAS and CPP
pensions, GIS benefits are not subject to income tax. The implicit taxback rate for GIS benefits is 50 percent; that is, for each dollar of
income (including CPP benefits) in excess of the basic OAS pension,
GIS benefits are reduced by 50 percent. 3
Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
The Canada Pension Plan (like Social Security in the United
States) is a mandatory, contributory, earnings-based pension that pro
vides coverage for the majority of workers. It was established in
(largely) its present form in 1965. The CPP is designed to replace 25
percent of a worker's average lifetime earnings for persons whose
earnings are equal to or less than the average industrial wage. For per
sons whose earnings are higher than the average industrial wage, the
CPP is designed to replace a smaller portion of their average lifetime
earnings. At the beginning of 1994, the maximum CPP benefit was
$6,248 per year, or approximately 25 percent of the average industrial
wage of $25,800. The maximum CPP benefit is paid to workers whose
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earnings equal or exceed the ceiling on contributions (the Year's Maxi
mum Pensionable Earnings, or YMPE) for each year during their work
lives.
The CPP is financed out of a payroll tax, with equal contributions
from employers and employees. In 1994, the contribution rate for
employers and employees was set for both at 2.6 percent of earnings
between the Year's Basic Exemption ($2,550) and the YMPE
($25,800).4 The average contribution was $680 in 1991. The contribu
tion rate is scheduled to rise steadily over the next 25 years, from 5.2
percent (combined rate) in 1994 to 10.10 percent in 2016 and to 12.73
percent in 2030.
Prior to 1987, CPP benefits were payable at age 65 (or later, at the
worker's option). Since 1987, CPP benefits have been payable at age
60, on an actuarially reduced basis and subject to the requirement that
the recipient is not working.5 The actuarially fair reduction is designed
to exactly compensate for the fact that the pension is received earlier
and for a longer expected period of time. In January 1992, the majority
of males who commenced receipt of CPP retirement benefits were
aged 60 to 64. Indeed, the number of males commencing receipt of
benefits at age 60 was only modestly less than the number commenc
ing receipt at age 65. For females, the early receipt of benefits is more
pronounced, with the number commencing receipt of CPP benefits at
age 60 exceeding the number commencing receipt at age 65 (Health
and Welfare Canada 1992, Table 8).
CPP benefits can be delayed until age 70, in which case annual
benefits are actuarially increased to compensate for the fact that they
will be received later and for a shorter expected period of time. After
the age of 70, there is no actuarial adjustment so that there is in effect a
penalty for delaying receipt after that age.
CPP benefits are fully taxable as a normal source of income. How
ever, there is no clawback if the person does not retire (after attaining
age 65) but continues to work and earn income. The only clawbacks
are indirect: CPP income is subject to income tax and if the person
continues to work, the person would presumably be in a higher mar
ginal tax bracket. As well, if the person continues to work, the person
is more likely to exceed the threshold level of income of $39,111 that
would subject their OAS income to the 15 percent clawback. More
importantly, if the person is eligible for the GIS supplement, the per-
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son's GIS benefits would be reduced by the 50 percent "tax-back" that
applies to income (including CPP income) beyond the OAS
demogrant.

Private Pension Plans (RPPs and RRSPs)
Canada's public and private pension system is generally described
as involving three tiers: 1) the universal Old Age Security component
consisting of the OAS demogrant and the possible GIS income-tested
supplement; 2) the Social Insurance component involving the manda
tory, earnings-based CPP which covers most workers; and 3) and
employer-sponsored, occupational Registered Pension Plans (RPPs).
The first two tiers are the public pension system, and the third is the
private pension system.
Private, employer-sponsored RPPs are financed by employers, usu
ally with employee contributions.6 In 1992, 38.4 percent of the labor
force were covered by such occupational pension plans, the coverage
being slightly higher for males than for females (Statistics Canada
1994, p. 16). In 1992, 90 percent of plan members were in defined-benefit plans, with 18 percent being in flat-benefit plans (predominantly in
the unionized sector) and 72 percent being in earnings-based plans
(usually dependent upon the individual's final years of earnings). Only
9 percent of plan members were in defined-contribution plans.
Although membership in both defined-benefit and defined-contribution
plans has been growing, membership in defined-contribution plans has
been growing at a faster rate.
Private, earnings-based pensions also exist in the form of personal
savings through Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) that
basically involve a deferral of taxes until the pension is withdrawn
upon retirement. These are earnings-based in the sense that (as of
1991) individuals are allowed to contribute up to 18 percent of their
earned income in the previous year. The maximum contribution for
1991 was $8,625 for individuals who did not have an RPP, or $8625
less what is known as the "Pension Adjustment" for those who belong
to an RPP. (The pension adjustment seeks to underscore the value of
the pension benefit carried during the year by a member of a definedbenefit pension plan. Technically, it equals nine times the benefit enti-
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dement less $1,000). In 1991, 24 percent of all tax filers made RRSP
contributions, averaging $2,172.
Contributions and Benefits from Pension Plans
As indicated in Table 2, among the different contributory pension
plans, the CPP has the greatest number of contributors, given the man
datory nature of such contributions. Private RPPs and tax-advantaged
RRSPs have considerably fewer contributors. The number of contribu
tors has grown most rapidly, however, for RRSPs. Although the CPP
involves the greatest number of contributors, it also involves the lowest
average contribution ($680) compared to average contributions of over
$2,000 for both RPPs and RRSPs. This smaller average contribution
for CPPs leads to lower total contributions for CPPs than for RRSPs,
which—in turn—are less than contributions for RPPs. From 1981 to
1991, the growth of total contributions has been greatest for RRSPs,
followed by the CPP and then RPPs.7
With respect to benefits paid under the different pension plans,
Table 3 indicates that the CPP and the OAS/GIS have the greatest num
ber of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries of the CPP have grown the most,
reflecting the aging of the workforce and the tendency to retire early
and receive the actuarially adjusted benefits after age 60. Average ben
efits are greatest for RPPs, followed by OAS/GIS, with CPP benefits
being the smallest. Total benefits, however, have grown the most under
CPP, reflecting the highest growth in both the number of recipients and
the average benefit per recipient.
Pension Income as Component of Retirement Income: Canada
The importance of the three public pension plans in contributing to
retirement income is shown in Table 4. In 1988, they accounted for 38
percent of retirement income for men and 50 percent for women. The
earnings-based CPP, however, constitutes a smaller component for
women than for men, reflecting the fact that women tend to have lower
earnings (and less continuous work histories) than do men. The OAS
and GIS benefits are not linked to labor-market earnings; hence, their
fixed nature means that, in combination, they constitute a larger portion
of the retirement income for women (40.0 percent) than for men (22.5
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Table 2 Contributors and Contributions of the CPP Relative to
Employer Private Registered Pension Plans (RPP) and
Earnings-Based Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs)
in Canada, in 1991
Public
(CPP)

Employer-based
private pension
(RPP)

Tax advantaged
savings (RRSP)

Number (millions)

12.0

5.3

4.6

Growth 1981-91

9%

14%

136%

Average ($US)

680

2,411

2,172

Growth 1981-91

151%

47%

46%

Total (million $US)

8,135

12,822

10,028

Growth 1981-91

173%

68%

245%

Contributors/contributions
Contributors

Average contribution

Total contributions

Working age population growth 1981-91,
Labor force growth 1981-91,

14.5%

16.8%

Nominal GDP growth 1981-91,

86.7%

Consumer price growth 1981-91,

67.2%

SOURCE: Calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1994, p. 9) Growth
rates calculated using the following data series from the Statistics Canada CANSIM
Main base: working age population, D767867; labor force, D767870; nominal GDP,
128026; and, consumer price index, P490000.
NOTE: All dollar amounts are converted to U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents
(U.S.) for each Canadian dollar.
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Table 3 Benefits Paid Under Public Pension Plans (OAS, GIS, CPP) and
Employer-Registered Pension Plans (RPP) in Canada, in 1991
RPP
CPP
OAS/GIS
Beneficiaries and benefits
Beneficiaries
1.8
3.7
3.3
Number (millions)
98%
108%
34%
Growth 1981-91
Average benefit
7,328
3,020
4,136
Average ($US)
99%
128%
63%
Growth 1981-91
Total benefits
13,083
11,171
13,571
Total (millions $US)
294%
375%
118%
Growth 1981-91
SOURCE: Calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1994, p. 14).
NOTE: All dollar amounts are converted to U S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents
(U.S.) for each Canadian dollar.

Table 4 Public Pension Income as a Percentage of Total Retirement
Income Males and Females Age 65 and Over in Canada, in 1978
and 1988
1978

1988

Men
Women
Women
Men
% Income derived from
29.1
17.2
36.2
20.8
OAS demogrant
10.9
5.3
11.0
5.6
GIS supplement
10.5
4.3
15.9
85
CPP public pension3
(38.4)
(50.5)
(51.5)
(34.9)
(Total public pensions)
23.1
11.6
8.4
16.7
Private pensions (RRP, RRSP)b
31.4
21.9
32.6
254
Investment income
14.0
4.2
5.3
19.5
Employment income
2.4
2.1
2.7
3.5
Other income
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total retirement income
SOURCE: Based on data presented in Galarneau (1991, p. 29).
a The CPP benefits include payments to surviving spouses, which amount to 32 percent
of total CPP payments in 1988.
b Private pension income includes income from employer-sponsored Registered Pen
sion Plans (RPP) and tax-advantaged private Registered Retirement Savings Plans
(RRSP).
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percent). This larger portion more than offsets the lower portion from
CPP income for women, so that overall pension income from the three
pension programs comprises 50.5 percent of the retirement income for
women, compared to 38.4 percent for men in 1988.
Because of their higher earnings and greater labor force attach
ment, the earnings-based occupational pension plans (RPPs) and earn
ings-based RRSPs also constitute a larger portion of retirement income
for men than for women. The same applies to employment income.
Table 5, based on more current and comprehensive data from the 1991
census, presents a similar picture.
Figure 1 illustrates that, between 1981 and 1991, there was a rela
tive decrease in the importance of the OAS demogrant and GIS supple
ment as a source of pension income, in contrast to the increased
importance of employer-sponsored RPPs and especially the public
CPP.
Table 5 Public Pension Income as a Percentage of Total Retirement
Income Persons Age 65 and Over in Canada in 1991
% Income derived from

Males

Females

Both sexes

OAS demogrant/GIS supplement

20.0

36.0

27.3

CPP public pension

15.3

12.6

14.0

(35.3)

(48.6)

(41.3)

(Total public pension)
Private pension (RRP, RRSP)

22.3

11.6

17.4

Investment income

19.1

25.9

22.2

Employment income

17.1

7.6

12.8

6.2

6.3

6.3

Other income
Total retirement income

100.0

100.0

100.0

Average income ($US)

17,699

11,255

14,018

SOURCE: Calculated from the individual files of the Public Use Sample Tapes of the
1991 Census of Canada, weighted by the Statistics Canada sample weights.
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Figure 1 Components of Pension Income in Canada, 1981 and 1991

1991

1981

OAS/GIS
52%

The Income Replacement of Public Pension Programs in Canada
The income replacement rate (i.e., the ratio of postretirement to
preretirement annual income) is a standard measure of the adequacy of
pension benefits. As indicated previously, the benefits delivered by the
CPP, the earnings-related component of Canada's public retirement
system, are modest. The CPP is designed to replace 25 percent of the
worker's average annual lifetime earnings, with a lower replacement
rate for persons beyond the average industrial wage. As well, there is a
maximum on the CPP benefit, equal to $6,248 per year in 1994. The
target replacement rate of 25 percent for the CPP indicates that the
CPP is to serve as only one component of the overall replacement rate
of 70 percent that is widely used in Canada as the goal for retirement
planning.
This fact, together with the flat pension provided through OAS and
the income-tested benefit provided by the GIS, implies that income
replacement rates from public pension programs will be high for lowincome Canadians, and low for high-income Canadians. This result is
readily confirmed by examining the income replaced through Canada's
public pension programs for individuals whose lifetime earnings equal
different fractions (or multiples) of the average industrial wage (Table
6).8

Table 6 Income Replaced by Public Pension Programs in Canada
Individual's earnings,
preretirement3

OAS
benefits ($)b

GIS
benefits ($)c

Nil

3,472

4,127

$6,450 (25%)

CPP
benefits ($)

Total
benefits ($)

Replacement
rate (%)

Nil

7,599

NA

3,472

3,346

1,562

8,380

129.9

$12,900(50%)

3,472

2,565

3,124

9,161

71.0

$19,350(75%)

3,472

1,784

4,686

9,942

51.4

$25,800(100%)

3,472

1,003

6,248

10,723

41.6

$51,600(200%)

3,472

1,003

6,248

10,723

20.8

$129,000(500%)

3,472
1,003
6,248
10,723
8.3
a The different levels of preretirement earnings represent the indicated fraction (enclosed in parentheses) of the average industrial wage in
Canada.
bAll amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents (U.S.) for each Canadian dollar, and pertain to January 1,
1994.
c GIS benefits are income-tested and reduced by 50 percent of income in excess of OAS benefits. In these illustrations, the recipient is
assumed to receive income only from the public pension programs. For the purpose of these illustrations, additional income-tested pen
sions provided by some provinces are ignored
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For an individual who earns the average industrial wage (i.e., with
preretirement earnings of $25,800 per year), 42 percent of their prere
tirement earnings would be replaced by Canada's public pension pro
grams. This ratio rises to 71 percent for those who earn half the
industrial wage and falls sharply to 21 percent for those who earn twice
the average industrial wage. The modest role of the earnings-based
CPP is further illustrated by the fact that an individual who qualifies for
the maximum CPP pension will also qualify for (partial) income-tested
GIS benefits, if the individual has no other source of retirement
income.
The OAS benefits shown in Table 6 are constant at the maximum
amount of $3,472 because the individuals are assumed to have no postretirement income other than public pension income and hence are not
subject to the 15 percent clawback. However, GIS benefits fall as pre
retirement earnings increase, because higher preretirement earnings
lead to higher CPP benefits and CPP benefits are included in the
income that is subject to the 50 percent GIS "tax-back." Therefore,
GIS benefits fall by 50 percent of the increase in CPP benefits. When
CPP benefits reach their maximum of $6,248, there is no further reduc
tion of the GIS supplement and it bottoms out at $1,003 as long as the
person has no source of income other than public pension income.
As a result of these opposing forces, total public pension benefits
are relatively flat and do not increase much for persons with higher pre
retirement earnings. Only earnings-based CPP benefits increase as
preretirement earnings increase, but these are capped at a fairly modest
level. The increase up to the cap is subject to the 50 percent "tax-back"
of the GIS supplement. The fact that OAS benefits are flat and that
CPP benefits are modest, capped, and effectively subject to the GIS
"tax-back," means that total public pension benefits do not change sub
stantially as the individual's preretirement earnings change. This
means that the income replacement rate is very high for persons with
low preretirement earnings and very low for persons with high prere
tirement earnings.
Clearly, the public pension system is very "progressive," yielding
relatively constant total benefits and hence high income replacement
rates for low-income individuals. Furthermore, the earnings-based
CPP component is relatively modest as evidenced by the fact that even
when the full maximum CPP benefits are received, individuals are still
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eligible for the income-tested GIS supplement if they have no other
source of income.

Intergenerational Transfers: Canada
The tax rates, explicit or implicit, to finance Canada's public pen
sion programs will rise sharply in the years ahead, to offset the aging of
the population and the increasing ratio of pensioners to active workers.
In 1966, when the CPP was introduced, the total contribution rate was
set at 3.6 percent, to be shared equally by employers and their employ
ees. This rate remained in effect until 1986. Since then, the CPP con
tribution rate has gradually increased, to 5.2 percent in 1994. This rate
is somewhat higher than the contribution rate that would have been
forecast for 1993 in 1966, the year that the CPP was introduced. This
result is due to subsequent benefit enrichments and "unfavorable"
demographic developments.
The CPP contribution rate is scheduled to rise to 10.10 percent in
2016, 12.73 percent in 2030, and 13.18 percent in 2040. 9 These
increases presume there will be no change to the CPP benefit formula.
However, two points merit attention. First, future generations of work
ers will be required to pay higher CPP contribution rates than does the
current generation of workers, with no increase in the benefit formula.
Second, there are no published forecasts of the implicit tax or contribu
tion rates for OAS, GIS, and the various provincial "top-ups." Since
these programs are also financed on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, however,
it is clear that the implicit tax or contribution rates necessary to finance
these programmes will rise as well.
With "pay-as-you-go" financing, each generation of workers pays
for the pensions of the previous generation. The security of CPP (and
other public pension) benefits is linked, ultimately, to the willingness
of the next generation of workers to pay the tax or contribution rates
necessary to finance the level of benefits promised to the current gener
ation.
Canadians born in 1920—who reached age 65 in 1985—will
receive far more in benefits from the CPP than they paid in contribu
tions. Canadians who were born in 1960—who will attain age 65 in
2025 —will also receive more in benefits than they paid in contribu
tions but on a more modest scale. For Canadians born after 1980, how-
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ever, lifetime CPP contributions are likely to equal or exceed CPP
benefits. The "pension crisis" thus reflects the concern that the next
generation of workers may choose not to honor the rules of the game
established by the current generation because the next generation will
be treated less favorably.
This likelihood of younger generations "breaking" an implicit
social contract established by older generations who will benefit by
such a contract is enhanced by a number of other factors. The younger
generations will also be experiencing greater pressure for health and
elder-care expenditures, associated with the aging population that is
also in receipt of the pension income. Pressure may be enhanced by
the possibility both of inheriting a large government deficit and assum
ing responsibility for substantial deferred wage obligations being paid
to public sector workers in the form of generous occupational pensions
and seniority-based wage increases and job security. Concern that
labor markets may not be able to absorb traditional immigrant flows
may lead to reductions in that source of labor-force growth that could
otherwise sustain pension obligations. The likelihood that the implicit
pension contract is not adhered to is also enhanced by the fact that the
"pension crisis" is not an exogenous unforseen event that leaves the
older generation no time to adjust.
Because of these and related considerations, there has been a pro
found shift in the past 15 years in the nature of the policy debate
regarding public pensions in Canada. In the late 1970s, the major issue
was whether or not to double the size of the CPP, as advocated by the
Canadian Labour Congress and other groups. This potential initiative
was debated at length in a National Pension Conference convened by
the federal government in 1980. In 1991, in sharp contrast, the Organi
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held a
major conference on "Private Pensions and Public Policy." The first
sentence in the "Foreword" to the conference volume (OECD 1992)
sets the tone for the current policy debate in Canada:
Government interest in relying more on private arrangements and
less on public pensions for income in retirement appears to be
increasing across OECD countries. Old-age pensions currently
are the largest social policy expenditure in public budgets, and
their share of public costs is expected to grow in the years ahead.
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Clearly, the potential financial problems and the intergenerational
transfers associated with public pension plans has redirected attention
from public to private pensions.

PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES
A brief treatment of the U.S. public pension system is given here,
highlighting the main similarities and differences with the Canadian
system.
Social Security (OASDI)
The United States does not have an equivalent of the first tier of the
pension system in Canada—a universal demogrant like the OAS and
income-tested supplement like the GIS. The U.S. Social Security
through Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), cover
ing over 90 percent of the U.S. workforce, is broadly comparable to the
second tier of Canada's system, the CPP. OASDI, which dates back to
1935, consists of three components: Old Age or retirement (OA), Sur
vivor (S), and Disability (DI) benefits. OASDI is financed by a payroll
tax with equal contributions by the employer and employee. In 1994,
the total contribution rate was set at 12.4 percent of earnings up to a
ceiling of $60,600. 10
The full Old Age Security retirement benefit is available to
employees who are fully insured by the year of their retirement.'' For
individuals born in 1937 or earlier, the normal retirement age (that is,
the age at which unreduced social security benefits are payable) is 65.
For those born after 1937, the normal retirement age is gradually being
increased. For those born in 1960 or later, the normal retirement age
will be age 67. Retirement benefits are available to individuals as early
as age 62 on an actuarially reduced basis. Benefits are increased for
those working beyond the normal retirement age, up to age 70.
The pension benefit is based on the worker's Averaged Indexed
Monthly Earnings (AIME) to which a formula is applied to determine
the Primary Insurance Amount (PI A). The PI A is subject to an annual
cost-of-living adjustment. Up to 85 percent of Social Security benefits
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are subject to income taxes for persons whose income exceeds a certain
threshold amount. The exact proportion subject to taxes depends upon
such factors as marital/tax filing status, and combined income from
earnings, tax-exempt interest, and social security.
Those who continue employment after commencing receipt of
benefits will have their benefit subject to a clawback. For those
between the ages of 65 and 69, the benefit is reduced by one-third of
earnings above $11,160 (in 1994). Those under age 65 experience a
reduction in social security benefits of 50 cents for every dollar of earn
ings above $8,040.
Fully insured individuals and their spouses qualify for health bene
fits under Medicare, which covers in-patient hospital care, home nurs
ing and health care services, and some types of hospice care.
Deductibles and coinsurance payments apply for certain services.
Those qualifying for Medicare may also opt (at a fee of $41.10 per
month in 1994) for supplementary health benefits which cover a num
ber of services not covered by the basic Medicare plan. There is an
annual deductible and coinsurance for most charges.
Family members of persons receiving Social Security are also eli
gible for partial payments. Eligible family members include: spouses
(including divorced spouses) who are at least 62 years old; spouses of
any age who are caring for a child under the age of 16 or caring for a
child who became disabled before the age of 22; unmarried dependent
children (and sometimes grandchildren) under the age of 18 (under age
19 if the child is still in high school); and children of any age if they
became disabled before age 22. The sum of these benefits are subject
to a Family Maximum Benefit level. If the Social Security recipient is
deceased, more generous survivor benefits are available to a slightly
broader group of family members.
Pension Income as Component of Retirement Income:
United States
Table 7 shows the relative contribution of OASDI benefits to the
incomes of older Americans in 1979, 1989, and 1992. The median
income level of those 65 years of age and older was $8,795 in 1979,
$10,765 in 1989, and $10,200 in 1992. OASDI benefits accounted for
about 42 percent of retirement income in both 1979 and 1992. The rel-
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Table 7 Contribution of Public Pension Benefits to Incomes of Americans
Aged 65 and Over, 1979,1989, and 1992
% Income derived from
Public OASDI
Private pension income
Investment income
Employment income

1979
42.7
14.8
21.5
17.3

Other income
3.6
SOURCE: Yablonski and Silverman (1994, p. 29).

1989

1992

38.6

41.7

17.5
25.2

20.1
20.5
14.8

15.8
2.9

3.0

ative share of income from investment was about four percentage
points higher in 1989 than in the other two years, presumably reflecting
the relatively high returns on investment vehicles experienced at the
time.
While definitional differences preclude strict comparisons with the
Canadian figures given in Tables 4 and 5, some comparisons can be
suggested. The share of retirement income derived from sources other
than public pensions are remarkably similar in the two countries. This
is best seen by comparing Table 5 for Canada with the latest year fig
ures in Table 7 for the United States. The components are usually
within 1-3 percentage points of each other. The overall public pension
components, at about 41 percent of retirement income, are almost iden
tical between OASDI in the United States and the combined OAS/GIS
and CPP in Canada. Because the OAS/GIS in Canada is almost twice
as large as the CPP component, this means that Canada delivers its
public pensions in a more "progressive" fashion—that is, universal
(OAS) and income-tested (GIS). As highlighted previously, the earn
ings-based CPP component in Canada is extremely modest.
The Income Replacement of Public Pension Programs
in the United States
The effect of this greater progressivity in Canada as compared with
the United States is highlighted when comparisons are made of the
extent to which public pensions replace preretirement earnings for
those who retire and have no further earnings. Like the Canadian sys-
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Table 8 Income Replaced by Public Pension Programs in the
United States
Individual's earnings,
preretirement

Nil
$6,450 (25%)
$12,900 (50%)
$19,350 (75%)
$25,800 (100%)
$51,600(200%)
$129,000(500%)

OA benefit ($)a

Replacement rate (%)

5,087
7,346

78.9
56.9
49.6
46.0
26.7
10.7

9,606
11,868
13,764
13,764

'The OA benefit calculation assumes that the worker retired at age 65 in 1994 with
average indexed annual earnings shown in the first column.

tern, the U.S. Old Age benefit program is designed to replace a greater
proportion of preretirement earnings for lower income workers. The
effect of this policy is demonstrated in Table 8, which shows the
income replacement rates for individuals with preretirement earnings
levels corresponding to the Canadian levels given earlier in Table 6.
Individuals earning the average Canadian industrial wage of $25,800
would have almost 50 percent of their preretirement earnings replaced
by the OAS benefit. The replacement rate is higher at 79 percent for
those earning one-quarter of the average industrial wage, and is lower
at 27 percent for those who earn twice the industrial wage.
While the U.S. public pension system has elements of progressivity, it is much less so than the Canadian system. For persons at onequarter of the industrial wage, the Canadian system replaces 130 per
cent of preretirement income, as compared with 79 percent in the
United States. For persons at twice the industrial wage, the Canadian
system replaces only 21 percent of preretirement income, as compared
with 27 percent in the United States.
Inter generational Transfers: United States
As of 1994, it has been estimated that the OASDI will require
funding from other government revenues by the year 2013 and will
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become insolvent by 2029 (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 1994). An increase in the contribution rate from the present
12.4 percent to 19.0 percent of earnings by 2070 would be required to
fund the benefits at current levels. No contribution rate increases have
been scheduled.
As a result of the 1983 reforms to the Social Security Act, the nor
mal retirement age of individuals born after 1937 has been gradually
increased. For those born in 1938, the normal age of retirement is 65
years and 2 months. For those born in 1960 and after, the normal
retirement age is 67. Assuming that the normal retirement benefit
remains at its January 1, 1995 level of $884, the impact of increasing
the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 has been estimated to result in
a reduction in the monthly benefit for an individual who chooses to
retire at age 65, with average indexed monthly earnings of $2,000,
from $884 to $766. This 13.3 percent reduction is due to the fact that
those retiring at age 65 will be doing so early, given the increase in the
normal retirement age to 67, and thus their benefit will be subject to the
reduction formula applied to the benefits of those who retire prior to
the normal retirement age. Similarly, those retiring at age 67 will
receive a 6 percent smaller monthly payment in comparison to the prereform benefit because the increase in benefits due to late retirement
would not be applied given the older normal retirement age (Salisbury
and Silverman 1994).

POTENTIAL INCENTIVE EFFECTS
While a full mapping of the incentive effects of the public pension
schemes in Canada and the United States is beyond the scope of this
analysis, some broad characterizations can be suggested. More com
plete discussions of theory and empirical research into the work incen
tive effects of social security benefits can be found in popular labor
economics texts such as Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) and Gunderson
and Riddell (1993), and they are also contained in broader reviews of
the pension literature including Mitchell and Fields (1982) and Lazear
(1986).
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Work Incentives
An analysis of the financial incentives contained in public (and pri
vate) pension benefits on the decision to retire from the labor market
typically begins by calculating the discounted present value of the
future stream of such benefits, commonly termed "pension wealth," at
different points in the lifetime of the worker. In essence, pension
wealth at time t is a measure of the future stream of pension payments
due to the worker if the worker were to retire or otherwise terminate
participation in the pension plan at time t. Other factors constant, it is
assumed that workers seek to maximize their pension wealth.
The period-by-period changes in pension wealth, termed "pension
accruals," embody the magnitudes of the financial incentives for the
worker to remain in the labor force earlier in the life-cycle and then
retire later in the life-cycle. For pension plans based on, for example,
average earnings over some number of years of pensionable employ
ment, an additional year of service generally brings about an increase
in the monthly benefit payable to the worker. This increases pension
wealth. Working against this, however, is the inevitable fact that every
year the pension plan member gets a year older and the remaining
years over which benefits can be received falls. In other words, over
any period of time, while the monthly benefit payable to the worker
may increase, the amount of time the worker has left to collect the ben
efit falls. As workers age, depending on the specific benefit formula of
the pension plan, the positive impact on pension wealth of labor-mar
ket work becomes increasingly offset by the reduced amount of time
remaining to receive the benefit. At some point, which again is influ
enced by the specific benefit formulae contained in the pension plan,
pension payments foregone by not retiring are not offset by increased
monthly benefits, and pension wealth accruals become negative—that
is, pension wealth falls with increased work. At some point in time, the
two effects are completely offsetting, at which point pension wealth is
maximized. Delaying receipt of benefits beyond this point is associ
ated with negative pension wealth accruals and, clearly, reductions in
pension wealth (see Kotlikoff and Wise 1987; Lazear and Moore 1988;
Pesando and Gunderson 1988; and Pesando, Hyatt and Gunderson
1992). Thus, as long as pension wealth accruals are positive, there is
an incentive to continue work, or stated differently, there is no pension
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penalty to continued labor market employment. Holding pension
wealth accruals constant, increases in pension wealth are expected to
be associated with younger retirement ages.
If Social Security benefits are unexpectedly increased, but the postretirement income clawback, the preretirement labor -market wage and
other factors are all held constant, economic theory predicts that the
retirement age will fall—that is, the increase in Social Security benefits
will have a pure wealth effect, encouraging workers to consume lei
sure. Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) estimated that unantic
ipated increase in Social Security wealth significantly increases the
probability of retiring earlier and significantly decreases the probabil
ity of retiring later, for a sample of men aged 58 to 63 in 1969. 12
Some public pension plans, like U.S. Social Security, have postretirement earnings tests such that pension payments are clawed-back by
some proportion for each dollar of labor-market income (usually over
some threshold amount). These earnings tests effectively reduce the
wage net of pension benefit reductions, thereby reducing the opportu
nity cost of retirement. Policies that reduce the clawback would
increase time in labor-market work, thereby increasing the expected
retirement age, but they would also result in greater wealth, thereby
reducing the expected retirement age. Which of the two effects domi
nates is an empirical question that Gustman and Steinmeier (1991)
addressed through a simulation analysis. Their results suggest that
eliminating the Social Security clawback would have a small positive
effect on the labor supply of those in the 65-69 age group.
In summary, Social Security can be expected to discourage contin
ued labor-market work (i.e., encourage retirement) both because the
income transfer enables the individual to afford to retire and because
the clawback reduces the net returns to continued work. The income or
wealth effect may be small because it is largely anticipated and hence
can affect labor-supply decisions throughout the life-cycle, not just
when the income is received after the normal retirement age. Never
theless, income that is guaranteed in the later part of the life-cycle can
be particularly important in facilitating retirement since it does not
require the uncertainty of liquidating assets to pay for retirement—
assets that can be bequeathed if not used and can be used up too
quickly if one lives longer than expected.
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While Social Security can discourage labor-force participation
after the age of normal retirement, it can encourage labor-force partici
pation in earlier stages of the life-cycle to build eligibility for the bene
fits. Furthermore, the wealth effects emanating from the intergenerational transfers can affect retirement decisions. Specifically, the
older generations who are recipients of the transfers can more easily
afford to retire. Future generations who are net payers may be less
likely to afford to retire.
As indicated previously, the Canadian public pension system has a
different set of incentives. The intergenerational wealth redistribution
effects are likely to be similar because both involve transfers from
younger generations to older generations. However, the more progres
sive nature of the Canadian system implies that lower income people in
Canada may more easily be able to afford to retire.
More importantly, the absence of direct clawbacks on CPP in Can
ada means that there are less disincentives to keep working past the
normal retirement age. 13 For lower income people who would other
wise receive the GIS supplement, however, the 50 percent clawback for
that component could discourage continued work. In essence, there
may be some tendency for the Canadian system to encourage retire
ment amongst lower income persons, both because the progressive
nature of the system means that they can afford to retire and because
the 50 percent clawback of the GIS supplement is likely to discourage
work most amongst low-income persons. Overall, however, the
absence of a direct clawback on CPP in Canada should mean that there
is more incentive to continue working and not to retire.
Interestingly, the United States appears to facilitate continued
working past the normal retirement age because of the legislated ban
on mandatory retirement. However, it discourages continued working
through the clawback of Social Security. In contrast, mandatory retire
ment in Canada is generally not banned 14; however, continued laborforce participation is not discouraged through tax-back features of the
public pension system (except possibly for low-income persons as
indicated).
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Payroll Taxes and the Demand for Labor
While most attention on incentive effects focuses on the labor-sup
ply side, the payroll taxes used to finance the CPP in Canada and
Social Security in the United States can also have important incentive
effects reducing the demand for labor. The issue is complicated, how
ever, by the fact that payroll taxes may be shifted back to labor in the
form of lower wages in return for the pension benefits that are financed
by the payroll tax.
Dahlby (1992), based on previous econometric studies, concluded
that in the short-run, workers bear less than 50 percent of the payroll
tax burden, increasing to at least two-thirds in the longer term.
Payroll taxes can affect the demand not only for the overall labor
input but also for the different components of the labor input. Specifi
cally, the ceilings on the payroll tax mean that the tax does not apply to
earnings beyond the ceiling. This can create an incentive for firms who
have employees at the ceiling to work them long hours (since no fur
ther payroll taxes are incurred) rather than to hire new recruits and to
incur the payroll taxes. In essence, the ceilings create an element of
quasi-fixed costs of employment that can discourage new employment
and encourage firms to demand longer hours from existing employees.
This can be a contributing factor, for example, to the tendency to work
incumbent workers overtime hours on a regular basis rather than hiring
new employees. Since the ceiling on CPP contributions in Canada is
reached sooner (i.e., at $25,800) than the ceiling on Social Security
contributions in the United States (i.e., $60,000), this constraint should
be more binding in Canada than in the United States.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

There is a clear trend to early retirement that exists in both Canada
and the United States. In both countries, in the immediate post-war
period, the labor-force participation rates of males aged 65 and over
were in the neighborhood of 47 percent. By the early 1990s, these had
fallen to well under 20 percent and closer to 10 percent in Canada.
Participation rates of older workers have consistently been higher in
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the United States than in Canada. Of note, however, is the fact that
after 1985, U.S. participation rates began moving upwards, while
Canadian rates continued their downward trend. Whether this reflects
the impact of the legislated ban on mandatory retirement in the United
States (a ban that did not occur in Canada) is an interesting and impor
tant question.
Overall, the following general conclusions emerge from this analy
sis.
• In addition to the earnings-based CPP (broadly comparable to
OASDI in the United States), the Canadian public pension system
also has a universal demogrant, the OAS, payable to all Canadi
ans 65 and over, and an income-tested supplement, the GIS.
• As a source of retirement income, the OAS demogrant and the
GIS supplement are more important than is the labor-marketbased, earnings-related CPP. In fact, the target income replace
ment rate of the CPP is designed to be modest, at 25 percent of
the average industrial wage. As a result, an individual who quali
fies for the maximum CPP benefit, but who has no additional
income other than the OAS pension, would qualify for some
income-tested GIS benefits.
• The U.S. public pension system of OASDI, which is broadly
comparable to the Canadian CPP, does not have a universal
demogrant like the OAS, nor an income-tested supplement like
the GIS. In spite of these differences, the public pension systems
in both countries are remarkably similar as a source of retirement
income, accounting for slightly over 40 percent of retirement
income in both countries. Canada simply delivers more of its
public pension under universal and income-tested components,
while the United States delivers its public pension largely through
the labor-market-related, earnings-based component.
• In both countries, the public pension systems are progressive or
redistributive in that they involve higher income replacement
rates for low-income persons and lower income replacement rates
for higher income persons. In Canada, however, this is much
more prominent. This reflects the fact that total public pension
benefits are almost constant with respect to income: the OAS
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demogrant is completely flat and the CPP component, which is
earnings-related, is modest, capped, and effectively subject to the
50 percent GIS clawback because CPP benefits are included in
total income for purposes of that clawback.
• In the United States, the continuation of working past a normal
retirement age is facilitated by the legislated ban on mandatory
retirement, but it is discouraged by the clawbacks on Social Secu
rity that range from 0.33 to 0.50, depending upon age and
income. In Canada, in contrast, mandatory retirement is not gen
erally banned, but continued work is also not discouraged in the
sense that there is no direct clawback from the CPP. There is only
an indirect clawback for low-income people in the sense that any
additional income (including CPP income) is subject to the 50
percent clawback of the GIS supplement.
• Payroll taxes that are used to finance public pensions can reduce
the overall demand for labor. The ceilings on such payroll taxes
can also create a quasi-fixed hiring cost that discourages new hir
ing (that would be subject to the payroll tax) and that encourages
working the existing workforce long hours (since no further pay
roll taxes are incurred once the ceiling is reached). The impact of
such taxes on the demand for labor, and on the demand for hours
versus new hires, is complicated by the fact that the cost of a
large portion of the payroll tax is ultimately shifted back to labor.
• In both Canada and the United States, public pension programs
contain significant intergenerational transfers, to current from
future generations, creating some uncertainty as to the willing
ness and ability of future generations to sustain future pension
"obligations."
These conclusions highlight the substantial degree of variation in
the key parameters of the public pension systems in the United States
and Canada. This variation can potentially be exploited to understand
examine the behavioral effects of public pensions in a way which is
seldom possible in a single jurisdiction, unless that jurisdiction experi
enced a major change in policy regimes. This echoes the sentiment
expressed by Card and Freeman (1993, p. 2) that, "(i)f one wants to
study the impact of differing unemployment insurance, income mainte-
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nance, or labor laws on economic behavior and outcomes, comparisons
of Canadian and U.S. experiences hold out the promise of relatively
straightforward inferences."
There are at least two areas of research on public pensions that
have the potential to realize some of the promise suggested by Card
and Freeman. The first is an examination of the comparative labor
demand effects induced by financing public pensions exclusively
through a payroll tax, as is the case in the United States, or a combina
tion of a payroll tax and general revenues, as is the case in Canada. It
would also be possible to examine the extent of disemployment in Can
ada that results from the quasi-fixed cost of hiring created by the rela
tively low payroll tax ceiling in Canada. These features have
competing implications for employment and hours. This first suggests
that Canadian firms will hire more workers than U.S. firms, while the
second suggests that rather than hire new workers, firms will try to
amortize the quasi-fixed cost of the payroll tax by working its existing
workforce longer hours. However, as we cautioned earlier, the impact
on labor demand of a payroll tax depends on the ultimate incidence of
the tax, which some evidence suggests may fall largely on workers in
the form of lower wages.
Second, on the supply side, useful research would consider the
impact of pension generosity on labor-force participation. It would be
expected that labor-force withdrawal rates would be higher for low
lifetime income earners in Canada than for their counterparts in the
United States. Confounding considerations, such as the fact that man
datory retirement is still permitted in some provinces, would have to be
addressed in the research design.
Both Canada and the United States have exhibited a dramatic trend
towards retirement as exhibited by the falling labor-force participation
rates of males age 65 and older. The role of public pensions (as well as
private pensions and mandatory retirement policies) in stimulating, or
facilitating, this trend remains an important topic of future research.
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Notes
1. The Government of Canada also provides an additional tax credit (equal in 1993
to 54 percent of the basic personal tax credit) for those age 65 or over and addi
tional tax credit for the first $750 of private pension income. In Quebec, the Can
ada Pension Plan is replaced by its equivalent, the Quebec Pension Plan.
2. There is also a Spouse's Allowance, which is income-tested and payable from age
60 to 65 to eligible widows, widowers, and spouses of OAS pensioners. In 1993,
the maximum annual allowance was $6,160 to spouses and $6,801 to widows and
widowers.
3. Additional income-tested benefits for those aged 65 and over provided by several
provinces are also exempt from the GIS tax-back provisions. Indeed, receipt of
GIS benefits is generally used as the eligibility criterion for these provincial sup
plements. As an example of a provincial supplement, Ontario paid a maximum
supplement of $83.00 per month in 1994 to single retirees through its Guaranteed
Annual Income System (GAINS) program The supplement is scaled down based
on a formula which takes into account other sources of income, such as interest
and dividend payments, foreign pensions, CPP benefits, employment income,
unemployment benefits, workers' compensation payments, and net rents from
property.
4. The self-employed pay both employer and employee contributions. The CPP also
contains death (including surviving spouse's) and disability benefits.
5. For those between the ages 60 and 65 who opt for early retirement, the normal
retirement benefit is reduced by 0.5 percent for each month that early retirement
precedes normal retirement to a maximum reduction of 30 percent. The worker
must have substantially ceased working, meaning that the worker's employment
earnings must be less than the maximum CPP benefit payable at age 65.
6. Of course, these costs can be shifted back to employees in the form of lower com
pensating cash wages in return for more generous pension benefits. Evidence on
such cost shifting in union-based flat benefit plans in Canada is given in Gunder
son, Hyatt, and Pesando (1992).
7. The contribution growth rate is expressed in nominal terms. This facilitates com
parison with the CPP growth rate, which reflects both increases in the earnings
base and increases in the contribution rate.
8. The retirement benefit payable under the CPP is linked to the worker's average
lifetime earnings, updated to the three years prior to the worker's retirement The
mechanics are as follows: The ratio of the worker's earnings to the YMPE (set
equal to one if earnings exceed the YMPE) is averaged for each year after the
worker turned age 18 (or 1996). The resulting fraction (or the value one) is multi
plied by the YMPE average for the year of retirement and the two previous years.
This is called the worker's Average Pensionable Earnings (AYMPE). The proce
dure, in effect, updates the worker's lifetime earnings to their current equivalent.
The worker's CPP benefit is equal to 25 percent of the worker's AYMPE. (If a
worker earned more than the YMPE in every year, for, example, the worker's pen-
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9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

sion would equal 25 percent of the YMPE in the years in which the worker was
63, 64, and 65. If the worker has contributed for more than 10 years, 15 percent of
the months in the contribution period can be dropped before the worker's AYMPE
is calculated. In effect, this allows the worker to eliminate the periods of lowest
earnings.
The contribution rates through the year 2016 were set in the 1990-1991 review of
contribution rates, per agreement among the federal and provincial ministers of
finance.
The self-employed pay both employer and employee contributions.
A fully insured individual is one who has (or whose spouse has) earned 40 credits
in the year in which they reach age 62. In 1994, a credit is earned for every $620
of employment earnings, up to a maximum of four credits per year. The amount
of employment earnings required to earn a credit increases annually, to reflect
changes in the average industrial wage.
For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Ippolito (1990). Krueger and Pischke (1992) find only small effects of increases in Social Security wealth on
labor-force participation of older workers.
As described earlier, to draw CPP benefits before age 65 an individual in Canada
must have substantially stop working.
Except in the federal jurisdiction, which covers about 10 percent of workers, and
in the provinces of Manitoba and Quebec.
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11 Current Policy Issues towards
Private Pensions in
Canada and the United States
Stuart Dorsey
Baker University

Public policies toward private pensions in Canada and the United
States share a common history and many current issues. Policymakers
and analysts in both countries view the retirement income program as a
"three-legged stool," with base incomes established by public pen
sions, supplemented by private pension benefits and individual retire
ment saving. Canada and the United States provide similar tax incen
tives for private pension saving, and both countries have regulations for
vesting, funding, and fiduciary behavior designed to enforce and pre
serve private sector pension promises.
Although basic private pension policies are similar, there are
important differences. Both countries limit tax-deductible contribu
tions and benefits, but the ceilings established by Revenue Canada are
considerably lower than those in the United States (although the differ
ence has shrunk over the past decade). Another significant difference
is the greater role for personal retirement accounts. Canadian Regis
tered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) have a longer history and
enjoy more favorable tax treatment than do Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) in the United States. An important tax distinction is
the greater responsibility placed upon actuaries by Revenue Canada to
determine minimum and tax-deductible contributions to defined-benefit funds in Canada. Internal Revenue Service rules, in contrast, disal
low contributions sufficient to fully fund future benefit obligations in
many plans.
The uniformity of pension regulations is another difference. Non
tax pension rules are primarily enforced at the federal level in the
United States, whereas pension regulation is a provincial responsibility
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in Canada. The result is that it is difficult to compare pension regula
tions in the United States with rules that differ between provinces in
Canada. Vesting rules, for example, vary between British Columbia
and Ontario. Also, only Ontario has mandatory pension insurance,
whereas all defined-benefit pension sponsors in the United States are
covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Canada and the United States share several current public policy
issues. One of the most important is the increasing tension between
policy goals of encouraging expansion of pension coverage and fund
ing, and of minimizing revenue loss of preferential treatment of pen
sion compensation. Both federal governments in recent years have
established minimum funding requirements, but they also have devel
oped regulations to discourage "overfunding" as a pure tax shelter.
There also is concern in both countries that increasing regulation will
continue to lead to the decline of defined-benefit pension coverage and
its attendant advantages over the defined-contribution approach. One
of the biggest public policy differences appeared in response to the
inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. The protection of pension ben
efits during an inflationary environment was the most keenly debated
public policy issue in Canada. In the United States, in contrast, infla
tion protection drew very little attention. Public policy in the United
States has been focused primarily on declining coverage, portability,
and the effect of the pension tax preferences on the distribution of the
tax burden.
This chapter compares public policies towards private pensions in
Canada and the United States and examines relevant policy research
from both countries. First, I review the evolution of private pensions
and policies in each country. Although pension policies are similar,
Canada (especially the province of Ontario) has tended to involve gov
ernment in the private pension system earlier than the United States.
Next, I describe and compare the most important pension tax and regu
latory rules. In the remainder of the paper, I examine four common
current public policy issues: coverage, portability, tax policy, and infla
tion indexing. The emphasis of this discussion is a review of relevant
research on Canadian and U.S. outcomes. The volume of pension
research has increased dramatically over the past two decades and,
although most studies have focused on the United States, pension
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research in Canada has made important contributions, especially on the
issue of mandatory inflation indexing.
The motivation for a joint discussion of private pension issues is
that a comparison of research may shed light on pension outcomes and
policy impacts in both countries. The similarities in pension systems
suggest that outcomes of research in one country will be applicable to
the other. Further, when possible, I try to identify differences in poli
cies and institutions that provide an opportunity for comparative analy
sis. For example, a major issue in the United States is the decline in
coverage rates. A review of Canadian coverage experience may inform
the extent to which this decline reflects policy changes or changes in
employment composition. Similarly, the continued popularity of
defined-benefit pensions in Canada may suggest reasons why definedbenefit coverage has declined in the United States. This issue also is
relevant in Canada, where many pension analysts are concerned that
regulations will result in similar trends there.

EVOLUTION OF PENSION POLICY IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Retirement programs and tax and regulatory policies towards pri
vate pensions have a similar history in the United States and Canada.
Both countries adopted universal public pension plans, extended favor
able tax treatment to encourage expansion of private pensions, and
later enacted broad regulations on pension outcomes. There have been
important differences, however, in the evolution of private pension pol
icies.
The first employer-sponsored pension in Canada was introduced
by the Grand Trunk Railway in 1874, followed a year later by the first
formal pension plan in the United States, sponsored by the American
Express Company. Although employment shifts from agriculture into
manufacturing created new pressures for explicit retirement saving
vehicles, pension coverage grew slowly in both countries before 1910. 1
The first legislation in either country to encourage retirement savings
was the Government Annuities Act of 1908, which authorized the
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Canadian federal government to sell annuities to the public at favorable
rates.
The period between 1910 and 1930 saw the widespread adoption
of pension plans by the largest employers in the United States and Can
ada. Graebner (1980) attributed much of the early growth to manage
ment's view that pensions could reduce labor costs by lowering turn
over and encouraging early retirement. The introduction of income tax
systems during this period also provided a stimulus to coverage in both
countries. The favorable tax treatment of pension contributions and
earnings that continues to this day was put in place quickly in the
United States. Payments to fund current retirement benefits were rec
ognized as legitimate business deductions at the outset of the corporate
income tax. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 explicitly exempted
the earnings of assets in retirement funds from taxation, and the Reve
nue Act of 1928 allowed pension sponsors to deduct contributions to
advance fund benefit accruals.
Employer contributions also were immediately exempted from the
Canadian corporate income tax. In addition, the 1919 Income Tax War
Act extended the exemption to employee contributions to pension
funds.
Rapid growth in pension plans and compensation during World
War II created fears that pensions were increasingly being adopted for
the purpose of avoiding income taxation. In the United States, the
result was the enactment of the first contribution limits in the Revenue
Act of 1942. This legislation also established the first nondiscrimination rules to prevent the adoption of pensions for the primary benefit of
high-wage employees. Employer contribution limits were first
imposed in Canada in 1947. Because tax-qualified plan limits on con
tributions and benefits in Canada have been strict, Canada has not felt
it necessary to adopt nondiscrimination rules.
A significant difference between tax policies is the more favorable
treatment of individual contributions to retirement funds in Canada
than in the United States. In addition to exempting employee contribu
tions from taxation, Canada established personal retirement accounts
in 1957. Canadian workers were allowed to make tax deductible con
tributions to RRSPs even if they were covered by a private pension
plan. In the United States, IRAs were not generally available until
1981 and were strictly limited after 1986.
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The existence and generosity of public pension benefits is an
important factor in private pension coverage. Canada first enacted
public pensions legislation in 1927. The Old Age Pension Act pro
vided federal assistance to provinces that delivered means-tested pen
sions to the elderly. By 1951, the view that means-tested pensions
were inadequate was widespread, and the Old Age Security Acts autho
rized a flat, universal retirement benefit. Canada did not adopt a uni
versal, earnings-related public pension until the Canada/Quebec Pen
sions Plans in 1965. The Canadian incremental approach is in contrast
to the United States Social Security program, which has been earningsbased since 1938.
Prior to the 1960s, private pension regulation was vested in each
country's federal income tax codes, which established conditions for
tax-qualified pension plans. The first important private pension regula
tions were approved in Ontario in 1963, establishing minimum vesting
rules, funding requirements and, most notably, requiring all employers
of more than 15 workers to provide pension coverage. Mandatory cov
erage was dropped with the revised Ontario Pension Benefits Act in
1965. However, the vesting standard of 45 years of age and 10 years of
service was preserved. Most of the provinces subsequently adopted
the major provisions of the Pension Benefits Act.
Significant pension regulation was not enacted in the United States
for another decade. The Employees' Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) was more ambitious than the Pension Benefits Act.
ERISA established standards for vesting, funding, and fiduciary behav
ior, as well as establishing a system of mandatory insurance for private
sector, defined-benefit plans. Ontario is the only province in Canada
that has mandatory pension insurance.
Several important changes in pension law were implemented in
Canada during the 1980s. In the late 1970s, interest in private pension
policy grew, as the ability of the public pension system to provide ade
quate income support for the elderly came into question. A number of
government and private sector commissions issued reports containing
various proposals for comprehensive pension policy reforms related to
issues of coverage, vesting, tax treatment, and inflation indexing. This
discussion has been referred to as the "Great Pension Debate," and it
contributed to the passage of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act of 1987.
This act reduced the minimum vesting period, required that vested ben-
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efits be locked in, and created options for transferability of benefits
under defined-benefit plans. All other provinces have adopted similar
regulatory legislation. A major change in the taxation of pension con
tributions was enacted in 1990, when the concept of integrated overall
limits for contributions to defined-benefit plans, money purchase plans,
and RRSPs was introduced.
Changes in pension policy were less extensive in the United States.
The President's Commission on Pension Policy (1981) called for man
datory pensions and improvements in portability. This report was
largely ignored, however, and there was no explicit national debate, as
compared with Canada, on the adequacy of retirement income. Pen
sion tax preferences, instead, were reduced in a piecemeal fashion.
Contribution limits were lowered several times, most recently in 1993,
and a controversial funding limit was adopted in 1987. In addition to
lowering benefit limits, nondiscrimination rules also were tightened.
The primary motivation for increased taxation of pensions was enhanc
ing federal tax revenue, and the preference of Congress for broadening
the tax base over raising marginal income tax rates. Critics of these
changes warned, however, that their cumulative effect would be greater
complexity and reduced attractiveness of pensions, especially definedbenefit plans.

PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARDS PENSIONS IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES
Among industrialized nations, Canadian and U.S. pension policies
are perhaps the most uniform. Tax rules and vesting and funding regu
lations are broadly similar. There are important distinctions, however.
Most notable are the integrated contribution limits that allow for
greater individual retirement savings in Canada than in the United
States and the provincial system of pension regulation, which allows
for differences in nontax pension rules within Canada.
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Taxes and Coverage
Tax codes in Canada and the United States both permit deductions
of employer contributions to pension funds from current income and
do not tax pension fund earnings until benefits are distributed. Favor
able tax rules clearly have been a stimulus to the growth of pension
coverage and assets. There is a tension in both countries, however,
between the policy goals of encouraging retirement saving and limiting
revenue losses. Therefore, both countries have ceilings on benefits that
can be provided under preferential tax status.
In the United States, defined-benefit plans cannot provide partici
pants with more than the lesser of 100 percent of the highest three-year
average earnings or $115,641 (in 1993). In addition, there is an overall
limit on annual compensation that can be used for benefit determina
tions. The compensation limit was lowered from $235,840 to
$150,000 in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Contribu
tions to pension funds in excess of these limits are not deductible.
Allowable contributions to defined-contribution plans may not exceed
25 percent of an employee's compensation or $30,000.
The contributions and benefit ceilings are lower in Canada. Under
rules adopted in 1990, the old system of separate limits for definedbenefit plans, defined-contribution plans, and RRSPs was replaced by
an overall contribution limit of 18 percent of earnings up to
Can$15,500. This figure was designed to correspond to a maximum
annual benefit of just over Can$60,000 per year and allowable compen
sation of Can$86,000 (Horner and Poddar 1992). An implied contribu
tion amount is determined for workers who participate in a definedbenefit plan. The total of this amount plus contributions to the definedcontribution pension could not exceed the 18 percent/Can$15,500 ceil
ing. (In 1995, the budget plan announced reductions in maximum con
tributions.) The idea is to apply uniform ceilings to workers, regard
less of the type of plan provided by their employer.
Both countries also limit employer contributions to fund benefits.
The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for the "normal cost"
plus amortization of any prior unfunded liabilities. However, contribu
tions to plans having assets equal to or above 150 percent of current
liabilities are not deductible.2 Further, the tax code limits the range of
actuarial assumptions that may be used to calculate pension liabilities.
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Thus, sponsors cannot avoid the 150 percent funding limit by adopting
a low discount rate.
Revenue Canada, in contrast, relies more heavily on the judgment
of professional actuaries in determining deductible pension contribu
tions. In Ontario, the Pension Commission of Ontario requires
defined-benefit plans to be evaluated by a pension actuary every three
years. The actuary's determination of the required contribution for full
funding is used by Revenue Canada to determine allowable deductions.
Contributions to pension funds determined to be overfunded are disal
lowed in Canada, as they are in the United States. It appears, however,
that the two countries apply different definitions of "fully funded."
Canadian actuaries are permitted to take into account future salary
increases as well as possible postretirement benefit increases; that is,
contributions are allowed to fully fund currently accrued benefits. The
full-funding limit in the United States, in contrast, applies to current or
termination liabilities, which can be substantially less than ongoing
obligations in periods of significant inflation.
Employee contributions in Canada are also generally exempt from
taxation as current income. In the United States, employee contribu
tions are deductible only in special 401(k) plans. 3 A more important
difference is the greater ability of Canadians to contribute to personal
retirement accounts. The overall contribution limit of 18 percent or
$15,500 also applies to RRSPs. Workers not covered by an occupa
tional pension plans may contribute up to this limit to their RRSP;
allowable contributions, however, are reduced dollar-for-dollar by
implied contributions to defined-benefit or money-purchase plans on
the employee's behalf. Contributions to RRSPs have grown rapidly
over the past decade. The proportion of tax filers who made RRSP
contributions rose from 13.8 percent in 1982 to 24.2 percent in 1991
(Statistics Canada 1992).
Individual Retirement Accounts were established by ERISA in
1974 for workers not covered by an employer-sponsored pension, but
American workers who were pension participants could not contribute
to a personal retirement account until 1981. Like Canadian RRSPs,
IRAs are nonforfeitable, fully portable retirement funds. The Eco
nomic Recovery Tax Act allowed all workers to make tax-deductible
contribution to IRAs. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 put limits
on contributions of workers who were otherwise covered by a pension.
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A married couple with adjusted gross income above $50,000 cannot
make tax-deductible contributions to an IRA.4
The most rapidly growing pension vehicle in the United States is
the 401(k) plan. Authorized by Congress in 1978, 401(k) plans allow
employees the option of making tax-deductible contributions to a qual
ified profit-sharing or stock bonus plan. Typically, the employer
matches voluntary employee contributions up to a percentage limit.
The maximum employee 401(k) contribution is $8,994 in 1993; other
wise, 401(k) plans are subject to the same rules as other defined-contribution plans.
In summary, contribution limits to tax-qualified pension funds are
stricter in Canada. Canadian workers, whether or not covered by an
occupational pension plan, however, have a greater ability to make taxfavored contributions to personal retirement accounts.
Vesting and Portability
Although personal retirement accounts are more important in Can
ada than in the United States, pension wealth overall may be less porta
ble in Canada due to the dominance of defined-benefit plans. About
one-third of all private pension assets in Canada reside in RRSPs or
money-purchase plans (Statistics Canada 1992). In the United States,
however, defined-contribution plans have grown rapidly and now hold
nearly 40 percent of pension assets (Turner and Beller 1992).
Portability of benefits has emerged as a major pension issue in both
countries, with much of the focus on early vesting. In 1987, the
Ontario Pension Benefits Act and the federal Pension Benefits Stan
dards Act established vesting after two years of service, and five other
provinces have since adopted this standard. Three provinces have a
five-year requirement, and Newfoundland applies the "10 and 45" rule.
In the United States, all defined-benefit sponsors are subject to the
same vesting rules, which generally require vesting after five years.
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act also enhanced portability of
vested defined benefits. Upon termination, the vested worker may have
the present value of his pension benefit transferred into another plan or
into a Registered Retirement Savings Plan. Generally, workers do not
have similar access to lump-sum benefits in the United States. As I dis
cuss in the next section, however, preserving the value of defined bene-
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fits depends less upon the portability of assets than upon the interest
rate used to calculate the termination value, and neither country
requires that distributions index for preretirement wage growth.
Portability outcomes also are a function of policies that encourage
personal retirement accounts or defined-contribution plans. Tax policy
in Canada is more favorable to RRSPs, but many analysts have argued
that tax and regulatory changes over the past decade are responsible for
the shift towards defined-contribution pensions (Clark and McDermed
1990). An indirect, and perhaps intended, effect of these policies has
been to make pension benefits more portable.

PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES
In this review I examine four public policy issues towards private
pensions that have been prominent in the United States and Canada.
The two countries share concerns about coverage, portability and pres
ervation of benefits, the role of tax policy in promoting pensions, and
inflation protection. My primary objective is to identify and briefly
review relevant pension research from both countries. Most of the
empirical research on private pensions has focused on outcomes in the
United States. A number of studies, however, on the Canadian system
have relevance for policy debates in the United States. In addition,
there may be opportunities for comparative analysis, which exploits the
different experiences of Canada and the United States, to improve our
understanding of the private pension system and the effects of tax and
regulatory policies in both countries. For example, research on trends
in pension coverage in the United States generally uses time series
methodology to evaluate the impacts of institutional, demographic, and
public policy changes. Since Canadian policies and coverage out
comes have been different, however, a comparative analysis should be
useful.
The discussion is organized around four policy issues: private sec
tor coverage, portability and preservation of benefits, pension tax pol
icy, and inflation indexing. I present an overview of the issue first,
describing recent or proposed policy changes in each country. A brief

Current Private Pension Policy Issues 423

review of relevant policy research is presented next. Finally, I discuss
some implications of cross-national comparisons and make some sug
gestions for further comparative policy research.
Pension Coverage
The most fundamental policy debates in both countries center on
the level of coverage. Governments in both countries historically have
promoted private sector pensions with favorable tax policy. Despite
these incentives, the expansion of coverage begun after World War II
has stalled, with cross-section coverage rates less than 50 percent in
both workforces.5 The percentage of employed, private sector workers
covered under an employer-sponsored pension plan is estimated to be
39 percent in Canada (Frenken and Maser 1992) and 42 percent in the
United States (Beller and Lawrence 1992).6 Incomplete coverage was
cited as the primary weakness of private pensions during the Canadian
Great Pension Debate. According to Sayeed (1984, p. 59), "The most
important issue in the debate on pension reform [in Canada] is whether
coverage should be improved by an expansion of the public system or .
. . of the private system." Most of the commission reports recom
mended expansion of private sector pension coverage, and one called
for mandatory pensions.7
Private pensions in the United States also have been criticized for
incomplete coverage. The President's Commission on Pension Policy
(1981) recommended mandatory pension coverage, and a 1988 report
of a Department of Labor advisory group also recommended consider
ation of, among other options, mandatory coverage. More recent crit
ics of incomplete pension coverage have made different recommenda
tions, arguing for repeal of pension tax preferences on the grounds that
the beneficiaries of pensions and tax preferences are disproportionately
high-income individuals (Munnell 1991, 1992; Gravelle 1993).
A particular concern in the United States has been the apparent
decline in private pension coverage since the late 1970s. Table 1 shows
coverage rates declining slightly between 1979 and 1988. 8 However,
these averages mask two significant trends: an increase in pension cov
erage for women and a decline for younger males. Even and Macpherson (1994) calculated that coverage rates for females rose by more than
6 percentage points between 1979 and 1988; whereas, over the same
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Table 1 Pension Coverage Rates, Canada and the United States (%)
____ ____United States ____ ___
Canada
Civilian, public and
Civilian, public and
Year____Private sector______private sector_______private sector
1979
43
46
1982
46.5
1983
41
43

1984
1986
1988
1990
1992

42

42

47.3
46.0
44.9
44.8
47.5

SOURCE. United States: estimates based on tabulations from May supplements to
Current Populations Surveys by Beller and Lawrence (1992) for private sector and
Piacentini (1989) for all civilian workers. Canada- Statistics Canada (1992).

period, the coverage rate fell 1.6 points for males between the ages of
35 and 55 and 6.6 points for males aged 21-35. Bloom and Freeman
(1992) reported similar results.
Coverage rates in Canada appear to have been stable in compari
son. Such a conclusion may be misleading, however. First, the source
of time-series data on coverage rates in Canada is administrative data
provided by plan sponsors, and coverage rate estimates from similar
data in the United States also show stable private-sector coverage rates
over the past decade, at about 46 percent (Beller and Lawrence 1992).
Evidence for declining coverage rates in the United States has come
from household surveys. A comparable trend might be found in Can
ada if household surveys were regularly repeated. Second, the stable
coverage rates reported for Canada in Table 1 combine private and
public sector employees. Unfortunately, an analysis of private sector
coverage trends is not possible with Canadian data. 9
More directly comparable are coverage rates for all civilians.
Table 1 shows falling civilian coverage rates in the United States (see
also Andrews 1985; Parsons 1991) relative to Canada. However, a
given downward trend in private sector coverage would show less of an
impact on civilian coverage rates in Canada because the proportion of
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covered public sector workers is greater in Canada than it is in the
United States.
Why Has Coverage Declined? Several studies have examined the
decline in male coverage rates in the United States. The two most
widely cited explanations are structural changes in the labor market,
and changes in tax and pension policy. The first explanation argues
that coverage declined because employment shifted to labor markets
with traditionally low coverage rates: small, nonunion firms in service
industries. Another possibility, however, is that coverage declined due
to increased regulatory costs, reductions in marginal tax rates, and the
introduction of pension plans in which employee participation is vol
untary. The results of these studies are relevant to Canada. Although
overall civilian coverage rates have not declined, common trends are at
work. Coverage rates for Canadian men declined slightly, from 53.7
percent to 51.8 percent between 1982 and 1992, while the coverage
rate for females was up about 6 percentage points. There also is con
cern that new Canadian pension regulations may reduce coverage (see
discussion in Frenken and Maser 1992).
Investigations of declining coverage in the United States build
upon cross-section studies of the determinants of pension coverage.
These studies have consistently shown that the probability of having a
pension is higher for individuals who are union members and are
employed by large, manufacturing-based firms (Mitchell and Andrews
1981; Dorsey 1982; Even and Macpherson 1994; Parsons 1994).
Although the determinants of pension coverage in Canada have
received less attention, the cross-section pattern is similar to that of the
United States (Frenken and Maser 1992; Smith and Meng 1991; Currie
and Chaykowski 1993).
On the basis of these patterns, Bloom and Freeman (1992) and
Even and Macpherson (1994) attributed most of the decline in pension
coverage to shrinking union membership, manufacturing employment,
and increases in the relative importance of small firms.
Cross-section estimates also suggest that earnings and marginal tax
rates are important determinants of pension coverage in the United
States (Alpert 1983; Long and Scott 1982; Woodbury and Bettinger
1991). Currie and Chaykowski (1993) and Smith and Meng (1991)
found coverage to be strongly related to earnings for Canadian workers
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as well. These results suggest that reduction in marginal tax rates dur
ing the 1980s may have lowered coverage rates in the United States.
Bloom and Freeman argued that tax cuts could not explain the drop in
coverage for younger, lower income workers because their tax rates
declined the least. When the pension coverage decision is viewed in a
lifetime context, however, tax cuts should have the greatest effect on
younger workers. Older covered workers would have little incentive to
drop pension coverage, but forward-looking younger workers would
anticipate lower lifetime tax savings if the tax cuts were viewed as per
manent.
Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) estimated that the decline in the
tax price of pensions, due to reductions in marginal tax rates, explained
about one-third of the drop in coverage between 1979 and 1988 and
was nearly as important as declining union membership. Reagan and
Turner (2000) attributed about one-fourth of the decline in coverage for
young males to tax effects.
Even and Macpherson also argued that much of the fall in coverage
for young males was due to the introduction of 401(k) plans, which
allow workers to voluntarily participate. Their estimates indicated that
the pension offer rate did not decline, but that the acceptance rate,
given that a pension was in place, fell. Note that this theory also is
consistent with the view that coverage fell due to an increased regula
tory burden. Under this view, higher regulatory costs for defined-benefit plans induced employers to adopt 401(k) plans, indirectly leading to
lower coverage rates.
This result is relevant for Canada, given the generous contribution
limits for voluntary RRSPs. There is a corresponding concern that
higher regulatory costs of defined-benefits will lead to substitution of
voluntary pension coverage for defined-benefit plans (Hirst 1992),
which could lead to similar reductions in coverage for young males in
Canada.
A test of the 401(k) explanation for declining coverage would be a
comparison of trends in coverage for young males in Canada and the
United States. This theory predicts that coverage rates for young males
should have declined less in Canada because RRSP limits were raised
well after 401(k) plans were introduced. Unfortunately, there are no
repeated household surveys that allow comparisons of coverage rates
by age over time in Canada.
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Another factor consistent with greater declines in coverage in the
United States for all workers is the greater decline in unionization than
in Canada.
Changes in Coverage Type. The structure of pension coverage
also has changed dramatically in the United States. The percentage of
covered workers who had a primary defined-benefit plan fell from 87
percent in 1975 to 68 percent in 1987. A similar decline has not been
found in Canada: 94 percent of covered workers had a defined-benefit
plan in 1982, as compared with 90 percent in 1992. Again, a time
series on only private sector, defined-benefit coverage rates is not pos
sible in Canada. But, given that about half of all covered workers are
private sector employees, a decline in private sector, defined-benefit
coverage similar to the United States would have lowered the overall
defined benefit rate by more than 4 percentage points.
The shift in coverage type has become an important policy issue in
the United States. Some analysts are concerned that the growth of
defined-contribution plans will yield lower retirement incomes than
defined-benefit plans, because savings rates are lower for defined-con
tribution plans and because of the likelihood that lump-sum distribu
tions will be consumed before retirement (Paine 1993). Although
defined-benefit coverage has not shrunk in Canada, some are con
cerned that pension and tax reforms, and especially the issue of the sur
plus in overfunded plans, may precipitate a similar movement toward
defined-contribution plans.
The two main explanations for shifts in coverage are changes in the
structure of employment and changes in sponsor preferences for
defined-benefit plans. Studies of pension plan type in the United States
have shown that defined-benefit plans are more common among large
firms and in unionized, goods-producing industries (Dorsey 1987).
Consistent with this, Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) estimated that
over half of drop in defined-benefit coverage between 1977 and 1985
was due to shifts in the distribution of workers away from sectors that
traditionally provide defined-benefit plans. Clark and McDermed
(1990) found, in contrast, that only 21 percent of the decline in firms
who offer defined-benefit plans is due to employment shifts. They
attributed the remainder to changes in sponsor preferences and argued
that changes in the tax and regulatory climate have been the primary
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reason for these shifts. A study by Hay/Huggins (1990) estimated that
administrative costs per worker increased 181 percent between 1981
and 1991, but only 99 percent for defined-contribution plans.
An analysis of plan choice in Canada could be instructive in evalu
ating the relative effects of public policy versus employment shifts.
Two significant differences in Canadian trends are a smaller decline in
unionization and, at least during the decade beginning in the late
1970s, a less dramatic increase in regulatory costs of defined-benefit
plans.
Portability and Benefit Preservation
The primary reason for encouraging private pensions is to raise
retirement income, but critics of private pensions point out that even
workers who are covered frequently receive low benefits due to imper
fect portability and consumption of pension assets before retirement.
Canada and the United States both have recently adopted policies to
enhance portability of benefits and to "lock in" pension assets. Stan
dards for vesting have been raised to five years in the United States,
and two years for most Canadian provinces. New legislation provides
Canadian workers with greater portability of defined-benefit assets
upon a job change, and vested benefits in Canada also are locked-in.
Although lump-sum distributions are increasingly common in the
United States, there is a 10 percent excise tax on assets not rolled over
into an IRA.
Policy towards portability and benefit preservation raises several
issues besides the ability of pensions to support retirement consump
tion. Equity concerns arise because workers who change jobs fre
quently reach retirement with smaller benefits than those who spend
their entire career with a single employer. Thus, imperfect portability
may lower retirement income of females and low-income workers rela
tive to high-wage males. The effect of pensions on economic effi
ciency also is relevant. Pensions are sometimes criticized for tying
workers to jobs, thereby restricting job changes when technology or
product demands change.
Despite shorter vesting periods, benefit losses when changing jobs
can still be significant. A Hay/Huggins study (1988) projected that 59
percent of covered workers would lose pension wealth in a job change
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and that the average loss would be 23 percent of the benefits that would
have been received if all years of service were credited to their final
pension plan. The study estimated that immediate vesting would lower
average portability losses by less than 1 percent. Most portability
losses arise because very few plans in either country index the earnings
of workers who separate from the firm before retirement. Thus, a
worker who is continuously covered by a pension, but changes jobs
frequently, receives a smaller benefit than a worker with the same years
of service credited to one plan.
Several proposals have been made to further reduce portability
losses (Turner 1993). Mandatory indexing of the earnings base, simi
lar to public pensions, has been suggested in both countries. Such a
policy would eliminate most portability losses but, of course, would
raise the cost of funding benefits. Ozanne and Lindeman (1987) esti
mated that such a policy would increase annual defined-benefit costs
between 6 and 28 percent. Alternatively, portability losses could be
reduced by requiring employers to accept service credit earned on a
previous pension. Clearly, this policy could substantially raise the cost
of hiring workers who were covered by a pension on a previous job.
Munnell (1991) pointed out that enhanced portability of assets will
not necessarily lower losses for workers who separate. If the present
value of benefits is calculated with a nominal interest rate, the assets to
be transferred do not reflect wage indexing, and the worker is no better
off than if the credits were left with the original plan. In theory, pen
sion losses from job change could be eliminated by requiring a prere
tirement distribution valued at a discount rate that assumes wage
indexing. The Ontario Pension Benefits Act provides that the present
value of the deferred pension may be transferred for an employee who
has terminated, either to another plan or an RRSP. However, it is my
understanding that the present value is calculated using a nominal
interest rate. If so, this option would have little effect on benefit losses.
In contrast to recent changes in Canadian regulations, defined-ben
efit assets generally cannot be distributed prior to the retirement age in
the United States. Sponsors may cash out job leavers with accrued
benefits of less than $3,500, however. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
required such lump sums to be calculated with the interest rate used by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The PBGC rate is less than
the market rate generally used to determine current pension liabilities,
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and thus portability losses are lower. However, when larger distribu
tions are permitted, sponsors may use a nominal interest rate.
Requiring sponsors to transfer pension assets of separated workers
valued with a real interest rate in effect transforms the defined-benefit
pension into a defined-contribution plan. A more direct policy to
enhance portability is to encourage defined-contribution plans. Some
analysts have argued that the increasing regulation of defined-benefit
plans has been purposeful to encourage defined-contribution plans.
Unfortunately, one consequence of the growth of defined-contribution
plans in the United States has been increased consumption of pension
assets before retirement.
Economic Effect of Enhanced Portability. The impact of policies
to enhance benefit portability centers on two questions. Would greater
portability increase retirement income? Second, would these policies
have adverse effects on employee productivity?
Pesando's (1984a) discussion of pension reform proposals in Can
ada pointed out that economists and employee-benefit experts widely
accept the view that higher pension costs must ultimately be borne by
workers, either in the form of lower wages or less generous pensions.
Whether retirement income rises on average depends upon whether
workers understand that benefits are imperfectly portable. If workers
are fully informed and the expected retirement benefit is consistent
with their preferences, enhanced portability would lead to lower bene
fit generosity, and retirement income would not rise. But, if workers
do not understand that job change lowers real benefits, the policy
would lead to an increase in pension benefits but lower wages or other
compensation.
Some have suggested that enhanced pension portability would cre
ate gains for workers who make frequent job changes at the expense of
long-tenured employees, but Pesando pointed out that this would occur
only if employers do not adjust the wage structure. If the reward for
long tenure is intentional, perhaps to provide incentives for longevity,
employers will respond by steepening the career wage profile. 10 If so,
the distributional effects will be minimized. No studies, however, have
attempted to estimate employer and employee responses to policies to
reduce pension benefit losses.
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The second question is based upon the premise that potential port
ability losses reduce employee turnover. Several studies in the United
States have shown that pension coverage is associated with lower quit
and layoff rates (Mitchell 1982; Ippolito 1986; Even and Macpherson
1991; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993; Alien, Clark, and McDermed
1993). Fewer studies have focused on the determinants of job change
in Canada, but a study by Osberg, Apostle, and Clairmont (1986) found
that Canadian workers were less likely to change employers when ini
tially covered under a pension plan.
The pension-quit relationship has different interpretations, how
ever. Even and Macpherson (1991) found that workers with definedcontribution pension coverage, whose benefits generally are fully por
table, also were less likely to change jobs. Gustman and Steinmeier
attributed most of the lower job change associated with pensions to
wage premiums, rather than the potential portability losses. Their
results suggest that pensions are associated with an efficiency wage
and that enhanced portability would not increase quit rates. In con
trast, Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) ascribed the significant
decline in quits and layoffs to backloaded pension benefits, indepen
dent of wages.
The question of how policies to enhance pension portability would
affect labor-market efficiency has received much less attention. For
some time, analysts have been concerned that nonportable pensions
would make workers less mobile in the face of demand and technolog
ical shocks. From this perspective, policies to make pension benefits
more portable would improve allocative efficiency in the labor market.
In contrast, most recent labor-market analysis is based upon gains from
durable employment relationships or implicit contracts. Under this
perspective deferred compensation plays an important incentive role in
encouraging firm-specific investments in workers or reducing job
shirking, and enhanced portability could reduce labor-market effi
ciency by encouraging worker quits and the loss of firm-specific job
rents.
I found very little direct evidence on the productivity effects of
nonportable pensions (Dorsey 1995). However, there is substantial
indirect evidence that pensions may raise worker productivity. Two
recent studies have shown that pension coverage is strongly related to
worker training (Dorsey and Macpherson 1997; Johnson 1996). In
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addition, a number of empirical studies based upon a wide variety of
data sets have established that pension coverage is associated with
large wage premiums. To my knowledge, there also have been no stud
ies of the effect of pensions on productivity in the Canadian workforce.
"Locking In." Proposals to "lock in" pension assets have received
closer attention in the United States with the growth of defined-contribution plans. A major difference between defined-contribution and
defined-benefit plans is that the former typically make lump-sum dis
tributions to workers who separate prior to retirement. According to
Turner (1993), consumption of these preretirement distributions results
in a greater loss in retirement income than do losses due to imperfect
portability."
Estimates based on the 1988 May Current Population Survey
showed that 8.5 million American workers reported a lump-sum distri
bution from a previous pension plan, averaging $8,300 in 1988 dollars
(Piacentini 1990). Piacentini reported that only 11 percent rolled the
entire sum over into a tax-qualified retirement plan, while 40 percent
reported consuming at least a part of the distribution.
In Canada, defined-contribution plans have been less important, so
presumably preretirement distributions have been quantitatively less
significant. However, the 1987 Ontario Pension Benefits Act allowed
separated workers to receive distributions from defined benefit plans.
To make sure that these assets were used for income support in retire
ment, the law generally requires that vested benefits be locked in (Conklin 1990). There is no corresponding requirement that distributions in
the United States be placed in another pension savings vehicle. How
ever, since 1987, assets not rolled over into another tax-qualified retire
ment plan are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
Many pension analysts are concerned that the growth in definedcontribution plans combined with the greater likelihood of spending
lump-sum distributions will lower retirement income. Samwick and
Skinner (1994), however, estimated that reductions in benefits due to
consumption of defined-contribution distributions approximately
matches portability losses from defined benefit plans. Overall, their
results suggest that, under current policy, the substitution of definedcontribution plans will have little effect on retirement income.
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Taxation of Pension Benefits
There is general agreement that the long-standing policy of prefer
ential tax treatment has been an important factor in the development of
private pensions in Canada and the United States. However, this basic
policy has been quietly diluted in the United States since 1982 as the
federal government looked for ways to raise revenue without raising
tax rates. A more explicit debate over the advisability of pension tax
preferences appears to be looming in both countries, reflecting a funda
mental tension between the goals of encouraging retirement savings,
horizontal tax equity, and limiting revenue loss.
Benefit and contribution ceilings in the United States have been
lowered on several occasions since 1982. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 lowered limits on the annual ben
efit a defined-benefit participant could receive, from $136,425 to
$90,000. The act also reduced the maximum contribution to definedcontribution plans. These limits again were lowered by the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. A limit on
compensation that could be used for benefit calculation became effec
tive in 1989 and was reduced from $235,000 to $150,000 by the Omni
bus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993. Perhaps the most
controversial policy shift occurred with OBRA 1987, which limited
pension funding to 150 percent of current pension liabilities, indepen
dent of contributions needed to fund future benefit promises. This
change prevented many plan sponsors from making contributions and,
in effect, required that future benefits be funded with after-tax dollars
(Ippolito 1991b).
Reduced pension preferences have not been driven by an explicit
reappraisal of federal retirement income policy, but instead by a con
tinuous search for additional revenue combined with the perception
that pension tax policy disproportionately benefits higher income
workers. According to estimates produced by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, the annual loss in revenue due to the exclusion of pension
contributions and earnings was $56.5 billion in FY 1993, the largest of
the so-called "tax expenditures." This figure has made pensions an
enticing target for revenue enhancement, especially when a claim can
be made that taxing pensions both raises revenue and improves hori
zontal equity. 12
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Many analysts have become concerned that retirement income pol
icy has become too focused on short-run budgetary concerns, and that
an explicit comparison of the costs and benefits of pension tax policy is
overdue (Paine 1993). Two fundamental questions would be addressed
by such a debate: Do the gains in private pension coverage and benefits
justify the revenue loss? Are the benefits of current policy distributed
too unfairly?
This explicit debate over pension tax policy is now being joined.
Munnell (1991, 1992) argued that private pension coverage is too lim
ited to justify favorable tax treatment, and she recommended taxing
pension earnings or assets. Gravelle (1993) also criticized pension tax
expenditures for disproportionately benefiting high-income individu
als.
These criticisms have been challenged, however. For example,
Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) and Salisbury (1993) argued that pri
vate pension coverage was never intended to be universal but must be
evaluating according to its contribution to "three-legged" stool. Schie
ber and Goodfellow also argued that the bulk of pension tax expendi
tures accrue to middle-income households and that the progressivity of
the entire retirement income system, including the Social Security sys
tem, should be considered.
A similar debate proceeded in Canada. During the "Great Pension
Debate," some labor groups took the position that private pensions
were fundamentally flawed due to incomplete coverage, nonportability,
and the lack of indexed benefits. They argued that augmenting public
pensions is more effective strategy for delivering retirement income.
The federal and provincial governments elected, instead, to strengthen
private pensions and individual retirement saving.
Recent changes in tax policy towards pensions in Canada have
taken a much different direction than in the United States. The 1990
tax reforms were the result of an explicit debate over the adequacy of
retirement income and the role of tax policy in encouraging private
pensions (Horner and Poddar 1992). In other words, changes in tax
policy have been less piecemeal and ad hoc than they have been in the
United States. The basic approach was to set a consistent overall limit
on contributions and benefits for each individual, regardless of whether
they were covered by a defined-benefit, money-purchase, or individual
savings plan. This integrated limit establishes a target benefit eligible
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for tax assistance, equal to an annual benefit limit of 18 percent of
earnings up to a maximum of Can$15,500. Workers who accrue bene
fits below this limit in a defined-benefit plan or money-purchase plan
may contribute the difference to a RRSP. Thus, workers who do not
participate in an occupational pension plan may contribute Can$15,500
to a RRSP.
Some Canadian pension specialists are concerned that the new tax
rules, designed to put money-purchase and RRSP plans on an equal
footing with defined-benefit plans have, in conjunction with the cost of
new regulations, created a disadvantage for defined-benefit plans (Hirst
1992). It must be kept in mind, however, that benefit limits still are
much lower in Canada than in the United States. As a result, horizontal
equity arguments for taxing pensions have less force in Canada.
Another important difference is that Canada has not adopted ad
hoc limits on funding, comparable to the 150 percent rule of OBRA
1987. This represented a fundamental change in policy, for the sole
purpose of raising revenue. The full-funding limit is difficult to justify
on equity or efficiency grounds.
The debate over taxation of pensions apparently has begun in Can
ada. The 1995 budget lowered contribution limits to reduce revenue
loss. The government has established the principle of limiting tax
assistance to earnings up to 2.5 times the average wage. A proposal to
tax investment earnings of pension funds was considered but rejected.
The Effect of Reducing Pension Tax Preferences. The question
of whether or not the benefits of expanded pension coverage justify the
revenue loss from pension tax preferences is very complex. What is
the effect of favorable tax treatment on pension coverage and benefits?
If tax preferences were eliminated and pension covered declined,
would individual retirement savings make up the difference? How
elastic is retirement saving to the after-tax rate of return? Would reve
nue gained by taxing pensions be used to lower marginal tax rates or
expand public pensions? Would taxing pensions make the income tax
code and retirement income programs more progressive?
A number of studies cited previously suggest that pension cover
age is quite sensitive to its tax price, implying that proposals to tax
pension contributions and earnings would reduce coverage. A more
direct prediction is made by Woodbury and Huang (1991). They esti-
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mated a simultaneous model of wages, health insurance, and pension
benefits, and the results allowed them to simulate policy effects of sev
eral proposals to tax fringe benefits. Woodbury and Huang estimated
that treating pension contributions and health insurance benefits as
fully taxable income would have reduced pension coverage by over 60
percent in the simulation period. This simulation suggests that a policy
of taxing only pensions, not other fringes, would have even greater
effects on pension coverage, as workers would substitute health insur
ance for pension coverage.
The case that tax incentives matter for the private pension system
is strong, but whether a decline in private pension coverage would
lower retirement saving is theoretically ambiguous. Empirical esti
mates, however, suggest that the trade-off between pension and nonpension saving is less than dollar-for-dollar (Munnell and Yohn 1990).
Ippolito (1986) estimated that at least one-quarter of pension contribu
tions represents new saving (see also VanderHei 1992). The result
hinges, in part, on whether savings has a positive interest elasticity.
Several studies have examined the effect of changes in IRA limits in
the United States on aggregate saving. Some found that a substantial
amount of contributions were simply substitutions of other forms of
savings (Gravelle 1991). However, studies by Venti and Wise (1990)
and Carroll and Summers (1987) suggested that IRAs did increase net
savings. Carroll and Summers estimated savings equations for the
United States and Canada in an attempt to explain why Canadian per
sonal savings rates increased relative to the United States beginning in
the mid 1970s. The availability of RRSPs in Canada was found to be a
statistically significant factor in the divergence of savings rates.
The impact of changes in tax policy on retirement saving depends
crucially upon how the public pension system responds. It is always
possible, as some have recommended, to expand the public retirement
system to counter any loss in private retirement savings. Private pen
sion advocates argue, in contrast, that one of its principle merits is to
reduce pressure on public pensions (Paine 1993). The OASI trust fund
in the United States is projected to face significant shortfalls as the
baby boom generation begins drawing benefits, and increasing public
pension generosity seems unlikely.
The equity effect of taxing pensions is also complicated. Given the
patterns of coverage and progressive income tax rates in both coun-
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tries, a disproportionate share of the pension tax expenditure accrues to
high-income families, 13 but the treatment of pensions is only one factor
in the progressivity of the tax code and retirement policies. Elimina
tion of pension tax preferences may lead to pressure to reduce the pro
gressivity of the tax code in other areas. Further, public pensions in
both countries increase the progressivity of the total retirement income
system. Estimates by Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) suggest that the
higher share of pension tax expenditures is more than offset by a less
than fair return on Social Security payroll taxes for high-wage workers.
The redistributive nature of public pensions may reflect the dispropor
tionate private pension benefits of high-income workers.
Evidence on Effects of the 1980s Changes. The reduction in ben
efit and contribution limits in the United States could be described as
"nibbling at the edges" of the pension tax preference. The basic policy
remains intact, so it is unlikely that tax policy changes directly reduced
coverage during the 1980s. 14 Many have argued, however, that fre
quent changes in tax rules added to the complexity of administering
defined-benefit plans and contributed to a shift towards defined-contribution and 401(k) plans. 15 As stated by Utgoff (1991), "It is often diffi
cult for nonspecialists to comprehend just how complex our pension
laws have become . . . nondiscrimination laws in particular." Frequent
changes in nondiscrimination rules appear to have been especially bur
densome for small employers, among whom the shift away from
defined-benefit pensions has been the greatest.
The full-funding limit established by OBRA 1987 also has created
concern. Ippolito (1991b) estimated that the 150 percent funding limit
establishes, in effect, an excise tax on defined-benefit assets of 3 to 10
percent per year, with a nominal interest rate of 10 percent. The con
straint is greatest for companies with a younger workforce and when
nominal interest rates are higher. Ippolito estimated that, had this limit
been applied since 1974, funding ratios, especially for growing firms,
would have been dramatically reduced. It seems clear that this provi
sion has significantly reduced pension funding. A study by the U.S
Department of the Treasury found that half of all defined-benefit plan
assets were affected by the limit.
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Mandatory Inflation Protection
The issues discussed so far have been prominent in both countries.
The debate over indexing private pension benefits, however, has
occurred almost exclusively in Canada. The erosion of benefits by
inflation was seen the principal weakness of private pensions by many
participants in the Canadian pension debate. Before inflation subsided,
there was widespread concern that, if private pensions were unable to
guarantee some form of indexation, the public pension system would
expand and eclipse private pensions. In response to this challenge, a
series of studies were undertaken and proposals issued. 16 Public debate
on indexing private pension benefits in the United States was minimal,
in contrast, even before inflation declined.
Canadian Proposals and Background Analysis. A 1978 pension
reform study for the Quebec government first proposed that "surplus"
investment earnings be used to fund increases in benefits. This "excess
earnings" approach was adopted by several other studies. The follow
ing year the Economic Council of Canada recommended that the fed
eral government assume the risk of variations in inflation by offering
price-indexed annuities to pension funds. The 1980 Report of the
Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario, however,
rejected various proposals to mandate inflation protection, arguing that
indexing would interfere with the more important goal of expanding
pension coverage. A short time later, four commissions proposed that
indexing be mandatory and favorably evaluated the excess earnings
proposal.
Not all reports supported mandatory indexing. Business groups
were critical of what they saw as an open-ended obligation. A report
by the Ontario Economic Council (1984) criticized the excess earnings
approach. Growing doubts about the excess earnings approach caused
subsequent study groups to favor a partial or capped CPI adjustment.
For example, an Ontario White Paper proposed a formula of 60 percent
of CPI.
This flurry of activity had little ultimate effect on policy.
Although the Ontario government is committed, in principle, to infla
tion protection for private pensions, inflation adjustments are not man
datory in any province.
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Much of the economic analysis of mandatory indexing proposals
in Canada was done by James Pesando (1984a). A series of papers
focused on the conditions under which pension funds could provide
inflation protection and remain viable. In his evaluation of the federal
government's proposals, he noted that a portfolio composed entirely of
Treasury bills could approximate a portfolio of index bonds, allowing
sponsors to promise index benefits without assuming inflation risk.
Pesando suggested that the general absence of such lower return port
folios, however, suggests that employees may be unwilling to pay the
market price for avoiding inflation risk.
In this and a later study (Pesando 1988), he was especially critical
of the excess earnings approach, which pegs inflation adjustments to
current bond interest rates, not yields. Under this approach, when
inflation and nominal interest rates rise, pension funds are required to
increase benefits, even though their value has declined. Although pen
sion funds could avoid inflation risk by holding only Treasury bills, the
real interest rate required by the excess earnings proposal was well
above the equilibrium rate for such a riskless portfolio.
What is the Nature of the Pension Contract? The debate over
mandatory indexing goes to the heart of a question that is fundamental
for pension policy. What are the implicit promises of defined-benefit
sponsors to employees? Is there an implicit promise of a real retire
ment benefit? While fewer than 5 percent of plan sponsors promise
automatic indexation, evidence suggests that ad hoc post-retirement
benefit increases, which sponsors are under no legal obligation to pro
vide, are widespread but incomplete. Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986)
found that 75 percent of retirees in the United States received such an
adjustment during the 1970s; however, the average increase was only
about 40 percent of price increases over the period. A later study by
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992) found that fewer plans raised ben
efits during the 1980s, but inflation adjustment was more complete.
Conklin (1990) reported that ad hoc adjustments also were common in
Canada and cited a study suggesting that the average increase offset
about one-fourth of price increases between 1977 and 1986.
Thus, the evidence is not consistent with a contract that guarantees
real pension benefits. Periodic adjustments are sufficiently common,
however, to suggest some kind of implicit agreement. Pesando
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(1984b) and Pesando and Hyatt (1992) have argued against the tradi
tional notion that the risk of pension fund performance is borne
entirely by shareholders. They suggest an implicit contract model in
which workers and, presumably, retirees share in favorable and unfa
vorable investment performance. The finding that benefits are not fully
indexed reflects the sharing by workers in a decline in the performance
of the pension fund.
Evidence for this type of contract is mixed, however. The studies
by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992, 1993) both find that larger
firms are more likely to provide ad hoc adjustments, consistent with the
contract model. However, they found no evidence that financial perfor
mance altered the likelihood that plans would provide benefit increases
during the 1980s. In addition, strong pension fund performance during
the 1980s should have made adjustments more, rather than less, likely.
Pesando and Hyatt (1992), on the other hand, presented informal evi
dence and case studies to suggest that employees are negatively
affected by adverse plan performance in Canada, where sponsors are
required to quickly amortize experience deficiencies through increased
contributions.
A closely related issue is the appropriate discount rate for valuing
pension liabilities. If the beneficiaries bear no investment risk, the
risk-free rate is appropriate, regardless of the assets held by the fund.
If the implicit contract calls for workers to share in investment risk, the
appropriate rate is instead related to the risk characteristics of the fund.
Petersen (1994) attempted to infer from the discount rate chosen by
plan sponsors the extent to which risk is born by workers. Given legal
limitations on the choice of discount rates in the United States, an anal
ysis of rates used by Canadian actuaries may be more instructive, how
ever.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992) raised the possibility that
slowing benefit increases during the 1980s may reflect increased pro
pensity to renege on the implicit contract, by terminating pension plans
and acquiring surplus assets. Ownership of surplus assets is another
aspect of the implicit pension contract, which is a matter of legal and
public policy interest in both countries. Recent legislation in the
United States has taken the view that pension surpluses belong to
workers and has imposed large penalties on sponsors who terminated
plans with surplus assets. The view that surplus assets are owned by
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plan participants is consistent with the view that workers share in the
investment risk of pension funds. Until recently, plan sponsors in Can
ada could more easily acquire surplus funds. However, the Pension
Commission of Ontario has enforced a freeze on surplus assets.
Why is There Less Concern about Indexing in the United States?
A striking difference between the pension policy debate in Canada and
the United States is has been the attention paid to mandatory indexing.
Inflation protection was perhaps the central private pension policy
issue in Canada through the mid 1990s. Indexing of private pensions
has drawn far less interest in the United States. Given the similarities
of systems and other policy concerns, what explains the difference in
emphasis on indexing?
A likely candidate is the conflict between encouraging retirement
income and minimizing federal revenue losses. This policy trade-off
exists in both countries and helps explain why indexing proposals have
not been implemented in Canada. Short-run revenue concerns appear
to have been more powerful in the United States, however. Utgoff
(1991) described how any policy to expand private pension benefits
increases the reported pension tax expenditures and, under current bud
get rules, requires a spending offset or revenue increase. During the
1980s, the budget rules were informal but no less binding. In short, the
U.S. federal budget deficit dominated any pension-related debates.
Second, the "Great Pension Debate" in Canada was largely over
the adequacy of retirement income, and benefit erosion is clearly a key
factor. The United States has experienced no similar fundamental
debate over retirement income policy probably, again, due to the
immediacy of the revenue concerns.
A reason cited by the Canadian Task Force on Inflation Protection
is that most of the attention in the United States on retiree benefits was
focused on health care insurance. More recently, of course, the health
insurance debate has dominated any policy analysis of employee bene
fit issues.
Consider also that, at the time that mandatory indexing was being
debated in Canada, cost-of-living increases for federal workers in the
United States were being reduced in order to minimize the budget defi
cit, and various proposals were circulating which would limit indexing
of social security benefits. Automatic indexing—of retirement benefits
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or the tax code—was viewed quite negatively by much of Congress, as
part of the entitlement "problem." No doubt contributing to this per
ception was the "double-indexing" of Social Security benefits during
the 1970s, which contributed to the solvency problems of the OASI
trust fund and created very unpleasant transitional problems.
Finally, comparison of the policy debate in both countries gives the
impression that there is greater consensus in Canada for an active gov
ernment role in guaranteeing retirement income. A frequently voiced
concern in Canada was that, unless private pensions could do a better
job of providing inflation protection, indexed government pensions
would be likely to expand. In the United States, expansion of the
Social Security to overcome perceived deficiencies in private pensions
seems quite unlikely. If anything, private pensions are seen as reduc
ing the pressure to increase Social Security benefits.

CONCLUSIONS
The policy stance of the governments of Canada and the United
States towards private pensions is similar. Both view private pensions
as a primary source of retirement income, along with public pensions
and individual saving. Tax and regulatory policies are fundamentally
the same in each country. There are small, but important, differences
however. One of the most important is that contribution limits are inte
grated and lower in Canada than they are in the United States. The
integrated limits establish a greater ability to save for retirement out
side of an employer-sponsored plan in Canada. The lower overall lim
its in Canada also have resulted in an absence of nondiscrimination
rules; the complexity of these rules is cited as an important factor in
declining defined-benefit coverage in the United States, especially
among small employers.
The most significant portability policy difference is that preretire
ment distributions are locked-in in Canada, whereas they only are sub
ject to a penalty tax in the United States. This is important because the
consumption of lump-sum distributions has created fears that the shift
towards defined-contribution plans threatens basic retirement income.
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Canada and the United States share most current pension policy
issues. The most basic policy issue facing both countries over the next
decade is pension coverage and, in particular, the appropriate role of
tax and regulatory policy. There is a fundamental tension in both coun
tries between the goals of encouraging private pension coverage and
benefits and minimizing revenue losses. This conflict already has pro
duced significant effects on pension outcomes in the United States. A
more explicit debate on fundamental pension tax policy appears to be
developing in Canada and the United States. In both countries, the
sides will be drawn between those who believe private pensions are
fundamentally flawed and favor the expansion of public pensions, and
advocates who view private pensions as an essential leg of the retire
ment "stool." Such an explicit debate would be welcome, especially in
the United States, where recent tax policy has been driven by short-run
revenue concerns with little regard to impacts on the retirement income
system.
The two most important trends in coverage in the United States are
a decline in overall private sector coverage, especially for young males,
and the dramatic fall in the relative share of coverage provided by
defined-benefit plans. An unresolved question is whether or not Can
ada is experiencing similar trends. There has not been an overall
decline in coverage rates in Canada; however, current data cannot
address whether there has been a similar large drop in private sector
coverage for young males, a drop that has been driving the falling cov
erage in the United States. A comparison of coverage trends for young
males would be helpful in evaluating the importance of policy changes
versus employment shifts since there have been differences in the latter
between the two countries.
A time-series for private sector, defined-benefit coverage is not
available in Canada; however, it is clear that coverage shifts have been
much greater in the United States. Again, a comparative analysis may
shed light on the causes of this trend. A theory of the decline in
defined-benefit coverage is that it reflects shifts in employment away
from large, unionized, manufacturing firms. However, Canada has had
similar shifts, with the exception that unionization rates have fallen
less. If the shift to defined-contribution plans has been primarily a
result of changes in tax and regulatory policies, the United States expe
rience may be relevant in Canada. There is concern that recent regula-
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tory changes in conjunction with expanded contribution limits for
RRSPs may cause a similar drop in defined-benefit coverage there.
Finally, my overall impression is that there is a greater consensus
for regulation of pension outcomes in Canada. Canada had earlier and
stricter vesting standards than the United States and does not allow
workers to consume vested benefits. Most recently, the seriousness of
the debate over mandatory indexing stands in contrast to the lack of
interest in regulating inflation protection in the United States.

Notes
The author wishes to thank Keith Horner for many helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

The most extensive survey of early pension coverage combined data from the
United States and Canada (Latimer 1932) It is likely that early trends were simi
lar in both countries, however According to Ezra (1983), the introduction of pen
sions in Canada resulted primarily from decisions of firms headquartered in the
United States.
Contributions to these "overfunded" plans are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
While most mandatory contributions are not deductible, interest earnings do accu
mulate tax-free.
However, each working spouse may make up to a $2,000 nondeductible contribu
tion, and the investment earnings are not subject to taxation.
Cross-section coverage rates understate the percentage of workers who earn credit
for pension benefits at some point in their career, due to the typical life cycle pat
tern of coverage. Tabulations reported by Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) tabu
lations from the March 1991 Current Population Survey showed that 61 percent of
all persons aged 45 to 59, whether working or not, were either participating or
receiving benefits from a private pension plan in the United States.
Estimates of private sector coverage rates can vary significantly in each country.
One reason is different databases. The Frenken and Maser estimate is based upon
the 1989 Labour Market Activity Survey. Other coverage rates estimates for Can
ada are derived from a biennial plan sponsor survey. The latter, however, do not
allow an estimate of private sector coverage. In the United States, several surveys
and methodologies are used to calculate coverage rates, and the estimates differ
by definition of coverage, public versus private sector, and other factors. See
Doescher (1994) for a comprehensive discussion and comparison of differences in
pension coverage statistics in the United States.
See Sayeed (1984) for a review of pension commission recommendations. Only
the Canadian Labour Congress opposed expanded private coverage, favoring
expansion of public pensions instead.
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8. The extent to which coverage has declined in the United States is a matter of some
debate. Other surveys have shown a larger drop in coverage; for example, see
Parsons (1994). In contrast, establishment surveys have indicated constant cover
age rates (Beller and Lawrence 1992). In general, comparisons of coverage and
trends are quite sensitive to the form of the survey question and population defini
tion. See Doescher (1994) for a review of pension coverage surveys in the United
States. Since different surveys yield different results, even with the United States,
international comparisons of coverage rates should be undertaken with great care.
9. Turner and Dailey (1990) estimate that Canadian private sector coverage rates
were unchanged between 1970 and 1988. Their figure of 28 percent coverage,
however, is well below the estimate of 39 percent reported by Frenken and Maser
(1992).
10. However, as noted by Ippohto (1991a), a steepened career wage is a less efficient
vehicle for delivering deferred compensation incentives than is a pension.
11. Samwick and Skinner (1994) pointed out, however, that workers may use these
distributions to purchase consumer durables or to pay down debt, which will
increase retirement resources. Workers obtain no benefit from portability losses.
12. For example, during the debate on TEFRA, Congressional staff generally referred
to the reduction in compensation limits as "loophole closers."
13. However, as pointed out by Schieber (1990), the share of tax expenditures always
is more skewed than the share of pension benefits, given that higher income fami
lies face greater marginal tax rates. A dollar of benefits provides a larger tax ben
efit to families with greater tax liability. He also estimated that more than half of
the benefits accrue to families with incomes less than $50,000 per year.
14. However, as noted above, the decline in marginal income tax rates may have had
an important effect.
15. As discussed above, the growing popularity of 401(k) plans may have been an
important factor in declining coverage. To the extent that tax and regulatory
changes encouraged the adoption of these plans, these policies have indirectly
reduced pension coverage.
16. A chronology of recommendations from no fewer than 12 study groups is pro
vided by the Ontario Economic Council (1988).
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By providing favorable tax treatment to pensions, as compared
with other assets, Canadian and U.S. tax policies encourage firms to
offer pension plans. Such tax policy is common among countries in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. All
countries with well-developed pension systems grant tax preferences to
saving through pensions (Turner and Watanabe 1995).
The tax treatment of pensions results from compromises legislators
make between competing political goals. Those goals include interper
sonal equity in tax deductions and deferrals, as well as minimization of
revenue loss from foregone taxes. While the broad goals of govern
ments concerning pension tax policy are similar across developed
countries, major differences occur within this framework.
In this regard, Canada and the United States are particularly inter
esting to compare. The two countries are similar enough to make com
parisons of differences useful: both have social security systems with
moderate benefit levels that leave room for a private pension system to
develop and both have voluntary private pension systems.
The level of family income in Canada and the United States is
roughly equivalent. While average family income is slightly higher (by
2.2 percent) in the United States, median family income is slightly
lower (by 4.4 percent), reflecting the greater income inequality in the
United States (Wolfson and Murphy 1994).'

451

452

Pesando and Turner

The elderly in the United States, however, have considerably
higher income than their counterparts in Canada—19 percent higher
for couples aged 65 to 74. The mix of income among the elderly also
differs. Social security benefits are higher in Canada—6 percent
higher for couples aged 65 to 74, accounting for 40 percent of the
income of that group—in comparison with 31 percent for U.S. couples
of that age. Income from private sources (earnings from working, pen
sions, and savings) is higher in the United States (Wolfson and Murphy
1994).2
In both countries, workers in unions, manufacturing, large firms,
and the public sector are more likely to be covered by a pension plan
than are other workers. In the United States, the percentage of the pri
vate sector workforce that is unionized has declined considerably, to
about 11 percent in the late 1990s. In Canada, the percentage is
roughly the same or perhaps slightly higher. 3 Public sector employ
ment is more important in Canada than in the United States.
Because of their proximity and similar income and culture, one
might think that the two neighbors would have similar tax policy
toward pensions. In fact, important differences exist that may have
caused differences in their private pension systems. Insights can be
gained into the tax treatment of pensions in both countries by examin
ing the differences.
The tax codes in both Canada and the United States place require
ments on pension plans to qualify for favorable tax treatment. These
include the requirement that the pension benefits of plan members
must vest within a minimum number of years. These requirements
have a strictly regulatory function, rather than being a revenue-raising
aspect of tax policy. While regulations influence or determine some
features of pension plans, we choose to ignore regulatory aspects of the
tax code. We analyze instead how marginal tax rates affect pensions as
a form of employee compensation.

OVERVIEW

Employer contributions to pension plans in Canada and the United
States are treated similarly to wages—both are tax deductible under the
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corporate income tax. Book reserve financing, where an employer
could receive a tax deduction without having made a contribution, is
not allowed.4 Investment earnings in pension funds accumulate tax
free, and pension assets and liabilities are not taxed.5
Workers are not taxed at the time their employer contributes to a
pension fund; however, all distributions from pension funds to workers
are taxable under the personal income tax. In Canada, retirees receive
a tax credit for the first Can$ 1,000 of pension income. Pension distri
butions in both countries are not subject to the social security payroll
tax. Worker contributions are treated differently in the two countries
and are discussed later. Both countries also offer workers individual
plans not tied to a particular employer: Registered Retirement Savings
Plans (RRSPs) in Canada and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
in the United States.6
The tax system affects the role of pensions in the compensation of
workers.8 We examine how the tax treatment of pensions affects four
pension policy issues: 1) pension coverage rates, 2) the generosity of
pension benefits, 3) employer versus employee contributions, and 4)
defined-benefit versus defined-contribution plans.9

PENSION COVERAGE
The pension coverage rate is the percentage of the workforce cov
ered by a pension. Although the concept is simple, the coverage rate is
measured in considerably different ways, producing a range of statis
tics.
Empirical comparisons of private sector workers in Canada and the
United States, such as the earlier comparison of the percentage of
unionized workers, are difficult because the distinction between the
private and public sector is less clear in Canada than it is in the United
States. It appears that some public sector Canadian workers who work
for institutions such as universities, hospitals, and public corporations
(such as Air Canada), rather than traditional government bureaucracies,
respond in household surveys that they are private sector workers.
Because of this, Canadian data for the entire workforce are much more
reliable than are data that attempt to distinguish between the public and
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private sectors. Because the public sector is relatively larger in Can
ada, however, and because pension coverage rates are considerably
higher in the public than the private sector, empirical comparisons
across the two countries are difficult. The coverage rate for the entire
workforce has the advantage that it indicates the percentage of the
workforce in the two countries that has an employer-provided pension
that supplements social security. It has the disadvantage that the rate is
influenced by government policy concerning the relative size of the
public sector.
Dailey and Turner (1992) attempted to comparably measure pri
vate pension coverage for Canada and the United States. They found
that, for many years, the private pension coverage rate was about 50
percent higher in the United States than in Canada. Since 1975, the
pension coverage rate for full-time private sector workers has varied
between 28 and 30 percent in Canada and between 44 and 46 percent
in the United States.
Several problems caused those figures to overstate the difference in
private sector coverage rates between Canada and the United States. In
1990, Statistics Canada determined it was impossible to accurately
determine private sector pension coverage rates because of difficulties
in determining who was in the private sector, and that previous figures
underestimated pension coverage. The U.S. figures are overstated rela
tive to those of Canada because the Canadian figures include the unem
ployed as part of the labor force, while the U.S. figures include only
wage and salary workers, not the unemployed. After adjusting for
these factors based on a somewhat subjective assessment of the magni
tude of their effects, it still appears that the private sector pension cov
erage rate was at least 5 percentage points higher in the United States
than it was in Canada.
By contrast, when examining pension coverage provided by both
private and public sector employers, the coverage rates by income for
all workers are higher in Canada for all income levels except the low
est, where the rate is slightly lower (Table 1). The coverage rates are
10 to 20 percentage points higher in the middle income categories; in
the highest income category, the difference is only 4 percentage points.
Because one goal of pension tax policy is to encourage pension
coverage, an important pension policy issue is the extent to which dif
ferences in pension coverage in Canada and the United States arise
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Table 1 Pension Coverage Rates by Income, All Workers
Canada (%)
1989

United States (%)
1993

1 - 14,999

27

28

15,000-22,499

59

48

22,500 - 29,999

72

52

30,000 - 44,999

82

62

45,000 or more

73

69

Earnings (U.S.$)

SOURCE: Canada—Franken and Maser (1992, p. 29); United States—unpublished
tabulations from the 1993 Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement.

because of differences in the tax treatment of pensions. In both Canada
and the United States, the tax system encourages employers to offer
pensions. Workers reduce their total lifetime taxes when they receive
some compensation as a pension rather than taking all compensation as
wages. In both countries, pension coverage rates increase with
income, presumably at least partially because tax rates increase with
income.
Marginal Income Tax Rates
If an individual's marginal income tax rate is the same in the prere
tirement and postretirement periods, the individual earns the pretax
rate of return on pension saving in both Canada and the United States.
This occurs because the investment earnings on pension funds are
untaxed. The incentive that the tax system provides for participating in
a pension is thus higher with higher marginal income tax rates. The
"wedge" between the pretax and the after-tax rate of return is higher in
Canada for most workers because income tax rates are higher in Can
ada and the top rates are reached at much lower levels of income.
Provincial tax rates differ in Canada but to a lesser extent than do
state income tax rates (Alpert, Shoven, and Whalley 1992). About 40
percent of Canadian employees work in the province of Ontario, and
thus Ontario is a major component of the Canadian experience. In
1996, the maximum tax rate—federal plus provincial—was 53 percent
in Ontario (Table 2). This maximum rate was reached at a taxable
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Table 2 Marginal Federal Plus Provincial or State Income Tax Rates in
Canada and the United States
Family taxable income
(U.S.$)
0 - 22,749
22,750 - 55,099
55,100-114,999
115,000-249,999

Canada (%)
(up to)
27
(up to)

53
53
53

United States (%)
19
33
36
42

250,000 and up
53
46
NOTE: Data for Canada are from the Province of Ontano; data for the United States
represents a national average. Provincial income tax rates are much higher in Canada
than are state income tax rates in the United States. The average state income tax
rates are calculated from the Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement,
April 1993 for the tax year 1992. For the income brackets in the table, they are,
respectively, 3.8%, 4.6%, 5.1%, 5.9% and 5.9%. Because of top coding of income in
the data, there is no income reported greater than $250,000. The average state income
tax rate for the preceding category is used for the top income category in this table.

income of $49,990. (Unless indicated otherwise, all amounts are
expressed in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate of U.S.$0.75 for each
Canadian dollar.)
In both Canada and the United States, marginal federal income tax
rates were reduced during the 1980s. In Canada, they were reduced
from 65 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1987. It should be noted,
however, that provincial income tax rates are much higher than state
income tax rates. For this reason, comparing only marginal federal tax
rates is misleading because the federal/provincial split of income tax is
far different than the federal/state split in the United States.
In the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top
federal rate on the highest-income households to 28 percent. The high
est rate was 33 percent, which applied for some middle income taxpay
ers. The top rate in 1980 had been 70 percent. Marginal tax rates have
since risen. The highest marginal federal income tax rate in 1994,
applied to families with income above $250,000, was 39.6 percent
(Table 2). In addition, taxpayers are liable for state income tax, which
in some states reaches as high as 11 percent. Thus, the highest mar-
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ginal income tax rate in the United States (state plus federal rates) is
currently 51 percent, but only the top few percent of families pay that
rate. Workers with family income of $50,000 would pay, on average, a
marginal tax rate (federal plus state) of about 33 percent and thus have
marginal tax rates about 20 percentage points lower than in Canada. 9
These comparisons do not include social security taxes. Social
security is largely funded through general revenues in Canada, while it
is funded by a payroll tax in the United States. When social security
taxes are included, the share of social security and personal income
taxes in GNP in 1987 was 18.0 percent in Canada and 19.5 percent in
the United States (Wilson 1992). The social security payroll tax rate in
Canada in 1993 was 5 percent, shared equally by employers and
employees. This compares to 12.4 percent shared equally by employ
ers and employees in the United States (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Social Security Administration 1994). In both cases,
it is presumed that employees bear the incidence of the payroll tax.
However, to the extent social security benefits are related to earnings,
some workers may view the true social security tax rate as being lower
than the statutory rate (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
Empirical studies in the United States have shown that higher mar
ginal income tax rates encourage the provision of pensions. In their
study of pension coverage in 1979,1988, and 1993, Reagan and Turner
(2000) found that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in mar
ginal income tax rates increases pension coverage rates by 0.4 percent
age points. 10 This finding suggests that, based solely on marginal
income tax rates, pension coverage would be roughly 5 to 7 percentage
points higher in Canada than in the United States.

Income Tax Progressivity
As well as being affected by the level of marginal income tax rates,
the tax incentive for pensions is greater with a greater progressivity of
the tax system. Workers generally have lower income in retirement
than while working. The more progressive the tax system, the more
their reduced income during retirement will lower the marginal tax rate
they pay on their pension benefits.
Because the highest marginal rate starts at a much lower income in
Canada, marginal rates are more "compressed," so that it might appear
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that higher income Canadians are less likely than Americans to face
lower marginal rates in their retirement years than while working.
In the United States, however, the tax system is also not very pro
gressive but for a different reason. The top marginal bracket begins at
a high income level, and a single marginal rate covers a wide range of
the distribution of income. Reagan and Turner (2000) found that, in
their regression sample of males aged 21 to 55, the marginal tax rate
(federal plus state) in 1979 was 32 percent, with a standard deviation of
13 percentage points. These figures had declined in 1993 to a marginal
rate of 25 percent with a standard deviation of 9 percentage points.
Thus, it appears that neither the Canadian nor the U.S. tax system is
very progressive, and differences in the progressivity of the income tax
systems cannot explain the lower pension coverage rates for private
sector workers in Canada.
Tax Subsidies for High-Income Workers

To further examine coverage rate differences between the two
countries, we focus separately on the tax treatment of high- and lowincome workers. The centerpiece of tax reform in Canada in the early
1990s was the establishment of a comprehensive limit to tax-assisted
pension saving. All workers are permitted to contribute the lesser of
18 percent of their earned income (in the previous calendar year) or a
maximum dollar amount (if lower) to an RRSP. In 1995, this dollar
amount equalled $11,625, or 18 percent of $64,550. The latter is the
level of earned income above which there is no tax-assisted pension
saving for members of defined-benefit pension plans.
For individuals with relatively high incomes, the tax assistance
provided to pension savings is considerably higher in the United
States. In the United States, from 1993 to 1996, the maximum com
pensation that could be used for calculating pension benefits that
receive preferential tax treatment was $150,000, with this figure being
raised to $160,000 in 1997."
Some benefits consultants have argued that a low ceiling on com
pensation used for calculating pension benefits reduces the incentive
for employers to provide pensions because the personal benefit to highincome employers is reduced. This argument is most likely to be valid
for the owners of successful small firms, where the owner may weigh
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the amount that he or she can accumulate in a pension versus the cost
of providing pensions to his or her employees. If this argument is
valid, it may partly explain why pension coverage appears to be lower
in the private sector in Canada.
In the United States since 1984, some higher income taxpayers
have faced an implicit tax on their pension benefits in addition to the
personal income tax. Up to 50 percent of social security benefits could
be included in taxable income for persons with adjusted gross income
plus certain nontaxable income above $25,000 for individuals and
$32,000 for married couples. Under the 1993 Omnibus Budget Recon
ciliation Act, a two-tier tax liability was established, so that the taxable
proportion of social security benefits for retirees with income in the
second-tier range was increased to 85 percent. Thus, for some workers
at the margin, increases in pension benefits are taxed at the worker's
marginal tax rate and cause the worker's social security benefits to
become taxable. Eighteen percent of families with social security ben
efits pay taxes on those benefits, but more than half of families in the
eighth, ninth, and tenth deciles are taxed (Pattison 1994). The net
result is that many higher income workers pay an implicit tax on pen
sion benefits of 20 to 40 percent due to the taxation of their social secu
rity benefits.
Housing as an Alternative Investment for High-Income Workers
Housing ownership is taxed differently in the two countries (Poterba 1992). In Canada, mortgage interest is not tax deductible, but
capital gains are not taxed. In the United States, mortgage interest is
tax deductible, but capital gains are taxed when a person sells their res
idence and does not purchase a residence of equal or greater value.
The tax liability is subject to a lifetime exclusion of $150,000. Since
Canadians must pay the before-tax rate of interest on their mortgages,
they can in effect receive the before-tax rate of return by paying down
their mortgage. Thus, housing provides an alternative vehicle for
investing at the before-tax rate of return. In the United States, homeowners in effect pay the after-tax rate of return on their mortgages
because they can deduct their mortgage interest payments. Thus, it is
relatively more favorable to finance housing with debt than equity in
the United States, making pension investments relatively more favor-
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able in the United States. This is especially true for high-income work
ers with high tax rates.
Two-thirds of Canadian elderly own their own homes and 86 per
cent of those have homes that are mortgage free (Chappell 1990). The
comparable figure for the United States is 70 percent home ownership,
57 percent of which are mortgage free (Struyk, Turner, and Ueno
1988). Thus, it appears that the different tax treatment of mortgages
causes elderly Americans to be much more likely to have one.
In sum, high-income workers in Canada face a greater tax incen
tive to invest in tax-sheltered assets than they do in the United States.
However, the amount they can shelter through pensions is lower, and
housing is relatively more favorable an equity investment in Canada.
Implicit Taxes on Low-Income Workers
In addition to explicit taxes, implicit taxes may also reduce the net
receipt of pension benefits. For Canadians with low lifetime earnings,
the income-tested component of the social security system discourages
participation in an employer-sponsored pension plan. All Canadians
aged 65 and over, independent of their work history, receive a flat-rate
Old Age Security (OAS) benefit. As of January 1, 1994, these benefits
were worth $3,472 per year. Canadians with no other source of income
also receive income-tested benefits from the Guaranteed Income Sup
plement (GIS), worth a maximum of $4,127 per year. For each dollar
of retirement income in excess of the flat rate OAS benefits, GIS bene
fits are reduced by 50 cents.
The maximum pension payable from the earnings-related compo
nent of Canada's public retirement system, the Canada Pension Plan
(CPP) was $6,250 as of January 1, 1994. The maximum Canada Pen
sion Plan benefit would be received by individuals whose lifetime
earnings (in 1994 dollars) average $25,800 per year. Thus, an individ
ual who receives the maximum CPP benefit would still qualify for par
tial GIS benefits if the individual had no other retirement income than
the flat-rate OAS benefits. So, too, would individuals not entitled to
the maximum CPP benefit.
The net result is that Canadians with low lifetime earnings face a
50 percent tax rate on private pension income during retirement, this
rate being in addition to federal and provincial income taxes. These
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public pension provisions, in effect since 1966, thus discourage lowincome workers from participating in an employer-sponsored pension
plan. 12 A similar disincentive exists in the United States because of the
income testing for eligibility for Supplemental Security Income, but
that program only affects very low income workers.
Individual Pension Plans
The Canadian government has set contribution limits for definedcontribution plans—money-purchase plans and RRSPs—equivalent to
the limits for defined-benefit plans. Also, the federal tax rules treat
employer and employee contributions the same, regardless of the type
of pension plan.
A primary objective of the Canadian tax treatment of pensions is to
provide equitable tax assistance for retirement, regardless of whether a
worker participates in a company-sponsored pension plan or in an indi
vidual account pension plan. In Canada, workers who set up a RRSP
can access the same amount of tax assistance as do workers who par
ticipate in an employer-provided plan.
Registered Retirement Savings Plans also enjoy other advantages
over IRAs. Since Canadian tax reform in 1990, failure to contribute to
a RRSP by the deadline does not cause the deduction to be lost.
Unused contribution amounts, subject to a seven-year limit, may be
carried forward and deducted later when made. No such carry-forward
provision exists for IRAs in the United States.
Participation in RRSPs has increased greatly in Canada. In 1970, 2
percent of the total population aged 18 to 70 contributed to a RRSP.
By 1988, 25 percent of all tax filers contributed to a RRSP, with an
average contribution of Can$3,545 (Venti and Wise 1995).
Since 1990, the tax treatment of RRSPs has meant there is no tax
advantage to participating in an employer-provided plan since an equal
amount could be contributed to either type of plan. This change should
cause a reduction in pension coverage rates in Canada. However, a
study of data prior to the change found no negative relationship
between the amount of employer-provided pension assets held by an
individual and their RRSP assets (Venti and Wise 1994). In 1987, for
example, 37 percent of tax filers who contributed to a pension plan also
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contributed to a RRSP, versus only 16 percent of tax filers who did not
contribute to a pension plan (Franken 1990).
In the United States, no attempt has been made to equalize the
treatment between employer-sponsored plans and individual plans.
Employers in the United States have a near monopoly in the provision
of tax-favored pension benefits. Since 1981, the maximum an individ
ual can deduct for contributions to an IRA has been frozen at $2,000. 13
Inflation has reduced the real value of the tax deduction for IRAs by
more than half since 1981.
Summary and Other Explanations
The higher marginal income tax rates in Canada would—other
things equal—cause pension coverage rates to be roughly 5 to 7 per
centage points higher in Canada than in the United States. This effect
may be offset somewhat by higher social security tax rates in the
United States. An explanation for relatively lower pension coverage
rates at lower income levels in Canada is that the income-tested provi
sions of the Canadian social security system place an implicit tax of 50
percent on the pension benefits of workers with low lifetime earnings.
Other factors besides taxes affect pension coverage. While it is
beyond the scope of this chapter to fully investigate other possible fac
tors, several are mentioned that would cause pension coverage rates to
be lower in Canada than in the United States. Social security is moder
ately more generous in Canada than it is in the United States, which
would lower pension benefit levels and probably also pension coverage
rates in Canada. The United States, through nondiscrimination rules,
requires employers that offer pensions to offer them to most of their
employees. This regulation is one way that public policy attempts to
expand coverage. Canada has no such regulation.
In Canada, pension benefits are locked in after vesting, and work
ers cannot access them until retirement. In the United States, workers
can often take a lump-sum distribution from their pension plan when
they change jobs. Some U.S. policy analysts have argued that prohibit
ing preretirement lump-sum distributions would reduce pension cover
age because it would reduce the flexibility that workers have to use
those funds for various purposes. These locking-in provisions, which
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are contained in provincial legislation, have been in effect in most
provinces since only 1987.

THE GENEROSITY OF PENSION PLANS

While pension coverage measures one dimension of the extent to
which pension plans are provided, the generosity of pension plans
measures another. One measure of pension plan generosity is the level
of pension benefits being paid to current retirees. The level of pension
benefits, however, does not directly measure the generosity of pension
benefit formulas because other factors also affect benefit levels. For
example, if a pension system is immature, workers having participated
in it for less than their full career, it will pay lower retirement benefits
than an equally generous system that is fully mature. While it is not
evident that the Canadian and U.S. pension systems differ in their
maturity, such a difference could cause average benefits to differ.
Canadian private pension plans are slightly less generous than U.S
private plans in the level of benefits they provide. Canadian pensions
in the late 1980s provided slightly less and U.S. pensions provided
slightly more than $6,000 in annual benefits (Dailey and Turner 1992).
Canada and the United States differ considerably in the maximum
amount that a worker can save through the pension system. In Canada,
the maximum percentage of earnings that a worker can save is lower
and, as indicated earlier, the maximum earnings that can be used in
determining pension benefits is much lower.
The maximum limit in Canada for contributions to a defined con
tribution plan is 18 percent of worker earnings, based on the previous
year's earnings. In Canada, the maximum benefit for a defined-benefit
plan is the lesser of $45,185 per year or 70 percent of the participant's
earnings in the three highest years.
Both the defined-contribution and defined-benefit limits are higher
in the United States. The maximum contributions to a defined-contri
bution plan in 1997 are the lesser of 25 percent of earnings or $30,000
a year. For a defined-benefit plan, the maximum benefit is the lesser of
$125,000 a year or 100 percent of the participant's average compensa
tion for his or her three highest earnings years. For high-income work-
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ers, the maximum pension benefit in Canada is about half of that in the
United States.
The lower maximum contributions and benefits, however, may be
of little economic significance if few workers are constrained by the
limits. The difference is most likely to be constraining for older work
ers and higher income workers who, because of the ceiling on social
security benefits, are more likely to wish to save a relatively large frac
tion of their income for retirement.
If the 18 percent maximum is not a binding constraint, the higher
marginal income tax rates in Canada would encourage middle income
workers to save more in pensions than they do in the United States.

EMPLOYER VERSUS EMPLOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS
In Canada, a major tenet of pension policy is equal treatment of
different options. This consideration has been considerably less
important in the United States. One aspect of the policy of equal treat
ment is that employees in Canada can make tax-deductible contribu
tions to both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. In the
United States, employee contributions to defined-benefit plans and to
most types of defined-contribution plans are not tax deductible.
In the United States, employee contributions are only tax deduct
ible if made to a type of defined-contribution plan called a salary
reduction plan. The most common type of salary reduction plan is the
401(k) plan. 14 As a result of the tax rules, few employees contribute to
pension plans other than 401(k) plans.
Even for 401(k) plans, however, employee contributions are taxed
more heavily than employer contributions. Employee contributions are
subject to the social security payroll tax, while employer contributions
are not. 15 Employee contributions are subject to the payroll tax on the
grounds that to do otherwise would erode the payroll tax base, causing
an increasingly small percentage of compensation to be subject to the
payroll tax.
The feature permitting deductible employee contributions to
401(k) plans favors those plans relative to other types of plans, and
they have grown considerably. Between 1984 and 1993, 401(k) plans
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gained 15.6 million participants, while defined-benefit plans and all
other types of defined-contribution plans lost participants (U.S.
Department of Labor 1997).
Economic theory suggests that, due to compensating differentials,
workers pay for employer contributions through reductions in wages
and other compensation. While this theory has proven difficult to test
empirically, some studies have found evidence supporting it (Mont
gomery, Shaw, and Bennedict 1992). If workers do pay for employer
pension contributions through reduced wages, the distinction between
employer and employee contributions is unimportant. Assuming labor
markets adjust imperfectly, however, or workers have imperfect knowl
edge, there may be some effects. Benefits consultants frequently argue
that workers undervalue employer pension contributions relative to
their own contributions because they are less aware of, and thus tend to
understate, the amount of employer contributions necessary to provide
the benefits they will receive.
In spite of the argument that the distinction between employer
and employee contributions is economically unimportant, provincial
pension legislation throughout Canada, as well as pension legislation
in the United States, treats employee contributions differently from
employer contributions. In Canada, a universal provision in provincial
pension regulation is that employer contributions must pay for at least
50 percent of the accrued value of defined-benefit pensions at the date
of the employee's termination, retirement, or death. Employee
"excess" contributions may (depending upon the jurisdiction) be reim
bursed, transferred, or used to increase benefits. To implement this
provision, a minimum rate of interest is imputed to employee contribu
tions, through regulation or statute.
Except for the flat benefit plans that predominate among unionized
workers in the private sector, employees as well as employers contrib
ute to most pension plans in Canada. Virtually all public sector plans
are contributory, while about one-half of plan members in the private
sector are in contributory plans.
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DEFINED-BENEFIT VERSUS
DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION PLANS
In the United States, there has been a major shift from defined-benefit plans towards defined-contribution plans. While the number of
participants in defined-benefit plans was slightly lower in 1993 than in
1984, the number of participants in defined-contribution plans grew by
11 million over that period due to the growth of 401(k) plans (U.S.
Department of Labor 1997). In Canada, there has also been a trend
towards defined-contribution plans, but that trend has been much
weaker. Between 1982 and 1995, for example, the percentage of pen
sion participants who belonged to money-purchase plans rose from 5.3
percent to 10.0 percent, while the percentage who belonged to definedbenefit plans declined from 93.7 to 88.6 percent. 16 This section exam
ines the extent to which differences in tax policy can account for the
much more pronounced trend towards defined-contribution plans in the
United States.
Tax reform in Canada, implemented in 1990, seeks to "level the
playing field" with regard to the tax assistance provided to pension sav
ing in different types of plans. The maximum amount of tax assistance
provided to members of employer-sponsored defined-benefit and
defined-contribution plans, as well as to individual RRSPs, is intended
to be equal. Further, through the introduction of new carry-forward
provisions, individuals are provided with greater flexibility in the tim
ing of RRSP contributions. These provisions were enacted because
firms who sponsor defined-benefit plans can make retroactive enrich
ments in their plans.
In Canada, the 18 percent maximum allowable contribution to a
defined-contribution plan was chosen because it is roughly equivalent
to the defined-benefit limit. The defined-benefit limit is 2 percent of
final earnings per year of service, with a maximum of 70 percent of
highest earnings (Wyatt Company 1990).
In the United States, the defined-benefit limit does not vary with
years of service, as it does in Canada. The maximum benefit that can
be received from a defined-contribution plan, in both Canada and the
United States, necessarily increases with service because the maximum
benefit is based on the accumulation of contributions and investment
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earnings over time. Because the U.S. limit does not vary with service,
short-service workers in the United States can receive higher benefits
through a defined-benefit plan than through a defined-contribution
plan. For long-service workers, the situation is the reverse.
Within its lower contribution limits, Canada allows individuals
greater flexibility in the timing of their contributions. In Canada, an
individual's unused contribution allowance in each year is carried for
ward indefinitely for use in subsequent years, subject to certain dollar
limits. Similarly, contributions not deductible in the year in which they
are paid may be deducted in subsequent years.
This flexibility for defined-contribution plans was introduced to
bring them on equal footing with the flexibility that is available to
employers for contributions to defined-benefit plans. This flexibility
occurs, however, at the cost of increased complexity of administration
of pension plans.
In the United States, contributions not deductible in the year paid
are subject to a 10 percent excise tax. Before 1987, a credit carry-for
ward was available when an employer's contributions to a profit-shar
ing plan were less than the maximum allowed (McGill and Grubbs
1989, p. 652). That carryforward is no longer available. Flexibility is
provided, however, by the higher limit on contributions, so it is not
clear which system effectively provides the greater flexibility.
As indicated earlier, in the United States, employee contributions
are only tax deductible for defined-contribution plans and then only for
contributions to 401 (k) plans. This feature of the tax code may favor
defined-contribution plans. In Canada, employee contributions are tax
deductible to defined-benefit plans.
The Tax Benefit of Overfunding Defined Benefit-Plans
In assessing the reasons why employers might prefer to sponsor
defined-benefit plans rather than defined-contribution plans, financial
economists (Tepper 1981) have drawn attention to the tax advantages
to shareholders of overfunding such plans. In the United States, the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA) reduced the desirability
of defined-benefit plans relative to defined-contribution plans by reduc
ing the amount that could be contributed to overfunded defined-benefit
plans (Ippolito 1990).
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Under the OBRA rules, employer contributions are not tax deduct
ible if the plan is overfunded by 50 percent on a termination basis.
This reduces the flexibility firms have in managing defined-benefit
plans, and it reduces the amount that can be sheltered from tax. Termi
nation liabilities are calculated as if the plan were to terminate immedi
ately. For plans with a typical age structure of workers, these liabilities
are considerably less than the liabilities calculated assuming that the
plan will continue in existence. Those liabilities for ongoing plans rec
ognize that currently accruing benefits are based on future wages, in
final average pay plans. Under the OBRA rules, many defined-benefit
plans cannot contribute sufficient amounts to a pension plan to cover
the current accrual of liabilities. This creates a tax disadvantage for
defined benefit plans because, by comparison, in defined contribution
plans firms can contribute an amount equal to the full current accrual
of liabilities.
In Canada, too, the tax authorities seek to limit the amount of overfunding in defined-benefit plans. However, the restrictions are less
onerous than those now in effect in the United States. In Canada,
employer contributions are tax deductible so long as the surplus in the
plan is no more than 10 percent of actual plan liabilities or twice the
annual value of current service contributions. However, the plan's lia
bilities are not valued on a termination basis for the purpose of this cal
culation. Indeed, if the plan has a history of cost-of-living or similar
adjustments, these may be taken into account in determining the plan's
liability if it is reasonable to assume that such adjustments will con
tinue. These adjustments would include ad hoc increases for pension
ers and increases in accrued benefits under career average earnings
plans and flat benefit plans. In Canada, a potentially more important
constraint on the extent of overfunding is the uncertainty that may exist
as to the ownership of surplus assets.
Summary
In Canada, an effort has been made to equalize the treatment of
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans. As a result, employee
contributions are tax deductible for both defined-benefit and definedcontribution plans, while they are only tax deductible to (one type of)
defined-contribution plans in the United States. Defined-benefit plans
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also receive more favorable tax treatment in Canada than in the United
States in terms of allowable maximum funding. Greater flexibility is
allowed for contributions to defined-contribution plans in Canada than
in the United States, in order to try to equalize the degree of flexibility
that employers and employees have to contribute to both types of
plans. On balance, tax policy in Canada is relatively more favorable to
defined-benefit plans than it is in the United States.

CONCLUSIONS
Major differences in the tax treatment of pensions in the United
States and Canada may help explain differences in the pension systems
in the two countries. They may account for differences in pension cov
erage and the prevalence of defined-benefit plans relative to definedcontribution plans.
In Canada, high marginal tax rates on income at upper income lev
els suggest that pension coverage should be higher among upper
income workers in Canada than it is in the United States. However, the
maximum benefit that an upper income worker can receive in Canada
is much less than in the United States.
The high effective tax rates on private pension incomes of lowincome retirees due to the earnings-testing of retirement benefits in
Canada suggest that coverage rates should be lower in Canada than
they are in the United States for low-income individuals.
Tax reform in Canada in 1990 sought to "level the playing field"
with regard to the tax assistance provided pension savings. In particu
lar, and unlike the United States, the self-employed and those not cov
ered by an employer-provided pension plan are—through the vehicle
of the Registered Retirement Savings Plan—provided with more equal
access to tax assistance.
Employee contributions to occupational pension plans in Canada
are tax deductible, unlike the case for employee contributions to
defined-benefit plans in the United States. In both countries, employee
contributions are treated differently by pension law than are employer
contributions. This fact, in turn, focuses attention on the issue of the
ultimate incidence of employer contributions. Implicit in pension law
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in Canada appears to be the assumption that the ultimate incidence of
employer contributions does not fall upon employees.
Defined-benefit plans receive more favorable tax treatment in Can
ada than they do in the United States. In Canada, the tax treatment of
defmed-benefit plans is also more favorable relative to the tax treat
ment of defined-contribution plans. The move towards defmed-benefit
plans has been much weaker in Canada.
While assessment of the magnitude of the effects of these differ
ences in tax policy is difficult, in part because the tax treatment of pen
sions differs in a number of ways, we believe that important insights
concerning the possible range of the parameters of pension tax policy
can be gained by comparing Canada and the United States.

Notes
The material in this chapter is the responsibility of the authors and does not represent
the position of the institutions with which they are associated. Patricia Reagan has
made valuable comments.
1. This study used the 1988 purchasing power parity of Can$l equals U.S.$0 80.
We use the slightly lower value of U.S.$0.72 for making comparisons.
2. The lower average Social Security benefits in the United States may arise in part
because more older Americans are working and not receiving Social Security ben
efits.
3. It is difficult to determine a precise estimate of the private sector unionization rate
in Canada because of difficulties in measuring the private sector workforce, a
topic that is discussed later.
4. Such financing is allowed in Germany and Japan by simply recording the liability
for the pension plan on the company's financial books.
5. In the United States, premium payments to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo
ration are based on the unfunded liabilities of pension plans. This is also true for
the Guarantee Fund in Ontario. We are not considering these levies as taxes.
6. For a more complete discussion of taxation of pensions in Canada, see Jobm et al.
(1991).
7. Generally, a tax policy affecting a workers' decisions distorts economic activity
from what it would have been without taxes. However, in a system with multiple
taxes, one aspect of taxation may correct distortions introduced by another aspect.
The optimality of pension tax policy in terms of creating or correcting distortions
is not discussed here (Ippolito 1990).
8. We thus do not discuss, for example, the effects of taxation of pensions on income
distribution, government revenues, or the capital market.
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9. The higher marginal personal income taxes in Canada are reflected in personal
income taxes being about 25 percent larger as a percentage of GNP in Canada
than they are in the United States (Wilson 1992)
10. The marginal effect is probably lower at higher tax rates. See also Woodbury
(1983), Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
11. An explanation for the more favorable tax treatment for pensions of high-income
workers in the United States may be that with its higher income inequality, there
are relatively more high-income workers in the United States, and they therefore
presumably have more political power.
12. This issue has important implications, as well, for public policy. In Canada, the
fact that pension coverage is far from universal is often cited by critics as proof of
the inadequacy of the private pensions system and the need, therefore, to expand
the public pension system or to mandate private pension coverage (In 1990, 49.6
percent of males and 33.1 percent of females who participated in the labor force
belonged to an occupational pension plan. [Statistics Canada 1990, Text Table D,
page 8].) However, the absence of universal coverage is perhaps best seen as a
statement about workers' revealed preferences rather than as a "failure" of the pri
vate pension system.
The introduction of a mandatory private pension plan, inclusive of part-time as
well as full-time workers, is likely to reduce the lifetime resources available to
those with low lifetime earnings. The incidence of employer contributions to a
mandatory private pension plan (if it is not retroactive) is likely to fall ultimately
on the employee. Workers, including those with low lifetime earnings, will be
required to allocate a larger fraction of their lifetime earnings to provide for their
retirement years On one hand, this will gradually reduce the likelihood of future
claims on income-tested programs such as GIS. On the other hand, by forcing
persons with low lifetime earnings to provide a larger share of their own retire
ment incomes, this proposal may redistribute income away from those with low
lifetime earnings.
In this context, two facts merit note. First, persons whose current earnings are
low are less likely to be members of occupational pension plans To the extent
that current earnings are positively correlated with lifetime earnings, this fact sug
gests that those with low lifetime earnings are less likely to be -covered by an
occupational pension plan. Second, Canadians with low current incomes gener
ally choose not to contribute to RRSPs. Given the low value to them of the tax
subsidy associated with RRSP contributions together with the likelihood that they
would be substituting their own savings for retirement for benefits available from
income-tested public programs, this decision is probably rational
13. The amount is $2,500 for a worker whose spouse does not also contribute to an
IRA.
14. These plans are named after the enabling section of the Internal Revenue Code.
15. Because both tax payments and future benefits are increased by increases in earn
ings, for some workers the payroll tax may not be a tax when viewed in a lifecycle setting (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
16. These figures do not add to 100 percent due to the presence of "composite and
other plans."
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13 Did the Decline in Marginal
Tax Rates during the 1980s
Reduce Pension Coverage?
Patricia B. Reagan
Ohio State University
John A. Turner
U.S. Department of Labor

After years of constancy or increase, private pension coverage
rates declined during the 1980s. Because private pensions are an
important source of retirement income, the decline in their coverage
raises concern over the adequacy of future retirement income. 1
Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of full-time male private sec
tor employees participating in a pension plan fell from 55 to 51 per
cent, where it remained in 1993 (Beller and Lawrence 1992; U.S.
Department of Labor 1994).
The coverage decline was particularly large for young males. Cov
erage for full-time male private sector employees aged 25 to 29
declined by nearly a quarter, from 53 percent in 1979 to 41 percent by
1993 (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
Because the decline in pension coverage rates has been particularly
great for young males, researchers have looked for determinants of
coverage that changed more for that group than for older males.
Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even and Macpherson (1994) used
this approach to argue that the decline in coverage for young males is
explained primarily by disproportionately large declines in their union
ization and contemporaneous real income.2 The fact that marginal tax
rates declined most for high-income workers while coverage declined
most for younger low-income workers led these researchers to ignore
the potentially important effect of contemporaneous declines in mar
ginal tax rates.3
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The tax code encourages both pension coverage and generosity by
exempting pension savings from the double taxation associated with
other savings vehicles (Turner 1981; Woodbury and Bettinger 1991;
Woodbury and Hamermesh 1992; Gentry and Peress 1995).4 Workers'
earnings are taxed, for example, before they contribute to savings
accounts. The returns on savings are again taxed when they are real
ized (Munnel 1982). In contrast, pension contributions made by firms
on behalf of workers are not taxed. Pension benefits are only taxed
when they are disbursed, thereby avoiding double taxation.
Preferential tax treatment causes the tax advantage of pensions to
increase with marginal income tax rates. Workers with high marginal
tax rates tend to seek jobs with pensions, suggesting that pension cov
erage was reduced by declines in marginal tax rates during the 1980s
and early 1990s. Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) found that decreases
in marginal tax rates did reduce pension coverage for a sample pooled
by gender and age. Woodbury and Huang (1991) and Feldstein (1997)
found that the large cuts in marginal income tax rates encouraged highincome workers to take less compensation as fringe benefits and more
as income.5
Because the tax expenditure for pensions is the largest tax expendi
ture for individuals in the federal budget, it is important to understand
the effects of that expenditure on pension coverage.6 The tax expendi
ture for pensions could lead to increased national savings through
increased pension coverage, but of itself reduces government revenue,
reducing savings.
We examine whether the decline in marginal tax rates during the
1980s caused a decline in pension coverage rates. We empirically test
the assertion that tax changes cannot explain the disproportionate
decline in coverage for young males because "the 1980s fall in cover
age was smallest among high-income (older) workers, for whom mar
ginal tax rates declined the most" (Bloom and Freeman 1992, p. 543).
We explore causal links between declines in tax rates and observed
declines in pension coverage using cross-sectional data over a 15-year
period, from the 1979, 1988, and 1993 Current Population Surveys. 7
Our estimates suggest that, on average, a 1 percentage point
increase in the marginal tax rate leads to a 0.4 percentage point
increase in private pension coverage. Declining tax rates explain
almost 20 percent of the total decline in coverage for young males
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between 1979 and 1988. Our model predicts that changes in exoge
nous variables lowered coverage rates 7.3 percentage points for young
males between 1979 and 1988. Declining tax rates account for 1.4 per
centage points of the total predicted decline in coverage. Declining
unionization accounts for only 0.9 percentage points of the predicted
decline, whereas declining earnings account for 5.7 percentage points
of the predicted decline.
We test the robustness of our results by reestimating the coverage
equation for a sample of female private sector workers. In contrast to
the males, who experienced declining coverage rates in the 1980s and
early 1990s, females experienced slightly rising coverage rates during
this period. Our results from the female sample corroborate our earlier
conclusions that on average a 1 percentage point increase in the mar
ginal tax rate leads roughly to a 0.4 percentage point increase in pen
sion coverage.
In the next section, we discuss the empirical specification. We then
discuss the data and variables, with special attention to the problem of
endogeneity of tax rates, and we estimate our model for males and then
for females. In the final section, we offer concluding comments.

EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION

Observed compensation packages consisting of wages and fringe
benefits result from decisions made by firms and workers, subject to
market and regulatory constraints. Woodbury (1983) and Woodbury
and Huang (1991) estimated a demand equation for pensions as a share
of total compensation. They modeled the determinants of pension pro
vision and other nonwage compensation by assuming that employers
offer a menu of compensation packages, given their costs. Utilitymaximizing workers then choose their preferred compensation pack
ages from the menu of available alternatives. As suggested by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980), the authors cited above specified a flexible
form expenditure function, from which they derive a system of demand
equations for wages and pension benefits as a share of total compensa
tion. Since share data are more readily available at the firm level, they
variously used the establishment and the two-digit industry as the unit
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of observation. Explanatory variables are firm or industry average
characteristics.
Other studies, such as Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), Bloom and
Freeman (1992), and Even and Macpherson (1994), focused on
accounting for changes over time in observed coverage rates. These
studies used household data and the individual as the unit of observa
tion. Household data sets, however, do not contain information about
the amount that the firm contributes to an individual's retirement pen
sion. The data available are discrete and measure whether an employer
offers a pension and, if so, whether the employee participates in the
plan. These authors estimated a discrete model of the probability that a
worker with given economic and demographic characteristics,
employed at a firm with given attributes, is covered by a pension. The
coverage equation is interpreted as the probability of a pension cover
age outcome and is not interpreted as a behavioral equation. The esti
mated coefficients in the coverage equation, appropriately transformed,
measure the effect of a change in an exogenous variable on the proba
bility that a worker/firm match leads to coverage for the worker.
Like Woodbury and Bettinger, Bloom and Freeman, and Even and
Macpherson, we use household data to estimate a pension coverage
equation. However, Bloom and Freeman and Even and Macpherson do
not include a tax variable and maintain the hypothesis that changing
tax rates have no effect on coverage. Woodbury and Bettinger, on the
other hand, include a tax variable, but pool by age and gender. None of
these authors have tested whether declines in tax rates contributed to
the decline in coverage for young males. They also have not tested the
hypothesis that declining tax rates put downward pressure on coverage
rates for women, during a time period where observed coverage rates
for women were rising.
To formalize the model, let Z represent a vector of worker and firm
characteristics that affect the probability of coverage.9 The equilibrium
outcome is represented by an indicator variable, P, which takes a value
of 1 if the worker is covered by a pension plan offered by the worker's
firm. Let e represent a random variable interpreted as unobserved het
erogeneity in the rates at which firms and workers are willing to substi
tute pension benefits for wages. We can write the probability that
worker / employed at firm j has pension coverage as:
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Prob(P=l) = F(Zg + <? > 0) = F(-Zg)

(1)

where F is a cumulative distribution function and g is the vector of
parameters to be estimated. We assume that e has a normal distribution
and estimate a probit model.
Rather than report the estimated probit coefficients, g, we report
the marginal effects of the continuous variables and the delta effects of
the dichotomous variables.9 The delta effect is the discrete analog of
the marginal effect. We report f-statistics for the marginal and delta
effects themselves. 10

DATA, VARIABLES, AND ENDOGENEITY
We use data from the 1979 and 1988 May Current Population Sur
veys (CPS) and the 1993 April CPS, which include a special survey of
workers concerning pension plan coverage and other employer
attributes. These data have been matched to the March CPS of the
same year, which provides income and other economic and demo
graphic data. The sample is limited to full-time employed, private,
wage and salary workers aged 21 to 55 who did not work in agriculture
or the railroad industry and had valid responses to questions relevant
for this study.
The dependent variable is worker self-reported pension plan partic
ipation, which includes participation in both defined-benefit and
defined-contribution plans. This is the best definition of pension cover
age for our purposes because it represents the worker's intention to use
a plan for retirement. Some workers who are in defined-contribution
plans, which are like savings accounts, may intend to use those plans
for preretirement consumption rather than for retirement and respond
that they are not covered by a pension plan.
Most of our explanatory variables are standard in equations esti
mating pension coverage. They include age, race, firm size, education,
marital status, years with employer, and union status (Table 1). We
also use nine industry and four occupation dichotomous variables.
In addition, we use two variables not universally included in pen
sion coverage equations—the predicted combined state and federal

480 Reagan and Turner

marginal income tax rate and predicted yearly earnings at age 55. To
avoid bias due to the endogeneity of earnings and thus marginal
income tax rates, we use the predicted value of both variables. 11
We calculate the predicted marginal income tax rate, reflecting
both state and federal income taxes, using current predicted family
income (rather than actual family income), marital status, and number
of children. These predicted tax rates are not subject to endogeneity
bias arising from idiosyncratic variations in labor supply and earnings.
To calculate marginal tax rates, we use the income tax codes for each
of the 50 states for each of the three years of analysis. Marginal tax
rate variability across states provides exogenous variation in tax rates.

Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable________________________Definition__________
Covered
Equals 1 if covered by a pension on the current job
Tax

State plus federal marginal income tax rate based on
current predicted family earnings

Age

Age in years

Pearn55

Predicted yearly earnings at age 55 in 1993 dollars,
assuming real earnings from the cross-sectional age/
earnings profile grow 1 percent annually

African American

Equals 1 if African American

Married

Equals 1 if married with spouse present

Newhire

Equals 1 if worked for current employer for no more than
one year

Union

Equals 1 if covered by a collective bargaining agreement

Mult 1000

Equals 1 if employer operates at more than one location
and employs 1,000 or more workers
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Since the family income question in the CPS is retrospective, we use
tax rates for the year prior to each CPSs. 12
The average predicted marginal income tax rate, state plus federal,
for male workers aged 21-35 in our regression sample fell from 30.8
percent in 1979 to 26.0 percent in 1988 and rose slightly to 26.1 percent
in 1993. The average for workers aged 36-55 fell from 35.3 percent in
1979 to 30.4 percent in 1988 and to 29.8 percent in 1993 (Table 2).
In addition to controlling for marginal tax rates, it is important to
control for wealth or lifetime income. The argument for including
such a measure is based on the normality of consumption during retire
ment. Individuals who have greater earnings or wealth over their life
time wish to consume more during retirement and thus have a higher
demand for pension coverage. Because income and marginal income
tax rates are positively correlated, if income is not adequately con
trolled for, a finding of a significantly positive effect of marginal
income tax rates on coverage could merely indicate that higher income
workers have a higher demand for coverage.
Some authors, particularly Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even
and Macpherson (1994), include current earnings as a variable explain
ing pension coverage. However, current earnings are endogenous and
so the coefficient estimate on this variable is biased. The direction of
the bias cannot be determined a priori. The estimated coefficient is
likely to be upward biased if unobserved heterogeneity in ability is
positively correlated with both earnings and pension coverage. How
ever, compensating differentials for pension coverage would cause the
coefficient on earnings to be downward biased since unobservables that
are positively correlated with pension coverage may be negatively cor
related with earnings.
Instead of using current earnings, we use the instrumental variables
approach suggested by Dorsey (1982) and Woodbury and Bettinger
(1991). First, for each data set we estimate an earnings equation, with
a standard human capital formulation. Included in the explanatory
variables is potential experience, measured as age minus years of edu
cation minus 6. Using current job characteristics, we predict earnings
for each individual at age 55. To do so, we assume that, in addition to
age/earnings growth due to greater work experience as indicated by
cross-sectional age earnings profiles, there is a 1 percent growth rate in
real earnings over the life cycle. 13
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Table 2 Variable Means for Male Workers
(standard deviations of continuous variables in parentheses)
Ages 21-35

Ages 36-55

Variable

1979

1988

1993

1979

1988

1993

Covered

0.569

0.481

0.453

0.694

0.674

0.657

Tax

30.8
(8.0)

26.0
(9.3)

26.1
(8.7)

35.3
(7.9)

30.4
(9.0)

29.8
(7.5)

Pearn55a

31.52
(9.75)

29.08
(10.85)

26.80
(10.86)

36.73
(11.08)

36.85
(13.46)

33.90
(13.48)

0.285

0.169

0.128

0.343

0.250

0.196

Union
MultlOOO

0.423

0.403

0.397

0.469

0.485

0.469

African American

0.055

0.058

0.056

0.054

0.050

0.057

Married

0.705

0.611

0.584

0.880

0.831

0.785

Newhire

0.188
0.206
0.074
0.193
0.094
0.095
SOURCE: 1979 and 1998 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993
March and April Current Population Surveys. 1978 tax rates are from Commerce
Clearinghouse (1979). 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques
tions relevant to this study. The sample size is 5,496 in 1979, 6,241 in 1988, and
6,157 in 1993.
a Predicted earnings at age 55, in units of 10,000 1993 dollars. The variable used in the
regressions was transformed by taking logarithms.

The predicted earnings measure is affected not only by changes in
the worker's current earnings but also by changes in the entire age/
earnings profile for workers of that gender for the given year. It is also
affected by changes in the rate of return to experience, unionization,
industry of employment, and firm size.
This measure of predicted earnings is then included as an explana
tory variable in the coverage equation. In addition to circumventing
the endogeneity problem associated with current earnings, the instru
mental variable approach measures (although imperfectly) the earnings
power of all individuals at the same age. The imprecision is greater for
young workers, for whom we project for more years.
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Predicted earnings at age 55 for young male workers fell by $2,400
(1993 dollars) between 1979 and 1988 and fell another $2,300 between
1988 and 1993. The fall during the 1980s occurred because young
males were moving to lower paid occupations and industries in greater
numbers than older males. In addition, young males experienced rela
tively large declines in unionization and in employment in large
firms. 14

COVERAGE ESTIMATES FOR MALE WORKERS
In this section, we present evidence from our data on the effect of
the decline in income tax rates on the pension coverage of males. We
examine effects separately for young and older workers for each of the
three years of data.
We tested whether we could pool our data by age group, gender, or
year, and the equality of coefficients across groups was always
rejected. This result is in itself interesting because pension antidis
crimination rules limit firms' ability to target specific groups of work
ers. Whether a firm provides a pension to a worker should depend on
the collective characteristics of the workers in the firm rather than the
individual characteristics of the worker. Sorting in the labor market
may account for the differing coefficients across age and gender
groups.
Table 2 contains variable means for the three sample years while
Tables 3 (young males) and 4 (older males) contain the estimates of the
marginal effects for the continuous variables and the delta effects for
the discrete variables.
A decline in marginal tax rates can result in reduced pension cov
erage rates through several paths. Some firms may decide to terminate
plans that have diminished value to their workers. New firms that oth
erwise would have offered a pension plan may decide not to do so.
Workers may change jobs, leaving firms offering a pension plan and
moving to firms without one. Workers in firms where pension partici
pation is optional may choose not to participate. Finally, workers
entering the job market who would have otherwise sought firms offer-
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ing a pension plan may instead seek employment with nonpension
firms.
The extent to which workers change their pension coverage status
in reaction to a change in marginal tax rates depends on the extent of
job change within the economy, which depends on the phase of the
business cycle. It also depends on the length of time workers have had
to adjust to tax rate changes and the length of time workers expect
those new tax rates to be in effect. Workers in firms offering only a
401(k) plan can adjust their pension status more quickly than other
workers because they can simply decide not to participate in the plan.
We do not attempt to distinguish by which path a change in marginal
income tax rates influences pension coverage. Because of dynamic
aspect of these factors, however, we expect the estimated tax coeffi
cients to vary over time.
The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates is positive and sig
nificant in all six of the male samples (Tables 3 and 4). 15 Thus, these
results suggest that the decline in marginal tax rates during the 1980s
reduced pension coverage for both young and older males.
The coefficient on predicted earnings at age 55 is positive and sig
nificant for all samples. 16 Given the positive correlation between mar
ginal income tax rates and employee income, the finding of significant
positive effects for predicted earnings as well as taxes is important
because it suggests that we have isolated separate income and tax
effects. 17
One way to quantify the predicted effect of changes in tax rates on
pension coverage is to multiply the estimated marginal effect of taxes
by the observed change in taxes. This approach is equivalent to taking
the difference in the predicted probabilities of coverage with mean tax
in the base year and mean tax in the comparison year, evaluated at the
means of the other variables in the base year. The difference in the pre
dicted probabilities gives the change in the estimated probability attrib
utable to the tax change for an "average" individual.
This approach has the weakness that the sum over changes in all
variables does not equal the change in coverage predicted by the
model. Even and Macpherson (1990) developed a technique without
this defect for calculating the predicted effect of changes in one vari
able. With their technique, the sum over changes in all variables is
constrained to equal the total predicted change.
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Table 3 Marginal And Delta Effects for Young (age 21-35) Male
Pension Coverage Probit, 1979,1988, and 1993
(/-statistics in parentheses)

1993

Variable

1979

1988

Tax

0 .0040
(2.34)

0.0036
(2.03)

PearnSS

0.467
(3.97)

1.071
(371 99)

1.064
(222.71)

Union

0.303
(1729)

0.156
(15.54)

0.166
(25.81)

MultlOO

0.278
(24.48)

0.180
(35.82)

0.123
(25.83)

0.055
(3.19)

-0.180
(0.64)

-0.013
(1.35)

Married

0.147
(33 48)

0010
(31.60)

0.129
(21 26)

Newhire

-0.192
(36.10)

-0.205
(18.11)

0.029
(3.16)

Intercept

-0.863

-1.744

-1.877

Log likelihood

-1492.9

-1534.3

-1524.1

3008

2931

2949

African American

N

0.0043
(2.32)

SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques
tions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for educa
tion, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were coded
as dichotomous variables.
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Table 4 Marginal and Delta Effects for Older (age 36-55) Male
Pension Coverage Profit, 1979,1988, and 1993
(^-statistics in parentheses)
Variable

1979

1988

1993

0.0066
(4.18)

0.0048
(2.86)

Tax

0.0033
(1.97)

PearaSS

0.370
(5.28)

0.627
(18.76)

0.662
(24.01)

Union

0.224
(11.74)

0.195
(9.64)

0.154
(7.81)

MultlOO

0.237
(14.67)

0.190
(13.95)

0.224
(17.14)

African American

-0.023
(0.78)

-0.033
(1.26)

0.148
(5.02)

Married

-0.021
(0.85)

0.077
(5.01)

0.035
(2.90)

Newhire

-0.150
(10.74)

-0.126
(8.80)

-0.012
(0.44)

Intercept

-0.628

-1.137

-1.312

Log likelihood

-1102.9

-1248.4

-1452.9

2516

2886

3213

N

SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques
tions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for educa
tion, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were coded
as dichotomous variables.
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The predicted change in coverage between 1979 and 1988 is calcu
lated:
N88

N19

EXP= IO(Z,88g88 )- ZO(Z/79£79 ),
1=1
1=1

(2)

where N88 is the number of observations in 1988, N19 is the number of
observations in 1979, and O is the standard normal cumulative distri
bution function. EXP is the average predicted coverage rate in 1988
minus the average predicted coverage rate in 1979. Using 1988 as the
base year, the portion of the predicted change attributable to changes in
variable Zk is
EXPk = EXP*(ZM -Zm )gkW /[(ZM -Z19 )gw ]
where Z79 and Z88 are the vectors of variable means in 1979 and
1988; and Zkl9 and Z^88 are the means of variable k in 1979 and 1988.
A similar formula applies for base year 1988 in comparison to 1993.
Calculations of the effects of the changes in selected variables are
presented in Table 5. These calculations indicate that the changes in
marginal income tax rates, in the earnings measure, and in the percent
age of the workforce covered by a union help explain the decline in
pension coverage. 18 Our results regarding the effects of declining
unionization and earnings are comparable to those found by Bloom
and Freeman (1992) and by Even and Macpherson (1994). However,
we find that between 1979 and 1988, the effect of declining taxes was
twice as large for young workers as for older workers. Between 1988
and 1993, for both young and older workers, the estimated effect is so
small as to be economically insignificant.
A calculation indicates that pension coverage rate for males aged
21 to 36 was 1 percentage point lower in 1993 than it would have been
had the marginal tax rates in 1979 been in effect. 19 Dividing the esti
mated effect due to the change in tax rates by the change in tax rates,
we find that a 1 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates on aver
age leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in pension coverage rates
for this group.
As a test of robustness, we reestimate the model for males making
three changes in the regression (Table 6). First, we pool the data. Sec-
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Table 5 Predicted Changes in Male Pension Coverage Attributed to
Changes in Observed Characteristics
_____Age 21-35_____ _____Age 36-55____
Variable_________1979-1988

1988-1993

1979-1988

1988-1993

-0.073

-0.041

-0.011

-0.026

Tax

-0.014

-0.3-e5

-0.007

-0.6-e3

Union

-0009

-0.002

-0.004

-0.002

Pearn55

-0.057

-0.038

-0.004

-0.019

Total predicted change
Change explained by

NOTE: These predicted changes are calculated using the 1988 estimates of the proba
bility of coverage. Qualitatively similar predicted changes are found using the 1979
estimates of the probability of coverage. The percentage change attributable to
changes in representation in manufacturing predicted a decline of 0.002 for young
male workers and a rise of 0.002 for old male workers. Since the predicted change in
coverage is sufficiently close to zero, we do not report the percentage of total pre
dicted change attributable to underlying variables.

ond, we test for the effect of lagged taxes. Third, we use the log of cur
rent salary rather than our permanent earnings variable. Our measure
of lagged taxes is the tax rate that would have applied in the second and
third years of our data had the tax laws applying to the first or second
years of the data prevailed. The interpretation of the lagged variable is
complicated. It can indicate the effect of a lag in adjustment to taxes.
It can also indicate for a particular time period that workers view
lagged taxes to be more representative of the long run tax regime than
they view current taxes.

COVERAGE ESTIMATES FOR FEMALE WORKERS

We test the robustness of our estimated tax effects for males by
reestimating the model using data on females from the 1979, 1988, and
1993 CPS. The additional estimates of the marginal effect of taxes on
pension coverage are an independent measure to assess the plausibility
of our estimated tax effects for males. These comparisons across gen
der are particularly useful because changes in average tax rates were
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Table 6 Estimated Marginal Tax Effects from Probit Regressions for
Females, 1979,1988, and 1993 (/-statistics in parentheses)
Sample____________1979_________1988_________1993
Young females

0.0046
0.0048
0.004
(2.28)
(2.63)
(2.09)
Older females
0.0073
0.0046
0.0040
_______________(2.30)________(2.11)________(1.90)_____
SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988
and 1993)
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, female, private, wage and salary workers
aged 21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to
questions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for
education, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were
coded as dichotomous variables.

similar for both men and women, while changes in coverage rates were
not. While coverage for men declined, women generally experienced
rising coverage rates during the 1980s.20
We estimate female pension coverage equations using the same
specification used for males. To economize on space, we summarize
results concerning tax effects (Table 6). Coverage rates for females in
our sample rose by 0.5 percentage points between 1979 and 1988 and
by 2 percentage points between 1988 and 1993. 21 The mean tax rates
in each year are virtually identical to those of men and display a similar
trend.22
Predicted earnings at age 55 for females rose over the period. The
increase in predicted earnings reflects the rising wages and narrowing
of the gender gap in wages that women have experienced from the late
1970s. In addition, the percentage of the workforce that is unionized
fell by 50 percent between 1979 and 1993. The overall percentage
decline in unionization is comparable to the percentage decline for
men, although in absolute levels men are twice as likely to be union
ized.
The percentage of women who were new hires, defined to have
less than one year of tenure with the employer, fell from 19 to 18 per
cent between 1979 and 1988 and then fell to 14 percent in 1993. Since
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eligibility for coverage usually requires some minimum level of tenure,
the 4 percent decline in new hires is potentially important in explaining
women's rising coverage rates between 1988 and 1993.
The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates is positive and sig
nificant in five of the six female samples.23 It is similar in magnitude to
the estimated coefficients in the male regressions.
Table 7 presents the total predicted change in coverage and the pre
dicted change in coverage attributable to changes over time in marginal
tax rates. As we did for men, we use the 1988 coefficients as the base
from which to extrapolate. The change in coverage for women pre
dicted by our model is much smaller than it is for men, consistent with
their smaller change in coverage.

Table 7 Predicted Changes in Female Pension Coverage Attributed to
Changes in Observed Characteristics
_____Age 21-35_____ _____Age 36-55____
______________1979-1988
Total predicted change

0.024

1988-1993

1979-1988

1988-1993

-0.035

0.013

0.030

-0.002

-0.001

-0.0-e3

0.005

-0.004

-0.001

-0.045

0.018

0.026

Change explained by
Tax
Union
PearnSS

NOTE: These predicted changes are calculated using the 1988 estimates of the proba
bility of coverage. Qualitatively similar predicted changes are found using the 1979
estimates of the probability of coverage. Although the model predicts a 2.4 percentage
point decline in coverage for young women between 1979 and 1988, almost all the
change came about by changes in the estimated coefficients in the two years and not
from changes in variable means. The decomposition described by Eq. 5 is meaning
ful only if the denominator is not close to zero. When this occurs, the predicted
change attributed to any one variable becomes implausibly large because of division
by a number close to zero. Therefore, we do not report predicted changes attributable
to individual variables for young women between 1979 and 1988.
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CONCLUSIONS
Private pension coverage rates for males declined during the
1980s, especially for young males. Previous studies of pension cover
age for young males have ignored the decline in marginal income tax
rates. Using data from the 1979, 1988, and 1993 CPS Pension Supple
ments, we find that the probability of coverage for an individual, in
both our young and older samples, increases with increases in the mar
ginal income tax rate. Declining marginal income tax rates are found
to be nearly as important as the decline in unionism in explaining
trends in coverage for young males. While our estimates vary, a rough
summary indicates that a one percentage point increase in marginal tax
rates causes a 0.4 percentage point increase in pension coverage rates.
We find comparable tax effects for women.
Our results indicate that workers and firms react to changes in mar
ginal income tax rates when making decisions concerning pension
plans. Higher pension tax expenditures associated with higher mar
ginal income tax rates "pay for" increased pension coverage.
Our results have implications for a number of issues not directly
addressed in the paper. The decline in generosity of pension plans that
many analysts believed occurred during the 1980s may have been due
in part to the fall in marginal income tax rates. To the extent that pen
sion saving is new saving, rather than replacing saving that would have
occurred in another form, the decrease in marginal tax rates may have
caused a decrease in savings. Finally, our results suggest that the
reduction in tax rates partially paid for itself because the lower tax
rates were associated with reduced tax expenditures on pensions.
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The opinions expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not
represent the position of the U.S. Department of Labor.
1. See Doescher (1994) for an extensive survey of studies on pension coverage.
2. We follow traditional usage and define coverage to indicate that a worker is a par
ticipant in an employer-provided pension plan. When discussing 401(k) plans, we
draw the distinction between being offered a plan and choosing to participate in it.
3. The primary legislative change in tax rates during the 1980s occurred with the
passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which cut the top federal
marginal income tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent and reduced marginal
income tax rates in all other brackets by 23 percentage points over three years.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top rate on wealthiest households to 38
percent, effective 1988. It provided for a transitional top rate of 38.5 percent,
effective 1987. The highest rate in 1988 was 33 percent, which applied that year
for single (unmarried head of household) [married couple] households with tax
able income between $44,315 and $100,480 ($61,650 and $156,550) [$71,900
and $192,930]. The brackets increased in subsequent years.
4. The basic tax rules concerning pensions were established in the Internal Revenue
Acts of 1922, 1926, and 1928. Employer contributions to private pension plans
are not treated as income to workers. The investment earnings on those contribu
tions accrue tax free. Benefits are taxed under the federal and state personal
income taxes when received.
5. If managers of firms decide on whether to offer pension plans based, in part, on
the desirability of pension benefits to themselves, the decline in tax rates at upper
income levels will also affect the probability that lower income workers have pen
sion coverage.
6. In 1979, 26 percent of all male workers with tax rates below 10 percent were cov
ered. Coverage rates rose to 75 percent for the 40-49 percent tax bracket. A sim
ilar profile emerges from the 1988 and 1993 data.
7. We follow the convention of referring to the data by the year of the survey that it
is from. The income data, and the income tax rate data derived from it, are for the
year preceding the survey.
8. Since the unit of observation is a match between worker i and firm j, we should
subscnpt the vector and subsequent stochastic terms by ij. However, for ease of
notation we suppress these subscripts.
9. The probit estimates are available from the authors on request.
10. The practice of reporting marginal effects of continuous regressors is standard to
the literature (see Even and Macpherson 1994). The authors, however, use the
same formula to calculate the marginal effects of discrete regressors. We instead
report delta effects for discrete variables. We also report ^-statistics based on stan
dard errors of the marginal and delta effects. These differ from the f-statistics on
the coefficient estimates of the probit equation. We believe that our approach rep
resents a technical improvement over previous work. The vanance-covariance
matrix for the marginal and delta effects is calculated by pre- and post-multiply-
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11.

12.

13.
14

15.
16.

17.

ing the variance-covariance matrix of the probit estimates by the matrix of the
derivatives of the vector of marginal and delta effects with respect to the elements
in the vector g. The code is available on request.
Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994) criticized previous studies for not
addressing the issue of the endogeneity of marginal tax rates. In principle, the
worker's expected marginal income tax rates for all future years affect the demand
for pensions. We do not pursue that approach empirically because of cohnearity.
State tax data for 1987 and 1992 are contained in reports of the Advisory Com
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (1988, 1993). Data for 1978 were sup
plied by Commerce Clearing House (1979). The marginal income tax rate is
calculated as follows. First, we take the family income data from the CPS, which
is categorical, and replace it with the mean family income in each category. Since
the data on family income is top coded, we use IRS Statistics of Income tables to
obtain average family income conditional on income exceeding the maximum
reported by the CPS. We then use information on marital status and number of
children in the family from the CPS, coupled with information about allowed
exemptions and deductions from the federal and state income tax codes to obtain a
measure of taxable income. Taxable income was calculated separately for state
and federal tax purposes. The combined federal and state tax rates take into
account the deducibility of state income taxes in computing federal income tax
rates.
We experimented with a 2 percent growth rate and found our results to be robust
to the assumption of 1 percent growth.
Unionism is another variable that previous studies have found to have an impor
tant effect on pension coverage. Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of work
ers covered by a union contract dropped 11.7 and 9.3 percentage points for young
and old workers, respectively. Between 1988 and 1993, these rates dropped an
additional 4 1 and 5.4 percentage points. Although older workers are more likely
to be covered by union contracts in all years, the magnitude of the decline in
unionization was large for both groups
We found statistically significant positive effects for all samples when we entered
marginal tax rates calculated from actual family earnings rather than predicted
family earnings.
The reported ^-statistics are for the marginal and delta effects. The marginal and
delta effects and their r-statistics are calculated by a nonlinear transformation of
the probit estimates. Because of the nonlmeanty of the transformation, it does not
preserve the r-values in the probit estimates. The transformation increases the tvalue for variables with already large f-values, explaining the very large reported
/-values for some of the earnings coefficients.
In addition, we find the standard results that pension coverage increases with
earnings, education, firm size, union status, and a marital status dichotomous vari
able (l=married). When we entered age in regressions not shown, it is insignifi
cant, age having been controlled for already in the choice of samples.
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18. For the calculations for both 1979 to 1988 and 1988 to 1993, we use 1988 as the
base year. These calculations are entirely based on statistically significant esti
mated coefficients.
19. We calculate this by multiplying the predicted tax effect on coverage rates by the
number of male full-time private sector wage and salary workers not covered by a
pension plan (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
20. Between 1988 and 1993, young women experienced a slight decline
21. As with males, the coverage rates within the sample exceed the population cover
age rates due to restrictions on valid responses to questions used in the regression
analysis.
22. This is not surprising since marginal tax rates are based on family income.
23. The predicted earnings at age 55 is positive and significant, which suggests that
the tax effect has been isolated.
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See also Income
Distribution of wealth, 362-374
by component, 368-369, 370-371
See also Wealth
Dual coverage
and demand for health insurance cov
erage among married women,
300-302
employer-provided benefits and,
273-281
health coverage of, 276-281
job search with potential for,
268-273
joint distribution of, 300
labor-supply effects present for
women and, 327-328
turnover probabilities and, 281-288
See also Married women; Spouse
Dun and Bradstreet, Small Business and
Million Dollar Directory Files,
137
Early retirement, trend toward, 404-405
Earned Income Tax Credit, 216
Earnings
inequality in, 349-352
pensions and, 9
retirement consumption and,
481^83
Earnings-based CPP benefits, 393

Earnings tests, for Social Security, 402
Eastern Bloc, fringe benefits, resource
allocation, and, 26-28
Econometric analysis, of child-care and
employment choices, 57-61
Econometric specification, 100-112
Economic Council of Canada, 438
Economic differences, impact on
distribution of child-care choice,
61-71
Economic model, of labor supply and
economic benefits, 87-124
Economics, of fringe benefits, 25-28
Economies of scale, 3
and employee benefits, 92
health benefit continuation and,
161-162
and provision of public goods
through collective or public
choice, 15-17
Education
health plan participation by, 94
leisure demand and, 117
pension plan participation by, 89
probability of working and, 113
EEEC. See Employer Expenditures for
Employee Compensation
Efficiency
and financing Social Security and
disability insurance, 214-216
of monetary pay, 14-22
Elasticities, 122-123
income, 121
price, 121
Elasticities of demand, 104
Elderly. See Older workers
Employee(s)
breakdown of participation in benefit
plans, 87-92
contributions to private pensions,
464-^65
Employee benefits
of collective choices, 16
demand for, 92
distribution of income and, 349-376
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employment security as, 20
as incentives or disincentives, 2
as income, 87
income inequality in 1980s and,
350-351
during leave, 139-144
leaves with, in U.S. firms, 141
literature on, 97-98
pensions, 363-364
Social Security, 365-366
sources of data on growth of,
253-256
worker turnover and family health
benefits, 265-292
See also Employer mandates; Fringe
benefits; Health benefits; Pension
benefits; Tax/benefit linkages
Employee Benefits (Chamber of
Commerce), 253-256
Employee Benefits Historical Data
(Chamber of Commerce), 257«4
Employee Compensation in the Private,
Nonfarm Economy (BLS),
253-256
Employee Leave Survey (United States).
See Small Business
Administration Employee Leave
Survey (United States)
Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act (ERISA, 1974),
public pension policy and, 417,
420
Employer(s)
contributions to private pensions,
464-465
reasons for providing benefits, 92-97
sponsorship of pension plans, 87-92
Employer contributions
health insurance and inequality in
distribution of compensation,
358-361
individual pension plans and, 462
to pension plans, 452-453
tax treatment of, 10
Employer Expenditures for Employee

Compensation (EEEC), inequality
of income, employee benefits,
and, 350, 354-356
Employer mandates, 5-6
for employee workplace benefits,
183-184, 188-191
group-specific mandates and,
203-212
payroll taxation and, 194-200
See also Mandates; Payroll taxes
Employer-provided benefits
child care, 37
health benefits, 273-281
pension plans, 105
vs. publicly provided benefits,
325-348
refusal in dual-earning households,
277-279
See also Employer-provided health
insurance
Employer-provided health insurance
(EPHI), married women and, 296,
297-300
Employment
child-care choices and, 54-71
competitive equilibrium and, 261
determinants of whether mothers
work, 61-64
fringe benefits and, 229-262
minimum wage and, 201
multinomial logit estimates of
child-care choice, 81-82, 83-84,
85-86
See also Child care; Unemployment
Employment contracts, 19-20
Employment Cost Indexes and Levels
(ECI), 253
Employment security, 19
Equal Employment Oppportunity
Commission (EEOC), 139
Equalizing differences, substitution and,
24
Equilibrium, substitution principle and
labor market, 22-25
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Equity, 6
of taxation for financing Social Secu
rity and disability insurance,
216-218
tax base caps and, 219-220
ERISA. See Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act
Exemption. See Taxes and taxation
Expenditures, allowable child-care,
37-38
Externalities
consumption activities and, 21-22
productivity and, 17-19
Family and Medical Leave Act, 135,
136, 142, 191
Family health benefits, 5
of dual-earning couples, 276-281
in employer-provided health insur
ance plans, 7
extent of, 265-266
worker turnover and, 265-292
Family income
in Canada and U.S.A., 451^52
child-care credits and, 37-38, 39
Family leave
benefits and guarantees in United
States, 139-144
in Canada, 132, 135-136, 145, 146
economics of, 129-178
incidence in United States, 137-139
incidence of, 155-160
policy implications for, 177-178
See also Leave; Medical leave
Feasible Generalized Least Squares
procedure, 104
Federal child-care subsidies, 36-38
Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
(United States, FMLA), 129, 160
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. See
FUTA tax
Female managers, paid and unpaid leave
and, 175, 176
Females. See Female managers;
Gender; Women

Financing
of Canada Pension Plan, 385
of public pensions, 406
of Social Security and disability
insurance through income tax,
214-218
Firm size
costs of fringe benefits and, 147
health plan participation by, 95
leave and, 140, 142-144, 160, 162
pension plan participation by, 90
FMLA. See Federal Family and Medical
Leave Act
401 (k) plans, 421, 426, 437, 466
Fringe benefits, 231
components of, 232
costs to firm, 146-147
economics of, 25-28
effects on market wages and employ
ment, 237-246
employment and, 229-236
growth of, 230
indices of nonwage labor costs as
proportion of total labor compen
sation, 233-234
legally required and voluntary,
247-249
overtime hours and, 247
wages and, 297-300
See also Employee benefits; Health
benefits
Fringe Benefit Supplement, to CPS,
299-300
Full-time employment, 326
health benefits limited to, 296,
298-300
Full-time employment of mothers
child-care choices and, 57
See also Child care; Employment;
Mothers
"Fully funded" pensions, Canadian and
U.S. uses of term, 420
FUTA tax, 188
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Gender
employer-provided benefits and,
274-275

health plan participation by, 94
labor supply and salary reduction
pension plan equations and, 116
pension plan participation by, 89
preferences for leave and, 147-148
turnover patterns and, 282-283
workweek of women and, 295-322
See also Marital status
Generalized purchasing power, 14-22
Geographic location, child-care choices
and, 71
Germany, 28
Gini coefficients
of assets, 367
inequality measure and decomposi
tion of, 351, 352-353
for nonretirement wealth, 372-373
for overall retirement wealth, 372
for personal income, 360
of private pension wealth, 373-374
GIS. See Guaranteed Income
Supplement
Government
role in health insurance, 265
See also Federal child-care subsidies;
Provinces; States
Government Annuities Act (1908,
Canada), 415^16
Government policy
on employer-provided health insur
ance and worker turnover,
289-290
equity as goal of mandates, 200
legally required benefits and,
244-246
toward private pensions, 413-444
public pension plans in U.S.A. and
Canada, 381-407, 422-442
Great Pension Debate (Canada),
417-418,423,434
benefit erosion and, 441

Group health insurance
lower price of, 328
married women's labor supply and,
311-312
Group-specific mandates, 203-212
"barriers to, 204
incidence of, 204-206
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS,
Canada), 383, 384, 460
See also Canada; Public pensions
Head Start program, 36
Health benefits, 24
continuation of, 161-175
coverage vs. eligibility among hus
bands and wives, 305-308
CPS data on, 105-106
double coverage and, 268-281
effects of provision on hours worked
and compensation, 327-330
as employee benefit, 92
employer-provided vs. publicly pro
vided, 325-348
employer tax savings from, 266
family benefits and worker turnover,
265-292
findings from medical expenditure
surveys, 357-362
full- and part-time employment and,
326
income effect of, 311-312
inequality of distribution, 361
inequality of employer contributions
to, 349-376
married women's demand for cover
age, 300-308
married women's labor decisions
and, 7-8
NMCES and NMES surveys on,
357-362
part-time work, insurance coverage,
and wages of married women,
295-322
private, 6
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Health benefits (cont.)
public responsibility for, 21-22
reduction through taxation of health
benefits, 290
state mandates for, 191
tax subsidy of, 266, 289
total compensation correlation with,
355
trade-off with wages for working
wives, 319-321
turnover and, 6-7
U.S. vs. Canadian eligibility for,
325-347
See also specific types
Health Care Financing Administration,
332
Health care systems, 1-2, 279-281, 282,
283, 289-290
Health insurance market, labor-market
behavior and, 326
Health Insurance Plan Survey (HIPS),
357
Health plans, employer sponsorship and
employee participation in, by type
of plan, 93-96
High-income workers, pension
subsidies, coverage, and, 458^60
HIPS. See Health Insurance Plan Survey
Hiring, pension plans as incentive, 97
Hispanics, child-care choices and, 71
Homogeneity property, 101-102
Hours worked
compensation and, 331-336
effects of health benefits provision
on, 327-330
Hours worked by married women,
295-322
OLS estimates of, 310
quantile regression and multinomial
logit estimates of, 313-319
Household data
on employer contributions for fringe
benefits, 350
on health insurance or pension cover
age, 350

Household demands
women's labor-market activities and,
295
See also Married women
Housing, as pension alternative for
high-income workers, 459-460
Housing wealth, as nonretirement
wealth, 366
Husband
income and child-care choices, 57
See also Child care; Dual coverage;
Married women; Spouse; Wives;
Working wives
Incentive effects, of public pensions,
400-404
Incentives, benefits as, 2
Income
benefits as, 87
Canadian child care choices and, 47
child-care credits and, 37-38, 39
employee benefits and inequality of,
349-352
multinomial logit estimates of
child-care choice, 80
OLS regression of log of hourly wage
for mothers, 79
payroll taxes and, 218-220
pensions in Canada, 387-390, 391
See also Income tax; Payroll taxes
Income distribution, employee benefits
and, 8-9, 349-376
Income effect, of health benefits,
311-312
Income elasticities of demand, 104, 121,
123
Income inequality
benefits and, in 1980s, 350-351,
358-361
and decomposition of Gini coeffi
cient, 352-354
Income replacement, of public pension
programs in Canada, 391-394
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Income tax, 16
caps on, 218-220
financing Social Security and disabil
ity insurance through, 214-218
Income tax credit, 41
Income tax progressivity, pension
coverage and, 457^58
Income Tax War Act (1919, Canada),
416
Income-tested subsidy, for child care,
38-41
Indexing
of pension benefits, 438—442
of wages, 365
Individually purchased insurance,
labor-market behavior and, 326
Individual pension plans
in Canada, 461-462
in United States, 462
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
364, 413, 420-421
taxation and, 436, 453
Industry
health plan participation by, 95-96
pension plan participation by, 90-91
Inequality. See Earnings; Income
inequality; Wealth
Inflation, pension benefits and, 414,
438^42
In-kind income, 13,16
Inputs
productivity-enhancing, 3
transactions costs on, 18
Insurance. See Health benefits
Insurance rationale, 3
Intergenerational transfers
in Canada, 394-396
in United States, 399^00
Internal Revenue Code, pension
deductions and, 419^20
Intertemporal consistency, 3, 21-22
Involuntary job transitions. See Job
transitions
IRAs. See Individual Retirement
Accounts

Job guarantees, 5
in Canada, 134-135
for family and medical leave, 129
health benefit continuation and, 176
in United States, 135, 139-144
See also Leave
Job lock, 267-268

health coverage and, 288
labor-supply behavior and, 327-328
Job search
dual coverage of health benefits and,
268-273
health care coverage and, 279-281
Job transitions
health care coverage and, 282
spouse-provided health coverage and,
288
Joint Committee on Taxation, 433
Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act (1996), 328
Keogh plans, 364
Kindergarten. See Center child care
Labor. See Work effort; specific "Labor"
entries
Labor contracts, pension plans and, 267
Labor demand
employee benefits and, 6
payroll taxes and, 404
Labor force
Canadian National Child Care Sur
vey of 1988 and, 46-47
Social Security benefits and,
402^03
Labor-force decisions, of women, 3-4
Labor market
health insurance market and, 326
leisure demand and, 117-122
Labor market effects
of payroll taxation, 194-195
of pension tax policy, 451^70
Labor market equilibrium, substitution
principle and, 22-25
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Labor supply
decisions of working wives, 308-312
economic model of employee bene
fits and, 87-124
effects of employer health insurance
provision on, 327-330
elasticity of income tax base and, 215
health insurance impact on labor-sup
ply decisions, 330-336, 346-347
mandates vs. payroll taxes and,
212-213
of married women, 295-322
and worker availability, 2
Labor unions. See Unions
Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS,
Canada), 47
Leave
modeling incidence of and conditions
surrounding, 146-177
policies in United States, 137-144
private sector policies in Canada,
145-146
See also Family leave; Firm size;
Medical leave
Legal framework, of family and medical
leave in Canada and U.S.A.,
130-136
Legislation
leave conditions mandated in, 160
retirement savings and, 415-416
See also specific acts
Leisure demand, 106, 116, 117-120
elasticities and, 122-123
price of, 109
Life insurance, as nonretirement wealth,
366
Liquid assets, as nonretirement wealth,
366
Locking in, of pension assets, 432,
462^63
Logit estimates. See Bivariate logit
estimates
Low-income workers, implicit taxes on
pensions of, 460-461
Lump-sum distributions, 442

Males
health benefits in dual-earning house
holds, 276-281
maternity mandates and, 207
private pension coverage rates for,
424, 425
turnover and health coverage of,
284-285
See also Gender
Managers
leave for, 162
leave for sick children and ailing par
ents, 142-144
paid and unpaid medical leave for,
169-171, 175, 176
See also Women
Mandated benefits, for low-wage
mothers, 327
Mandates
composition of labor supply and,
212-213
employer, 5-6, 183-184, 188-191,
194-200
vs. employer-provided health bene
fits, 289
government policy goals toward, 200
group-specific, 203-212
maternity coverage and, 205-212
in monopsony model, 201-203
Mandatory indexing. See Indexing
Mandatory pension insurance, 417
Mandatory retirement, 403, 406
Manufacturing, leave and, 153
Manufacturing industries, nonwage
labor costs and, 235
Marginal tax rates, 107
intangibles and, 16
pension coverage and, 10, 455-457,
462, 475^91
Marital status
health plan participation by, 93
leisure demand and, 116-117
pension plan participation by, 88
Market labor demand function,
derivation of, 258-260

513
Market wages, fringe benefits and,
237-246
Married women, 131

demand for health insurance cover
age among, 300-308
with employer-provided vs. publicly
provided health benefits, 325-348
estimates of trade-off between wages
and health benefits, 319-321
husband's health insurance coverage
and, 8, 295-322
increase in coverage of, 301
labor supply decisions of working
wives, 7, 308-312
quantile regression and multinomial
logit estimates of hours worked,
313-319
See also Working wives
Maternity leave
in Canada, 135, 146
determinants of, 160
mandated, 191
See also Paid leave
Maternity mandates
individual or workplace-specific
shifting and, 205-212
See also Mandates
Maximum likelihood, 104
Means-tested pension, Old Age Security
(OAS) in Canada as, 384
Medicaid, 265
employer benefits and, 327
information from, 332
Medical insurance. See Health benefits
Medical leave
benefits and guarantees surrounding,
5,160-176
in Canada, 135-136, 145
Canadian job guarantees and,
134-135
economics of, 129-178
firm size and, 162
incidence of, 137-139, 148-155
policy implications for, 177-178

in United States, 135, 139-144
See also Family leave; Leave
Medicare, 186, 265, 397
substitution principle and, 23
Men
income tax rate decline and private
pension coverage of male
workers, 483^88
pension coverage decline for, 475
See Gender; Males
Military compensation, 25-26
Minimum health care benefits, in
Canada, 325-326
Minimum wage, 201-203
Mining, leave and, 153
Minorities
health insurance coverage for, 302
See also Race/ethnicity
Models of employee benefits and labor
supply
AIDS model, 116-122
bivariate probit model, 112-116
data for, 105-112
econometric specification of,
100-104
elasticities, 122-123
misspecifications of, 97-98
results of studies, 112-123
theoretical model of, 98-100
Models of leave
incidence of leave and conditions
surrounding leave, 146-177
theoretical considerations in,
146-148
Monetary pay
economies of scale and, 15-17
efficiency of, 14-22
externalities, productivity, and,
17-19
intertemporal consistency and, 21-22
worker-firm commitment and, 19-20
Monopsony model, 201-203

514
Mothers
benefits for low-wage, 327
determinants of decision to work,
61-64
econometric analysis of child care
and, 57-61
See also Child care; Dual coverage;
Married women; Women
Multinomial logit estimates
of child-care choices, 54-57, 75-86
of hours worked by married women,
313-319,322
of wives' choices about work, 331
on wives whose husbands worked
with and without insurance,
337-346
National Child Care Survey of 1988
(CNCCS, Canada), 46, 51
National Child Care Survey of 1990
(USNCCS, United States), 46, 51
National Health Insurance, 183-184
employer mandates and, 196-197
National Income and Product Accounts
(1977-1987), 360
National Medical Care Expenditure
Survey (NMCES), 351
health insurance findings of, 357-362
National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES), 8,267, 332,351
health insurance findings of, 357-362
NMCES. See National Medical Care
Expenditure Survey
NMES. See National Medical
Expenditure Survey
Nonmanagers
leave for, 162
leave for sick children and ailing par
ents, 142-144
paid and unpaid medical leave for,
166-168, 172-174, 175
Nonmanufacturing industries, nonwage
labor costs and, 236
Nonprice rationing allocation problems,
27

Nonrefundable subsides for child care.
See Subsidies for child care
Non-relative child care, 52, 71
Nonretirement wealth, 366-374
Nonwage payments, 230, 235
increases in, 247-249
trends in, 254
wages, unemployment, and, 246
See also Fringe benefits
North American Free Trade Agreement,
130
OASDI. See Social Security
OBRA. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act
Occupation
health plan participation by, 95
pension plan participation and, 89-90
Old Age Pension Act (1927, Canada),
417
Old Age Security (OAS, Canada),
382-384, 386, 460
Older workers
in firms with pensions plans, 87-92
income of, 452
OLS equivalent coefficient. See
Bivariate logit estimates
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA, 1993), 433, 467^68
Ontario Economic Council, 438
Ontario Pension Benefits Act (1987),
417^18,421
Organization for Economic Cooperation
Development, 229
Overfunding, of defined-benefit plans,
467^68
Overtime hours, fringe benefits and, 247
Ownership type, leave and, 159
Own-price elasticity of demand, 104
Paid leave, 135
job guarantees and, 176
in United States, 137-144
variables affecting, 162-175
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See also Family leave; Leave; Medi
cal leave
Parent child care, 35
demographics, prices, wages, subsi
dies, and, 70-71
for preschool children, 51
Parents
leave for parents in Canada, 135
leave to care for ailing, 142,
143-144, 160
Part-time employment
child care choices and, 57
health benefits and, 326
by married women, 295-322
See also Child care; Employment;
Health benefits; Mothers
Paternity leave. See Paid leave
Pay. See Compensation
Payments in kind, 15
Pay Research Bureau (Canada), 145
Payroll taxes, 5-6, 183-184
and Canada Pension Plan, 385
composition of labor supply and,
212-213
Disability Insurance financing by,
185-186
empirical evidence about, 198-200
and employer mandates, 194-200
group-specific mandates and,
203-212
history of, 187
incidence of, 197-198
and labor demand, 404
mandates and, 196
Medicare financing by, 186
in monopsony model, 201-203
public pensions and, 406
raising taxable maximum for,
218-220
rate of, 216-217
reform of, 214-220
Social Security financing by, 185
See also Income
PDA. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act

Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation,
414, 429^30
Pension benefits
coverage in Canada and U.S.A.,
419-421,453-463
deferred compensation and, 267
employer adoption of, 416
employer contributions as wealth,
375
employer vs. employee contributions
and, 464-465
equity effect of taxing, 436-437
generosity of plans, 463-464
household data and, 478
individual pension plans, 461-462
inflation protection and, 438^442
"locking-in" of, 432
maximum payable, 460—461
preservation of, 428^32
price of contributions, 107
public plans in U.S.A. and Canada,
381-407
public policies toward, 418-422
public vs. private, 2
regulation of, 413-414
as share of total compensation,
477-478
sponsorship and participation in,
87-92
structure of coverage and, 421-428
taxation of, 433-437
total compensation correlation with,
355
turnover, hiring, training, and, 97
wealth and, 363-364
See also Health benefits; Leisure
demand; Private sector pension
benefits
Pension Benefits Act, 417
Pension crisis, in Canada, 395-396
Pension income
as component of retirement income,
397-398
components of (Canada), 391
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Pension law, in Canada, 417-418
Pension plan contributions
marital status and, 117
share of, 106-107
Pension policy
evolution of, 415-418
nature of pension contract and,
439-441
public policy toward private pen
sions, 413-444
retirement savings and, 415
Personal income. See Income; Income
inequality
Policy. See Government policy
Portability of pensions, 422, 428^32
economic effect of enhanced,
430^32
Postretirement earnings, 402
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (1978),
138-139, 191
Premiums
worker work schedule and, 328-330
See also Costs
Preretirement distributions, in Canada
vs. U.S.A , 442^43
Preschool children, parent care for, 51
President's Commission on Pension
Policy (1981), 418, 423
Price elasticities, 121
Price index, 109
Prices of child care, 34-35, 52, 53
child-care choices and, 54-71
employment probabilities for moth
ers and, 63-64
Primary child-care choices, 47-51
distribution by child's age, 48, 49
distribution by mother's employment
status, 50
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), 365,
396
Private employment, military-like
features of, 26
Private health insurance, 6
See also Health benefits

Private insurance markets,
group-specific mandates and, 203
Private pensions, 2, 9, 423-428
in Canada, 386-387
changes in coverage, 427-428,
475^91
decline in, 10, 425-427, 443
employer vs. employee contributions,
464-465
generosity of, 463-464
marginal tax rate increase and pen
sion coverage increase, 476-477
public policy issues in Canada and
U.S.A., 413-444
substitution principle and, 23
tax incentives for, 436
See also Pension benefits
Private sector pension benefits
coverage of workers in Canada and
U.S.A., 453^63
coverage of workers under employer
pension plan, 423
leave policies in Canada, 145-146
Probability of working, 112-116
Productivity
externalities and, 17-19
pension portability and, 431-432
Progressive pension systems, 405-406
Progressivity of income and payroll
taxes, 16, 216-218
Provinces, child-care grants and
subsidies in, 37, 38^42
Public benefits
vs. employer-provided benefits,
325-348
substitution principle and, 23
Public pensions, 2, 9
in Canada, 382-396, 404-407
incentive effects of, 400^404
redistnbutive nature of, 437
replacement of preretirement earn
ings by, 398-399
in United States, 396^00, 404-407
Public policy. See Government policy;
Pension policy
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Public sector, pension benefits of
workers in, 452
Purchasing power, generalized, and
efficiency of monetary pay, 14-22
Quantile regression estimates, of hours
worked by married women,
313-319,322
Queues, 27
Race/ethnicity
child-care choices and, 64, 71
health plan participation by, 93-94
leisure demand and, 117
pension plan participation by, 88-89
See also Minorities
Real after-tax total compensation, 109
Redistribution, public pensions and, 437
Reduced form demand model, paid leave
and, 178
Reform
of payroll taxation, 214-220
of taxation, 466
Registered Pension Plans (RPPs,
Canada), 386
See also Canada; Public pensions
Registered Retirement Savings Plans
(RRSPs, Canada), 386-387, 413,
418,421,435
taxes and, 453
See also Public pensions
Regulation, of private pensions, 417
Regulation of child care
price of care and, 52, 56
provincial and state regulations, 42
stringency in Canada, 42
Regulations
of pensions, 413-414
on state insurance, 332
Relative care of children, 52, 70, 71
Research
on public pensions, 407
Retail trade, leave and, 153

Retirement
legislation about, 415^16
mandatory, 403
Social Security encouragement of,
402
trend toward early, 404-405
See also Pension benefits; Pension
policy
Retirement age, in United States, 400
Retirement benefits, 24
in Canada, 385
Social Security as, 396-397
and wealth distribution, 362-374
See also Pension benefits
Retirement income, 2, 9
pension income as component of,
387-390, 391
Revenue. See Taxes and taxation;
specific forms of taxation
Revenue Canada, 413
pension deductions and, 420
RPPs. See Registered Pension Plans
RRSPs. See Registered Retirement
Savings Plans
Rural areas, leave policies in, 154, 159
Salaries
data on, 357-358
See also Compensation; Wages
Salary reduction plans, 105
Sales volume, provision of paid and
unpaid leave and, 152
Savings, pension exemptions and, 476
SCF. See Survey of Consumer Finances
Selectivity bias, 104
leisure demand and, 122
Self-employed, health insurance
coverage of, 275-276
Seniority, sick leave and, 140-142
Service sector, leaves in, 162
Shifting of wages, to group-specific
wages, 206-212
Sick leave. See Medical leave, Paid
leave
Sickness and accident insurance, 135
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Sickness insurance. See Paid leave
Small Business Administration
Employee Leave Survey (United
States), 136, 137, 146
on benefits and guarantees during
leave, 139-144
on incidence of leave, 137-139
Small Business Data Base (SBDB),
136-137
Small firms, sick leave and, 140
Social insurance programs,
employer-financed, 183-184
Socialism, fringe benefits, resource
allocation, and, 26-28
Social Security, 5, 185
distribution of, 372
evaluating level of, 221
financing through income tax,
214-218
payroll taxation and, 197
retirement age and, 400
wealth from, 365-366
Social Security (OASDI), in United
States, 396-397
Social security benefits, in Canada vs.
U.S.A., 452
Social Services Block Grants. See Title
XX Social Services Block Grants
Sole proprietorships, medical leave and,
162
Soviet Union (former), fringe benefits,
resource allocation, and, 26-28
Spouse
benefits for, 7-8
earnings of, and child-care choices,
64,71
job mobility and health coverage by,
270-272
married women health insurance cov
erage and, 295-322
self-employment of, 275-276
turnover and health insurance of,
281-288
See also Family health benefits; Mar
ried women

States
child-care subsidies in, 38-42
child-care tax credits, 41
insurance regulation information
from, 332
leave in, 154, 159
leave legislation in, 160
maternity mandates and, 206-212
unemployment insurance in,
186-188
Static model of labor supply, 97
Stocks, as nonretirement wealth,
366-367
Subsidies, for pension coverage of
high-income workers, 458-459
Subsidies for child care, 34, 55
child-care choices and, 54-71
for combinations of work and child
care, 58-59, 60
eligibility for, 57
employment probabilities for moth
ers and, 63-64
federal, 36-38
provincial and state, 38-42
Substitution principle, 22-25
Supplement (1993), to Current
Population Survey (CPS),
265-266,273-281,282
Supply-side factors, in providing leave,
146-147
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),
351
distribution of retirement and nonre
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